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Social Control

A Survey of the Foundations of Order

BY

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF NEBRASKA

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To my Master

LESTER F. WARD

PIONEER AND PATHFINDER IN THE STUDY OF SOCIETY

THIS WORK

IS GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

PREFACE

THE foundation of this book was laid in a series of articles under the title "Social Control," contributed to the *American Journal of Sociology* between March, 1896, and May, 1898. After protracted researches abroad, the series was taken up again, and seven supplementary articles have since appeared. To the ever generous appreciation and encouragement of the editor, Dr. Albion W. Small, is due not only the publication of the articles, but also in large measure the stimulus to round and complete the studies into their present form.

All these studies fall within one narrow tract in the province of Sociology. Social Psychology, which term I apply to the branch of knowledge that deals with the psychic interplay between man and his environing society, falls into two subdivisions. One of these, Social Ascendancy, deals with the domination of society over the individual; the other, Individual Ascendancy,—embracing such topics as invention, leadership, the rôle of great men,—deals with the domination of the individual over society. Social Ascendancy is fur-

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ther divided into Social Influence,—mob mind, fashion, convention, custom, public opinion, and the like,—and Social Control. The former is occupied with the social domination which is without intention or purpose; the latter is concerned with that domination which is intended and which fulfils a function in the life of society. This work, therefore, deals with only one subdivision in the field of Social Psychology.

In this book I seek to determine how far the order we see all about us is due to influences that reach men and women from without, that is, *social* influences. I began the work six years ago with the idea that nearly all the goodness and conscientiousness by which a social group is enabled to hold together can be traced to such influences. It seemed to me then that the individual contributed very little to social order, while society contributed almost everything. Further investigation, however, appears to show that the personality freely unfolding under conditions of healthy fellowship may arrive at a goodness all its own, and that order is explained partly by this streak in human nature and partly by the influence of social surroundings. As I now conceive it my task is, therefore, first, to separate the individual's contribution to social order from that of society, and, second, to bring to light everything that is contained in this social contribution.

In taking up this task I have had no other thought than to see things as they are and to

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report what I see. I am not wedded to my hypotheses nor enamoured of my conclusions, and the next comer who, in the true scientific spirit, faces the problems I have faced and gives better answers than I have been able to give, will please me no less than he pleases himself.

EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS.

LINCOLN, NEBRASKA.

March, 1901.

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SOCIAL CONTROL

SOCIAL CONTROL

PART I

THE GROUNDS OF CONTROL

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

A CONDITION of order at the junction of crowded city thoroughfares implies primarily an absence of collisions between men or vehicles that interfere one with another. Order cannot be said to prevail among people going in the same direction at the same pace, because there is no interference. It does not exist when persons are constantly colliding one with another. But when all who meet or overtake one another in crowded ways take the time and pains needed to avoid collision, the throng is *orderly*. Now, at the bottom of the notion of social order lies the same idea. The members of an orderly community do not go out of their way to aggress upon one another. Moreover, whenever their pursuits interfere they make the adjustment necessary to escape collision, and make it according to some conventional rule. If the weaker of two hunters that have brought down the same stag avoids a fight by yielding up the game, there is peace, but no order. But if the dispute is settled according to the rule that "first struck" decides

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the ownership of game, the solution is an orderly one. Similarly, there is order when teamsters shun collision by conforming to "the law of the road," or miners settle the ownership of claims according to priority of "pegging out."

The denser the traffic that is handled without confusion at a busy corner, the higher is the grade of order. Likewise, the more that the smooth running of social machinery implies the frequent breaking off or turning aside of individual activities, the more perfect is the social order. *Successful coöperation*, therefore, bespeaks a high grade of social order, inasmuch as each of the coöperators must unfold specific activities within precise limits, and the results therefrom are enjoyed or shared according to some recognized principle. *Hierarchical organization* is still more a test of orderliness, inasmuch as in the sharing of unlike burdens and the division of unequal benefits men are more apt to fall afoul of one another.

The severest test of the régime of order occurs when, as in war or government, individuals are incited to a common effort, the benefits of which are shared in common. The sacrificing of one corps of an army to save the rest, or the placing of the public burdens upon the non-governing classes, is recognized as putting the severest strain on discipline. In general, the absence of hostile encounter is a mark of social order, since it implies that interferences are adjusted according to some rule. But extreme division of social labor and high organization is the surest sign of order, since it requires the nice adjustment of multifarious activities according to some prearranged plan.

The readiness of men to disturb the peace or to violate rules in the pursuit of their personal interests depends upon their mental make-up. The

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peaceable turn aside from collision, while the pugnacious welcome it. The easily contented readily accommodate their desires and actions to the customary restrictions, but the enterprising are always pressing against and trampling upon barriers. The passive strive only to satisfy old wants, and are therefore much stronger in resistance than in offence. The aggressive are insatiate and put forth as much energy to seize what they have not, as to keep what they have. In a passive race, once order is established, the individual keeps to his prescribed orbit from sheer inertia. In an aggressive race order is perpetually endangered by the unruliness of the individual, and can be maintained only through the unremitting operation of certain social forces.

Now, it is the purpose of this inquiry to ascertain how men of the West-European breed are brought to live closely together, and to associate their efforts with that degree of harmony we see about us. Social order, even among the passive, unambitious Hindoos, presents a problem for solution. But it is a much more serious problem among the dolichocephalic blonds of the West. The restless, striving, doing Aryan, with his personal ambition, his lust for power, his longing to wreak himself, his willingness to turn the world upside down to get the fame, or the fortune, or the woman, he wants, is under no easy discipline. The existence of order among men of this daring and disobedient breed challenges explanation. Especially is this true of the European man in America or Australia. The same selective migrations that made the Teuton more self-assertive than the docile Slav or the quiescent Hindoo, have made the American more strong-willed and unmanageable than even the West-European.

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To many, no doubt, a survey of the foundations of social order will appear superfluous. Most of us take order for granted, and are hardly more aware of it than we are of the air we breathe. Order being the universal and indispensable condition of all our social structures, we give no more thought to it than to the force of cohesion that keeps our machinery from flying into bits. Those to whom the fact is brought home by the persistence of a delinquent class assume, nevertheless, that the social fabric rests on a law-abiding disposition which is natural to all but the slant-browed few.

But it would be, in truth, much juster to assume a state of disorder. We ought to take for granted that men living in propinquity will continually fall afoul of one another. We ought to expect in the normal person not, it is true, the malice, lust, or ferocity of the born criminal, but certainly a natural unwillingness to be checked in the hot pursuit of his ends. Whenever men swarm in new places, — Dutch Flat, Kimberly, Siberia, Skagway, — the man-to-man struggle stands out naked and clear, and the slow emergence of order out of disorder and violence presents itself as the attainment of a difficult and artificial condition. Could we abstract from such communities the training received in older societies, the thrift that recognizes disorder as a blight upon prosperity, and the ready revolver which discourages aggression by equalizing men, we might arrive at a notion of the state in which the men of to-day, despite their high facial angle, would find themselves, if they were remanded to the zero point of social development.

Starting from this point, we must face the problem. By what means is the human struggle narrowed and limited? How has violence been purged away from it? How has the once brawling torrent

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of conflicting personal desires been induced to flow smoothly in the channels of legitimate rivalry, or even for a time to vanish underground in those numerous coöperations where conflict is absent until it comes to dividing the results?

It is a common delusion that order is to be explained by the person's inherited equipment for good conduct, rather than by any control that society exercises over him. Once it was held that normal human beings are born with a set of commandments etched upon the soul. When evidence accumulated as to the startling contrasts in the moral ideas of different times and peoples, the moralists contented themselves with declaring that the soul is, at least, endowed with a sense of *oughtness*. When the emptiness of this theory was demonstrated, and formalism was convicted of overlooking the emotional elements that lie behind conduct, there arose the theory that man's nature is constituted out of egoism and altruism. This in time was seen to be much the same as defining milk as a combination of whey and curd. Then came the charming tales of the mutual aid of ants, beavers, and prairie dogs, suggesting the existence of certain social instincts which moralists found it very convenient to use in explaining human society.

We are not yet sure, however, that man is the "good ape" Buffon supposed him to be. There is reason to believe that our social order is by no means a mere hive or herd order. It seems to be a *fabric*, rather than a *growth*.

But, in any case, it is important to know what human nature can furnish in the cause of social harmony. The gulf between private ends and public ends, between the aims of the individual and the aims of his fellows, is bridged from both sides, and we must know what abutments and

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spans are provided by the individual himself, if we are to measure the extent of the moral engineering that must be undertaken by society. It is our business, therefore, before entering upon the consideration of the social factors of order, to take stock of the moral capital of the person. We shall, first of all, ascertain the rôle of *sympathy*, of *sociability*, of the *sense of justice*, and of *resentment*, in establishing and maintaining social order.

CHAPTER II

THE RÔLE OF SYMPATHY

SYMPATHY, Sociability, Justice—these are the “mothers” to which, Faust-like, we must repair for the secret of natural goodness. For we are no longer free to reduce altruism to an extremely refined egoism, or to pronounce illusory the pains and pleasures felt on beholding the experiences of another. The metaphysical, strictly egoistic “self” of Helvetius or D’Holbach turns out to be a myth. Those cunning architects, Selection and Heredity, are quite competent to build into the nervous system sympathetic promptings as well as selfish appetites. In the light of the facts collected by many workers, it is no longer difficult to trace the slender stem of altruism rising from the lower levels of mammalian life side by side with the thicker and rougher trunk of egoism.

The beginnings of sympathy lie in the later developments of the reproductive function. With the advent of the helpless mammalian young, sympathy acquires a high value for survival and is rapidly generated. In the human species the dependence of the young on the self-sacrifice of the parents is great, and the feeling of tenderness for the helpless becomes all-important. Those lacking in this quality do not leave so many children as the self-sacrificing, and so are crowded out and replaced. Thus has been developed in

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woman, in connection with her child-rearing function, a power of sympathy so great that travellers among savages have learned to throw themselves, when in straits, on the pity of females.

Besides family selection, social selection works in many ways to put a premium on the more amiable type of man. We know that women, being less quarrelsome, learned to associate before their male companions did. It is probable that, likewise, the more peaceable strains of men betook themselves to group life sooner than did the rest. Now, other things being equal, the larger and better-knit the group, the better its chances of success in conflict with other groups. While this may not favor the mild and gentle, it tends, at least, to put at a disadvantage the man of savage and solitary mood.

Again, the level of social endowment is raised by the slow elimination of the quarrelsome. The bullies kill one another, or they are extinguished by the combined action of the peaceable, or else they are disposed of by the agents of authority. In any case there is a weeding-out process, which works in favor of adaptation. Moreover, as soon as men have a free choice between warfare and peaceful industry, the disorderly and bloodthirsty spirits are drained away and devoured by the sword, while the more peaceable elements of the population gain a steadily increasing preponderance. It is well to remember, however, that the gentle may likewise be sifted out, being slain or driven off by the violent, or self-eliminated by a mistaken celibacy. Social selections, therefore, have tended to remove the morally extreme types of men,— the ferocious who taking the sword perish by the sword, and the gentle who fail to stand up for their rights. It is not certain that their net

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effect is to raise to any great degree the level of sympathetic endowment. An adaptive process that rejects the few worst rather than selects the few best, seems too languid to keep pace with the fresh demands that the growing complexity of social organization is continually making on human nature. Nor may we overlook the fact that selection adapts man to yesterday's conditions, not to to-day's. When the requirements of the social environment are changing a gap is bound to appear, and this will be closed, when possible, by artificial means.

The age-long operation of selection under a great variety of conditions forbids us to look everywhere for the same endowment of sympathy, and leads us to recognize that the human species embraces no small range of moral variety. Very striking are the moral differences between neighboring tribes of red men, or negroes, or the hill folk of India. In history, too, we have the contrast between the kindness and generosity of the Egyptian and the cruelty of the Assyrian or Turk. Now, it is not at all certain that the peoples most successful as social architects are the most sympathetic. In fact, it is among natural peoples who have made but slight progress in social organization—Veddahs, Arawaks, Innuits, Dhimals—that we find the best social instincts.

When we remember that idyllic gentleness has been found only in island races or in small communities isolated by natural barriers, while the races that have emerged successful from the ages of war and migration on the great open land areas, like the Mississippi Valley or the Eurasian Continent, have been marked by a bellicose rather than a pacific disposition, it is evident that the larger historical aggregations of men have not been based on sympa-

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thy. When the curtain rises on our ancestor of eighty generations ago, he was a fierce, unruly savage living in constant warfare, a wild "blond beast" with little love for his kind. Undoubtedly the Teutonic temper has been toned down by the blood-letting of centuries. Through the Dark Ages, the mutual slaughter of untamed nobles and on-hangers cleared away the aggressive spirits and gave the more peaceable industrial type of man an opportunity to multiply the bonds of social life. But gentleness is still no salient trait of the European. In endowment for friendly association he is inferior to any one of half a score of races that might be mentioned. In the spontaneous formation of small, peaceable, natural communities the Buriats or the Tahitans leave him far behind. That he, nevertheless, continues ceaselessly to develop his wonderful social organization proves that his order rests upon something else than the social sentiments.

Natural affection, while it is not the main pillar of the social edifice, has, no doubt, the leading rôle in forming the family of to-day. It is sympathy, in the forms of sexual, parental, and conjugal love, that preserves and renews from generation to generation the family relations. Besides these services sympathy is valuable to the social group as a stimulus to beneficence. With its timely help it mitigates the vicissitudes of the individual life, averts the stroke of misfortune, lessens the smart of disaster, tones down the harsher inequalities of lot, and for the weaker ones, such as women, widows, children, and the aged, softens the rigor of individualistic competition. In its collective manifestation sympathy fixes the legal status of the feeble and defective classes, and determines the plane of comfort they shall enjoy at public expense. Moreover, it authori-

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tatively oversees all disciplines and subordinations. It throws the arm of the law about the more helpless, and intervenes actively between husband and wife, parent and child, teacher and pupil, master and servant, policeman and offender, warden and convict, employer and employee. Nor is sympathy without its services to the economic organization. It smooths daily intercourse, binds together the members of an industrial group, and helps to keep men to the due performance of their appointed tasks.

But after the fullest and frankest recognition has been given to the services of spontaneous altruism, nothing can be clearer than its utter inadequacy. Success in social organization implies that each man, whether watched or unwatched, sticks to his appointed work, and interferes with no one else in *his* work. Each does his special task, trusting that others will do certain things, at certain times, in certain ways, and will forbear from certain other things. This trust would be sadly misplaced if *affection* and *impulse* were all that could be relied upon to work our complicated social organization.

Sympathy, as we see it in the family, tends to abolish disparities. The feeling of brotherhood makes for a condition of equality. If, then, society were founded upon sympathy, the enormous inequalities of lot and fate we see about us would be impossible.¹¹ All Utopias which base the social union on mutual affection arrive at community of goods, or of women, or both. To the unfortunate sympathy presents itself as pity, the impulse to extend aid. To the miserable it presents itself as envy, the impulse to relieve one's distress by dipping into the abundance of another. In both cases, extreme disparity of conditions inspires feel-

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ings which are unfavorable to that disparity. But a differentiating society produces and consecrates stupendous inequalities in condition ; so that, did it trust itself to spontaneous feelings apart from law and morality, it would be ground to powder between compassion and envy, as between the upper and nether millstones. It is *obedience* that articulates the solid, bony framework of social order; *sympathy* is but the connective tissue. As well build a skeleton out of soft fibre as construct social order out of sympathies.

Not friendly aid, but reliable conduct, is the corner-stone of great organization. Now, sympathy will stay the hand of the wife-beater, but it will not spurn the bribe or spare the lie. It will snatch a child from trampling hoofs, but it will not keep the watchman awake, or hold the contractor to the terms of his agreement. It will nerve the rescuing fireman, but it will not stimulate the official to do his duty. It will relieve the beggar, but it will not stop the adulteration of goods. It will man the lifeboat, but it will not lead men to give just weight, to make true returns of their property, or to slay their country's enemies.

The strength and the weakness of sympathy must now be apparent. Regard for others will protect the circle of kindred and friends, but not those one does not know or care for. A man's sensibilities may restrain him when the harm of his deed is sure to fall upon a particular individual, but not when it is lost in the vague mass called "the public." They will deter him when the evil can be clearly visualized, but not when the consequences are doubtful or indefinite. Precarious impulse may produce a settled behavior for persons, but not that steady turning in a prescribed path which is required of every wheel in the social

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machine. A person may be tender-hearted, and yet do vast harm by dodging quarantine, or smuggling in coolies, or falsifying news, or stuffing ballot boxes. He will not hurt a fly, and still he will supply explosive kerosene, or contaminated water, to multitudes. He is generous, but will trample upon institutions like marriage, property, the ballot, or free speech, in the pursuit of his ends.

Sympathy, then, breaks down at just the point where we are increasingly in need of security. For our social development is marked by the progressive substitution of *fixed impersonal* relations for *transient personal* relations. To be "a kind husband, a devoted parent, and a good neighbor" no longer sums up the duty of man. As institutions multiply, it becomes as needful for us to respect them as to love one another. As social machinery gains in importance, the common welfare becomes more vulnerable. With the advent of the time when the most momentous actions will present no more obvious relation to their remote social consequences than does the fingering of the train despatcher to the fate of distant passengers, it will, no doubt, be realized that intermittent sentiment is unable to cope with the problem of subordination, and that other motives must be called in.

CHAPTER III

THE RÔLE OF SOCIABILITY

BESIDES sympathy, human nature exhibits certain gregarious instincts which facilitate harmony. These instincts appear as craving for the presence of one's kind, distress at being left alone, nostalgia after separation from mates, and a capacity for social pleasure indicated by mirth, laughter, and festal impulses. These in themselves are no security for good behavior. But they lead to social amusement, play, games, dancing, feasting, and intercourse. These in turn foster friendly interest, spontaneous helpfulness, and a sense of solidarity, all of which conduce to the maintenance of order.

We do not yet know whether our simian ancestor was most akin to the solitary ape, or to the sociable chimpanzee, but it is safe to say that man was never so thoroughly sociable as the horse, the prairie dog, or the grass-eating animals generally. With even the best strains of man, the gregarious instincts do not seem to have very long roots. His social union comes late and is not easy to maintain. It resembles not so much the colony of beavers, as those packs of wolves or wild dogs which form for hunting, and which frequently break up in a free fight at the sharing of the prey. Those enthusiasts, then, who draw charming lessons from the study of gregarious animals and of social insects, not only fail to give us the

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clue to human association, but are very apt to lead us quite astray as to the real causes of social order.

It is a paradox of anthropology that the best instances of instinctive adaptation to social life are found among some of the most backward races of men, and at the lowest levels of culture. The most astonishing fact brought to light by the ethnologist, is that frequently the savage is not, save in his mode of warfare, "savage" at all, but is, on the contrary, amiable and peaceful. After a long acquaintance, Europeans have described Ostyaks, Samoyeds, Eskimos, Dyaks, Aleuts, Papuas, Tunguses, Sioux, and Zuñis, as the "gentlest" or the "kindest" races on earth. We find them living in joint families or house communities with an intimacy and peaceableness we cannot attain to. The Hottentots are reported as "all kindness and good will to one another." The Papuas are "sociable and cheerful." "They laugh very much." The Negritos "live in harmony among themselves." The Bushmen are "kind, generous, and hospitable." The Andaman Islanders are declared to be "gentle and amiable in their mutual intercourse." The children of the Siberian savages "never fight." "For a hundred years, one single murder has been committed in the tundra." "Scorning, scolding, and the use of rough words are absolutely unknown in Aleut life."

Certain shocking practices of primitive folk which were formerly held to indicate great ferocity — abandonment of the old, infanticide, cannibalism, witch-baiting, blood revenge, etc. — are now differently interpreted. On closer examination they are seen to spring from ignorance, superstition, or dire necessity, rather than from callousness. On the whole it is safe to say that, until war and predatory activities break up their early communism,

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primitive folks show in unusual degree the traits that make order a matter of course. In their simple groups, the bad man, lacking the shelter he enjoys in our vast societies, is steadily eliminated or extruded, until, in the course of ages, the social type of human nature predominates.

It is a far cry from "the friendly and flowing savage," to the men of the West. In the first place, a prolonged struggle in the North Temperate Zone, with a harsh, though not a depressing, natural environment, endows the Teuton with unusual energy and initiative. Then centuries of wanderings in which the strong set forth and the weak and timid stay behind, brings the Teuton to the west of Europe, to the British Isles, and to America, with a courage, enterprise, and self-assertion rare in the history of man. The Teuton becomes the Anglo-Saxon, and therewith less apt for the gregarious life. Moreover, the constant fighting brought about by his migrations accentuates warlike traits in the Teuton and breeds in him violence and aggression, the propensities of the predatory man. With conquest and state-building begins a protracted régime of force, status, and exploitation, which strengthens self-seeking and clannishness, undermines the primitive instinct of friendly association, and leaves an emulative, individualistic stamp upon nearly all the institutions of the Teuton. Finally, the social deeps are agitated, and the low-lying masses begin to tinge with their far-transmitted sentiments of friendliness and solidarity the Western theory of social relations.

We cannot tell how the Teuton lived in primitive times, for when the curtain rises he is already a fighting man. But if, like most other savages, he once lived peaceably in little house or village communi-

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ties, without private property, police, or crime, it is certain that he brings the mere wreck of his early social instincts to his latter-day unions. For sixty generations or more, circumstances tended to breed out of him this primitive amiability. Then for a score or so of generations, circumstances have tended to breed out of him some of his acquired ferocity. This double selective process has left in high relief those prideful, self-regarding qualities, which are the soil of noble virtues but not of genial sympathies. In blood and bone, then, the Western man is *individualist*, and most so is the American, the product of the last, most Westerly decanting of the Germanic race.

Not only is our material intractable, but social evolution has swept us farther and farther from the simple primitive ties of fellowship. The essence of the process consists in the replacement of instinct by reason. Intellect has come to fix the range and closeness of association instead of feeling. The force that urges us on from step to step in the process of union is economic rather than ethical. The great social expansions have occurred, not in the most gregarious varieties of mankind, but in those races that have sense enough to perceive the advantages of association, and wit enough to construct a good social framework.¹ While, therefore, the

1 "The Frenchmen were too gregarious." "They appeared to want that daring and independent spirit of individual self-reliance, which impels an American or Englishman to disregard all counsel and companionship, and to enter alone into the wildest enterprise." "But though they were so fond of each other's company, they did not seem to possess that cohesiveness and mutual confidence necessary for the successful prosecution of a joint undertaking. Many kinds of diggings could only be worked to advantage by companies of fifteen or twenty men, but Frenchmen were never seen attempting such a combination. Occasionally half a dozen or so work together, but even then the chances were that they squabbled among themselves, and broke up before they had got their claim into

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earlier groupings are natural communities, the unions of civilized men are artificial societies.

The primitive horde or clan with its few score of members is not too large to be bound together by personal ties. Among some races more persons assemble in the dance or the *korroborre* than can be got together in any other way. But the convenience of association is such that the coöperating unit gradually comes to be much bigger than the fellowship unit. We are brought into relations of reciprocal obligation with many persons we cannot know or care for. So that the circle of those united by interlacing interests comes to be much wider than the little circle for companionship and festal enjoyment. On every hand, we see still going on about us the silent changes by which the local cluster,—parish, neighborhood, commune,—once the unit alike for social pleasure and for division of labor, splits up for sociable purposes and coalesces with other clusters for economic purposes.

If we take up, one by one, the forms of union that are mighty and spreading in these days, we can see that each of them owes its existence to something else than the charm of like for like. It is a commonplace of history that the unceasing agglomeration of communities has never been due to the mutual attraction of peoples, but always to conquest or to combination for defence. Not sentiment, but invariably force or the dread of force, has called into being that most extensive of co-operations, the State. Again, certain types of voluntary association that thrive mightily in our time, the industrial corporation and the labor union, are often cited as the work of the "spirit of

working order, and so lost their labor from their inability to keep united in one plan of operations." — BORTHWICK, "Three Years in California," pp. 368-369.

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association." But a moment's consideration shows that these unions testify to *interlacing interests*, rather than to the sociable instinct.

Or take that wonder of our age, the growth of cities. The modern commercial or industrial city, with its lack of neighborliness, its mutual indifference, its mingling without fellowship and its contact without intercourse, its absence of communal opinion, its machinal charities, its vicarious philanthropy, its dismal contrasts of wealth and poverty, its wolfish struggle for personal success, its crimes, frauds, exploitations, and parasitism — surely this strange agglomeration is the work of the economic man, not the social man! How little it proceeds from the gregarious impulse appears from the marked predominance of the long-skull Teutons in the urban upbuilding now going on in central Europe. For they constitute just that element of the population which is the least sociable, but the most energetic, ambitious, and hardy.

It is in the urban group, in fact, that social order finally parts company with the sociable impulse. For one reason why this impulse tends to harmonious conduct is that bad actions cause forfeiture of companionship, exclusion from social pleasure, ostracism. But in the city the variety of social grouping is so great that the anti-social disturber need not forego festal enjoyment. The criminals with their chums and "pals" and their circles for fellowship and frolic, are quite as well off for social pleasure as the good citizen.

In a word, we have spun out the web until the social relations of the individual are far too many to elicit any response from his jaded social instinct. We have at the same time spun out amazingly the relations of persons to things, *i.e.* property rights. We have spun them out until they have become

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fantastic and meaningless to mere good-will. The untrained social man cannot take them seriously, cannot "respect" them as they must be respected in our social scheme, because they often seem to mean nothing to the welfare of flesh-and-blood persons. Fellow-feeling inspires scruples about possessions that ostensibly have something to do with the good of another. But how should it cause one in eager pursuit of his ends to pause and thread his way reverently among the property rights that cover the world with an invisible network!

Such are the transformations that have carried our types of association far beyond the hive or herd instinct. What, now, are the evidences of this fact?

The stubborn quality of the stuff in our Western societies is indicated by the persistence and high repute of fighting. The duel has only recently declined among gentlemen, while the fistic encounter still enjoys great favor with the lower classes. As to our boys, their pugnacity can hardly be matched in any other race. The popularity of hunting, and of a great number of emulative sports, mimicking the forms and language of battle, further certify to the survival of barbarian traits.

The existence of a hereditarily criminal class shows that our social order imposes a peculiar moral strain. For the criminal is not ordinarily a monster devoid of social instincts. He goes in bands and is not incapable of a rude devotion to his fellows. He is not so much unsociable, as utterly incapable of responding to the particular stimuli by which we build the good citizen.

The small gregariousness of the Westering Teuton appears in his aversion to indiscriminate physical intimacy, and his unwillingness to inhabit large dwellings. He lives apart, in a separate domicile, and guards jealously the seclusion of the fireside.

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The swarm-life of aliens in tenement house and alley is abhorrent to him, and he tries to cure the evil by building up in the denizens of the slums a sense of decency to which contact shall be obnoxious. As a settler he at first lives in villages for protection, but later he draws apart and establishes the American homestead. This aloofness is deemed by some to be a characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon.¹ It is, therefore, not without meaning that of sixty communities that socialists have started in the United States, the average duration has been less than two years.

That our societies do not inspire that identification of self with the group which is characteristic of primitive communism is shown by the Occidental thirst for personal immortality. A lively sense of the life of the tribe enables a man to bear the aspect of death. On the other hand, the longing for the continuance of the individual existence rises to passionate intensity when dissolving influences cause the *ego* to stand out naked and clear against the *cosmos*. That all our rapid growth of social tissue has in no wise restored the comforting sense of identity with the group, suggests that with us society is a cunning piece of joinery reared above the devouring waves of self-interest.

Our modern cult of nature and solitude is likewise full of meaning. Early peoples shrink from lonely nature, and find the savage wilderness gloomy and dreadful. But nowadays, to us denizens of "the man-stifled town," where the sight, sound, and contact of human beings goes far beyond what the sociable instinct demands, the opportunity of going off alone far from the presence and works of man is a sweet relief. Hence, we

¹ Demolins, "Anglo-Saxon Superiority," Book II, Ch. iv.

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read into lifeless nature our own joy and sense of freedom at escaping from the multitude.

If sociability is not the basis of social order, it is still not without its services. It calls into being all manner of circles, clubs, and fraternal orders for social pleasure. It is the parent of friendships and brotherhoods. By fostering the tolerant disposition it smooths the path and lessens the friction of all forms of purposive association. The easy combination of Americans for any end whatever, testifies to the absence of suspicion, jealousy, and ill will. Hence with us many things can be left to private action, which among less social men would devolve upon coercive associations like the State.

CHAPTER IV

THE RÔLE OF THE SENSE OF JUSTICE

FOR the germ of the sense of justice, we must look to the process by which the child at the day-break of its mental life arrives at the notion of *self*. The child finds no self-idea ready to hand in its mental furnishings. Nature equips it with selfish instincts, but not with a "Number One." It can only slowly build up this idea out of its sensations and efforts, and out of elements that by imitation it has taken from those about it. But this wholesale appropriation of what was "other" makes it easier to impute this enriched self-notion to "other." The child interprets persons in terms of its own subjective experiences because it has no other means of interpreting them.

In other words, the *ego* and the *alter* are only the same thought with different connotations. I use the same notion of personality, now in thinking of *ego*, now in thinking of *alter*. Hence, I must read into the other person the same desires and interests I feel in myself. What I want and claim I must by the very same thought allow others to want and claim. "Whatever I fancy, hope, fear, desire for self in general, with no qualification as to which self it is, remains the same whether afterwards I do qualify it by the word 'my' or by the word 'your.'"¹ This being so, whenever my inter-

¹ Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development," p. 16.

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ests are entangled with those of another, I am moved to give equal weight to the claims of self and the claims of that other. When a problem of human relations presents itself, I grope uneasily for a solution in which the self-thought I use in thinking of me and the self-thought I use in thinking of you shall be the same. Contending with the impulse to aggress is the craving for an *impersonal* solution. I seek a *reversible* adjustment of conflicting claims; one that would be the same if I turned it end for end, or if the "you" and "me" in it were transposed. Adopting any other solution, I feel that stress or "prick of conscience" which gives the sense of justice its power over conduct. Such is the germ of rectitude. Under the forcing of custom and public opinion, this germ develops and conscience reaches towering proportions. But custom and public opinion are social stimuli, and hence must be accounted to social control rather than to human nature.

There are two ways of viewing conduct, which are at once reasonable and self-consistent. I may regard the world as peopled by persons like myself, and so find it consistent to pursue a line of action which takes equal account of the interests of self and of others. Or I may look upon the world as simply a corner in which the ego-spider can spread its web and await its prey. I may make myself the centre of the universe, and count the other person a cipher, save as he perturbs me with sentiments of pity, friendship, and so on. Both these solutions of the moral problem—that of Epicurus as well as that of Zeno—are self-consistent. Both give us *reasonable* as opposed to *impulsive* conduct. Both are the outcome of a long course of reflection, starting in the one case from the self-preserved instincts, and in the other case from the early neces-

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sity of using a single self-thought in thinking of "you" and "me." Which of these will come to prevail in a given individual is largely determined by his early training. The one is the consequence of a petted and indulged childhood; the other of a childhood passed under household law and amid equals.

As it is the use of a single self-thought for "self" and "other" that inclines a person to just dealing, anything that contradicts this way of thinking undermines his sense of justice. Always and everywhere, then, *difference* is the occasion and excuse for ignoring the equal claims of another. The boy imposes on his little sister and justifies himself by the thought that he is older or bigger or male. Man treats woman unjustly and evades the prick of his conscience by dodging behind her "sphere." The conscientious master exploits his human chattel without a qualm because he is "only a slave." From the savage whose feeling of obligation does not extend beyond his clansmen to the noble who puts no rein on himself in dealing with serf or commoner, it is *sense of difference* that opens the door to greed and oppression. The farther apart are men in respect to color, race, speech, status, or mode of life, the harder is it for the electric spark to leap across the space between them. Whoever brushes away conventional differences strengthens the will to justice. Whoever treats title, rank, or place as "clothes" widens the sway of equity. Whoever compels us to feel that "a man's a man for a' that" weakens the claims of pride and privilege.

"Et la fraternité, c'est la grande justice."

The sense of justice is a unique moral spring. It is by no means the same thing as sympathy. Sympathy begins in instinct; the sense of justice

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has its beginning in the early mental life of the individual developing under conditions of healthy association. The one is inclination; the other a habit of thought that overrides inclination. The one, so far as it is pity or tenderness, unites unequals; while the other unites equals. Both profit by the progress in intelligence. But the sense of justice is far more intellectual than is sympathy, and gains much more from everything that makes for reflection and reason. The philosopher who was surprised to find among men so much kindness and so little justice forgot that the mass, the mob, is emotional, and from it we shall get chiefly the emotional kinds of goodness.

In the everyday triumphs of the sense of justice over selfish impulses there is likely to be an admixture of sympathy. To appreciate this sense as a distinct item in the moral equipment of the person, we must, therefore, isolate it. We must scrutinize it in cases where there can be no suspicion of an alloy. We must seek it in situations and under circumstances, that minimize or even wholly exclude natural sympathy. Let us, therefore, observe the behavior of men who are contending one with another. Any restraints that men impose upon themselves in combat and rivalry may surely be credited to something else than fellow-feeling.

The pure type of the equity spirit appears in the leaning toward "fair play," or what is the same thing, "fair fight." Often in early warfare, before there are any restrictive rules, there are, nevertheless, self-imposed restraints. If you rob your foe, you rob him openly and not by stealth. If you outwit him, you do it without truce-breaking or treachery. If he wanders by chance to your door, you entertain him and dismiss him in peace. If you attack him, you attack him armed, in front,

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and by day. If in combat your foe is unhorsed, you dismount. If his lance breaks, you throw down your own.¹ Moreover, you will show toward your enemy whatever forbearances he shows toward you. If he refrains from ambuscade, night surprise, envenomed weapons, or poisoned wells, you do likewise. The forbearance that one combatant practises from humanity, chivalry, or sheer bravado comes to infect his foes through their love of fighting on equal terms.

In sport also the real nature of the "fair play" feeling comes out clearly. Here it does not imply any reluctance to triumph or any slowness in taking advantage of success. But it does lead to an observance of those limits to competitive endeavor which are imposed by "the rules of the game." It leads rivals to forego advantages arising from accident or circumstance, to exercise the customary forbearances, and to confine their opposing efforts to the prescribed channels. In professional or business competition it works the same way. If my rival does not cheat, adulterate, or solicit on the street, neither will I do so. Especially does the sentiment of fair play prompt to the keeping of voluntary promises given for a consideration. The keeping of a parole or the repayment of a loan is the first dictate of the equity feeling, and the idea of *duty* can easily be traced back to the idea of *debt*.

The pure justice-motive, then, crops up oftenest in the dealings of equals, in such fields as war, sport, trade, business, and politics. It is the natural regulator of emulation, as sympathy is the

¹ Of the Maoris, we read, "Sometimes when a besieging party knew of their enemies wanting food or stones or spears, they sent them a supply, laying them in heaps near their defences, and then retiring. — "Transactions of the New Zealand Institute," Vol. I.

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regulator of mutual aid. It is a virtue peculiar to men, because they are trained in egoistic struggle, while women move in a sphere where the personal relation is everything. It thrives in the bracing air of freedom, and shows to the best advantage where workmen have no bosses, children no monitors, maids no chaperones, and students no proctors. Its magic is greatest when doors are left without locks, property without watchmen, debts without security, contracts without witnesses, promises without writing, and taxes without inquisition.

The social group, by drilling its members to observe certain forbearances toward one another, manufactures conscience. On nature's granite it rears tall superstructures of moral feeling. Hence, the native, unschooled sentiment of fairness should be sought at the edges and frontiers of groups. Where there is no general social consciousness, as in the Caucasus or the Soudan, where there is no social unity, as among the early Greeks, Arabs, or Germans, where men of divers races, faiths, and teaching mingle, as in old Timbuctoo or Khartoum,—there the reality of this elementary virtue is tested. On the decks of ships, between the rifle-pits, at frontier towns, in colonial armies, along the borders of rival faiths and languages, the sense of justice shows itself, if it appears at all, clear and unalloyed. And the wonder is that there is so much of it in the intercourse of alien and dissimilar men. How often foes accept arbitration that has no force behind it! How often defenceless travellers have made their way unharmed through savage tribes! What striking instances of truthfulness, honesty, and fidelity to engagements explorers have recorded of their native helpers!

Much as nature has prized the panther traits in

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man, the justice proclivity is too valuable to be overlooked by natural selection. Of course, so long as the struggle is man to man and there is no banded competition, a conscience is a handicap, and will be kept down like a hunchback or a club-foot or any other dis-serviceable growth. But when well-defined groups — families, *gentes*, tribes — begin to contend, a new test of fitness is set up. The individual struggle gets in the way of success in the mass struggle, and hence must be thrust aside or modified. The best man in a fist fight is not the best in the days of gunpowder. Likewise the fittest to survive when the competition is man-wise, may be eliminated when the competition is group-wise. For centuries survival has been the meed, not of the biggest, heartiest fighters, — the combative qualities developed early and soon became common, — but of those fighters who could somehow rub along together and so avoid mutual destruction.

Now what reconciles men of violence to one another and keeps them in the paths of peace is not the affectionateness of Tahitans or Lepchas, but that voluntary limitation of one's claims that flows from a sense of fairness. But as this is not an instinct, natural selection cannot seize upon it and build it up. All that nature does to fit men for just dealing is to give them self-control and reflectiveness. From the standpoint of peace and order, the race most hopeless is not the hard and aggressive race, but the race afflicted with seething, explosive passions. Self-control, or the power to inhibit the passions, gives a man time to remember, to hear the other side, to discuss. Reflection favors that *thought-out* type of conduct which marks the fair-minded man. The problem of making a winning race is not, as some suppose, to blend cleverly cer-

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tain egoistic with certain altruistic qualities, — as well mix oil with water! — but to unite the pushing, combative disposition with self-control and reflectiveness in such a way as to develop *the conscientious individualist*.

Accordingly the great conquering, civilizing races have, at their *début*, shown themselves possessed of a healthy sense of justice. The virtues they are praised for are so many forms of this trait. The truth-speaking, honesty, good faith, and hatred of guile that have, at one time or another, characterized Persians, Spartans, Romans, Germans, Arabs, and Ottomans, can all be derived from the love of fair play. They are not at all incompatible with barbarian greed, lust, or brutality. They are the virtues of warriors, and they are the bases of the polity that warriors establish among themselves. Straightforward is the way of bold, prideful men before they have been spoiled by domination, while supineness and lying seem to develop as life becomes complex and multifarious. The early Persian learned "to draw the bow and speak the truth," but his children were thoroughly "Asiatic" by the time of Alexander. "The old Spartan type in Greece," says Mahaffy, "had been above the smallest suspicion of lying, while the Roman aristocrats degenerated so rapidly by contact with the Hellenistic world that honesty became as rare among them as a white crow."¹ Later the Gallo-Romans fled the tender mercies of the Roman administrators for the rough and violent, but just-dealing, barbarians. The truth seems to be that the races which subjugate peoples and found states, bring to their work a certain love of fair play, and are strong in the manly virtues that can be coined

¹ Mahaffy, "A Survey of Greek Civilization," p. 297.

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out of this bullion. But in the course of time their predatory activities accustom them to fraud and treachery as well as force. Then prolonged domination blunts their equality feeling, and contact with a servile population breeds in them the well-known vices of the master. Medes, Quirites, Dorians, Franks, Saracens,—all have gone down to Avernus by this path.

In a composite society of this kind the anvil is deformed as well as the hammer. For while freedom and equality quicken the will to justice, unfreedom and difference deaden it. Weak, therefore, in this trait are the outcasts, off-fall and leavings of groups; the poor so far as they feel themselves unfairly beaten in the battle of life; the subjects of arbitrary will, such as women, servants, and slaves; the classes, castes, and peoples that lie under the harrow. These victims of injustice lose all compunction as to means of self-protection. They stoop to guile and cunning, the natural weapons of the weak as open force is the natural weapon of the strong. Most demoralizing of all is the subjection to arbitrary treatment. It is a step up when the subjugated are freed from irritating personal will and given a legal standing however lowly. For the building of injustice into the foundations of society conceals it. The possession of well-defined rights by the lower ethnic element, as well as by the higher, revives the sense of equity and gives it social play.

It is doubtful if the rise of a self-conscious society is, on the whole, favorable to this sense. For the reflective self, that "impartial spectator within the breast" becomes corrupted by the sentiments of the spectators without. The public infect the conscience with a regard for the distinctions and ranks and inequalities consecrated

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in the particular social group. The just comes to be identified with the praiseworthy, the unjust with the blameworthy. Society finds ways of manufacturing conscience to order, but meanwhile the native sense of obligation to "play fair" is blunted and perverted. Society tries to get the feeling of justice out of its own pathway, to eliminate it from politics and get it wholly domesticated. To the cry of the heart "*Justitia fiat coelum ruat*," it replies, "*Salus populi suprema lex.*" It is probably this growing ascendancy of the group over the moral intuitions of its members that explains certain strange atavisms in the development of civilization. It was at the moment of highest culture that the behavior of the Greek states toward each other was most unscrupulous and cynical; while it is questionable if the rise of the modern state has not been, on the whole, unfavorable to international morality.

In the sense of fair play, we detect the first superior endowment of the Teutonic peoples for social order. While the long-skulled blond of central and northwestern Europe is mediocre in power of sympathy and weak in sociability, he is strong in that most important of political aptitudes—the will to justice. It is significant that only in Anglo-Saxon countries does the public treasury open an account under the heading "Conscience Money." And it is the Germanic race that is best able to build up highly organized societies without losing the perception of what constitutes elementary fairness between man and man! Egyptians, Chinese, Byzantines, Saracens,—all have found that civilization spelt degeneracy. Truth-speaking and untaught honesty have departed from them, and their later social organization has wrought injustice on a stupendous

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scale. But the Teuton's sense of justice appears to be a hardier growth. So far from withering and dying, it is still an active force in his civilization. It enables him to recover just social relations that have been lost in ancient conquests. It qualified him to go forth from highly differentiated societies, and established in new lands without assistance a just political régime. It fits him to rule dependent peoples with a self-restraint no other race has shown.¹

Whence come the self-control and reflection that underlie this sense of justice? Who knows? Somehow or other the Teuton has outgrown the quick reflexes of the primitive man so that the line from feeling to action is not so short and straight. His consciousness has more diameter and is too full of memories and desires for him to act so gustily and impulsively as the savage. Perhaps this fuller thought and tardier action come from the stern nature that cradled the Teuton. A northern climate spares only those who "look before and after," while the kindly sun of the warmer lands lets the careless and improvident live. And that capacity for reflection so necessary to conscience! Did the early Western man get it from the long cold of his winters, which by depriving him of the outdoor, sensuous life of the South threw him back upon his thoughts? We

¹ The difference between justice and solidarity as a basis of order comes out in certain contrasts between Chinese and Western nations of right.

"We make righteousness the standard; the Chinese, humanity. We say, 'Is it right?' the Chinese, 'Is it kindly?' With us a man insists upon his 'rights' and looks upon any infringement of them as wrong; in China a man rather considers his circumstances and what is to be expected in the case." "There is no harm in helping yourself to a little of what a rich man owns; but to steal from the poor is considered a great outrage." — GRAVES, "Forty Years in China," p. 68.

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do not know. But it is a sifting of some sort of other that shapes race character. For instance, Dr. Patten has shown how, centuries ago, the selections in England were against the sensual type and in favor of the Puritan. Given the conditions of climate, drink, and disease, the thoughtful, cool-blooded, home-loving frugalist was bound to outlive in the industrial masses the careless, roistering sensualist.¹ And from his brooding spirit comes the Puritan's concern for his soul's salvation and the Puritan's conscience.

Is this bent toward even-dealing and abhorrence of foul play competent to account for the social order about us? I think not. We have seen that this trait prompts a man to observe those restraints and show those forbearances he finds in the conduct of his competitors. Hence, in the struggles that go on in society, the love of fair play will lead him to conform to the rules obeyed by all his rivals, that is, *it will tend to generalize forbearances and to complete an order already "set up and running."* But it cannot originate mutual restraints; it knows nothing of the group interest to which private interests must bow. It will not hear of vicarious sacrifice of the individual for the common weal. The unschooled sense of justice acquiesces in a shoot-at-sight policy as cheerfully as in a régime of peace, sees fairness no less in the arbitration of a gun than in that of a court, and would no liefer abide by the Golden Rule than by —

“The simple rule, the good old plan
That he shall take who has the might
And he shall keep who can.”

The concern of a just man on entering a society is that of the honest miner sitting down to a card

¹ Patten, “The Development of English Thought,” ch. III.

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table. "What," he asks, "are the rules of the social game? What is and what is not permissible in the battle for money, place, power, success? Tell me how the others are bound, and I will put myself under the same bonds." Such a frame of mind can sustain but cannot generate our social order. There must be other forces to build up from the bottom. This is why on the *Mayflower*, as well as by the Sacramento, *the making of law* is ever the first care of a new community. Reasonable rules once set up, the just-minded hasten to obey them, because now each knows what forbearances he can look for in his rivals. Thus is formed a law-abiding disposition, the birthright of all good laws but soon lost if they are not enforced. But the bare predilection for justice does not, of itself, give us the secret of a perfected social order.

CHAPTER V

THE RÔLE OF INDIVIDUAL REACTION

IN the absence of a policeman either of two motives may lead the driver on a busy thoroughfare to avoid collision. He may think of the injury to the other man's vehicle, or he may fear damage to his own. Likewise, when the native restraints of sympathy, sociability, or sense of justice are not strong enough to keep men from trespass, the dread of retaliation may give them pause. There are, then, four traits which constitute the pillars of a natural order. Three of these are the moral sentiments of the person acting. The fourth is the resentment of the person acted upon.

This appears first as a mere defensive reflex. Driven by his exasperated instinct of self-preservation, the person who thinks himself attacked or injured immediately reacts. If from premeditation or reflection this reaction is deferred, it tends toward equivalence. In the taking of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," the instinct has become intellectualized. In the law of like for like, the passionnal reaction finds its formula. Self and other are once more "even," and the wronged man is satisfied.

Both the *lex talionis* and the Golden Rule are dictated by the sense of justice. The "Do to another as he has done to you" is addressed to the sufferer of an action. The "Do to another as you

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would have him do to you" is enjoined upon the person about to act. The one maxim is merely the other turned inside out.

Resentment in its lower forms is an instinct; but in its higher forms it is simply the egoistic side of the sense of injustice. The more one recoils from *doing* an unjust action, the more he resents *suffering* such an action. On its altruistic side, the sense of justice lessens aggression by inspiring respect for the claims of others. On its egoistic side, it lessens aggression by prompting to the energetic assertion of one's own claims.

Resentment is, therefore, a moral quality,—elementary, no doubt, but not without its value. It tends to equalize men by establishing equal rights. It fortifies the claims of the weak against those of the unscrupulous strong. If there were no such thing as the passional reaction; if the policy of men in view of the threat or the fact of aggression were purely one of calculating prudence, the weak would accept a subordination answering to their degree of weakness, and equal rights could never grow up save between equals.

But usually the aggressor has only the courage of self-interest, while his victim has the courage of passion. If both acted from passion, the trespasser would show as much energy as the injured man. If both were ruled by canny prudence, the wronged man would renounce his bootless vengeance and make terms with superior strength. It is the gall and venom of the abused man that makes him formidable to the strong.

If men reached for what they have not as energetically as they cling to what they have, or were as calculating in resistance as in aggression, action and reaction would be equal in intensity. In such a case they would fight to the point of mutual ex-

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termination, or else the stronger would be conceded a superiority in social status corresponding to his advantage in strength. It is the vindictiveness of the assailed that startles and gives pause to the would-be aggressor. The duel could never have promoted good manners had not blind resentment made the insulted less afraid of it than the insulter.

The reaction of the injured is, therefore, the first outer check upon the aggressor and the first agent of order. It enables rude men to reach a certain equilibrium among themselves, even if they are not strictly equal in fighting power. The fact that, in general, the power to resist is greater than the power to aggress, and that, owing to the irascible traits, the will to resist is greater than the will to aggress, favors a social scheme which ignores the differences among men or families in respect to strength, and enables unequals to coöperate on a basis of equal and reciprocal rights.

When fierce men swarm in new places without law, there arises what has been called "a leonine society." The very strong and overbearing clash with one another and perish. The weaklings are killed, driven off, or ground down by the capable. There remains a type of man who has the will and the strength to resist encroachments on his own sphere, but not the will or the strength to impose upon others. So there comes to pass a quiet which is like the moments of tense stillness in the combat of two well-matched stags. In spite of frequent experiments in aggression a certain equilibrium is attained.

But the situation is much improved when not the injured man alone, but his family or clan, reacts against violence. In this way vengeance becomes surer, and therefore more to be dreaded. The dead do not go unavenged. Families being more equal

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are more formidable to one another than individuals. The kinsmen of the wrong-doer and his victim, being in a measure outside parties, are more apt to find a solution that will satisfy both. While family vengeance, then, frequently widens the zone of disturbance, it restrains men by the dread of bringing trouble upon their kinsmen. And for fear vengeance should become chronic in the form of the *vendetta*, the elders of the families find means to regulate or avoid it. By compensation, arbitration, or adjudication, the individual reaction passes gradually and insensibly over into the social reaction.

Everywhere among primitive men shame is the portion of him who fails to take his revenge. The wrath of the wronged man is sacred and must be given free course. The community is content to stand by and urge its formula of "like for like" in the hope of converting blind vengeance into true retaliation. Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, Persians, Germans, Celts, Slavs, Arabs,—all have passed through this stage in social evolution. All have known the time when there was no redress save that which a man could win by his own right hand. After sovereign power was established and law provided, it was a desperate task to wean men from their old violent ways. Only by the most ferocious penalties could the early monarchs assert their monopoly of redress. They did not succeed, indeed, until they had made revenge every whit as culpable as aggression.

The "Don't-tread-on-me" menace works best when the social interstices are large and the natural line between the life spheres of man and man stands out clear and certain. But it cannot well keep order among those in close coöperation because the sharing of burden and benefit is too indeterminate. Between equals social order is safe as long as it

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is a greed that confronts a resentment. But with the interpenetration of interests disputes constantly arise in which the sense of right is on both sides, and each is ready to die for his point of honor. In such cases resentment is pitted against resentment, and the irascible spirit will provoke rather than allay conflict. High social organization, therefore, presupposes some kind of control. There must be some recognized authority to draw the line of demarkation between conflicting interests. In a static society, custom can run such a line. But when there is change and progress, such lines become uncertain; and if there is no external authority to draw them afresh, society dissolves in chaos.

The system for the control of conduct, while it stimulates sympathy, sociability, and the sense of equity, greatly narrows the sphere of resentment. Personal reaction against violence is found to hamper society in its own reaction. Since blow brings blow and revenge breeds revenge, private redress leads to chronic feud and disorder. But society being impersonal can strike without provoking counter-stroke. Accordingly, the suppression of "fist law" forms an interesting chapter in the early history of every civilized society. Law with rude hand crushes out private vengeance and steadily narrows the field of self-defence. The king deems every aggression an affront to him. The state regards all outrages as breaches of the peace. Wrongs become crimes, and the justice of the peace sits in the place of the primitive arbiter. Religion enjoins upon individuals the duty of forgiveness, while society takes up and carries on for them the task of repression.

CHAPTER VI

NATURAL ORDER

Sympathy, sociability, the sense of justice, and resentment are competent, under favorable circumstances, to work out by themselves a true, *natural order*, that is to say, an order without design or art. While such an order is far from perfect, it may permit a considerable unfolding of personal enterprise and mutual aid. For the features of such an order it will not do to look to the older communities. In the course of time, a society invariably develops a certain measure of control over the individual, so that the quiet that is attained is partly natural and partly artificial. Moreover, the two are so blended that it is impossible to say how far good behavior is due to the original, moral traits, and how far it is due to the influences that have been set in motion by the society itself.

It is otherwise in new aggregates formed by the coming together of men from different societies. For although the men bring with them certain ideals, traditions, and training imposed upon them by their mother folk, yet under the stimulus of new scenes, new conditions, and the opportunity of self-direction much that is conventional sloughs off. The person expands freely on all sides, and the old thongs and bandages fall from him. And as to the new aggregate, it exerts at first practically no pressure at all. It is a mass,

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not a society. The rise of public opinion, law, religion, and other like manifestations of the general will, takes time. The regulative institutions grow up slowly even when there is urgent need of them. In the life of the new aggregate, therefore, we can see men living and acting almost without social pressure, and the order that forms among them is, accordingly, the nearest we can come to natural order.

If such an embryonic society is to be orderly, the conditions of association must be such as to elicit the strongest response from the natural conscience. This occurs when men meet on the plane of simple and unforced equality. When inequality of condition is transplanted from an old society, the institutions of an artificial order, such as State and Church, must be carried over at the same time. Thus in early Virginia with its contrasts of free and slave, great landholders and indentured servants, the political and ecclesiastical institutions of England were reproduced much more promptly and faithfully than in the New England colonies. When, on the other hand, men come together from the same economic stratum, as in the Puritan colonies and in the settlements of homesteaders on the public domain, or when people of different condition are levelled by the powerful equalizing influences of a new environment, as were the gold-seekers of California, natural order is seen at its best. In such communities it comes sooner and lasts longer than elsewhere.

That under these circumstances it is possible for men to live at peace with one another is proven by the experience of the mining camps of California during the year 1848. Says Borthwick: "Thousands of men hitherto unknown to each other, and

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without mutual relationship, were thrown suddenly together, unrestrained by conventional or domestic obligations, and all more intently bent than men usually are upon the one object of acquiring wealth. It is to be wondered that chaos and anarchy were not at first the result of such a state of things; but such was never the case in any part of the country.”¹

Says Charles Howard Shinn: “Letters from pioneers and all printed accounts agree in the general features of mining life in the later months of the summer of 1848. Scattered over a large territory the men of the various camps dwelt together in peace and good fellowship without any representatives of the United States government in their midst. Legal forms and judicial machinery were as nearly non-existent as it is possible to imagine in a civilized country. The ‘social contract’ ideas of Rousseau and his followers seemed to have suddenly found a practical expression. The unwritten, unformulated law that ruled each camp was the instinct of healthy humanity to mete out equal justice to all. There was no theft and no disorder; few troublesome disputes occurred about boundaries or water rights.” “The miners needed no criminal code. It is simply and literally true, that there was a short time in California, in 1848, when crime was almost absolutely unknown, when pounds and pints of gold were left unguarded in tents and cabins, or thrown down on the hillside, or handed about through a crowd for inspection. An old pioneer writes me that ‘in 1848, a man could go into a miner’s cabin, cut a slice of bacon, cook a meal, roll up in a blanket, and go to sleep, certain to be welcomed kindly when the owner

¹“Three Years in California,” p. 382.

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returned.' Men have told me that they have known as much as a wash-basinful of gold dust to be left on the table in an open tent, while the owners were at work on their claim a mile distant. Of course this condition of affairs was partly due to the ease of acquiring gold." "Considering all the circumstances, a man capable of stealing from his comrades in these busy, friendly camps was hopelessly hardened, was capable of all the crimes of the Decalogue."¹

"Throughout this Arcadian era there was not only no theft, but the bonds of fellowship were strong and sincere among all the miners of the camps. In some districts where the American element kept strongly in the majority, the entire 'flush period' from 1849 to 1853 was marked by such unity. But in most camps disturbances increased; human leeches and parasites lowered the healthy tone of the community; and the miners drew farther apart than in the days when their first tents were pitched beneath the lofty Sierra pines, in clumps of chapparal and manzanita."¹

Equally interesting were the caravans of gold-seekers. "Almost all the overland trains previous to 1849 consisted of relatives or intimate neighbors and friends who intended to become permanent settlers side by side on the Pacific coast, and were accustomed to living together in harmonious equality, mutually helpful and mutually tolerant. Such companies seldom had unruly members, or any that were not entirely devoted to the general good and perfectly submissive to the will of the recognized leaders."² Year after year these trains "made their way across the vast stretches

¹ C. H. Shinn, "Mining Camps," pp. 118, 119.

² Hittell, "History of California," Vol. III, p. 235.

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of infertile country without any more disagreement or dispute than if they had been, in fact, one family led by its patriarch, to whom all looked up and in whom all had unbounded confidence. But when the gold rush began in 1849, and companies consisting of all kinds of heterogeneous elements got together for the simple purpose of reaching the mines in the quickest and most inexpensive manner,"¹ it was found necessary to set up a code of laws and establish tribunals to enforce it.

The order of 1848 was literally a natural order. The old restraints of religion had for the most part fallen away, and new ones had not yet been forged. Law had not commenced to exert its pressure, for there were no courts and no jails. Even public opinion—that earliest and most elementary of pressures—had hardly begun to exist. The population was too shifting and too intent on gathering gold to learn to praise or blame together. This was shown by the startling frankness and independence of the miners in matters that in older societies are regulated by opinion. "Every man passed for what he was. There was no obstacle to the most unreserved intercourse. No one took any trouble to conceal what passed within him, but showed himself for better or worse as the case might be."² "The habitual veil of imposition and humbug, under which men usually disguise themselves from the rest of the world, was thrown aside as a useless inconvenience."³

But the early appearance of this respect for another's rights was not without its favoring circumstances. One was that the first-comers were picked men, being mostly young and strong, and

¹ Hittell, "History of California," Vol. III, p. 235.

² *Ibid.*, p. 174.

³ Borthwick, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

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able to live by their own exertions. They were used to work, and came expecting to work. They were at first chiefly Americans, and hence not without some training in self-control. When later the camps were invaded by adventurers and broken men from all parts of the world, when the lower classes of old societies had contributed their quota, and when criminals from distant cities and convicts from the penal settlements of Australia came to ply their trade, the scene grew rapidly darker, and disorder reached a point where only lynching parties and vigilance committees could cope with it.

Another favoring circumstance was the economic and social equality of the miners. All came to labor, or found on reaching the mines that they had to labor. "Every man finding every other man compelled to labor found himself the equal of every other man; and as the labor required was physical instead of mental, the usual superiority of head-workers over hand-workers disappeared entirely."¹ "Men who had been governors and legislators and judges in the old states worked by the side of outlaws and convicts; scholars and students, by the side of men who could not read or write; those who had been masters, by the side of those who had been slaves; old social distinctions were obliterated; everybody did business on his own account, and not one man in ten was the employee and much less the servant of another."¹ The consequence was that labor became worthy, everything like aristocracy of employments vanished, and men scattered freely into all the useful occupations. Equality of opportunity was also realized. No one was allowed to monopolize the subterranean

¹ Hittell, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

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wealth. The gold deposits were extensive, and no man was allowed to hold more ground than he could work or to shut out others from what he did not use.

The result was that no parasitic relation could establish itself, and even natural superiorities were slow to assert themselves. Property had the consecration of toil, and the opportunity to win property opened on every side. When in the winter of 1849-1850 circumstances changed, the spirit changed also. The severe winter kept supplies from reaching the mines and compelled thousands of diggers to seek refuge in the cities. "The lack of remunerative employment in the cities, on the other hand, . . . induced many to resort to stealing for a subsistence; and that extraordinary career of crime commenced which made California as famous in this respect as it was in many more creditable ones."¹

For a brief period, then, all the conditions tended to *maximize* the impulses that make for harmony. There was no social imperative, no arbitrary code, no traditional requirement, no conventional standard. There were no social institutions to protect, no vague corporate welfare to safeguard. Nearly every moral problem resolved itself into a question between man and man. One was called on to be true not to an abstraction, but to his fellow-miner. Under these circumstances, a natural order grew up and flourished for a brief time.

The moral fruits of this spontaneous social life were just what we might expect. "Every fortnight," writes one who had resided at this time on the Isthmus of Panama, "two crowds of passengers rushed across the Isthmus, one from New

¹ Hittell, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

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York, the other from San Francisco. The great majority in both cases were men of the lower ranks of life. . . . Those coming from New York seemed to think that each man could do just as he pleased, without regard to the comfort of his neighbors. They showed no accommodating disposition, but grumbled at everything, and were rude and surly in their manners; they were very raw and stupid, and had no genius for doing anything for themselves or for each other to assist their progress, but perversely delighted in acting in opposition to the regulations and arrangements made for them by the Transit Company. The same men, however, on their return from California, were perfect gentlemen in comparison. They were orderly in their behavior; though rough they were not rude, and showed a great consideration for others, submitting cheerfully to any personal inconvenience necessary for the common good, and showing by their conduct that they had acquired some notion of their duties to balance the very enlarged idea of their rights which they had formerly entertained."¹

¹ Borthwick, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEED OF SOCIAL CONTROL

EVEN in a mining camp, the issues are not always between man and man. In the keeping of arms or whiskey from the Indians, or in the limiting of gambling, there comes to light a collective interest which only collective action can protect. There are offences that exasperate the group as well as offences that arouse the ire of the individual. In this common wrath and common vengeance lies the germ of a social control of the person.¹

So far as the fruits of a common enterprise can be reaped in full by the participants, coöperation may be left entirely free; but when the benefits of a coöperation will redound to the group as a whole and be enjoyed by all alike, it is necessary that all be required to assume their due share of the burden. Among the earliest signs of collective pressure is the endeavor to make kickers, cowards, and shirkers take part in joint undertakings which benefit all. Among the Iowa settlers the first symptom of contractile power in the social tissue appeared

¹ Sir Henry Maine shows that in early law only injuries of the community are crimes. The injuries of the individual are torts and can be settled for. Moreover, "When the Roman community conceived itself to be injured the analogy of a personal wrong received was carried out to its consequences with absolute literalness, and the state avenged itself by a single act on the individual wrongdoer. The result was that in the infancy of the commonwealth every offence vitally touching its security or its interests was punished by a separate enactment of the legislature." — "Ancient Law," p. 360.

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in the community defence of cases to test squatter land titles.¹ Along the river the building of the levee is the first occasion for compulsory coöperation. In Egypt and China, the early river monarchies, the care of the waters had much to do with forming the state.² In new lands, defence against the aborigines is the chief community interest and overrides masterfully the timidity or apathy of individual settlers.

In complex coöperation even the willing need an authority over them, for success implies such a delicate poise of numerous individual performances that the Word must go forth and with power. This is why warfare, the great primary coöperation, is usually the mother of discipline. The old Germans lived in absolute personal independence. Nevertheless, when they went on the war-path, they chose a war chief and gave him power of life and death. At the close of the campaign this authority disappeared with the occasion that called it into being; but when war became chronic, the war chief held over through peace times, and his power became the embryo of the state.

Even in peaceful communities, the greater propinquity that comes with social growth and the greater intimacy of men in their dealings and relations subjects the natural order to a breaking strain. Friction wears away the good-will that prevails when men live "in open order." Disputes multiply and with them occasions for disturbance of the peace. Says Mr. Shinn of the mining camps: "How could there be much law-

¹ Jesse Macy, "Institutional Beginnings in a Western State." *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Vol. II.

² E. J. Simcox, "Primitive Civilizations," Vol. I, pp. 75-76; Vol. II, pp. 9, 63.

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lessness when so few temptations to crime, and so few opportunities for its commission, existed? Men could quarrel, could steal, could kill each other; but nine out of ten of the misdemeanors and crimes that appear in the docket of an ordinary criminal court were impossible in the mining camps, while ninety-nine hundredths of the ordinary civil cases were equally out of the question. Land titles all similar, transfers verbal, commercial transactions for cash, borrowing and lending simply a matter between individuals — the best of lawyers would have starved in such a community. As society grew more complex, temptations and opportunities increased. . . ."¹

In every cluster there are predatory persons — moral idiots or moral lunatics, who can no more put themselves in the place of another, than the beast can enter into the anguish of its prey, or the parasite sympathize with his host. Even in a free and fluid association like the mining camp, there were "mean" and "low-lived" men; but in an old society these degenerates, "sports," and men of prey constitute a formidable fraction. Now greater propinquity and growing complexity of relation give this class more power to do harm. Just as when men form a line for passing water at a fire, the man who spills or pours out some of the contents of each bucket he passes does more harm than when each man handles a bucket of his own; so when men who have been working apart enter into intricate coöperations, the mean man finds it easier to prey and inflict damage upon the others, and the individual reaction is less able to hold him in check. The development of mutual aid and higher forms of organization, therefore, neces-

¹ Shinn, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

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sarily thrusts upon society the problem of controlling the delinquent class.

The simplicity of the mining camp or the back-woods settlement is sure to vanish. Society, at first a direct association of men, becomes a congeries of associations, and the fellowship bond dissolves away. As population thickens we mark the genesis of sects and clans, each of them a natural community which forbids society to remain a natural community. The sect being a true social cell enjoys a natural order. It monopolizes sympathies. It becomes the object of devotion. It instigates heroism. It has its martyrs. It has, in fact, everything that society ought to have, and yet is only a segment or fragment of the mass. Hence the antipathies of sects threaten to tear society to pieces. The drawing apart into opposing camps of poor and rich, capitalist and worker, functionary and citizen, civilian and soldier, as well as the race enmity of white and black, or yellow and white, or Christian and Jew, summons society to act or perish. The folk mass becomes a dangerous compound ready to explode at a touch. Unless the all-inclusive group finds means to assimilate and reconcile its members and weaken the ties that bind men into minor groups, the social order will be disrupted. In the struggle for order, therefore, the group is not always pitted against the person, the social against the individual interest. It is often the big group against the little group, society against the sect or clan. And the danger is from fanatic and sectary, zealot and partisan, as well as from the egoist. Society must muzzle Jesuit and Mafiot, conspirator and anarchist, as well as the man of prey.¹

¹ See Scipio Sighele, "La psychologie des sectes."

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The equality that gives homesteaders or gold-diggers a few Arcadian days without bolt or bar, state or law, soon passes away. If there is any means whereby the Occidental with his private property and free enterprise can escape acute economic contrasts, he has not yet discovered it. The pristine pecuniary level gives place to the steepest inequalities in reward, possession, and inheritance. Equality before the law, political equality, religious equality,—these may delay but they cannot stop the progress of economic differentiation. But with this comes a greater need of control. On the different planes of worldly condition arise classes within which may form dangerous antagonistic sects unless connective institutions are provided. In a New Zealand aiming to realize a democratic fraternalism, conscience strikes its high noon. There the sentiments that make for spontaneous order are ever in spring tide, and the state has little of beak or claw. In an Italy or a Russia, on the other hand, the economic differentiation generates terrible forces which make the state a thing of iron and blood.

Private property is, in fact, a great transforming force which acts almost independently of the human will. It has an evolution of its own, and the time comes at last when it violently thrusts men apart, in spite of all their vows to draw closer together. As it warps society farther and farther from the pristine equality that brings out the best in human nature, there is need of artificial frames and webs that may hold the social mass together in spite of the rifts and seams that appear in it. Property is, therefore, the thing that calls into being *rigid* structures. It is the reagent that precipitates hard crystals, the lime that changes gristle into bone.

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Again, society dares not throw itself unreservedly into the arms of those sentiments that weave the natural order, so long as it closes within itself so many antinomies. There is the antinomy of inheritance. That transmitted wealth should give some persons a lifelong exemption from work and stress, is a stone of stumbling to the fair-play sense. Men are willing that life should be a race. But what kind of a race is it when some must run while others have the prizes without running at all? But if, to conciliate the disinherited, society were to deny the power of bequest, it would dash upon another difficulty. It would exasperate the strong who feel they have a right out of their success to shield their children from the struggle for existence. For what kind of a victory is it if the winner may not share the prize with his own flesh and blood?

The private ownership of income-producing property, such as land and capital, forces society upon another dilemma. Men are willing to be beaten in a "square" race. But how if some must run on foot, while the prizes are snatched by those having bicycles or autocars? In the issue of such a race the beaten do not heartily acquiesce. But if to appease them society should manage productive wealth for the common benefit, it would antagonize the strong, who feel that it is perfectly fair to use their winnings in one competition to insure their success in the next. The capable welcome all forms of struggle as their golden opportunity, and their sense of fair play is outraged when they are bound down under too many equalizing restrictions.

Even beneath the fair exterior of competition lurks an antinomy. What seems more appealing than "a fair field and may the best man win"? But what if the clubfooted man says, "Why should

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the possession of all the good things turn on the issue of this particular form of struggle? Why should speed be the criterion? That is just my weak point. If you make it strength and cunning, I can compete. But I will not enter this race of yours, nor will I respect its awards. It is not fair." It is idle to try to argue this man over. The only thing to do is to keep an eye on him. For it is undeniable that the actual competitive régime was never devised by the sense of justice, but is a balance struck between the aggressive and the conservative impulses of men. With a people of conservative temper the competition is not too keen and all who compete will get something at the close. With a people of aggressive temper like the Anglo-Saxons, the pace will be severe and the prizes will be big, even if they must in consequence be few.

The point of all this is that our institutions are not shaped by any one simple ethical principle that appeals to all men who are not bad. They are called into being to balance warring forces, and hence they enclose hopeless contradictions. Neither the present inequality, nor yet the artificial, carefully protected equality of the communistic state, can enlist the fair-play sentiments of all. With us the rebels and recalcitrants must therefore form a much greater percentage than those who made trouble in the emigrant trains, the mining camps, and the farm colonies of the Far West.¹ The social personality must control them if our social order is not to go down

¹ "When one considers the number of offences the perpetrators of which remain unknown, the number of which the offenders are known but one cannot, may not, or will not prosecute, and finally the number of faithless and immoral actions which do not fall within a legal definition, one must recognize that the convicted are only a little unlucky section of the vast army of delinquents. . . ." — Sighele, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 4.

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like a house of cards. A policy of *laissez-faire*, not in respect to law alone, but also in respect to education, public opinion, religion, and suggestion, would certainly tend to renew among us the confusion that prevailed in northern Europe in the seventh century.

If economic differentiation calls social control into being in the young societies of virgin lands, still more pressing must be the need of control in the mother countries. For nearly everywhere in Europe there is added to an economic differentiation more harsh than that of the New World, the deformation of the social body produced by an ancient ethnic inequality. The seeds of enmity were sown in the original constitution of most of the European societies. For they were formed by conquest; there is a race on top and a race driven down. The overlordships of Franks, Burgundians, Normans, Goths, Varangians, have left deep scars on the European peoples.¹ Nearly everywhere, at some time or another, the parasitic relation of races has been established, and, although it has been somewhat softened by time and obscured by the economic process, it has sown seeds of rancor and strife ready to spring up at the first careless moment.¹

The effect of conquest and the fastening of one race upon another as parasite is the razing of the natural community.² The violent superposition of people on people forbids the establishment of the primal moral bonds between the upper and the lower. In the composite society, therefore, order

¹ See Gumplowicz, "Der Rassenkampf."

² Among the peasants and burghers, on the one hand, and among the "gentle folk," on the other, there persists, however, a harmony and a willing mutual aid which is still largely natural.

See P. Kropotkin, "Mutual Aid in the Mediæval City," *Nineteenth Century*, August and September, 1894; "Mutual Aid amongst Modern Men," same periodical, January, 1896.

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seems to be wholly a creation of state and law, and its thinkers are apt to form too low an estimate of the social capabilities of human nature. Although the social fabric is at first held together by sheer force of arms, time gradually masks naked might, and moral and spiritual influences partly replace brute force. It is in the composite society, then, where the need of control is most imperative and unremitting, that the various instruments of regulation receive their highest form and finish. Here has been perfected the technique of almost every kind of control.

It may be that if society refrained from all control of its members, a natural order would arise. But such an order is crude and imperfect compared with artificial order, and the penalties of putting up with it are certain very grave and obvious general evils. Of a mining camp formed in 1884, near the Amoor, Mr. Kennan tells us: "In the camp at large every man who was not a member of an *artel* defended himself and his property as best he could, without regard to law or authority. For some months after the establishment of the camp there was no law except the law of might, and no recognized authority other than the will of the strongest; but as the feeling of solidarity, fostered by the *artels*, gradually permeated the whole mass of the population, an attempt was made to establish something like a general government. The logic of events had convinced both honest men and criminals that unless they secured life and property within the limits of the camp, they were all likely to starve to death in the course of the winter. Traders would not come there with food, and merchants would not open shops there, unless they could be assured of protection for themselves and safety for their goods."

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Accordingly, the miners held a general meeting, adopted a penal code, and appointed a committee of safety. "The effect of this action was to diminish for a time the frequency of robbery and murder, and greatly to increase the population and promote the prosperity of the camp. The news that a government had been organized and three *starostas* elected to maintain order and punish crime in the 'Chinese California' soon spread throughout eastern Siberia, and gave a fresh impetus to the tide of immigration across the Manchurian frontier." A better class of men arrived, merchants sent in caravans of horses and camels, laden with bales of dry goods, hardware, and provisions; amusement-purveyors of all sorts from the East Siberian towns joined in the universal rush, and before midwinter the camp had grown into a mining town of five thousand inhabitants.¹

In China "a lie is no disgrace; it is only disgraceful not to put a good 'face' on things. . . . The natural result is universal mistrust which places coöperation, without which even a pin cannot be economically made, largely out of the question." "Mines do not pay the proprietors because the laborers pilfer the production; cotton factories, because the mill hands carry off the raw material stowed away in their clothes. The most important Chinese companies are machines for wholesale misappropriation of funds." "Therefore it seems needless to seek for more speculative reasons for the want of enterprise of the Chinese, or for the well-known fact that they are willing to place their funds at low interest with foreign banks rather than trust their own countrymen on more tempting

¹ George Kennan, "A Russian Experiment in Self Government," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 80, p. 496.

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terms." "It is only by organized probity that we can compete with the Chinese."¹

It is, in fact, impossible to reap the advantages of high organization of any kind — military, political, industrial, commercial, educational — save by restraints of one kind or another. If the units of a society are not reliable, the waste and leakage on the one hand, or the friction due to the checks and safeguards required to prevent such loss on the other hand, prove so burdensome as to nullify the advantages of high organization and make complicated social machinery of any kind unprofitable.

Men are therefore in chronic need of better order than the natural moral motives will provide. At this point and at that point they gradually become sensible of a drag on their prosperity. They find themselves in the presence of a degree of discord, collision, and general unreliability which shuts them out of real material advantages. Better order becomes "a long-felt want," and it would be most surprising if this "demand" called forth no "supply." If in their collective capacity men did not find a means of guiding the will or conscience of the individual member of society, they would here betray a lack of enterprise they show nowhere else. The elementary personal struggle threatens the general prosperity just as the swollen river or the wildfire. And if men raise levees and fire-brakes against the natural forces, why not against the human passions? Provided it be possible, a group control of conduct is, therefore, just what we should look for. The wonder would be if it were lacking.

Most of us, it is true, are born with a certain fitness for order. Ages of social weathering have

¹ Colquhoun, "China in Transformation," pp. 256, 258.

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allowed a mantle of soft green to creep over the flint of animal ferocity and selfishness. But the layer of soil is too thin. The abundant fruits of righteousness we need to-day must grow on *made* soil. The primitive Teuton is to the modern what the frowning ledges along his Rhine are to the smiling vine-clad terraces into which human labor has transformed them.

An unremitting control is needed, for the moral habit of one generation does not become the instinct of the next. The sermons preached to our forefathers in the eleventh century would frequently fit us, so little has human nature changed. Thirty centuries of circumcision leaves no mark on Jewish babies. Cutting off the tails of mice for many generations does not create a tailless race. What the son of the sot inherits from his father is not the drink habit, but the nerve degeneracy that calls for stimulant. Eight and a half centuries ago, the confusion in Normandy was such that the "Truce of God" was proclaimed. Shall we ascribe the quiet of that fair land to-day to a *personal evolution* due to the gradual moulding of Norman character through twenty-five generations of discipline? Shall we not rather credit it to a *social evolution* which encloses the child of to-day in a civil régime and steeps him in influences that inspire the law-abiding disposition?

Protracted social control does not, then, qualify a race for order. The only thing that can enable society to dispense with control is some sort of favorable selection. The way to create a short-clawed feline is not to trim the claws of successive generations of kittens, but to pick out the shortest-clawed cats and to breed from them. Similarly it is only certain happy siftings that can shorten the claws of man. Even in a primitive Boisé or

CHAPTER VIII

THE DIRECTION OF SOCIAL CONTROL

As toward every deed there are three possible attitudes,—that of the doer, that of the sufferer, and that of the disengaged spectator,—so there are three bodies of feeling and opinion that work together in shaping social control; namely, that of those who wish to follow a certain line of conduct, that of those who are injured by such conduct, and that of the rest of the community. The second and third *impose* control, the first *limits* it.

In trying to make a man do or desist from something, society may be acting either as indignant bystander or as irate victim. Its policy may be inspired by moral disapprobation or by self-interest. We can account for the volume of existing constraint only by keeping in view *both* these factors. Neither factor by itself can generate all the control there is. Time and again thinkers have sought to interpret the imperatives and ideals in force at a given moment in terms of common sentiment.¹ Time and again thinkers have been fain to interpret them in terms of social utility.² But each of these mutually exclusive explanations

¹ See Adam Smith, "Theory of the Moral Sentiments," Vol. I, Part II, Sec. II, ch. iii; and Durkheim, "De la division du travail social," ch. ii.

² See von Ihering, "Der Zweck im Recht," Vol. II, pp. 177-215.

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has about it something strained and arbitrary. The fact is that society interferes with the course of the individual in some cases from sentiment and in other cases from self-interest.

The first service of sentiments like sympathy and the sense of justice is to enable a man to control himself. Their next service is to stir him up to control others. But in the social field this latter service is much the greater, seeing it employs far more of the total moral sentiment abroad in the community. Rare is the strength that can single-handed overcome temptation ; but common enough is that mild predilection for the right which is equal to supporting some one else under temptation. The affliction of weak knees does not, thank Heaven, debar us from triumphing over the frailties of others ! Nothing is more trite than the saying that he who cannot control himself is not fit to control others,—and nothing is more false. If only those were allowed to uphold standards who had demonstrated their ability to live up to them, how our reigning ideals would suffer ! What widespread blindness if no one might pick motes from his brother's eye until he had cleared his own optic !

Far from meriting sarcasm, the faculty of apprehending my neighbor's case so much better than my own deserves to be spoken well of. For the fact that the rôle of the referee is far easier than that of the principal, renders available for social control a vast amount of correct sentiment which is too weak to be effective for self-control. Just as in silver-mining the cyanide process permits the reduction of low-grade ores formerly unprofitable, so the method of mutual control turns to account a vast deal of flabby, anaemic sentiment, which hitherto has been of no use

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whatever in raising the general level of conduct. The invasion and overrunning of the will with custom, public opinion, suggestion, and the rest is in itself a guarantee of better things. It is chiefly the cool spectators, not the combatants, who have imposed humane rules on war. It is the bystanders, not the champions, who mainly deserve credit when the laws of the lists or the rules of the ring are observed. And this not because the bystander is a better man, but because he is in a less trying position. This is why "the voice of the people" is about as near as we can come to "the voice of God," whatever may be the practice of this same people.

When men constrain one another, conduct comes to be determined less by the individual as *agent* and more by the individual as *bystander*. And the views of the man standing by have the same moral superiority over the feelings of the man acting that the verdict of the reflective self has over that of the acting self. Moralists love to see the original fount of all goodness in the voice of the reflective, onlooking self, *i.e. the conscience*, and to make public opinion the unison of many such consciences. But it is more likely that the onlooking fellow-man had his say before the "spectator within the breast," and that conscience is the reflection of public opinion rather than public opinion the reflection of conscience. The early history of moral concepts certainly points in this direction. Says W. Robertson Smith, "The ideas of right and wrong among the Hebrews are forensic ideas; that is, the Hebrew always thinks of the right and the wrong as if they were to be settled before a judge. Righteousness is to the Hebrew not so much a moral quality as a legal status. The word 'righteous'

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(çaddîk) means simply 'in the right,' and the word 'wicked' (râshâ') means 'in the wrong.'"¹

First among requirements which have a sentimental basis are those which rest on the organic sentiments, and are directed against private acts which shock the deep-seated instincts of personal life. The energy with which most persons abhor offences against nature,—incest, abortion, prostitution, and drunkenness,—causes these practices to be discouraged by the more impulsive kinds of social pressure, even when they do no harm to the corporate interest.

The social frown is bent on idleness, senseless luxury, wilful waste, and wanton destruction of one's own property, not because such courses may make the culprit a charge on the community, but because they outrage the common man's instincts of economy and thrift.

In another field of control we perceive the religious sentiment at work. At sundry times and places the liveliest reprobation has attached to touching an object *tabû*, eating an impure animal, letting die the sacred fire, failing to offer the proper sacrifice, neglecting the sanctuary, losing vestal chastity, or ignoring the rules of ceremonial cleanliness. If sympathy with the affronted divinity no longer leads us to repress unbelief, impiety, or sacrilege, it is more from indifference than from our ideas of toleration. The increasing liberty of conscience appears to be due not so much to a livelier sense of the injustice of persecution, as to the decay of the religious sentiments in energy and range.

Elsewhere we encounter repressions which betray the energy of the sentiment of sympathy.

¹ "The Prophets of Israel," pp. 71, 72.

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Here belong the injunctions not to "seethe a kid in its mother's milk," and not to "muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn," the punishment of cruelty to animals, the suppression of infanticide, the protection of the dead from desecration, the excess and exquisiteness of the torture meted out by early peoples to the murderer of father or mother.

But more important than the sympathy of onlookers with the suffering of the victim of wrong, is their power to enter into and share his resentment. In what may be called *the sympathetic functioning of the sense of injustice* we have a motive to disinterested interference which is of the highest importance in the evolution of order. Sympathy alone makes for *helpfulness*. The sense of injury makes for *retaliation*. But their *interaction* yields that "moral indignation" which leads a community to interfere in quarrels or aggressions that in no way harm it. To this force is due, in a measure, that gradual encroachment of society on private action which is registered in the progressive transformation of wrongs or torts into crimes.

But in giving collective sentiment its full due we have not therewith supplied the clew to the direction of control. For the key to the interpretation of social pressure is, after all, not righteous impulse but utility. Though the surface is troubled by the cross-currents of sentiment, the tidal movements in the struggle of the many with the one betray the influence of self-interest. The man on Mars who should undertake to forecast the contents of our terrestrial codes would do better to deduce from interests than to work out from sentiments. An acquaintance with the conditions that favor the smooth running of social machinery would be of more use to him than a knowledge of the human heart.

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Like the hypothesis that storks bring babies, the theory that the moral instincts beget control has a distressing lack of finality. But how the mystery lights up when we reach the idea of *society*, — a something distinct from a bunch of persons! For we can regard this society as a living thing, actuated, like all the higher creatures, by the instinct of self-preservation. Social control, then, appears as one of the ways in which this living thing seeks to keep itself alive and well. Or, we can regard this society as a person having its good and its evil and a knowledge of this good and evil. And social control would be the limitation that the social ego for its own sake imposes upon the freedom of the individual ego. In either view society is seen to take action not as bystander but as interested party. The conduct it frowns on is that which in the long run hurts it; the conduct it smiles on is that which in the long run helps it. Laws and imperatives would be — as in fact we find them — neither uniform nor immutable, but adapted to the situation in which society happens to find itself. To explain a régime like Sparta's, for instance, — common meals, obligatory bodily exercises, a personal ideal exalting frugality, courage, and "grit," — we should look into the situation of the Spartan community, a small army encamped amid a great malcontent slave population, rather than into the psychology of the Dorian race it sprang from.

There are several reasons why the practical nature of most control does not show on the surface. Since the exercise of social discipline is often attended with much heat and emotion, the sentiment that effects a particular reaction frequently hides from us the origin and meaning of that class of social reactions. Again, society in managing the individual assumes a disinterested

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air, and speaks to him with the language of sentiment rather than with the language of interest; for it would be bad policy openly to pit its interest against his. In the third place, ignorance and superstition adapt requirements not to the real, but to the supposed, interests of society. If the prosperity of the tribe is held to be bound up with the favor of its god, self-interest will prove as intolerant as pious sentiment. Says Bagehot, "When the street statues of Hermes were mutilated, all the Athenians were frightened and furious; they thought that they should *all* be ruined because some *one* had mutilated a god's image and so offended him."¹ In like manner Puritanic outbursts against private vice are caused by the belief that not the individual, but the people as a whole, is judged and chastised for its sins.²

Furthermore, as social commands are adapted to social needs not so much by conscious thought as by a slow and hidden process in the deeps of the folk mind, they frequently outlive the conditions that called them into being. Retaining their authority after their usefulness has utterly departed, they confuse the observer and hide from him the real meaning of social control.

Finally, the tenor of control changes from time to time. The life of a given society reveals a bewildering series of metamorphoses in laws, moral standards, and personal ideals. And one might well hesitate to connect the changes in the legality or morality of slavery, insolvency, usury, heresy, or polygamy, with changes in the requisites of the social welfare. But the Social Person that controls is not the folk mass, but an organiza-

¹ "Physics and Politics," p. 103.

² Patten, "The Development of English Thought," p. 124.

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tion of distinctive elements of the population in a particular way, and there are always influences at work altering the value of these constituent elements, and hence altering the prevailing notion of the social welfare. Let plebs, burghers, non-conformists, Puritans, working men, or women, gain in social value, and both law and morals will run more in their favor. Moreover, as the state is more composite and egoistic than the public, these changes in the value of social constituents are registered more clearly in *law*, the will of the state, than in *morals*, the will of the public.

Although such considerations may lead us to suspect the deep meaning in regulation, it is our duty to review the positive reasons for connecting social control with the social order.

The struggle between groups of men involves a testing of the codes and moralities that govern them, and must in the long run conduce to the triumph of those codes and moralities which strengthen the group over those which do not. In Persia, Servia,¹ or the South American states, we see how bad standards and low ideals sap the life of the society that supports them.

In the second place, the search for "the spirit of laws," which since the days of Montesquieu has engrossed many of the highest minds, shows that the legal code is connected with the institutions and needs of society by bonds which we find closer and more numerous, the farther we go beneath the surface. Let a typical instance of this suffice. The original basis of an action for breach of contract in Roman law was *res*, the thing given. Later, it was *verbum*, the promise received. This evolution which the earlier historical jurists at-

¹ See Von Sydcoff, "Die Corruption in Serbien."

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tributed to a clarifying and refining of popular ideas of right—sentimental explanation—is now put down to the development of Roman society, which made the need of enforcing promises by law increasingly felt.¹

A like change in point of view can be detected in the historians of morals. For instance the disappearance of the municipal houses of prostitution in Germany in the sixteenth century has often been credited to the moral awakening of Reformation times; but the latest historian of German morals lays it to the frightful ravages of syphilis. And the shameless public bath-houses vanished at about the same time, owing to the dearness of fuel! As active causes in the improvement of German public morality, he finds political, economic, dogmatic, æsthetic, and intellectual forces; but never an ethical force.² In line with this is von Ihering's suggestion that both monogamy and the stability of the marriage tie are habits that became fixed among the Aryan peoples during their great migrations. The former he traces to the control of the food supply by the host, the latter to the reluctance of women to set out from home with the wanderers without some guarantee of security.

A crucial test of the rival theories of sentiment and utility is afforded by comparing group with individual morality. If society binds rules on its members in obedience to the moral law written on the heart, it will observe these rules in its own conduct. If, on the other hand, it imposes these rules on the individual in its own interest, it will refuse

¹ Von Ihering, "Entwickelungs-geschichte des Römischen Rechts."

² Rudeck, "Geschichte der öffentlichen Sittlichkeit in Deutschland," p. 422.

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to be bound by them. Being at once author and beneficiary of requirements, it will not permit them to hamper it in its own dealings.

Now, what are the facts? The facts support the law that *public morality is lower than private morality*. International dealings are more unprincipled than domestic dealings. The Christian nation surpasses the heathen nation less than the Christian man surpasses the heathen man. The state is more rapacious and perfidious than it will allow its citizens to be. Hence diplomats, statesmen, warriors, ecclesiastics, and public men continually do in their official capacity that which they will not stoop to in their private life.¹ Society authorizes, nay, even expects of its agent practices which it forbids them to use in their own behalf. It bids the statesman steal for it, the diplomat lie for it, the spy betray for it, the soldier kill for it; yet it will condemn them if they do such things for themselves. Statesmen have always sought exemption from the moral code and pleaded the need of a special standard. We now see that they simply reflect the morality of the master they serve.

The fact is, every group of men exhibits a morality corresponding to its place in the hierarchy of groups. The more big groups there are above it the more obligations it recognizes. The nearer it is to the top the purer its egoism. Many nepotists, sectaries, and partisans are simply victims of one of these unscrupulous group moralities. Adherents of sects — anarchists, Jesuits, Jacobins, *émigrés* — are induced by the sect ego to commit crimes they would not commit for themselves. So

¹ Proal, "Political Crime," Ch. II; Sighele, "La psychologie des sectes," pp. 104 *et seq.*

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clear is this that criminologists have put such criminals in a class by themselves.¹ Now society is the all-inclusive association. It limits the self-assertion of the minor groups, but is not limited in turn. Accordingly, its egoism is the more perfect, and in its preaching as in its practices it is likely to keep in view its own interest.

Of like significance is the *ethical dualism* that prevails before the advent of universal religions. Says Dr. Brinton: "All tribal religions preach a dualism of ethics, one for the members of the tribe who are bound together by ties of kinship and by union to preserve existence; and the other, for the rest of the world. To the former are due aid, kindness, justice, truth, and fair dealing; to the latter, enmity, hatred, injury, falsehood, and deceit. The latter is just as much a duty as the former, and is just as positively enjoined by both religion and tribal law."²

Let us now review the shares of sentiment and interest in the various codes.

Of all the controls that impinge upon the individual that of the Crowd is the most aimless, arbitrary, and capricious. The crowd stands for the common man in his most unreasonable mood, and hence its rule is marked by impatience of contradiction, contempt for individual rights, and destruction of personal freedom.

In purpose and sanity the Moral Code, which embodies the injunctions of public opinion, stands far higher than the behests of the crowd. The Public is the people organized about natural centres of influence, and hence guided in a measure by time and wisdom. Its control is therefore less

¹ Sighele, "La foule criminelle" and "La psychologie des sectes."

² D. G. Brinton, "The Religion of Primitive Peoples," p. 228.

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emotional and better fitted to protect common interests against particular interests.

The norms comprised under Custom possess a certain presumptive fitness, seeing they have been winnowed by time and slowly shaped by social needs. But the needs they serve are those of the past, and if society comes into new situations the norms of custom may prove exceedingly ill-adapted. Moreover, the dictates of custom are enforced by veneration of the time-hallowed and horror of the new, perhaps of all the sentiments that inspire control the ones most remote from any rational purpose.

Quite apart in its purport stands the Religious Code. In some respects religion is well qualified to be the custodian of the obscure and permanent interests of society. Often those requirements of the religious code which outrun the common moral sentiment are directed to the preservation of fundamental institutions—such as the relations of the sexes, marriage, paternal authority, property, etc.—which do not appeal immediately to the feelings of the public. The reason is that a church, even when it is lay and democratic, gives more weight to the superior few and sets more store by the garnered wisdom of the ages than does the public. At its best, then, the church shows a truly statesmanlike intuition of the laws of collective life. But behind the control of the devout lurks a very masterful and dangerous sentiment, namely, sympathy with the divinity's abhorrence of sin. When the god happens to be an ethical god who will have mercy and not sacrifice, and loves judgment better than the melody of viols, this sentiment is salutary enough. But in many cults the god is a potentate, eager for his due of praise and honorific observance.

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Hence, the worshipper's sympathy with the mortification and wrath of the slighted divinity against the undevout, drives him to excesses of Puritanic zeal. So that the religious code, receiving a false direction, wastes, in repressing swearing, Sabbath-breaking, heresy, and unbelief, energies which ought to be turned against anti-social conduct.

Of all the controls, that of the State is the least sentimental because the state is an organization that puts the wise minority in the saddle. In spite of the not infrequent ascendancy of the class interest over the social interest, the state aims more steadily at a rational safeguarding of the collective welfare than any organ society has yet employed.

Prescribed as they are by a special body and enforced by special agents, the rules of the law differ in no small degree from the rules of morality. When the legal code refuses to go with the moral code, it is usually because the state sees no social harm in personal vices that common sentiment condemns.¹

When, on the other hand, the legal code extends beyond the moral code, it will be found that the insight of picked men has descried evils and dangers to the general weal, not yet realized in the common consciousness. Law being the most progressive department of control, conduct that harms society in new ways is made crime before it has had time to become wrong or sin; and fine and imprisonment is visited upon an offence that brings, as yet, neither blame nor shame.²

¹ Whether it will be possible to persuade public opinion to a like abstention is an open question. See J. S. Mill, "On Liberty," chs. iv and v; Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," ch. iv.

² In enactments against the tapping of telegraph wires, the stealing of rides on a railroad, the getting on or off cars in motion,

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The varying proportions of sympathy and interest in the different branches of regulation obey the general law that *a Social Ego emerges in the degree to which collective opinion is elaborated and organized.* Illustrations of this truth lie on every hand. It is democracies that are the most active in humanitarian legislation. "The people" are the readiest to respond to a generous proposal. In every organization of national opinion the bottom is more radical on purely moral questions than the top. If we would mark the moral plane of an age, we look to the common people and not to the hierarchies. For progressive views as to the rights of slaves, foreigners, enemies, or the lower races, we appeal to the intuitions of common men,¹ and not to the spokesmen of highly organized bodies of sentiment, such as Church, Army, Trade, State, or "Society." It is to the masses, and not to the classes, that one must protest against national wrong-doing.

Who in quest of a universal rule of right would hearken to high priest, metropolitan, archbishop, or consistory? The proneness of a national church to champion its country against other countries, right or wrong, is proverbial. Whatever the sentiment absorbed at the bottom, there issues from the top a blend of the gospel of enmity and the gospel of amity which is foolishness to the natural man, but strictly consistent from a corporate point

the killing of game out of season, the sale of cigarettes to minors, the soliciting of divorce business by advertisement, the tampering with an electric metre or with an automatic ballot machine, the use of a bakery for sleeping purposes, and the bestowal of favors by quasi-public companies on public officials, our states have shown themselves able to keep pace with changing needs. See Barrows, "New Crimes and Penalties," *Forum*, January, 1900.

¹ Saving always, be it remembered, the initiative of the Remnant or Elite.

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of view. In the same nation the nonconforming sects—dissenters, *raskolniks*, pietists,—starting from the same level of Christian sentiment, come to a different conclusion from the established church because the lay sentiment is less sophisticated.

CHAPTER IX

THE RADIANT POINTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

A CONTROL that we have any right to call *social* has behind it practically the whole weight of society. But still this control often wells up and spreads out from certain centres which we might term *the radiant points of social control*. Uniform as it is to the eye, the social substance when tested resolves itself into froth and liquid, into chaff and wheat, into protoplasm and nuclei. Our task now is to fix upon the nuclei that determine the principal lines social control may take. In plain terms, the question before us is, What is the ultimate seat of authority? Where resides the will that guides the social energies? Who hold the levers which set in motion the social checks or stimuli that hold a man back or push him on?

That frequently these checks and stimuli are managed by a rather small knot of persons should not for a moment lead the reader to confuse social control with class control. Often enough, indeed, a minority, in virtue of its superior strength, courage, craft, or organization, seizes the reins of power; but such domination always entails a rupture of social consciousness. While outwardly there is but one society, there are in reality two or more societies which happen to interpenetrate as to substance. Between leaders and led, there is a bond of good-will and trust. Between drones and

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workers, parasites and hosts, come distrust and hate, and their clash of interests is liable to pass at any moment into the clash of arms. In history the relations of Venetians and Cypriotes, Normans and Sicilians, Franks and Gauls, betray the presence of class control.

Totally different from class control in origin is the power of a minority to direct social control. Each category of people in society has its own point of view, and consequently its own way of envisaging the problems of conduct. Now, one of these views can prevail only in case the others are withdrawn. If a class finds itself leading the march at the head of the social procession, it is only because the other classes have more confidence in it than they have in themselves. *Social power is concentrated or diffused in proportion as men do or do not feel themselves in need of guidance or protection.*¹ When it is concentrated it lodges in that class of men in which the people feel the most confidence. The many transfer their allegiance from one class to another—from elders to priests, or from priests to savants—when their supreme need changes, or when they have lost confidence in the old guidance. When they begin to feel secure and able to cope with evils in their own strength and wisdom, the many resume self-direction and the monopoly of social power by the few ceases.

Such is the underlying law of the transformations and displacements of power. The immediate cause of the location of power is prestige. The class that has the most prestige will have the most power. The prestige of numbers gives ascendancy to the crowd. The prestige of age gives it to the

¹ See G. Tarde, "Les transformations du pouvoir," ch. iii.

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elders. The prestige of *prowess* gives it to the war chief, or to the military caste. The prestige of *sanctity* gives it to the priestly caste. The prestige of *inspiration* gives it to the prophet. The prestige of *place* gives it to the official class. The prestige of *money* gives it to the capitalists. The prestige of *ideas* gives it to the élite. The prestige of *learning* gives it to the mandarins. The absence of prestige and the faith of each man in himself gives weight to the individual and reduces social control to a minimum.

In some cases there exists an appropriate name for the régime. When the priest guides, we call it *clericalism*. When the fighting caste is deferred to, we call it *militarism*. When the initiative lies with the minions of the state, we call it *officialism*. The leadership of the moneyed men is *capitalism*. That of the men of ideas is *liberalism*. The reliance of men upon their own wisdom and strength is *individualism*.

These distinctions, I need hardly add, are far deeper than distinctions, like *aristocracy*, *monarchy*, *republic*, which relate merely to the form of government. For the location of social power expresses much more truly the inner constitution of society than does the location of political power. And so the shiftings of power within the state, far from having causes of their own, are apt to follow and answer to the shiftings of power within society. Yet since political power is palpable and lies near the surface of things, political science long ago ascertained its forms and laws; while social power, lying hidden in the dim depths, has hardly even yet drawn the attention of social science.

When picked men flock together in a settlement or mining camp, authority resides at first in the Crowd. The mass is the sole seat of social power,

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and the mass meeting, in which one man is as good as another, expresses the will of the community. When in the course of time neighbors learn to know and appraise one another, men of superior character, sagacity, or disinterestedness come to influence their fellows more than they are influenced by them. The seat of the common will, then, is no longer the crowd, but the Public. In this organization of minds every man counts for something, but one man does not always count for as much as another.

When, on the other hand, a group is formed by the natural increase of families, the first seat of authority is the Elders. The long years of dependence on the parent make it difficult even for grown sons to throw off the paternal yoke. This prestige of the father becomes the prestige of *age* when ancestor worship teaches men that the old stand nearest to the Unseen, and will themselves soon become spirits, able to ban or to bless.

Like the kinship bond, the ascendancy of the elders is all but universal in the childhood of societies. But one place where the graybeard is always at a disadvantage is in the fight. So when, as with lusty barbarians, fighting becomes the chief business of life, the war leader quite outshines the council of elders. Prowess finally surpasses age in prestige, just as from the same cause the bond of comradeship becomes stronger than the tie of blood. Warriors of fine qualities and brilliant exploits get together the biggest bands for foray, and so are able to amass wealth, keep retainers, and get looked upon as "noble." In the days of permanent conquest these men of social power become the captains of the host, the heads of the state, and the sole possessors of political power.

It is clear, then, that the Military Caste does not

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get social weight just because it is able to bully the rest of the people. Terrify men and they cling to the skirts of those powerful to save. When violence is loose the hind creeps under the castle wall, the trembling burgher pours out his florins for protection, and the Soldier strikes the dominant note in social opinion. When peace makes broad her wings the fighting man, becoming less necessary, becomes less influential.

In proportion as men do not understand the play of natural forces, they are likely to connect their fate with the good-will or the ill-will of unseen beings. If now, in an ignorant age, among imaginative men who see pain, disease, and death lurking on every hand, there arises a class of men who claim to enjoy high consideration with these unseen beings, that class will acquire enormous social power. Whether or not they finger the machinery of the state, their curse will be dreaded, their commands obeyed, and their intercessions sought by all men. It is no wonder, then, that the Priesthood, which in the civilized Roman Empire was the minister of society, became its master when this organization of intelligent men had only benighted, fanciful barbarians to deal with. The fact that between the sixth and the thirteenth centuries about one-third of the soil of Europe passed by free offering into the hands of religious corporations, while the best talent of the age turned to the monastic life, tells what confidence men had in the supernatural powers of the sacred caste.

The layman is far less supple to the will of the priest if there lie to hand written directions and formulas for controlling or pleasing the Unseen. An open Sacred Book, therefore, has saved both the Jew and the Mohammedan from the excesses of priestly domination ; and when Luther and the

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Reformers sought to break the sacerdotal spell, they gave men the Bible, and bade them look therein for the way of life.

After safety from foes and from the Unseen, man's next desire is for the security of his daily bread. For most men this depends upon the willingness of some one to buy their wares or their labor, *i.e.* upon *patronage*. The Wealthy, then, who, as luxurious idlers, spend money and make trade, or, as captains of industry and lords of enterprise, employ the labor and organize the prosperity of kingdoms, will never be without great social power. From the dependence of the working many upon the moneyed few flows a patronal authority which sends its tinge far into law, religion, morals, and policy. For when any class of men play the part of earthly Providence to the multitude, their views as to what ought to be praised or blamed, commanded or forbidden, cannot but affect the character of social control.

The State is, in theory at least, a channel and not a source of control. It is supposed to be a device by which social power is collected, transmitted, and applied *so as to do work*. But, as a matter of fact, the state, when it becomes paternal and develops on the administrative side, is able in a measure to guide the society it professes to obey. With its hierarchy of officials and its army of functionaries, the state gets a glamour of its own, and becomes an independent centre of social power. And here again we can see that such a concentration of influence is a measure of man's need and trust. For the prestige of officialdom is not wholly a matter of numbers and pay. The more the state helps the citizen when he cannot help himself, protecting him from disease, foes, criminals, rivals abroad and monopolists at home,

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the more he will look to it for guidance. While, conversely, the more he uses it merely as a convenient alternative to self-help or free association, the less will he accept its lead.¹

Another radiant point in society is the Mandarinate, or the body of scholarly or learned men who have in some formal way been tested, accredited, and labelled. Such are the mandarins of China, the pundits of India, the *Gelehrte* of Germany, the academicians and professors in France, the clergy of non-sacerdotal bodies like the Reformed churches, and the rabbis of the Jewish congregations. The mandarinate ought to include the wisest and best in society ; but the false worth that attaches to purely conventional learning, and the sifting and promoting of the learned by tests that are artificial and futile, are likely to prevent it.

The Élite, or those distinguished by ideas and talent, are the natural leaders of society, inasmuch as their ascendancy depends on nothing false or factitious. Usually they appear as a small knot of persons who, united by allegiance to some group of ideas, are able to persuade the majority without allowing themselves, in turn, to be infected by vulgar prejudices. The Greek Philosophers, the Stoics, the Fathers, the Schoolmen, the Humanists, the Reformers, the Pietists, the Encyclopædist, the Liberals, are examples of an active leaven able to leaven the whole lump.

Finally, there is the Genius, who, as founder of religion, prophet, reformer, or artist, is able to build up a vast personal authority and sway the multitude at pleasure. Society can dispense with the guidance of the Élite and the genius only when the way is straight and the path is clear. A

¹ See Pearson, "National Life and Character," pp. 236-239.

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people creeping gradually across a vast empty land, as we Americans have been doing this century, may safely belittle leadership and deify the spirit of self-reliance. But when population thickens, interests clash, and the difficult problems of mutual adjustment become pressing, it is foolish and dangerous not to follow the lead of superior men.

The impulses streaming out from each of the eight principal centres we have described do not, of course, meet a perfectly yielding mass. The power of the Few to take the rôle of social cerebrum depends entirely upon how far the Many capitulate to it. The radiation of control from the elders is limited by the reaction of the young men, that from the priests is limited by the reaction of the laity, that from the bureaucracy is limited by the reaction of the citizens, that from the élite is limited by the reaction of the vulgar. When the energy of the resistance comes to equal that of the impulses, the class ceases to be a controlling centre and loses itself in the social mass.

What keeps social commands from multiplying and choking up life, as the rank growth of swamp weed chokes up watercourses, is, of course, the resistance of the individual. Naturally a man prefers to do as he pleases, and not as society pleases to have him do. The more, then, that social power dwells in the mass of persons whose necks are galled by social requirement, the more the yoke of the law will be lightened. On the other hand, the more distinct those who apply social pressure from those who must bear it, the more likely is regulation to be laid on lavishly in obedience to some class ideal. Hence we arrive at the law that *the volume of social requirement will be greater when social power is concentrated than when it is diffused.*

When the laws, standards, and ideals a man is

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required to conform to, spring up among the plain people, they will be ahead of the community, but not very far ahead. But when they originate with the few, they may be very far in advance of the community and so hurrying it forward, or they may be far in the rear and hence holding it back. It is a well-known fact that we never find a legal or moral code pitched high above the natural inclination of a people without signs of minority domination. It is safe, then, to frame the law, *the greater the ascendancy of the few, the more possible is it for social control to affect the course of the social movement.*

Social control takes the tinge of the source from which it springs. When the reverend seniors monopolize power, much will be made of filial respect and obedience, infanticide will be a small offence, while parricide will be punished with horrible torments. Let the priests get the upper hand, and chastity, celibacy, humility, unquestioning belief, and scrupulous observance will be the leading virtues. The ascendancy of the military caste shifts the accent to obedience, loyalty, pugnacity, and sensitiveness to personal honor. When the moneyed man holds the baton, we hear much of industriousness, thrift, sobriety, probity, and civility. The mandarins and *literati* have no moral programme of their own, but they are sure to exalt reverence for order, precedent, and rank. The élite, whatever ideal they champion, will be sure to commend the ordering of one's life according to ideas and principles, rather than according to precedent and tradition. For only by fostering the radical spirit can they hope to lead men into untrodden paths. We may, then, lay it down as a law that *the character of social requirement changes with every shifting of social power.*

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Classes differ in readiness to twist social control to their own advantage. Elders, élite, or genius have rarely abused their social power. But ecclesiasticism claims exemptions and privileges for the clergy, makes the word of the priest binding even when he is living in open sin, and grants for money indulgence to commit the most horrible crimes. When the fighting caste guides social opinion, it is permissible to mulct the husbandman and the merchant, and to condone the violence and sensuality of the men of the camp. Under the ascendancy of the rich and leisured, property becomes more sacred than person, moral standards vary with pecuniary status, and it is felt that "God will think twice before He damns a person of quality." In general, *the more distinct, knit together, and self-conscious the influential minority, the more likely is social control to be colored with class selfishness.*

If we examine the causes that have lightened the yoke of control in America and fostered a notable growth of individualism, we find a striking confirmation of the foregoing principles.

It is not natural for men of a vigorous Northern breed to bend the neck. The monopoly of social power by warrior, priest, or capitalist flows from certain conditions, and may be expected to disappear when these conditions disappear. Now, the men who built up society in the New World were in every way encouraged to rely upon themselves. Their only enemies, the red men, could be fought individually and did not call into being a military caste. The Bible charted the Unseen for them, and so fortified them against priestcraft. Free schools limited the ascendancy of the learned clan. Free land enabled them to employ themselves, and they did not learn to look up to the rich as the foun-

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tain of their earthly blessings. The direct management of their own affairs through the town meeting saved them from officialdom. Even the élite were not indispensable, for the problems of their simple farmers' society were to ours what short division is to quadratic equations.

The consequences have been just what one might expect. The community has become too often the prey of individuals. In the absence of prestige and reverence, social control, the control of the many over the one, has been pared down so far as to permit, too often, the counter aggression of the one upon the many. The reaction of the led upon the leaders has been more marked here than in the Old World. The democratic spirit that accompanies a diffusion of social power has set on all our institutions the stamp of liberty and self-government. That these characteristics do not flow from some peculiar merit of our own is shown by the fact that when, as in Australia, like conditions recur, the results are much the same as here.

It will be interesting to mark how the powerful democratic tradition that has grown up in this country meets the adverse conditions of the century we are just entering on. For there are no noteworthy present developments in American society that make for a still greater diffusion of social power; while there are several that tend to centre it in certain classes. As we cease to be so much a farming people, and as in almost every branch of industry the independent producer gives way to some Titanic organization, the sense of dependence on the business magnate, the employer, and the capitalist is sure to favor the growth of patronal power. The moneyed man, as he comes more and more to predominate in matters economic, can hardly fail to gain in social weight.

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Again, in order to protect ourselves against the lawlessness, the insolence, and the rapacity of overgrown private interests, we shall have to develop the state, especially on its administrative side. This implies the formation of an official body which is sure to become a seat of social power.

In the third place, we cannot hope, with our utmost efforts, to improve our free schools fast enough to keep pace with the increasing complexity of social relations and the growing reliance on special knowledge. As higher education, claiming more and more years of one's life, widens the space between those who possess it and those who do not, and as the enlightenment of the public wanes relatively to the superior enlightenment of the learned castes and professions, the mandarinate will infallibly draw to itself a greater and greater share of social power.

PART II

THE MEANS OF CONTROL



CHAPTER X

PUBLIC OPINION

“You call these toys? Well, you manage men with toys!” These words of Napoleon regarding the ribbons and crosses of his Legion of Honor fitly introduce a study of the rôle of public opinion in the ordering of human life. In the spontaneous reaction of the community against conduct that displeases it, it is possible to distinguish different forces and different sanctions. *Public Judgment* is the opinion the public pronounces upon an act as to whether it is good or bad, noble or ignoble. *Public Sentiment* is the feeling of admiration or abhorrence, respect or derision, expressed by the public with regard to an act. *Public Action* comprises those measures, other than mere manifestations of opinion or sentiment, taken by the public in order to affect conduct. Any or all of these will be referred to by the general term “Public Opinion.” To these three forces roughly correspond the sanctions of *opinion*, the sanctions of *intercourse*, and the sanctions of *violence*.

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On the plane of instinctive life, the doing and the approving of an act go inseparably together, and praise and blame are without power. But when the inner figuring of one's self and one's doings has become habitual, when, in other words, the stage of self-consciousness is entered on, there appears in the soul a rift which admits the thin end of the social wedge. When a man's opinion of himself begins to uplift or distress him, vanity and shame are certain to arrive, and in the growing abundance of ornament, the archæologist can mark their advent in the life of prehistoric man.

The opinion an individual has of himself and his doings, like all judgments not grounded on the perceptions of the senses, is greatly affected by suggestion. Haman is at the mercy of Mordecai. Rarely can one regard his deed as fair when others find it foul, or count himself a hero when the world deems him a wretch. The first hold of a man's fellows is, therefore, their power to set him against himself, and to stretch him on the rack of whatever ideas of excellence he may possess. The coarse, vital man may ignore the social stigma. The cultivated man may take refuge from the scorn of his neighbors in the opinion of other times and circles; but for the mass of men, the blame and the praise of their community are the very lords of life.¹

The sanctions of intercourse lie next to hand.

¹ But peoples and times differ in amenability to opinion. The more one looks to Divine approval the less store one sets by praise and blame. The Greeks of classic times, having no hope beyond the grave, were avid of praise. Hence, a furious eagerness for distinctions, laurel wreaths, monuments, inscriptions, eulogies. See A. de Ridder, "De l'idée de la mort en Grèce," p. 23. In times of scepticism, ferment, and new life, men being less guided by old standards look more to the opinion of their fellows. Such were the Renaissance, the Elizabethan age, and the Revolutionary epoch in France.

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The slight displeasure of one's neighbors shows itself in coldness and avoidance. The offender loses the outer circle of his associates and misses the social consideration he is accustomed to. With greater irritation there appears an active section of the public aggressively propagating their disapproval of him. The cut direct, the open snub, the patent slight, the glancing witticism, are in order. In graver cases, the offender must face such collective manifestations of feeling, as the cat-calls of the street, the taunts of the corner loafers, the hoots of the mob, the groans of the regiment, the hiss of the audience, or the stony silence of the dinner company. Moreover, the regular organs of the public—the pulpit, the press, the caricature, the topical song, the poster, the lampoon, the resolutions of societies and public bodies—help give vent to its indignation.

But the climax is reached when society invades the family of the offender. Though affection is the chief family bond, yet it is rarely the case that the actual relations of the members do not involve ideas as to right and duties, support and loyalty, rule and obedience, created and stamped upon their minds by the authority of society. But so far as this is true, it is possible to destroy these ties. If wife or child be impressively assured that the loyalty and obedience, once a duty, is now a sin, they may be detached from the man who has incurred the extreme hatred of his fellows. When thus the nearest and dearest have recoiled in horror, the full might of public opinion has been made manifest. Farther in this direction it is impossible to go.

But one can suffer in his *economic intercourse* as well as in his *social intercourse*. One lives to-day by the practice of coöperation at various removes

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from the self-sufficing stage of industry. Most of one's well-being comes through coöperations that are advantageous to both parties, some comes as aid that benefits one but does not burden the other, and some comes in the way of succor and implies a sacrifice. Now the instinct of an angry community is to refuse coöperation. First to be withheld are neighborly offices; then "accommodations" cease; finally, even the coöperations of mutual benefit are refused. The merchant loses his customers, the clergyman his parish, the clerk his office, the lawyer his clients, the laborer his job. This may go on till boycotting tradesmen refuse to sell an egg, a loaf, or a candle to him who is under the ban. Thus one by one are severed the roots that spread into the social soil, little by little the ligature is tightened, till communication ceases and the dead member drops from the social body.

Beyond the sanctions of intercourse lie the *positive physical sanctions* which in all civilized societies have been handed over to the organs of the law. This partition is, however, the outcome of a long evolution. The primitive public, knowing nothing of "individual rights" or "sacredness of the person," draws no firm line between passive and active punishment, between the refusal to esteem, communicate with, or aid, and the infliction of bodily pain. When men relapse into that most primitive combination, the mob, they stick at no violence, and without compunction stone the prophets or cut Hypatia to pieces with shells. Even now in new communities, ere the legal habit is formed, the occasional resort to egging, whipping, branding, riding on a rail, running out of town, tarring and feathering, or lynching, reminds us that the General Will is anterior to law, and that

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the forbearing public opinion we have made one of the props of order is, as it were, the core of a stump from which slab after slab has been removed.

The gamut of rewards employed by the public corresponds to its gamut of punishments. Minor acts meet recognition in unusual cordiality, in greater deference, in a more bountiful hospitality. If the service is greater, the hero becomes the lion of the social circle and finds haughty patricians vying for his company. Honorary offices and titles, membership in exclusive societies, the freedom of cities, are his. Medals and decorations, swords, snuff-boxes, memorials, and resolutions, are showered upon him. Place is made for him, and helping hands lift him into a position he could not hope to attain competitively. In many ways, the returned veteran, the heroic fireman, the brave engineer, or the devoted physician may find facilitation.

The rewards of public opinion are naturally most lavishly employed when society is most in need of services that cannot be got with ordinary material inducements, *i.e.* in war time. While punishment or disgrace may be used to enforce a certain level of deed, it is necessary to distinguish by praise and favor all achievements of valor or fortitude rising above this plane. The stimulus that a discriminating public can supply, by marking with due care and instant recognition every service out of the ordinary, is incalculable.

Such are the sanctions in the hand of the public. Let us now examine the merits and demerits of public opinion, comparing it especially with law, the most formidable engine of control employed by society.

Public opinion has the advantage of a *wide*

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gamut of influences. By thus supplementing the coarse and rough sanctions of the law, society avoids putting itself into such undisguised opposition to a man's wishes, and is not so likely to raise the spirit of rebellion. Its blame does not exclude moral suasion, and its ban does not renounce all appeal to the feelings.

Public opinion is *less mechanical* in operation than law.¹ The public can weigh provocation better, and can take into account condoning or aggravating circumstances of time, place, motive, or office. The blade of the law playing up and down in its groove with iron precision is hardly so good a regulative instrument as the flexible lash of public censure. The law is far away, but all of us have, some time or other, felt the smart of general disapproval, and have learned to shun its heavier stripes.

Public opinion guards the social peace by *enforcing moral claims* that law, with its rigid definitions and stern self-consistency, dares not support. The law frequently upholds the right of summary eviction, grants the widow's cow to the rich creditor, permits a railway company to turn adrift an em-

¹ "Both kinds of pressure are imperfect; both have their excellences and their shortcomings. The excellence of the mechanical pressure of the law lies in its certainty of operation—wherever it is applicable it succeeds. But it is not everywhere applicable, and just here lies its failing. It is too awkward, too clumsy, to support all the requirements that society deems necessary. Legal compulsion cannot make the good mother. Maternal love cannot be forced by law, nor can the way in which it ought to manifest itself be laid down in the paragraphs of a statute. The excellence of the psychological pressure of society is that it is everywhere felt, like the pressure of the atmosphere, in the recesses of the home as well as at the steps of the throne, reaching places where mechanical pressure loses its effectiveness. Its weakness lies in its uncertainty of operation—public opinion, the moral judgment of society, can be defied, but not the arm of the law."—VON IHERING, "Der Zweck im Recht," Vol. II, pp. 182-183.

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ployee crippled in its service, and confirms the right of a husband to administer moderate castigation to his wife. But the public will not tolerate such things. Law works to the line, but public opinion is the jet of compressed air that clears out corners and crevices that the clumsy broom of the law will never reach.

In most cases, the law must wait till the "overt act." Public opinion, on the other hand, can act in anticipation of an offence, interfere at any moment, and apply a gradually increasing pressure. Its premonitory growl is more *preventive* than the silent menace of Justice.

The action of public opinion has the virtue of *immediacy*. If not deliberate, it is at least prompt, and it brooks not the delay so conspicuous in the pursuit of leaden-footed law. The mills of Justice may grind slowly, but the mills of the public grind promptly, if at all, for there are many grists pressing to be ground.

Finally, the sanctions of public opinion are *cheap*. Marvellous is the economy of praise and blame. To regulate a man merely by letting him know your opinion of him is as much cheaper than legal process, as faith-cure is simpler than surgery. The economy of reward is especially great. The honors and glory held out as incitements by the public, while they are superlatively prized, cost but little to confer. By careful and well-considered bestowal of public attention and marks of distinction, a public can reap the fruit of heroic exertions that, if recompensed by material rewards, would entail a prodigious burden of taxes.

These, then, are the merits of public opinion. It has a wide gamut of sanctions. It is flexible. It is penetrating. It is preventive. It is prompt. It is cheap. Let us now review its defects.

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The requirements of one's neighbors are *not clear and precise*. They are not codified, and their uncertainty weakens the deterrent power of their sanctions. Moreover, these sanctions likewise are not *definite*, and not proportioned to the gravity of the offence. No member of the public knows just how much praise or blame, warmth or chill, others are applying. Moreover, systematic inquisition into guilt or merit, with observance of the rules of evidence and due deliberation, is impossible with the public, for it does not function as does a court. It merely *reacts*. From this fact arise the many injustices and mistakes which weaken the authority of public opinion.

Again, to utilize the temper of the community, it is necessary to strike while the iron is hot. The ministers of the law, if they have a slow foot, have a firm clutch and, like the gods, are known by their long memories. But the public has a short wrath and a poor memory, and the offender, if he dodges into obscurity and waits till the gust of public indignation is over, often goes unpunished.

As there is only one law in force at any one time, there can be no clashing of jurisdictions. But the public is rarely unanimous, and public opinion often clashes with the sentiment of a sect, party, or class. In a homogeneous community, people are able to feel and think alike in all important cases, and hence public opinion is effective; but in a stratified community, the separation of classes hinders an easy conduction of feeling. Here, then, an offender escapes the lowering glances and bitter words of his fellows by taking refuge in circles where his fault is condoned. The bruiser dives into the sporting class, the duellist haunts the mess-room, the ballot sharp takes refuge with his political friends, the snob shuts himself away from

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popular derision in a social club. This right of asylum with complaisant coteries is a very grave thing, for it often transforms an act of punishment into a class war, and rends the community in twain. The power of wealth or place to command an *entourage* of flatterers makes extremely difficult the control of rulers by public opinion. Between throne and people hangs oftentimes a thick curtain of obsequious courtiers and buzzing sycophants that shuts away unwelcome murmurs till the gathering whirlwind of public indignation tears away the curtain and topples over the throne.¹

The might of public wrath is destroyed by anything that diverts it from an individual and spreads it harmlessly over a network of administrative responsibility. The common indignation, always confused by a shifting responsibility, is most baffled when responsibility on being traced back is found to be lodged in a body of men. It is this fact that accounts for the increasing disregard of public opinion in the management of business. Corporate organization opposes to public fury a cuirass of divided responsibility that conveys away harmlessly a shock that might have stretched iniquity prone. Witness the ineffectual agitations against grade-crossings, link couplers, or fenderless street cars. In such cases public indignation must be given an arm to strike and hurt with, if it is not to become mere impotent rage. Those who, overlooking this truth, ignorantly extol the might of public opinion in all cases whatsoever, thereby stand

¹ The full empire of public opinion includes, of course, the control of representatives and rulers. But this phase of its action has already been well cleared up. See Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," Vol. II, Part IV. What I undertake to do here is to show how public opinion bears on a man as mere member of society, rather than as its agent or spokesman.

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sponsor for the efficacy of the faith-cure in the field of social therapeutics.

Mindful of these defects — its indefiniteness, its passionnal character, its short memory, its divided jurisdiction, and its frequent impotence — we must recognize that public opinion is far from satisfactory as to technique. The only way in which society can profit by the excellences of its coercion without suffering too much from the shortcomings, is to hand over to specialized organs all those harsh physical penalties that ought to be used only in grave cases and after careful inquisition. Moreover, all the major behests of society must be enforced by long-memoried agents that have feet for pursuing and hands for gripping. The waste of energy in securing the effective coöperation of the amorphous public is too great. Accordingly, a partition takes place, by which public opinion, ceasing to be the all-in-all of control, becomes simply one coercive agent alongside of others. It vacates the field of violence and accustoms itself to self-imposed restraints. At times, it is true, it overflows these barriers and shows us that the common will is the sum of social force, against which no man may stand. But nevertheless, the patience of the public in abiding by its diminished rôle is an accurate index of social advancement.

The place reserved to public opinion in the system of social control should depend, furthermore, on its competency to coerce in the right direction; for it must not only drive men, but drive them along the paths it is necessary they should go in. Now, in respect to technique, public opinion is, as we have seen, primitive. It is vague as to requirements. It is indefinite as to kind and quantity of sanction. It is crude as to procedure. It is evidently not a product fashioned for the purpose of

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ging of armor plate. People react most against that which shocks their instincts,—incest, for example, infanticide, or unnatural lust; but these offences being contrary to deep-seated instincts are just those which are least liable to spread and threaten the life of society. Light shines first on the few, and the public is the last to apprehend the real bearing and ultimate results of conduct. The handful of thoughtful men penalize forest-firing and the selling of explosive oil, and the killing of game out of season, while yet the senseless mob is gnashing its teeth at vaccinators and body snatchers.

The unfitness of public opinion to serve as Social Will is shown again by its inability to uphold at the same time in their respective spheres the ethics of amity and the ethics of enmity. In England, during the Napoleonic struggle, as in Greece, during the Peloponnesian War, national hatred infected domestic opinion, and the ferocity toward foes was reflected in a certain insensibility in regard to cruelty or oppression within the social group. Conversely, a public educated to be sensitive and peace-loving in the guidance of its members sometimes weakens the national defence by coldness toward the military profession. But while public opinion thus falls into confusion, the less sentimental and more highly evolved opinion that speaks through law and religion and national ideals will be found adjusting itself intelligently to the moral dualism demanded by the situation.

In certain directions, on the other hand, unenlightened public opinion pushes regulation to excess. It is possible for the vague feelings against vegetarianism, or long hair, or "bloomers," or non-church-going, to run together into a hostile and imperious public sentiment. It is but a step from

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the image-breaker's hatred of stained glass, the Scotch Calvinist's contempt for a violin, the rabble's resentment of a silk hat, or the frontiersman's detestation of a "biled" shirt, to a persecution that is as senseless as it is abominable. To the ignorant, unlikeness is an affront, nonconformity an outrage, and innovation a crime. Give full play to this feeling, and you have the intolerant multitude, eager to stretch every one on its Procrustean bed. It was the majority that stoned Stephen, banished Aristides, poisoned Socrates, mobbed Priestley, and beat Garrison.

Primitive public opinion, therefore, far from being a wise disciplinarian, meddles when it ought to abstain, and blesses when it ought to curse. Now, how does this ignorant, despotic patron of conservatism and stagnation become a respectable agent for the righteous protection of the social welfare? The processes are three:—

1. A general improvement in character and intelligence. The feeling of the many reflects the feeling of the average person, and if he is cool and reasonable in his private resentments, he will be so in his sympathetic and corporate resentments. A schooled, informed, thinking public is far fitter to exercise a beneficent control than a people that vents its wrath against America by stoning the statue of its discoverer.¹

2. A general acceptance of principles of law or right which guide opinion and cause it to play smoothly in certain grooves. These slow-won, time-hallowed maxims are bits in the mouth of the mob and reins in the hands of the wise. They virtually endow the multitude with memory and equip it with experience. Stern old Hebrew words

¹ Spanish mob in December, 1898.

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about "false witness," and "unclean hands," and "selling the righteous for silver," and "making the ephah small and the shekel great," are lamps to a groping people. Law itself reacts powerfully on the public, teaching it to frown on offences like malpractice or blackmail or intimidation, that it does not resent instinctively. On the other hand, the right to worship "according to the dictates of one's conscience," the right to free speech and opinion, the right to eat, dress, and live as one pleases, and, in general, the right to be unmolested, save when others are concerned —these principles that have struck root in the public conscience are so many barriers against the intolerance of the majority.

The lamps that guide the opinion of to-day were not lighted by the public of yesterday. Strictly speaking, public opinion is non-progressive, developing no canons and handing down no traditions. It has in itself no power to rise. There is no precipitate from its experience as agent of discipline. The moral ideals, standards, and valuations that come to guide it are formed, not with reference to the *judging* of conduct but, as we shall see later, with reference to the *shaping* of conduct, and they emanate not from the experience of a bygone public but from the insight of the bygone few.

3. The ascendancy of the wise. A scrutiny of the source of public opinion in a healthy community shows us not an amorphous crowd, but an organic combination of people. Not only is there a reciprocal influence of man on man, but in this universal give-and-take we find some men giving out many impulses and receiving few, while others receive many impulses and give out few. Thus arises the contrast of influencers and influenced, leaders and led, which does so much toward ex-

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plaining how minds of weight and worth come to their own under a popular régime. These knots of influential men, which in time spontaneously arrange themselves into higher and lower, constitute the nerve centres or ganglia of society. They are the rallying points of public opinion, and although even these leaders may be bad or addle-pated, the mere existence of such a psychic organization shows that the popular consensus is by no means the Walpurgis-night of feeling and folly it is often said to be.

Such a guidance being possible, the remedy for the abuses of public opinion is not to discredit it but to instruct it. A power which is, in the words of Tolstoi, "the convergence of the invisible, intangible, spiritual forces of humanity,"¹ is needed as a prop of duty in this new time, when the moss-grown buttresses of social order reared by a distant past are crumbling away. Under due guarantees, the reaction of his neighbors is one of the most righteous and legitimate restraints to which a man can be subject; and we must regard as pernicious the attempt of certain artist mandarins to undermine the authority of public opinion, and to inflame the individual against it. Flaubert's doctrine that the people is "an immoral beast,"² that "the crowd, the multitude, is hateful," that "the mass is always idiotic," and that "the people is an eternal infant, and will always be the last in the hierarchy of social elements,"³ however eloquently championed by Carlyle, Renan, Ibsen, or Nietzsche, finds no foothold with us, because it is at once untrue and inexpedient. And few will find the mystical cult of the ego preached by brilliant

¹ "The Kingdom of God is within you," p. 266.

² "Correspondance de Gustave Flaubert," Vol. IV, p. 49.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

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megalomaniacs anything but a poor substitute for the approval of one's neighbors. The war against folly must go on, but it is doubtful if the oppression of public opinion in matters of conduct is such as to call for any further inflation of the self-conceit of the individual.

Signs are not wanting that in the future an increasing restraint will be exercised through public opinion, and that this kind of control will gain at the expense of other kinds. For one thing, this form of coercion is suited to the type of man created by modern life. Only the criminal or the moral hero cares not how others may think of him. The growing rage for publicity and the craving for notoriety shows that the men of to-day respond warmly to praise and wilt quickly under general disapproval. Then, too, certain social developments favor the ascendancy of the public. The growing economic interdependence and the closer interweaving of private interests mean that the individual gives hostages to the community for his good behavior. Liable as he is to have his prosperity blighted and his course of life changed by the resentful action of others, he will think twice before flying in the face of common sentiment. The more frequent contacts of men and the better facilities for forming and focussing the opinion of the public tend in the same direction. Similar in effect is the modern emphasis on *publicity* instead of positive regulation. We are more and more insisting on the complete transparency of industry and business.

With a democratic, forward-looking people like ours, opinion, no longer split up into small currents by class lines or broken in force by masses of family, sect, or caste tradition, the débris of the past, acquires a tidal volume and sweep. In such a stream all oaks become reeds. The day of the

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sturdy backwoodsman, settler, flat-boatman, or prospector, defiant not alone of law but of public opinion as well, is gone never to return. We are come to a time when ordinary men are scarcely aware of the coercion of public opinion, so used are they to follow it. They cannot dream of aught but acquiescence in an unmistakable edict of the mass. It is not so much the dread of what an angry public may do that disarms the modern American, as it is sheer inability to stand unmoved in the rush of totally hostile comment, to endure a life perpetually at variance with the conscience and feeling of those about him.

CHAPTER XI

LAW

THE first requisite of social order is that people shall not molest one another in person or property. The second requisite is that responsibilities, whether incurred by way of nature, as those of the family, or by promise, as those of contract, shall be duly met. The law, therefore, the most specialized and highly finished engine of control employed by society, has a double task. It must deal *repressively* with men in respect to acts of aggression; it must deal *compulsively* with them in respect to neglects which violate the relations of family or contract. In general, it is more vital to prevent the mutual interference of individuals than to enforce coöperation. Still, when people trust their lives to the crew of a train or the keepers of a lighthouse, failure to coöperate becomes disastrous, and is punished as criminal negligence. In the army, too, where failure to do appointed tasks may bring ruin, physical punishments are used to stimulate as well as to restrain.

The characteristic which marks off legal sanctions from all others employed by society, is that they are positive, violent, and, to a large extent, corporal, thus appealing in an almost equal degree to all kinds of men. While conceivably we might procure obedience to the laws by reward as well as by punishment, we do in fact use punishment alone. Nor is this strange, when we consider how

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easy is the infliction of great pains, and how difficult is the affording of great satisfactions. However preferable a scale of prizes to a scale of dooms, the latter will be used so long as it is so cheap to give pain and so expensive to confer pleasure.

In dealing with a disturber, society has two objects, to avoid further harm from this man, and to guard itself against would-be offenders.

The first object might be gained not only by chastising him, but also by killing, confining, or reforming him. Only the first of these modes of treatment is a use of sanction. To kill or shut up a criminal certainly prevents further wrong-doing; but as it does not succeed by means of motive, it is not a case of control at all. Reformation, on the other hand, does succeed by power over the mind; but as it employs habit, education, and religion instead of fear of consequences, the discussion of its method belongs to later chapters of this work. As regards the detention and discipline that the reformatory demands, it is, strictly speaking, no more punishment than is the strait-jacket of the madman. In the eye of the reformer, the offender is a moral invalid, who cannot help offending and whom no punishment will deter. The reformatory is, therefore, a hospital for moral diseases, and its penalties are mere hospital discipline.

The second object in dealing with the offender, namely, the protection of society against other evil-disposed persons, is attained only through punishment. The infliction of pain is, therefore, a rational means for warding off harm, and is justified as such. While the barbarous idea of retribution has dominated the penal systems of the past, and even to-day enjoys high repute in certain quarters through the support of certain theological and pseudo-ethical dogmas, it is not too much to de-

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clare that for afflictive punishment the sole justification known to the social scientist is its deterrent effect. If it intimidated nobody, it would sink from the plane of rational action to the level of senseless cruelty. It is true that the satisfaction of giving a ruffian what is felt to be his just due, supplies a motive to the enforcement of law which we cannot yet do without. The retaliatory aspect wins for punishment the endorsement of public opinion, and even squares with the offender's own crude ideas of wrong and recompense. But the ultimate scientific ground for inflicting pain is protection.

This purpose of deterrence, or control by dread, even now crops out in all the repressive measures known to law. In *damages* the idea is hidden because sufficient deterrence can be got by enforcing compensation to the injured party. In *exemplary damages* the idea becomes obvious, but is not allowed to appear as the ruling motive. The exemplariness "is accomplished by allowing compensation for the sense of wrong and injury."¹ In *penalties*, such as fines or forced labor, the motive of deterrence overshadows the reparative idea, and in *afflictive punishments*, such as whipping or hanging, it rules supreme. The practical aim, therefore, under one pretext or another, already shapes the sanctions of law. And the sooner this view comes to prevail and be frankly avowed among legislators and penologists, the better. Nemesis the goddess of vengeance is gone, and in her place stands Justice, with bandaged eyes, holding the scales. But as we gaze longer, the figure melts away, and there looms dimly in the background the colossal phantom of Society, with eyes wide open and the sword of self-defence in her hand.

¹ Sedgwick, "Elements of Damages," p. 16.

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The moment we give up the idea of expiation or vengeance, we no longer need mete out so many stripes or so many strokes or months according to an inflexible code, but can deal with crime in an intelligent and practical manner, chastising the deliberate wrong-doer as a warning to his kind, and curing the weakling in the reformatory. Then, too, the "example" feature of punishment can be emphasized. For, if they are inflicted chiefly for the impression on the evil-disposed outsider, and not at all to "get even" or to "square accounts" or to "satisfy justice," punishments should not only be keenly realized by this outsider, but should *seem* to him to be severer than they really are.

Just how severe a penalty should be depends primarily on the position of the offence in the scale of misdeeds. For there must be such a gradation of penalties that the psychological pressure over the whole field of offence is uniform. This compels penal provisions to form a system in which each part has necessary relations to every other part. But the severity of the penal system as a whole is limited by the social situation. While pains must be harsh enough to terrorize most of the evil-disposed, they must not outrun the approval of the community. They must not be so harsh as to outrage the natural sentiments of fair play and humanity, or to forfeit the endorsement of current morality or religion.

The principles by which penalties may be proportioned are various. They may be graduated according to the abhorrence felt for the offence. The savage horde or the frantic mob resents most keenly certain purely private acts that shock the instincts or the religious feelings, while it ignores indirect or masked aggression upon others. In

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rude communities where the keynote of feeling is sympathy with the victim of wrong, abhorrence varies with *the measure of harm wrought*, and the avenging law takes the impulses of the aggrieved man as the index of its punishment. When at a later stage law is the will of a reflective but still highly sentimental public, the principle prevails that offences should be repressed *according to the badness of character they imply*. Poisoning is more heinous than adulteration, because, while the poisoner will adulterate, the adulterator will shrink from poisoning. The red slayings of hate are deemed worse than the pale slayings of greed. The trolley company, the quack-medicine man, the insurer of rotten ships, and the jerry-builder, despite their devastations, are not dealt with so sternly as the assassin, because they are morally superior to him. The cutthroat is more criminal than the train-wrecker by reason of his depravity ; while the ravisher is marked off from the professional enticer of maidens, not by any greater harm in his deed, but by his greater moral hideousness.

All these fumblings will cease when society gets eyes to see with. A scientific penology will graduate punishments primarily *according to the harmfulness of the offence to society*, and secondarily, *according to the attractiveness of the offence to the criminal*. It will be hard on the careless train despatcher, because mistakes *must not* occur in despatching trains ; it will be hard on the deserter, because of the temptations to desert. But this criterion will be adopted only when the spirit that presides over the development of law is vastly different from the impulses of the amorphous multitude. A self-conscious, intelligent society is, of course, made up of the same people that compose the public ; but between these two lies a series of

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processes which can be compared only to the hundreds of hammerings and weldings that make a rod of iron into a Japanese sword blade.

It is not well to give to the prison the publicity of the courtroom. Let a knowledge of punishments leak out and soak into the stratum of people they are meant for, but do not thrust them upon the law-abiding. We welcome that growing sensitiveness which renders people unable to regard without horror and pity the salutary measures necessary to restrain certain classes. But we can only deplore the interference in penal matters of a public which, again and again, has shown itself too maudlin and womanish to uphold the stringency needed for its protection. It is likely that the problem of repressing crime without demoralizing the public can be solved only by committing the penal system to the hands of official experts checked by non-official specialists. It is easy to withdraw executions and prisons from the common gaze and attention, without excluding the watchful eye of the philanthropist and the reformer.

In order not to demoralize those who inflict them, corporal punishment must proceed in a decorous way, without display of wrath or other personal feeling. Sheriffs and wardens must feel themselves to be, and must be looked upon as, functionaries, not foes. Hence, developed law insists upon proceeding according to precise rules and using prescribed formulas which purge punishment of its personal element. It is chiefly the absence of this protective regularity and ceremonial which distinguishes a lynching party from a court, and makes it so demoralizing to those who constitute it. Impersonal manner makes the difference between civilized execution and mere collective killing, and it is pathetic to see how on the frontier the agents

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of popular justice, dimly realizing this truth, hasten to wind about themselves a cocoon of formalities.

Such ceremony has, moreover, a deeper purpose than to spare the feelings of penal officials. Much of the effect of punishment on both culprit and spectators depends on accompanying circumstances that stir the imagination and excite awe. Punishment must not appear as naked brute violence, but as the act of God or of Justice. It must firmly ally itself with the religious and moral ideas of the time, and avoid the appearance of being a blow dealt by a victor to his prostrate foe. Whatever puts *a moral space* between official and culprit, serves this purpose. Anything brutal or criminal that assimilates them defeats it. In reference to the corruptness of sheriffs and wardens, Professor A. G. Warner says: "This conviction, that crime is all-pervasive, and that government is one of the tricks of the trade of dog-eat-dog, which all are playing, will paralyze the conscience quicker than any other belief that can take possession of the human heart."¹

Not only should hanging or whipping be a ceremony, but trial and sentence should likewise enjoy the ceremonial backing, because court procedure may be made a powerful means of intimidating both accused and onlookers. "Our magistrates," observes Pascal, "are well aware of this mystery. Their scarlet robes, the ermine in which they wrap themselves like furred cats, the halls in which they administer justice, the fleurs-de-lis, and all their august apparatus, are most necessary." In view of the corrosive flippancy of the press, it is not strange that our jurists should cling to the grave demeanor, the prolix and archaic language, the sonorous oaths,

¹ "American Journal of Sociology," November, 1895, p. 291.

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the stiff formalities, the rigid and decorous manner, of the court of law. If the proceeding which puts in jeopardy a man's liberty or life were allowed to appear careless, cynical, passionate, hurried, or undignified, it would be impossible to ally with the brute force of law the might of those ideals and feelings that move the average man. Hence the wig and the robe, the cocked hat and the sword, the "Guilty or not guilty?" the kissing of the book, the "So help me God!" the "May God have mercy on your soul!"

Those who would conduct such proceedings as they would a committee meeting or a business conference, quite overlook the peculiarities of the problem. In a criminal court the impression made on the minds of actors and beholders may not be lightly sacrificed to the mere despatch of business, to the discovering of the guilt or innocence of the greatest number of accused persons in the least possible time. Radical as he is, Letourneau admits that "even to-day, in most civilized countries, a rigid, almost hieratic formalism still accompanies the administration of justice, and certainly influences the minds of both judges and judged."¹ Of course, formalities that have really lost meaning and impressiveness are mere obstructive mummery, and should be dropped as soon as possible. The fact remains, however, that the more good form is observed in the trying of people, the fewer there will be to try.² In the light of the foregoing, the undignified

¹ "L'évolution juridique," p. 492.

² Of the look and demeanor of the judges in the Cadi's divan at Tunis, a writer exclaims: "What is finer than the face of one who has been accustomed to wield authority over the common herd? Decisions which none may question, glosses which none may contradict, pardon which no other dare bestow, doom which no other dare pronounce, the power which for years has been theirs alone, is stamped upon their thoughtful countenances; and this moral

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and demoralizing conduct of many of our police courts, presided over by burly, vulgar-minded political henchmen, without personal prestige, professional traditions, or good manners, needs no comment.

The punishments of a social, moral, or religious character that follow in the train of legal guilt are not to be counted as legal sanctions, being neither allowed for nor inflicted by the officers of the law. But these supplementary pains, while they are indefinite, are none the less important. Could we imagine a society in which prison or pillory carried no hint of shame, caused no forfeiture of general esteem, no wound to self-respect, no loss of religious peace, the penalties of its courts would have just the deterrent value—not more, not less—they would have if wielded by brigands, invaders, or despots. It is in this light that law appears to revolutionists, patriots, and political offenders. This natural alliance between society and the police cannot be dissolved without the law losing much of its binding power. In a country of local self-government like ours, where judges and sheriffs are elective, and the jury system prevails, a breach between the judicial arm and the public sentiment is avoided by the non-enforcement of unpopular laws. The futility of passing laws far in advance of public sentiment is more striking in America than anywhere else.

In fact, law as the instrument of organized society has only very slowly differentiated itself from the other repressive forces, *i.e.* the reaction of *individuals*, the reaction of the *public*, and the reaction of the *gods*.

force is more potent to sway the masses who crouch at their feet than are all the swords of the Janissaries who guard their portals.”—GREVILLE-NUGENT, “The Land of Mosques and Marabouts,” pp. 179-180.

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The rootage of legal repression in the red soil of revenge is shown by the prominence of the injured man in early law. At first nothing but a private accusation can set the machinery of the law in motion.¹ Most offences are wrongs or delicts, not crimes.² The early judges are arbiters, and the submission of the case to them instead of fighting it out is purely voluntary.³ The judicial proceedings are a petrified drama, representing a quarrel between two armed men who finally call in an outsider as umpire.⁴ Judges keeping up the rôle of the obliging passer-by rather than that of the functionary get no pay, save from the litigants themselves.⁵ The meting out to the offender caught in the act a heavier punishment than to one taken after some delay, shows that the law puts itself in the place of the wronged man, and takes his impulses as the measure of vengeance.⁶ For the same reason, an accidental injury is treated in the same way as an intentional one. The fines imposed are paid to the victim or his family.⁷ Punishment is often inflicted by him⁸ or his representatives, and the primitive encounter is consecrated as the judicial duel.⁹ The eye-for-eye principle, so dear to the victim of wrong, dominates all early punishment, and lasts even to our time.¹⁰

¹ Post, "Ethnologische Jurisprudenz," II, 527.

² Maine, "Ancient Law," pp. 369-371 (ch. x).

³ Burckhardt.

⁴ Maine, pp. 375-376; Von Ihering, "Entwickelungs-geschichte des römischen Rechts," p. 100.

⁵ Letourneau, "L'évolution juridique," pp. 408; Post, I, 461; Maine, pp. 377-378.

⁶ Dareste, "Etudes d'histoire du droit," pp. 401-402; Maine, pp. 378-381.

⁷ Letourneau, p. 501; Post, II, 256-262.

⁸ Dareste, p. 400.

⁹ Post, II, 504-509.

¹⁰ Gunther, "Die Idee der Wiedervergeltung."

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Then, too, early law shows many points of contact with public opinion. The fountain of law is the immemorial notions and customs of the folk.¹ The scale of penalties shows that offences are graded according to their detestableness, rather than according to their harmfulness. The sway of vindictive motives betrays the crude folk-consciousness. The accusation is formulated by a grand jury. The judges are sometimes the tumultuous general assemblies of the people. The award is given to the litigant who can produce in court the greater number of his neighbors to support him by their oaths.² Guilt or innocence is established by the verdict of twelve jurors drawn from the locality and acting on their own knowledge and views.³ Certain punishments, such as open reprimand, official degradation, branding, shaving the head, imposing badges of shame, derive their effect from the direction they give to public opinion.⁴ Other punishments, such as outlawry, stoning, pillory, stocks, and dragging at the cart's tail, imply the willing coöperation of the public, or at least of the rabble.

Primitive law again is entangled in many ways with religious belief. Priests are often the judges.⁵ The awards of the judge are regarded as inspired from above.⁶ The codes that come with the art of writing are usually given out as dictated by deity.⁷ Rules of religion are mixed up with rules of law.⁸ Sins are not distinguished from crimes, and acts of sacrilege, blasphemy, desecration, or impiety are

¹ Vaccaro, "Les bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état," p. 447.

² Letourneau, pp. 219, 418, 452.

³ Forsyth, "Trial by Jury."

⁴ Post, II, 288-290.

⁵ Post, II, 511; Spencer, "Principles of Sociology," III, 260.

⁶ Maine, "Ancient Law," pp. 4, 5.

⁷ Maine, p. 18; Letourneau, pp. 131-133.

⁸ Maine, p. 23.

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corrected by the civil authorities.¹ Legal documents, such as charters, deeds, and wills, imprecate tremendous curses on him who shall trample upon their provisions. The oath is not, as later, a mere solemn promise; it is a self-pronounced curse, expected to take effect of itself, if the swearer is guilty or speaks falsely.² Trial is by ordeal, which implies that God will perform a miracle on behalf of the innocent.³ Punishment is an expiation due the deity as well as a satisfaction due society.

Now unquestionably one great line of improvement in law has been the purging away of these elements, and the giving to it a sphere and validity of its own. Its commands finally take social welfare as their keynote. Its awards come to be made in calm, deliberate aloofness from the feeling of the hour. It learns to chastise without wrath, and to wield the rod with its own arm. There is wrought out for it a series,—statute, accusation, trial, judgment, correction,—all its own. In other words, law parts company with private resentment, public opinion, and religious belief, and becomes the trained and single-minded servant of a serene, far-seeing *Social Personality*. How is this managed? Simply by building up for it a ganglion rich in gray matter. Special organs are carefully constituted, law-making bodies, courts, prison boards. The administering of law is brought under the influence of the wise and expert, jurisconsults, legists, penologists, criminologists. Great steadyng traditions are followed, such as the Civil Code of Rome, the commentaries of Mohammedan jurists, or the precedents of English law. It will, of course, never do for a

¹ Bagehot, "Physics and Politics," ch. v; Post, II, 399.

² Post, II, 478; Letourneau, p. 99.

³ Sergeant, "The Franks," pp. 161-162.

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social organ to get encysted ; in law, as elsewhere, the abuses of professionalism and cliquism call for the safeguard of publicity. But there should be no reluctance to grant to the organs of law that detachment which is necessary to a wise, calm, strong repression of acts hurtful to society.

There are other developments in law which throw light on present problems. The discouragement of wrong-doing by means of punishment is essentially a skilful psychological achievement, having little in common with mere retaliation. The law could not, therefore, go far in this path without losing many of its early crudities. Tribal justice, for instance, always looked at the deed and took no note of the intention. But the inflicting of pain for involuntary acts¹ has absolutely no deterrent effect, and is, therefore, socially useless. So with the decay of tribal justice accident is punished less harshly, money is paid instead of blood, and the indemnity becoming ever slighter finally passes into pure damages or disappears.

Again, rude men, with their attention riveted upon the outer rather than the inner causal chain, strike at the physical cause of a crime, even if this be a lunatic, a drunken man, an animal, or even a thing.² But with a clearer idea of the real aim of punishment, there grow up those notions of moral responsibility and criteria of guilt which are the foundations of penal science. And we are not at the end of this progress. The reformatory idea rests on the sound maxim that *Only those should be punished who are amenable to dread of punishment.* This would enjoin that all law-breakers enjoying self-control and real power of choice

¹ Post, II, 214-218.

² Post, II, 231.

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should be made to smart; but that as to the mass of small-witted, weak-willed, impulse-ridden human "screenings" that collect in prisons, our care should be to reform the reformable and to hold fast the incurable the rest of their days.

The principle of *individual responsibility* is another great improvement in the technique of control. At first the family or clansmen of a wrong-doer are made to smart, while the criminal himself is, perhaps, left to the execration of his kinsmen. This compound action of force with opinion is due to the fact that early rules grow up between, not within, groups, and, like our international law, have no supreme impartial authority behind them. They are used to stave off reprisal and war rather than to control the action of persons. Strictly speaking, the social vice never grips the misbehaving man till the state is formed out of the war band. At that time law gets its hands on the individual because the chief has direct power over every man in the host.¹ Thenceforth the mordant action of the bigger group loosens and dissolves the Household and the Clan, until all answerability of one man for another disappears, and organized society stands, as it does to-day, face to face with men and women. The same passage from joint to individual responsibility occurs on the higher plane of Divine Justice. The principle of family solidarity, which at first is accepted by the Divine Judge as well as by the human judge, is undermined until Ezekiel² can announce: "The soul that sinneth it shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be

¹E. Jenks, "Law and Politics in the Middle Ages," p. 78.

²Ezek. xviii: 20.

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upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."

Pristine justice is dispensed for the benefit of the wronged man,¹ and only slowly does there arise the idea of a paramount social interest in the repression of crime. But the time comes when it is the district attorney who prosecutes the law-breaker and not his victim, when it is the public peace that has suffered and not A or B, and when the taking of a composition is punished as "the compounding of a felony." The state, besides thus appropriating to itself the grievances of its subjects, continually widens the zone of civil redress; multiplying remedies, for instance, against fraud or libel or breach of contract. Why this restless reaching out? Is it instigated by a love of fair play between man and man? Probably not. Save, perhaps, in the edicts of the Stoic Emperors of Rome or in the legislation of modern democracies, the love of justice has never been a leading motive in the extension of law. Often the very society that unweariedly works out its law into detail, and provides redress in more and more cases, is itself an organization of injustice.

The force that enlarges the scope of law would seem to be the same as that which carries forward the outposts of reluctant empires. Just as the Russian or English "warden of the marches" is

¹ This is clear from the fact that all peoples, after they realize that feud and vendetta do not pay, adopt the blood-money system, so absurd from the standpoint of control. "On the decay of the tribal and village community organization, and after the era of blood vengeance and outlawry, there follows everywhere on the earth a development of criminal law in which offences are settled by the payment of a composition. Capital and corporal punishments disappear. This phenomenon is universal." — Post, II, p. 256.

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led to interfere in the quarrels of neighboring tribes and impose his authority upon them, not by a regard for justice, but by concern for the peace of the border, so society substitutes the remedies of the law for rude self-help, not out of love of justice, but out of concern for the public tranquillity. Order is the genial summer weather in which ripen all fruits of hand or brain; and not lightly may it be broken. For the sake of order the law punishes violence, and for the sake of order it settles disputes which might breed violence. Not indignation at wrong but fear of fist law multiplies actions and remedies. Urged by practical considerations, society provides redress for cases of wrong among equals, who might otherwise break the public peace; but, until the newer age, it has viewed with indifference the weak — such as women, minors, apprentices, slaves, or seamen, — who were not likely to react dangerously, and has dodged their claims to redress by assigning them a special standing in the law.

Not always has Justice held both sword and scales. In the primitive group the judge is, at first, an umpire, whose verdict is accepted because it saves fighting. Even when the representative of society, the elder or priest, intervenes, it is as an arbiter whose decision is respected because of his moral authority. In order to give effect to the judgment of early courts it is often customary to require the parties by pledges, delivery of arms, bondsmen, etc., to give security for their submission to the verdict. Aided by suasion, superstitious reverence, public opinion, and by the occasional violence of outlawry or lynching, the courts of justice maintain a precarious authority, until centres of power are developed. On the one hand, the powers vested in the captain of the host during

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war time become the permanent possession of the state among conquering peoples, and are wielded by its justiciaries. On the other hand, outside of militant or composite societies, law is equipped with power by means of *association*.

There are, then, two ways by which Power and Right come together. Either the arbitrary power of the master over the slave, or of the conqueror over the subject, becomes right by accepting and abiding by certain principles of interference; or the rules felt to be wholesome and fair in a body of equals, say an emigrant train or a miners' camp, get behind them the united physical force of the community.¹ This, if properly organized, suffices to overcome any recalcitrant. Comparing the orderly Scotland of to-day with the disorderly Scotland of the Middle Ages, Justice Stephen says: "The force which goes to govern the Scotland of these days is to the force employed for the same purpose in the fourteenth century what the force of a line-of-battle ship is to the force of an individual prize-fighter. The reason why it works so quietly is that no one doubts either its existence, or its direction, or its crushing superiority to any individual resistance which could be offered to it."²

The power that compels obedience to law in America has arisen not from conqueror or superior class, but from the massed forces of common men. But the vice of a power too local and popular in its origin is weakness. The personal force of law-supporting individuals must be concentrated ere it can drive the machinery of justice with irresistible power. It must be, as it were, collected into reservoirs and then redistributed where needed.

¹ Von Ihering, "Der Zweck im Recht," Vol. I, pp. 322-323.

² "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," pp. 243-244.

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The merit of local enforcement of the law is its economy and its adaptiveness ; its bane is a feebleness in dealing with the rich, influential, corporate, or collective lawbreaker. The condition revealed by the statistics of homicide, the high percentage of grave crimes never punished, the defiance of the law by the ill-disposed, the lapse of whole communities into vendetta, the frequent lynchings, the anarchy of corporate lawbreakers, and the increasing resort to the courts supported by the more highly organized Federal power, raise the question if we Americans have not been content with too simple an organization of the forces of the individual members of the community.

What is the place of law in social order? A concrete instance will make it clear. Mr. Hodgkin, seeking to explain the policy of Theodoric, the barbarian restorer of order in Italy, traces it to his early life in Byzantium. "He could see more or less plainly that the soul which held all this marvellous body of civilization together was reverence for Law. He visited perhaps some of the courts of law ; he may have seen the illustrious Praetorian Prefect, clothed in imperial purple, move majestically to the judgment seat, amid the obsequious salutations of the dignified officials, who in their various ranks and orders surrounded the hall. The costly golden reed-case, the massive silver ink-stand, the silver bowl for the petitions of suitors, all emblems of his office, were placed solemnly before him, and the pleadings began. Practiced advocates arose to plead the cause of plaintiff or defendant ; busy shorthand writers took notes of the proceedings ; at length, in calm and measured words the Prefect gave his judgment : a judgment which was necessarily based on law, which had to take account of the sayings of jurisconsults, of the

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stored-up wisdom of twenty generations of men; a judgment which, notwithstanding the venality which was the curse of the Empire, was in most instances in accord with truth and justice. How different must Theodoric often have thought in after years, when he had returned to Gothland,— how different was this settled and orderly procedure from the usage of the barbarians. With them the ‘blood-feud,’ the ‘wild justice of revenge,’ often prolonged from generation to generation, had been long the chief righter of wrongs done; and if this was now slowly giving place to judicial trial, that trial was probably a coarse and almost lawless proceeding, in which the head man of the district, with a hundred assessors as ignorant as himself, amid the wild cries of the opposed parties, roughly fixed the amount of blood money to be paid by a murderer, or decided at haphazard, often with an obvious reference to the superior force at the command of one or other of the litigants, some obscure dispute as to the ownership of a slave, or the right to succeed to a dead man’s inheritance.”¹

While dread of the law is now less prominent than formerly among the motives to good conduct, and will, no doubt, in the future play a diminishing rôle, we should not look upon legal compulsion as a type of control society is destined to outgrow. In view of the falling off in the number of repressions where the law is well administered, the thoughtless might conclude that the smaller the grist the less the consequence of the mill that grinds it. But I cannot too often insist that the social mission of the law is not to make evil-doers smart, but to deter from evil doing. Whatever the

¹ Thomas Hodgkin, “Theodoric,” pp. 46–48.

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cave-men may say, not the crimes punished but the crimes prevented should measure the worth of the law; and such a standard, were the statistics forthcoming, might show our courts and jails to be ten times as useful as they appear.

Nor is this all. If out of a score of law-abiding persons, only one obeys the law from fear of its penalties, it does not follow that the penal system occupies a correspondingly insignificant place among the supports of social order. For the rules of the social game are respected by the many good men chiefly because they are forced upon the few bad. If the one rascal among twenty men might aggress at will, the higher forms of control would break down, the fair-play instinct would cease to bind, and, between bad example and the impulse of retaliation, man after man would be detached from the honest majority. Thus the deadly contagion of lawlessness would spread with increasing rapidity till the social order lay in ruins. The law, therefore, however minor its part at a given moment in the actual coercion of citizens, is still the cornerstone of the edifice of order.

CHAPTER XII

BELIEF

THE working of the legal and social sanctions just described is not without grave shortcomings.

1. These sanctions do not control the hidden portions of life. Despite the sleuths of the law and the ferrets of the press, there are still opportunities for secret wrong-doing. We cannot watch everybody all the time. As family and property are always exposed to the clandestine acts of trespassers, the need arises for something that will intimidate a man when he is alone.

2. Law and public opinion are frequently paralyzed by the power of the offender. The success with which bold or influential men can browbeat their accusers, hoodwink the public, and pluck profit from open offence, is proverbial. Outraged by the impotence of the regular restraining agencies, the heart cries out for a higher tribunal where the powerful transgressor may get his just dues.¹

¹ The weakness of the English common law courts in restraining the powerful led to petitions to the Chancellor, the keeper of the King's conscience. Thus originated the Court of Chancery. "Most of these ancient petitions appear to have been presented in consequence of assaults and trespasses . . . for which the party complaining was unable to obtain redress, in consequence of the maintenance or protection afforded to his adversary by some powerful baron, or by the sheriff or other officer of the county in which they occurred." Preface to calendars of the Proceedings in Chancery, 1827. The petitioner usually beseeches the Chancellor to interfere "for luff of God and in way of charitee."

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3. Human sanctions reach only the outward deed. But it is hard to control men by measures that leave the evil disposition untouched. Sooner or later opportunity comes, and the evil will flashes forth in wicked deeds. The improvers of character, therefore, cast about for a means of applying pressure not to conduct merely, but to the very intents and desires of the heart. Moreover, an act is felt to be innocent or guilty according to the intention, and hence men crave a justice that laying bare the secret springs of action shall treat a man according to his desert rather than according to his deed.

4. The operation both of law and of public opinion is expensive. Moreover, as punishment is usually *cheaper* than reward, they rely overmuch on fear, and so fail to get the best service out of a man. They hold ground already won, but do not offer the utmost stimulus to new and splendid achievement for society. They do not inspire the hero, martyr, or saint.

From the recognition of these defects, springs the endeavor to supplement imperfect human control by the awards of a judge who is all-seeing, all-powerful, all-knowing, and possessed of infinite resources.

If any one is to be influenced by threats or promises, he must of course *be assured* that the requital will come without fail. But this assurance, when it is based on testimony, observation, or experience, may properly be distinguished from a conviction grounded on inference or authority. These non-verifiable convictions respecting that which is beyond the field of human experience we shall call *belief*, and the control of conduct by means of such convictions we shall term *control by belief*.

The elementary supernatural sanctions are founded on the belief that there is a supernatural

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being (or beings) who follows the doings of men, and that he intervenes in this life to punish the bad and to reward the good. "The fear of unwittingly offending the countless visible and invisible beings . . .," says Im Thurn, "kept the Indians (of Guiana) very strictly within their own rights and from offending against the rights of others."¹ Of the Africans, Livingstone says, "The belief in the power of charms for good or evil produces not only honesty, but a great amount of gentle dealing."² A Fuegian killed a "wild man" who was stealing his birds. "Rain come down, snow come down, hail come down, wind blow, blow, very much blow. Very bad to kill man. Big man in woods he no like it, he very angry." Also the killing of flappers before they can fly is serious. "Very bad to shoot little duck, come wind, come rain, blow, very much blow."³ In classic Polytheism, Juno guards conjugal fidelity, Vesta watches over the household, Jupiter chastises perjurors and violators of hospitality, and the terrible Eumenides pursue unpunished criminals.

In the Mosaic law we read: "If thou shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy God to observe and do all his commandments . . . all these blessings shall come on thee and overtake thee. . . . Blessed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy ground, and the fruit of thy cattle, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. Blessed shall be thy basket and thy store. . . . But . . . if thou wilt not hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe and do all his commandments and his statutes . . . cursed shall be thy basket and thy store, cursed shall be the fruit of thy body.

¹ Quoted by Lang in "The Making of Religion," p. 222.

² *Ibid.*, p. 223, note.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

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... The Lord shall smite thee with a consumption, and with a fever, and with an inflammation, and with an extreme burning, and with a sword, and with blasting, and with mildew; and they shall pursue thee till thou perish."¹

The crude belief that sees in every event of life some inmixture of the gods, and interprets every stroke of fortune in the light of past behavior, is soon in need of the plausible explanations of quick-witted priests. A very little reflection on life shows an apportionment of good and evil that can be reconciled with no conceivable standard of moral desert. The Psalmist is troubled at the "prosperity of the wicked," and confesses that "their eyes stand out with fatness; they have more than heart could wish."² Says Professor Huxley: "If there is a generalization from the facts of human life which has the assent of thoughtful men in every age and country, it is that the violator of ethical rules constantly escapes the punishment which he deserves; that the wicked flourish like a green bay tree, while the righteous begs his bread."³

Moreover, the theory succumbs to the victorious demonstration of law in natural events and human affairs. As group after group of happenings is seen to lie in the mesh of law and not in the palm of caprice, the expectation of recompense in this life fades before a growing scepticism. An orderly universe with an occasional "special providence" takes the place of a world riddled with the supernatural.

Thus fades the belief that men's actions dog their earthly footsteps till little is left but the vague feeling that somehow the course of things is against him who breaks the social interdict. A

¹ Deuteronomy xxviii.

² Psalm lxxiii.
³ "Evolution and Ethics," p. 58.

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dimly seen retributive working in life is thought to betoken a mysterious moral drift deep in the heart of the universe. Law reigns, but to natural laws there is paramount a moral law. This precious faith that sometimes gives salutary pause to the unscrupulous is carefully fostered. Epics, novels, and dramas rarely fail to depict the triumph of a justice which, because we find it nowhere else, is called "poetic." A realistic portrayal of life would too much shock the pious popular conviction that all things work together for the good of him who obeys time-honored precepts.

A second type of supernatural sanction is presented by the Hindoo doctrine of transmigration. Here we are taught that deeds draw after them their appropriate consequences in this world, but not in this life. The souls of bad men suffer by being re-born in men of low caste or in animals, while those who are pure are born again as kings or Brahmins or Devas. The allotment of good and ill to the soul in its wanderings does not proceed from an arbitrary deity, nor yet from a just judge, but depends upon the law of Karma. Karma is the moral kernel which alone survives death and continues in migration. The law of Karma is simply the doctrine of cause and effect applied to character. "There is no escape, according to this theory, from the result of any act, though it is only the consequences of its own acts that each soul has to endure. The force has been set in motion by itself, and can never stop; and its effect can never be foretold."¹ This Hindoo doctrine makes the minimum demand upon the supernatural. Its economy of belief enables it to compare favorably with the Western doctrine of the future states.

¹ Rhys Davids, "Hibbert Lectures," p. 85.

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A third species of sanction rests on belief in a supernatural life. In two vast unseen worlds, Heaven and Hell, is led an unending life, and the lot of each man there is determined by his doings in this brief earthly span. Though the connection of the two lives is close, it is not causal necessity but the will of a judge that binds them together. So there is a judgment day when the soul appears before its judges, its record is read, its deeds and its thoughts are weighed, and its doom is spoken. This formal court-of-law procedure is found in the religions of Egypt and Greece, and in Lamaism, Mazdaism, Islam, and Christianity. At first we have simply the states of woe and bliss; but later we get a delicate and scientific graduation of penalty and reward. The Buddhist hells, with their many compartments, are most discriminating in the treatment of sinners, while in the invention of Purgatory and in the "circles" of the Inferno and the Paradise, we must recognize a normal development in legal religion.

Of the possibilities of such a belief, Mr. Lecky writes: "The doctrine of a future life was far too vague among the Pagans to exercise any powerful general influence, and among the philosophers who clung to it most ardently, it was regarded solely in the light of a consolation. Christianity made it a deterrent influence of the strongest kind. In addition to the doctrines of eternal suffering and the lost condition of the human race, the notion of a minute personal retribution must be regarded as profoundly original."¹ "Experience has abundantly shown that men who are wholly insensible to the beauty and dignity of virtue, can be convulsed by the fear of judgment, can be even awak-

¹ "History of European Morals," Vol. II, p. 3.

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ened to such a genuine remorse for sin as to reverse the current of their dispositions, detach them from their most inveterate habits, and renew the whole tenor of their lives."¹

A fourth type of sanction is seen in the penance. Here the punishment is experienced in this world and prescribed by man, but it is belief that makes it poignant. Nothing but belief could make temporary banishment from the communion table or excommunication a dreaded penalty. In cases where the penance consists in abstinences, fasts, humiliations, vigils, mortifications of the flesh, alms, pilgrimages, or religious exercises, it presents itself as an alternative to a frankly supernatural punishment, and as such is patiently endured. In the penitential system can be secured a graduation of sanction that is very convenient so long as Heaven and Hell are states of absolute woe or bliss.

The advantage of a full arsenal of sanctions to draw from should not be forgotten in explaining why in the Roman Empire the Church succeeded when pagan philosophy failed. The Stoics had only moral suasion, while Christianity at the time of Constantine "presented itself as an organized body, armed with penalties more or less severe, to coerce the faithful who should transgress the moral code, the propagation of which formed its real mission. In becoming the religion of the state, it soon found means of reënforcing its ethical sanctions with penalties in which secular privations and disabilities were added to spiritual."²

The difficulty of curbing barbarians, uncowed by law and too impulsive to be steadily guided by

¹ "History of European Morals," Vol. II, p. 4.

² Lea, "History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences," Vol. I, p. 19.

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prospects of the other world, pushed Christian priests and Buddhist lamas into the same path.

"A network of law came by degrees to be stretched not only over the conduct but also over the inward thoughts and purposes of the people, all of whom, from the youngest to the oldest and from the highest to the lowest, were subject to ecclesiastical rule and supervision. A code of penalties, first for outward transgression, then for sins of the heart as well, was administered by the priesthood, with the coöperation, when it was needed, of secular authority. In the Sends in the Frankish Church, the visitations of the Bishops, private confession came to be associated with the public acknowledgment of grave offences. That personal dealing with the conscience and allotting of penalties which were customary in the monasteries spread beyond their walls and into dealings with the laity. Disciplinary penalties were appointed for the sins reckoned as mortal. The origin of rules in detail for the penal treatment of penitents was attributed to the Irish Cloisters and to Theodore, the Saxon Archbishop of Canterbury."¹

When there are bonds of love uniting this world and the next, we have still another group of moral stimuli. For not only may the will of spirits react upon us, but our action here may affect them. When loved ones gone are thought of as looking down upon this life with their former interest and concern, we have a powerful motive to do only that which will please them. With us to-day, in non-religious as well as in religious circles, the influence of this thought in fostering family piety and strengthening family bonds is certainly very great. Likewise the ancestor worship of China and Japan

¹ George P. Fisher, "History of Christian Doctrine," p. 208.

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has been the abler to control conduct, because to the concern for what the family deities might do to the individual has been joined a loving solicitude for what his conduct might do to them. "It were well," insists Colquhoun, "to examine into the relation which is called 'worship' and see what an important part these ancestors play in Chinese life. Their authority seems to be the power which keeps the nation together; they are one with their posterity, and the ancestral tomb is the family altar."¹ But such an influence has always been powerful in Christianity; and for multitudes of young Christians to-day, the chief motive to a right life springs from the conviction that their beloved Master is at this moment living, and that He looks down upon their efforts, grieving when they stumble, rejoicing when they stand.

Going back to the third type of supernatural sanction, which registers the greatest triumph of legal motives in the sphere of belief, we find that the tremendousness of the pains that can be crowded into an eternity calls into being an unique device. This is *the systematic remission of penalty*. When one has sinned and incurred the penalty, there must be opened a door to forgiveness, lest the sinner, made reckless by despair, abandon himself to his evil impulses. Hence, in the Primitive Church, we find such means of pardon provided as repentance, mutual confession, and prayer. The opening of this door did not annul the whole system of sanction as it surely would have done in the case of law or public opinion. Nothing less than deep contrition and sincere amendment could wipe out guilt; and before Him to whom the secret places of the heart are bare, these could not be simulated.

¹ A. R. Colquhoun, "China in Transformation," p. 265.

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But the importance even then ascribed to the intercessory prayers of the brethren "introduced an element out of which eventually grew the enormous development of sacerdotalism interposing mediators of every kind, terrestrial and celestial, between man and his Creator."¹ Then "through successive steps and under varying conditions, the power of the Keys gradually established itself and the Church acquired the awful and mysterious power of regulating the salvation or perdition of her children."² The missionaries among the heathen tribes, finding the prospect of distant damnation insufficient to tame the impulsive spirit of the barbarian, began to insist on the regular and habitual confession of sin. "After an apparently hopeless struggle for centuries, auricular confession finally won its way to recognition as an incident in the revolution of thought in the twelfth century, whereby the schoolmen established the power of the Keys and the sacrament of penitence, with the contingent result of facilitating the pardon of sin."³

Penances to secure remission of sins, having to be borne here and now, might, if well laid on and wisely proportioned to the offence, prove about as deterrent as dread of far-away damnation. But for reasons to be explained elsewhere, the church desired to keep all within her borders, and shrank from driving any away by the hardship of her requirements. The balance between offence and penalty was disturbed till the carefully fostered anxiety for personal salvation took a false direction and led to the piling up of monkish merit instead of the rectification of life. When super-

¹ H. C. Lea, "A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences," Vol. I, p. 76.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 166.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 217.

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natural sanctions heaped mountain-high failed to engender righteousness, when useless works of penitence burdened the sinner without benefiting society, and when finally Tetzel, the seller of indulgences, began "to market the mercy of God," Luther, with his doctrine of justification by faith, cut the cord, and the whole mass of "works" fell into the pit.

The contrast of "Law" and "Gospel" dwelt on by the early Reformers betrayed a hope that henceforth filial submission to the will of the Father, gratitude to Jesus for His assumption of our sins, and the benign influence of Christian fellowship, might be relied on to keep the converted in the right path, and that dread of punishment might be dispensed with inside the fold. But the excesses of the Antinomians and Anabaptists, who pressed the doctrine of free grace to its logical conclusion, and the need of tightening the reins of discipline in the Reformed churches soon banished such dreams. Hell not only remained a terror to the unregenerate, but again came to be strongly emphasized within the pale of the Church. Legalism never regained its old eminence, however, and for over a century the sentiments and intelligence of the age have been narrowing its field of operation.

In the long run, the domination of a system of belief in the supernatural depends less on its plausibility than on the perfection with which its control meets the needs of the social organism.¹

¹ A truth sometimes recognized. In an address to the merchants of Shanghai, Lord Elgin said: "In the rivalry which will then ensue [on confronting Chinese with Western civilization] Christian civilization will have to win its way among a sceptical and ingenious people by making it manifest that a faith which reaches to heaven furnishes better guarantees for public and private morality than one which does not rise above the earth."

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saved by emphasizing inherited turpitude and the guilt of sin, new evils arise. Again, the guidance of men by ideals enforced by honor and self-respect, which has become so general in Protestant countries, requires the illusion of free self-direction. The casting-off of authority and the vindication of the right of private judgment which paves the way for this higher form of control, has at every step encountered the stubborn resistance of the earthly dispensers of unearthly rewards and punishments.

Secondly, *it perverts the social commandments*. As the whole scheme rests upon belief, this must be hedged about with the sharpest thorns. More than any wrong to fellow-man must the gods hate and punish doubt, unbelief, defiance of the priesthood, or neglect of churchly requirements.¹ Not only does unbelief become the capital sin and faith the cardinal virtue, but even rack and stake will be used to drive out heresy. Such an inversion of ethical values shocks the natural moral judgment, and often lashes the best men of a society into revolt against an institution which ought to unite within itself all the impulses making for the perfection of character.

Thirdly, *its recompenses are not immediate*. A primitive scheme that relies on the far reverberation of present deeds in another life, has to contend with the unconcern of people for consequences remote and shadowy.² To overcome this, the horrors

¹ "Multitudinous anomalies occur, however—anomalies which seem unaccountable till we recognize the truth that in all cases the thing which preceles in importance the special injunctions of a cult, is the preservation of the cult itself and the institutions embodying it." — SPENCER, "Principles of Sociology," Vol. II, p. 815.

² "It is proved by an experience of eighteen hundred years, that the tremendous sanctions which Christianity yields are inoperative on the majority of minds. They do not realize them, the threats are not heard, as it were, by the inward spirit. The immediate connection between wrong-doing and going to hell is not grasped.

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of hell and the raptures of paradise are exaggerated to the limits of the imaginable. Priests and seers vie one with another in a vividness of imagery and a profusion of metaphor that shall bring the future into the present. The terror resulting is most fatal to the growth of that sympathy which makes social control unnecessary.

Lastly, *it is hard to manage*. More perhaps than any other regulative agency is belief liable to degenerate into an engine of personal or class oppression. Certain checks and balances that guard from abuse the other instruments of control are wanting here. History testifies that belief implies a sacerdotal ascendancy that is perhaps as often found working against the common welfare as for it.

These evils grow worse as the world grows better, and impress thoughtful men of to-day far more than they did the Fathers or the schoolmen. Hence, the religio-penal system is sloughing off. The forces that have humanized the criminal code work against everlasting punishment. The egoistic anxiety for personal salvation is not whetted to its old keenness, and the deliverance nowadays promised is from sin rather than from the recompense for sin. The recrudescence of other-world realism in those who labor with sailors, miners, frontiersmen, the declassed, and others cut off from family or social influences, is but an eddy in the great drift. However serviceable it may have been in disciplining the barbarians, the wielding of supernatural sanctions seems to be to-day a decaying species of control.

But how did belief become a mainstay of order? Belief in the supernatural was not invented out-

Hell is a long way off, is not visible, and its deterrent efficacy is weakest when the attraction of sinful pleasure is strongest." — MORISON, "The Service of Man," p. 164.

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right as an engine of priestly or social control. Many groups of belief were never brought to assist in the keeping of order,¹ and those that were so utilized had a long career behind them ere they were first turned to account. Faith was the motive power of rite and observance for centuries before it was fairly coupled on to the regulative machinery of society. Says Professor Petrie: "The piety of the Carthaginian before Moloch, of the Roman as he sent his captives to be slaughtered in the Colosseum, . . . or of Louis XV as he prayed in the Parc-aux-Cerfs, show what the brigand who pays for his masses and the Arab who swindles in the intervals of his prayers prove in the present day—that the firmest religious beliefs have no necessary connection with the idea of moral action."²

But the government of man's doings lies in the very nature of belief in invisible beings, and as they consolidate into a system there is always somebody ready to use them in managing somebody else. Out of the blend of nature myths, legends, rules for interpreting dreams, notions about good and bad spirits, recipes for exorcism or propitiation, traditions about charms, omens, and sacred places, there crystallizes in time a national religion, which has rejected many beliefs as mere dross, and has built the rest into a system for guiding the individual in both his private and his social life. In the transition from the early

¹ Certain groups of beliefs even became influences of debasement, turning people away from the conditions of family order and wholesome living. Witness the Dionysiac element in the religions of Canaan, Phoenicia, Greece, and India. The purging or supplanting of these orgiastic religions is one of the most interesting steps in moral evolution.

² "Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt," p. 15. See also Havelock Ellis, "The Criminal."

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Hebrew religion to the Prophets, from the Rig-Veda to the Law of Manu, and from the worship of Ra to that of Osiris, we can watch a group of beliefs developing injunctions and sanctions that have to do with conduct.

The dogmas of theology obey the same influences, though here, of course, the speculative impulse is visibly working along with the practical purpose. Theology may have been a theory of things when it proclaimed the resurrection of the dead, but it was certainly a disciplinary tool when it devised places of elaborate punishment and reward.¹ Just as Buddhism got itself equipped with a Great Judgment, paradise, purgatory, hells, confessional, saints, and a graded priesthood, in dealing with Thibetan savages, so the teaching of Jesus must have been converted into mediæval theology largely at the instance of practical men confronted with the problem of maintaining order after the collapse of the Roman Empire.

Strong emphasis on belief and great stress on the non-social virtues mark the decay of the moral element in a system of belief. When this is perceived, the living forces of society insensibly retire from it, and there is left an imposing but worm-eaten trunk ready to fall at the first shock. It was the failure of the attempt to Protestantize the Greek Church in the beginning of the seventh century which led those ardent for simplicity of faith and a devout life to embrace Islam. Mohammedanism spread so rapidly because "The African and Syrian doctors had substituted abstruse metaphysical dogmas for the religion of

¹ Save in Mahomet's paradise the rewards and sufferings have not been correlative. The kind of man who most dreads hell is not particularly attracted by heaven. In the higher religions, heaven is the place of union or communion with God, and appears to have been conceived by the mystic rather than the law-giver.

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Christ ; they tried to combat the licentiousness of the age by setting forth the celestial merit of celibacy and the angelic excellence of virginity — seclusion from the world was the road to holiness, dirt was the characteristic of monkish sanctity. . . . Islam swept away this mass of corruption and superstition. It was a revolt against empty theological polemics ; it was a masculine protest against the exaltation of celibacy as a crown of piety. It thrust aside the artificial virtues, the religious frauds and follies, the perverted moral sentiments and the verbal subtleties of theological disputes. It replaced monkishness by manliness. It gave hope to the slave, brotherhood to mankind, and recognition to the fundamental facts of human nature.”¹ Similarly, in the eighth and ninth centuries Buddhism was swept out of India after the order had become wealthy, idle, and corrupt. The laity had left the principles of the teacher for witchcraft and devil-worship, the teaching of Gautama had become enveloped in superstitions, and the faithful were taught to rest their hopes more on their liberality to the monks than on the harder duties of self-control and charity.

To follow the steps by which belief became ethical, let us take the Semitic religion.

In a chaos of superstitions regarding ghosts, our attention is fixed by the attitude of a group of kinsmen toward the spirit of a departed ancestor. The feeling here is not fear, but rather the trust and fellowship that are possible only between those who are held together by the bond of blood kinship. The branch of belief that led to the practice of magic and sorcery with reference to strange or hostile spirits had no social possibili-

¹ Canon Isaac Taylor, quoted by Arnold in “The Preaching of Islam,” p. 62.

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ties, and decayed early. For us the main stream of belief is that pertaining to the known god of the community, blood kin to all its members, and not at the service of the individual in his private aims. "Religion," says W. Robertson Smith, "is not an arbitrary relation of the individual man to a supernatural power, it is a relation of all the members of a community to a power that has the good of the community at heart and protects its law and moral order."¹

The god being conceived as ancestor may properly claim from his worshippers the reverence and service that belong to a father. As patriarchal institutions develop, the god, like the patriarch, comes to be looked upon as judge and king. As the business of the chief, however, was to lead the community against its enemies, and not to meddle with its internal affairs, so the god had, at first, little concern with the doings of his worshippers. "What the Semitic communities asked, and believed themselves to receive, from their divine king lay mainly in three things: help against their enemies, counsel by oracles or soothsayers in matters of national difficulty, and a sentence of justice when a case was too hard for human decision. For the rest it was not expected that he should always be busy righting human affairs."² ". . . The conception of the tribal god as father . . . does not carry with it any idea of the strict and rigid enforcement of divine commands by supernatural sanctions."³

As monarchy develops, the old independence is broken down and the king is more able to interfere actively in his subjects' quarrels. By his authority he replaces the rude trial by strength

¹ "The Religion of the Semites," p. 55.

² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

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with judicial decisions realizing some ideal of abstract justice. Rude "fist law" is made to yield to awards based on general equity. Through this evolution the godhead follows the kingship like a shadow. "As the god, though not conceived as omnipotent, is at least conceived as much stronger than man, he becomes in a special measure the champion of right against might, the protector of the poor, the widow, and the fatherless, of the man who has no helper on earth."¹

The precise way in which the divine sanction was annexed to conduct appears to have been the extension of the idea of *tabu*. From very early times, men recognized certain spots as the haunts of the god, and therefore sacred from intrusion. Holy places and things were "surrounded by a network of restrictions and disabilities which forbid them to be used by men except in particular ways, and in certain cases forbid them to be used at all."² This place-*tabu*, which had within it the assertion of common property against private license, was extended to guard the sanctuary against acts or liberties that might offend the personal dignity of the god. At this point it needs but the socializing of the *tabu* to transform a jealous regard for sacred etiquette into an ethical holiness to which the sight of evil or injustice is an offence and an abomination.

Here lies the crisis in the history of religion. Belief, which has been hitherto a political badge, expressing, on the one hand, the alliance of the members of the political group, and, on the other, its separateness from any other group, now assumes a social office. It asserts not tribe against tribe, but society against its individual members.

¹ "The Religion of the Semites," p. 72. ² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

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It becomes an agent of social control. This momentous revolution is achieved by a very simple turn of ideas,—namely, by conceiving that the god is pleased not by sacrifices, praise, and ritual, but by certain forms of conduct and certain elements of character. “Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols. But let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream.”¹ “They sacrifice flesh for the sacrifices of mine offerings, and eat it; but the Lord accepteth them not; now will he remember their iniquity and visit their sins.”² “To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats.” “Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth: they are a trouble unto me; I am weary to bear them. . . . Cease to do evil: learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow.”³

The same idea is expressed by Gautama when he says: “Rituals have no efficacy, prayers are vain repetitions, and incantations have no saving power. But to abandon covetousness and lust, to become free from evil passions, and to give up all hatred and ill-will, that is the right sacrifice and the true worship.” But the complete identification of god-service with man-service awaited the exquisite humanity of Jesus’ saying, “Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me.”

¹ Amos v : 23, 24.

² Hosea viii : 13.

³ Isaiah, ch. i. See also Kuenen, “The Religion of Israel,” Vol. I, pp. 57, 59.

CHAPTER XIII

SOCIAL SUGGESTION

WE have seen how by means of the punishments and rewards the stubborn individual will is bent to the social purpose. It is now in order to consider whether the same result may not be attained without the use of any sanctions whatever. This calls for a study of the social rôle of suggestion.

Sentiments and ideas can, of course, be suggested as well as volitions. We have already touched on this in connection with the working of praise and blame, and we shall have occasion later to see how an ideal or a valuation must be, as it were, fixed in the mind by social pressure before it can begin to affect conduct in its peculiar way. There is, in fact, hardly any device of social control in which tradition, instruction, convention, example, or personal influence—in other words, suggestion—is not employed. Now, in the present study we shall, so far as possible, neglect these secondary services of suggestion and fix our attention upon its primary services in the direct shaping of volitions and conduct.

The marvellous control of the operator over the hypnotized subject shows how susceptible a person in a neuropathic condition may become to suggestion,—that is, to “the abrupt entrance from without into consciousness of an idea or image which becomes a part of the stream of thought and tends to produce the muscular and volitional effects which

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ordinarily follow upon its presence."¹ But it is likely that even in the normal condition one experiences a shock whenever a wave from without impinges upon his own mental current. Often he obeys the sharp command without thinking of sanctions. He imitates the striking action without regard to its fitness. Persuasion is little else than the art of introducing into a man's mind unwelcome ideas so neatly as not to arouse the will to expel them. The onset of an idea, image, or emotion has a real momentum, and is stayed only by a certain resistance. This counter-effort takes time, and hence fails oftenest with those suggestions which call for instant action. We find in the mind not only what has been accepted, but everything that has not been rejected. The doctrine of *idea-forces* which is gaining ground in psychology is a recognition of this impact of ideas. The masters of persuasion know the value of the moments when the power of resistance is weak. They harvest their converts from the school, the sick-room, the death-bed, the ranks of the broken-hearted, the humbled, the disappointed. In children, suggestibility is at its maximum; while in hale and firm characters among adults the daily impact of ideas causes no tremor. But few attain such self-possession; most adults retain a responsiveness to hints from without that can be counted on in the social regulation of conduct.

The force of suggestion depends somewhat on *bodily* and *mental condition*. Fatigue, disease, and "nerves" lessen the power of inhibition, while mob-madness leads men captive to the impressions of the moment. The *source* of suggestion is a vital matter. The strange power of the individual of

¹J. Mark Baldwin, "Handbook of Psychology," Vol. II, p. 297.

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authority or prestige to impose his will on others is well known. The services of this power on behalf of social control will be examined in the chapter on "Personality." *Volume* or *mass* is, of course, to be considered in measuring the importance of suggestion. The orator presses his point by reiteration. The advertiser wants the name of his soap or baking powder to catch the eye at every turn. The politician knows that if much mud be thrown some of it will stick. The ascendancy of the mob over a newcomer varies directly with its size. The educator estimates his power to influence a child by the number of years allowed him. The officer demands time to train the recruit into a soldier. The missionary finds it is the first batch of converts that costs. It is its cumulative aspect that makes *social suggestion* emanating from the community at large the chief kind to be considered in connection with the conduct of adults. Finally, there is the *purity* of suggestion. The force of a suggestion is vastly lessened if it meets counter-suggestions that inhibit and block it off. It is therefore *social suggestion protected from contradiction* that can best bend down the individual will.

Everything we do reveals the pull on conduct exerted by social suggestion. Our foods and drinks, our dress and furniture, our amusements, our religious emotions, our investments, and even our matrimonial choices confess the sway of fashion and vogue. Whatever is common reaches us by way of example or advice or intimidation from a hundred directions. In our most private choices we are swerved from our orbit by the solar attraction—or repulsion—of the conventional. In public opinion there is something which is not praise or blame, and this residuum is mass suggestion. From this comes its power to reduce men to uni-

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formity as a steam roller reduces bits of stone to smooth macadam. Mr. Bryce has termed it "the fatalism of the multitude," and shown that it is something entirely different from the tyranny of the majority.¹

On comparing social suggestions among themselves, we can observe a great difference in tone. Over one great range of conduct society is unconscious or careless of its suggestions, and neglects to collect, unify, focus, and direct them upon any one. This is the field of indifferent actions, and the ascendancy here is a form of *social influence*. Over the other range, society is strenuous, emphatic, and pertinacious in its suggestions. This is the field where individual and group preferences are liable to clash, and the ascendancy here is a form of *social control*.

No little care is needed to discriminate the working of the social imperative from the operation of a public opinion, a social ideal, or a social valuation. A man bows to public opinion because he has come to dread it. He conforms to a social ideal because he has come to admire it. He adopts and acts on a ready-made social judgment because he has come to trust it. He obeys the social imperative, however, for none of these reasons, but because he feels he *must*. In the parlance of the day, he has become *obsessed* by it.

Sometimes we feel the present will of the community like fathoms of sea lying heavily upon us, and we acquiesce with a sense of necessity. At other times, it is not to a pressure from outside that we succumb, but to an inner tension due to accumulated past suggestions, ingrained "shalts" and "shalt nots" deposited in forgotten hours; in

¹"The American Commonwealth," Vol. II, ch. lxxxiv.

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such cases we yield with a sense of obligation. But whether through the imperious expectation of our neighbors or through unremitting teaching and preaching, the social intimation comes to be the sun about which we circle like asteroids. Some of us wheel smoothly, some with zigzags and perturbations that betray other commanding forces in our lives. But in respect to conduct only the deliberate criminal and the moral insurgent break completely away from the social standard. And sociologists may well be pardoned for isolating and lingering over these most fascinating and tragic species of men.

People of narrow orbit—children, farmers' wives, spinsters, peasants, fishermen, humble village folk, often soldiers and sailors—are slaves to an imposed sense of obligation. Prolonged exposure to a circle or group that speaks always with the same decision the same commands, benumbs the will over whole areas of choice. On the other hand, whatever breaks the clench of the environment or invigorates the will,—liberal education, discussion, travel, varied experience, contact with new types of men, leadership, new ideas and wants, changes in general opinion or intellectual progress,—undermines the tyranny of group suggestions. But most people live their lives in a cove; only the few ever reach blue water. In the wilderness, on the border, in the country neighborhood, the individual counts for much. Likewise in a large city with many types of belief and sentiment. But in a military academy, a garrison, a colony, a religious community, a country village, or a provincial town, the many get the upper hand of the one. And when it is not Mrs. Grundy that coerces, it is tradition. Old colleges, universities, monasteries, senates, academies, administrative departments, army

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and navy, ancient families and quiet neighborhoods become the haunt of traditions that cast a spell over those who come within their reach. So around rank, station, caste, and office cluster powerful precedents and traditions which quietly overpower and regulate the newly initiated.

"In civilized society," says a writer, "laws and regulations press on the individual from all sides. Whenever one attempts to rise above the dead level of commonplace life, instantly the social screw begins to work, and down is brought upon him the tremendous weight of the socio-static press. . . . Under the enormous weight of the socio-static press, under the crushing pressure of economical, political, and religious regulations, there is no possibility for the individual to determine his own relations in life; there is no possibility for him to move, live, and think freely; the personal self sinks, the suggestible, subconscious, social, impersonal self rises to the surface, gets trained and cultivated, and becomes the hysterical actor in all the tragedies of historical life."¹

Such are the results of social suggestion. Let us now look at its process. The first noose thrown over the neck is *example*. Whatever kind of family type, neighborly relation, trade practice, business transaction, civic activity or patriotic sacrifice becomes common, tends to draw the practice of individuals in its wake. Of course, this influence does not bring up society as a whole, but only the backward minority. Conventionality is simply a leveller, and if it levels upward it is no less true that it levels downward. The reigning example does not, therefore, bring about a general

¹ Boris Sidis, "The Psychology of Suggestion," pp. 311-312.

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advance in conduct, but merely extends and secures a progress that has been won by other means.

Despite our inherited theories of the "free moral agent," we all know the ease of drifting, oars in lap, with the current. We admire goodness only when it is difficult; and outside of obituaries we never give any one credit for practising the common virtues. If it is the rose-strewn path that tempts, then respectability constitutes in old and staid communities the greatest of temptations. Merit in fact begins only when we surpass the ordinary practice. Not to lie to the assessor is one thing; to show him overlooked property is another. They are the same in principle, but the latter means more, because it transcends the ordinary practice. We see far greater merit in a lawyer who will not deceive the jury than in one who will not deceive his client. Yet the difference is simply that the one gravitates to the example of his profession, while the other rises sheer above it.

"Nowadays," said Sighele, "the difficulty is not in finding collective crimes, but rather in finding crimes that are not collective." But if there is much badness, there is likewise much goodness, that betrays the complicity of one's surroundings. There is collective righteousness as well as collective crime, and in a just apportionment of responsibility Jones deserves scarcely more credit for his conventional virtues of decency, monogamy, and tolerance than he does for his conventional accomplishments of reading and writing. Between a man and his associates there comes to be a silent, subtle *moral osmosis* which we are just beginning to perceive; and until we have comprehended this we shall never quite account for good behavior.

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The early history of frontier places like Ballarat or Dutch Flat or Skagway shows that many well-behaved persons, when lifted out of the social pressure, become in respect to character as seriously deranged as those deep-sea fishes that are brought to the surface with the air bladder protruding from the mouth.

Distinct from the force of example is the force of *expectation*. Even when the ordinary practice is low, there persists somehow a pathetic confidence that people are going to do right. Like the church debt-raiser who assumes on the part of his contributors a liberality he knows they have not, society expects from its members a virtue it has no reason to look for. Private gossip is shrewd enough; but opinion, whenever it begins to get organized and official, shows a strange simplicity. What people lives up to the preamble of its constitution, or rises to the level of its political philosophy? Our political phraseology implies that every one is going to be the "good citizen." Law assumes such an alacrity of obedience that we forget all about the mailed fist in the velvet glove. The forms of intercourse exhale our unwarranted trust in the civility and peaceableness of the average man. The tone of business and professional etiquette is strangely untrue to the facts. The sentiments that are everywhere applauded, that each professes to act on, and that each professedly expects others to act on, are by no means the real springs of conduct.

This make-believe is thin enough, yet somehow a Juvenal, a Flaubert, or a Zola never quite abolishes the gap between expectation and reality. The satirist has his day, but the generations belong to the optimists. His mordant words are as vain as the sermons Saint Anthony of Padua preached to the fishes. Only in times of decay, when society

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has lost the instinct of health, does the cynic give tone to current belief, discussion, and literature. Usually, it is a book, the play, the poem, the sermon, the appeal, that deems "the great heart of the people" sound, and declares meanness to be an abnormal and exceptional thing, that wins applause, vogue, and influence.

The cynic deems this "Fools' Paradise" debilitating, declares that shams rot out the moral fibre of a people, and insists that we learn to see things as they are. For he misses the secret of this invincible optimism. He does not see that it is kept as a moral stimulus. Yet expectation has always been used in managing people. The notice "Gentlemen will not spit on the floor" is naïve but effective. The signal "England expects every man to do his duty" is a better stimulus than an offer of prize money. At Rugby school, Arnold always seemed to place implicit reliance in the word of his pupils. If a boy denied anything, he considered the matter settled and would not investigate further. Consequently, the sentiment grew up that it was a shame to tell Arnold a lie, as he always believed it. Mr. Pearson testifies, "Dr. Jelf, the chief [of King's College] for more than twenty years, was a gentleman of the old school, who was incapable of supposing that any one could lie to him. . . . It was an accepted maxim that no one could lie to the Principal, because he always believed what was said. . . . After a few months at the College, every student, finding that he was treated as a gentleman, acted up to the gentleman's code of honor."¹

"It has been justly said," observes Guyau, "that the art of managing the young consists,

¹C. H. Pearson, "Reviews and Critical Essays," p. 5.

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before anything else, in assuming them to be as good as they wish themselves to be." "The same principles find their application in the art of governing men. Numerous facts from prison life show that to treat a half criminal as a great criminal is to urge to crime." All jurists, historians, and sociologists see the weakness of human nature, and decline to reckon much on noble impulses. On the other hand, those who influence and regenerate men, the salvationists, evangelists, apostles, preachers, and moral reformers, are optimists save in moments of discouragement—or insight. They expect much of men, not from a better knowledge of human nature, but from that native sanguineness of temper which is the secret of their success. They demand the impossible and get it, because their confidence is a powerful suggestion to their followers. They verify the principle "To him who expects much, much shall be given."

We now see why there reigns in society this stubborn and absurd confidence, that neither facts nor ridicule can overthrow. It is a kind of bluffing in the game with the Evil One. The frank trust that of course everybody is going to be pure, honest, and public-spirited, acts on many men as a hint they cannot resist. It is dimly felt that to abandon this assumption is to lose a certain stimulus to goodness.

The tonic effect of this grand illusion may be shown by an analogy. It is well known that the temper of a social circle is likely to be more cheerful and buoyant than the average mood of its members. The reason is that, wherever social intercourse has become a fine art, there is a secret understanding that every one shall put his best foot foremost and keep his private griefs to himself. Good form bids each tell of his good luck, but not

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of his misfortunes, report his elations, but hide his worries, pains, disease, and anguish. Each does this, and requires it of others under penalty of avoidance. As a result of this innocent legerdemain, the atmosphere of a company is charged with an ozone of gayety, hopefulness, and *joie de vivre*, that helps each to bear his private burdens. Is it too much to suppose that a beneficent illusion of this kind about conduct may create a social atmosphere that will brace and invigorate the faltering?

Besides exalting the tone of social suggestion, society interposes to exclude counter-suggestion. Realizing better than did our forefathers the contagion of the bad, we set no one in stocks or pillory, veil decently our prisons and prison discipline from the common gaze, avoid public executions, stop brutal exhibitions, forbid such sports as the fighting of cocks, dogs, bulls, or men, look after the treatment of car or cab horses, restrict vivisection, confine prostitutes to the back streets, keep the saloons away from the churches and school-houses, and treat open drunkenness as a public scandal. Furthermore, we exact from our public men, as the price of leadership, a private life that shall offer no stone of stumbling.

The suggestion of *word* is looked after as well as the contagion of *deed*. We recognize our jails as schools of crime, and are taking steps to guard first offenders from the contamination of hardened criminals. The law gives increasing attention to anything that smacks of incitement or instigation to law-breaking. Criminal trials are recognized as plague-spreading, and the admission of the public to the court room is discreetly regulated. Depraving or obscene literature is suppressed with a heavy hand. Minute, highly colored accounts of crime

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are frowned on. Agitation against certain evils is deprecated as more harmful than the evils themselves. Public places are so looked after that on our streets one finds almost nothing to remind of vice or crime. From the pulpit, on the platform, in all meetings and social gatherings, it is a grave offence to speak, save sparingly and in way of condemnation, of aught that is not pure and of good report. Where two or three are gathered, the tongue wags freely. Before twenty, in the sewing circle or the lodge, one stammers and thinks of his neighbors' morals. Before a hundred, the social *cloture* is in full operation; and to an audience of both sexes and all ages it is always the pontiff, and not the man, that speaks.

The growing clamor for the purifying of the press and the recurring agitation for an endowed newspaper, point to the day when unwholesome news will be edited in the interest of public morality. Literature already feels the rein. "Since the days of the author of 'Tom Jones,'" writes Thackeray, "not one novelist in our country has painted humanity as it is. We must dress it in a certain way, give it the attitude and language of convention. Our readers, and especially our women, do not admit the natural in art." In America, Howells, Julian Hawthorne, James, Lathrop, Boyesen, and Fawcett have complained that our fiction is jejune and insipid because our magazines are edited with an eye to the Young Girl of the American family. Says another: "We treat each other as if we had just graduated from a young ladies' boarding-school or were possible contributors to some Ladies' Journal. We will not see, at least in literature, that there is a coarse and animal side to life, and that for mere relief we must give it in speech if not in act." "I hardly know where to look for coarseness or raci-

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ness in American literature. Mr. Howells' people are all respectable and genteel. Mr. James's are genteel if they are not respectable. Mark Twain's Mississippi roustabouts never say anything that would bring a blush to the cheek of modesty. Bret Harte's heroes have the manners of the grand opera." "Dr. Holmes, a delicate humorist, seemed born to preach the propaganda of the clean shirt. There is a precious spark or two of vulgarity in Irving, but it soon dies away into the general decency. Cooper's heroes are moral prize-winners. Gazing on all this wide expanse of clean linen and well-washed humanity, the soul aches for a little dirt."¹

This care for a lacquer finish is partly due to our way of dealing with the young. Continental Europe carefully shuts them in hot-houses till their characters are sufficiently formed; but here in America there is little isolation of youth. The young are more and more granted the right to go everywhere; and as the danger of suggestion is better realized, society with increasing vigor plies the broom in front of them. Whatever the American girl touches — politics, literature, art, drama, social intercourse, festivity, or sport — must be cleansed of objectionable suggestion, not by a luke-warm *police des mœurs*, but by the far more exacting censorship of public opinion. The innocent can, if they wish, tread the mazes of our society almost as unscandalized as they would be in convent or boarding-school. Whatever offence may lurk in the back alleys, the highways, at least, are kept decent. The eager air that on the Continent nips adolescent virtue outside the hot-house, is here tempered to the lambs.

Of course this keeping up of appearances offers

¹ C. L. Moore in *The Dial*, May 16, 1898.

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a shining mark to the cynic and to the moral prophet. The cynic wants things to *seem* as they *are*: the prophet wants things to *be* as they *seem*. Yet they agree in the conviction that the contrast between being and seeming is a sign of hypocrisy and moral decay. But is there not something to be said on the other side? Crime is not a little contagious, and vice is notoriously so. Art fills our modern life with stimuli that excite the jaded senses to the point of exhaustion. Protection from the more powerful and obtrusive of these solicitations is, therefore, like athleticism, the "outing" mania, or the "fresh air" movement, an endeavor to restore natural conditions and to get back to the old lines. All civilized peoples feel this more or less, not excepting the Latins, who are always jeering at Anglo-Saxon prudery. For even Gallic frankness would seem a veiled reserve to one who could pass a day in old Rome or old Carthage. We moderns are all more or less whitewashed with the same brush, yet it is not certain that we are less sincere than the Romans of Sallust, or less frank and truthful than the Greeks of Polybius.

The question raised is a wide one. The whole process of selection and rejection, by which, in a very natural way, are formed those patterns, ideals, and valuations with which society seeks to influence its members, is bound to give offence to the assailants of shams and conventional lies. It means the lifting of some things into sunlight, the dropping of others into shadow. It implies emphasis alternating with silence, confidence broken by discreet reserves, the contrast of high relief and low relief, foreground and background, *fortissimo* and *pianissimo*. It calls for the fig-leaf, the veil, the mask, the screen. But ere we cry "Hypocrisy!" let us remember that a screen may

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be used to spare the thing concealed, or to spare the eyes that might light on it. Society does not thrust vice off into corners that vice may be the safer, but that innocence may be the more secure. The French Realists, Balzac, Flaubert, and Zola, with all their indignant pulling off of *bourgeois* masks, have not regenerated their people. The English artist with his side-glances at convention has done more for his country than the French artist with his eye fixed on naked truth. The fact is, conventional or middle-class decency is a stage in the ascent of the European *bourgeoisie*, as Puritanism was, for one thing, the passage from lusty, libidinous, coarse-mouthing Squire Western to the clean Briton or American of to-day. The starched shirt front is the forerunner, not the substitute, of the bath.

In new, mixed communities there is no clear suggestion to decant from the seething life. The vicious may proselyte as well as the virtuous, and evil is not handicapped in the struggle with good. Hence, virtue without the corset of social suggestion grows firm of fibre and strong to resist. In an old community where much is taken for granted, there is more of pseudo-virtue and more of the exotic morality that withers in the blast of temptation.¹ From this contrast springs the per-

¹ "All qualities, good and bad, are intensified and accentuated in the life of the wilderness. The man who in civilization is merely sullen and bad-tempered, becomes a murderous, treacherous ruffian when transplanted to the wilds; while, on the other hand, his cheery, quiet neighbor develops into a hero, ready uncomplainingly to lay down his life for his friend. One who, in an Eastern city, is merely a backbiter and slanderer, in the Western woods lies in wait for his foe with a rifle; sharp practice in the East becomes highway robbery in the West; but, at the same time, negative good-nature becomes active self-sacrifice, and a general belief in virtue is translated into a prompt and determined war upon vice." — ROOSEVELT, "The Winning of the West," Vol. I, p. 131.

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petual dispute between colonial and native, between West and East. The Westerner mistakenly supposes that in the old community virtue has no "old guard" because it has so many conscripts and camp followers. The Easterner errs in thinking virtue scarce on the frontier because it does not dominate social expression.

In this contention of cynic and moralist, Westerner and Easterner, results must decide. It is significant that the new community follows the old community in improving the façade. Arizona girds at New England for hiding vice under a lustrous varnish of respectability and lauds her own frankness in regard to evil. But somehow the "wide open" policy is given up with the advent of women and babes. Arizona when she becomes *mater familiæ* resents the flaunting of bad practices, and takes steps to purify the social atmosphere. Long before the facts of hypnotism, practical men learned to value moral tone and acted on the maxim "Evil communications corrupt good manners." The striking influence of suggestion on the animal instincts long ago established a reserve in sexual matters which is now being extended to other lines of conduct.

Yet there are other interests at stake than those of social morality. The gyving and gagging of people in their social life may go on till the cost far outweighs the gain. We must beware of bringing back "the hideousness, the immense *ennui* of life which the Puritan type created."¹ Naturally, the strong do not want their reading, art, drama, festivity, and sport emasculated on account of the weak. Those who are scandalized and stumble at the "eating of meat offered to idols" finally

¹ Matthew Arnold.

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become an intolerable nuisance. That there are people who, when they hear of a suicide, dare not look at a razor, is a pity; but we cannot all go bearded to spare their susceptibilities. Between Louis XIV and Louis XV, between Puritan tyranny and Restoration profligacy, there must be a wise middle course.

Moreover, there is danger as well as annoyance in the over-much coddling of anti-social or defectively-social natures. It is as possible to make things too easy for the morally unfit as for the physically unfit. Puritanism would check the elimination of the former as communism would check the elimination of the latter. Too much consideration for moral weakness would fill the world with moral weaklings. To abolish temptation is to deprive the self-controlled of their natural right to outlive and outnumber those who have a cotton string for a backbone. The over-zealous guardian of public morals, like Emerson's conservative, "assumes sickness as a necessity and his social frame as a hospital; his total legislation is for the present distress, a universe in slippers and flannels, with bib and pap-spoon, swallowing pills and herb tea."

CHAPTER XIV

SOCIAL SUGGESTION CONTINUED—EDUCATION

THE hackneyed metaphors, “potter’s clay,” “wax tablet,” “bent twig,” “tender osier,” are so many ways of emphasizing the high suggestibility of childhood. The mark of the young mind is an absence of fixed habits, of stubborn volitions, of persistent ways of acting. The stanch personality that can plough through counter-suggestions as tremorless as an ironclad in a flight of arrows we look for only in the adult. The child gradually builds it as a worm builds its worm-cast—out of material taken in from without. And this original dependence on surroundings holds true alike of martyr and of milksop, of moral hero and of weakling. They differ only in their power to form fixed habits. “The ethical life itself, the boy’s, the girl’s conscience, is born in the stress of the conflicts of suggestion, born right out of his imitative hesitations.”¹ Not long ago it was the fashion to magnify heredity and belittle surroundings. But the close study of infancy has shown that much we charged to blood is really due to example. The close mental and moral resemblances to parents are largely the result of imitation. “Heredity does not stop with birth; it is then only beginning.”² “Under limitations of heredity” the child “makes up his personality . . . by imitation out of the

¹ J. M. Baldwin, “Mental Development in the Child and the Race,” p. 360.

² *Ibid.*, p. 361.

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'copy' set in the actions, temper, emotions, of the persons who build around him the social enclosure of his childhood."¹ He "reflects the whole system of influences coming to stir his sensibilities. And just in as far as his sensibilities are stirred, he imitates, and forms habits of imitating; and habits? — they are character!"²

Now, this early suggestibility, which has become so huge and pregnant a fact to the psychology of to-day, has always been more or less clearly apprehended by thinkers. For upon this, and this only, rests the time-honored policy of founding social order on a system of *education*.

Most, though not quite all, of the moral possibilities that lie in education are bound up in some way or other with the power of suggestion. There is, first of all, the training received in school or on playground from mingling with other children on a footing of equality. "All the ways of men," says Goldsmith, "are practised in a public school in miniature." In this microcosm the too obstreperous *ego* gets a wholesome dressing down. There is formed a habit of moderating one's claims, of respecting others' rights, and of hitting upon those moral solutions known as "justice." Closely related to this is the training to self-control and the habit of obedience to an external law which are given by a good school discipline. Another gain lies in the partial substitution of the teacher for the parent as the model upon which the child forms itself. Copy the child will, and the advantage of giving him his teacher instead of his father to imitate, is that the former is a picked person, while the latter is not. Childhood is, in fact, the heyday of personal influence. The position of the teacher

¹ J. M. Baldwin, "Mental Development in the Child and the Race," p. 357.

² *Ibid.*, p. 358.

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gives him prestige, and the lad will take from him suggestions that the adult will accept only from rare and splendid personalities. The committing of education to superior persons lessens our dependence on magnetic men. It is a way of economizing Savonarola or Wesley or Phillips Brooks.

We must allow an effect to the continual impact of precept. Whether as the master's exhortation, as oft-quoted injunction, as memorized text, or as schoolroom motto, a persistent suggestion as to conduct, provided it really strike the attention and be brought home by illustration and instance, ought to count for something. The mere droning or dinging of maxims is perhaps vain, but that which is really *taught* certainly tends to *sink in*. The present contempt for such direct methods of impressing the will is an accident, due to the fact that the reigning scepticism usually cuts for the man the bonds in which precept has bound the child. Let us not forget that the immemorial device of stationary societies to preserve their ancient order has been to steep the young in certain traditional wisdom. For thousands of years the mere learning by rote of Analects, or Vedas, or Koran, or Thorah, has been, not unjustly, deemed of great effect in fixing habits of thought and moulding character.

Again, education can so direct a child's enthusiasms and scorns as to inspire it with a desired ideal. The born teacher is able to kindle zeal at the right flame and "fix the generous purpose in the breast." In song, religion, natural history, legend, fable, and fairy tale are embedded seizing characters which draw down love or hate according to the way in which they are presented. In the soul of the pupil the subtle and innocent Jesuitry of the schoolmaster is thus able to weld feelings to ideas in ways which that pupil will never discover later on.

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Finally, it is possible to fix in the plastic child-mind principles upon which, later, may be built a huge structure of practical consequence. For thus out of sight in the impressions of childhood lie the foundations of many a man's theory of conduct and philosophy of life. Undoubtedly, when reason is fully active the man revises his beliefs, tearing down the hastily-run-up structures of youth, and building anew. But, while dislodging stone after stone that has been laid in the mortar of bad logic, he rarely disturbs the deep concrete foundation that, clinging to the bedrock of his mind with the grip of early suggestion, seems to be a part of his very self. Building on some early moral or intellectual prejudice such as the divine government, the harmony of public and private interests, the coincidence of virtue and happiness, the sacredness of law, the dignity of magistrates, society is able to get the individual on its side almost for nothing. It is this planting of seed-ideas Callicles has in mind when he says: "We take the best and strongest from their youth upward and tame them like young lions—charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honorable and just."¹

Thus can education help in "breaking in" the colt to the harness. But education is far from being always and everywhere a moral instrument. True, it does not follow the preferences of the child; it is always *provided*. But if it is provided by the parent, it will reflect the parent's desire to fit his child for *practical* life, to equip him for success in the struggle for existence. If education is provided by a sect, it will reflect the zeal of the

¹ Plato, "Gorgias," 484.

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sect to fit for *eternal* life, to equip the soul for salvation. Finally, if it is provided by society, it will reflect the desire of society to fit for *social* life. Not always, however, are these aims kept distinct. The parent comes to prize good character as a means to getting on, while the state finds that one way to lessen law-breaking is to equip its children to earn a living. Moreover, the parent may be held responsible for the education he provides, as when he is commanded: "Thou shalt teach them [your children] the words of the law, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down and when thou risest up. And thou shalt write them upon the doorposts of thine house and upon thy gates."¹ Or the sect may, as in the case of Magi, Brahmins, or Churchmen, become virtually the educational organ of society. We ought, perhaps, to regard as engine of social control only that school education *which is provided gratuitously for all children by some great social organ.*

There are several factors which condition the appearance of a free public education. Stage of social development is one. When society is still patriarchal and the commonwealth reposes on families, education remains the appanage of the parent. Heads of families being the authors and mainstays of social order, moral education may, as in old Israel, Homeric Greece, early Rome, Persia, and China, be safely committed to their care. When, as in military Sparta, social existence is staked on the fidelity and prowess of the individual man, the state thrusts the parent to one side and imposes its own discipline. There seems, too, to be an inverse relation between force and education, between

¹ Deut. ii: 18-20.

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direct and indirect methods of control. Rome, strong in lictors and legions, ignored education. The Jews, backward in political organization or dispersed among alien races, must needs impose the yoke of their law by school and synagogue rather than by scourge and prison.

A third factor is the intelligence and self-consciousness of society. The schooling of the young is a long-headed device to promote order, and does not get adopted till the group wakes up. At first it is the rare thinker who sees anything in it, and his arguments do not always prevail. Down to the Reformation, only the Greek philosophers and the Jewish rabbis had set forth the possibilities of education in respect to social order. Men trust the policeman and the priest sooner than the pedagogue. To collect little plastic lumps of human dough from private households and shape them on the social kneading-board, exhibits a faith in the power of suggestion which few peoples ever attain to. And so it happens that the rôle of the schoolmaster in the social economy is just beginning. The technique of belief and religion has been understood for thousands of years; but the technique of education is the discovery of yesterday—or, shall I say, to-morrow?

The aims that have dominated the historical systems of education have not been dictated solely by society's instinct of self-preservation, but reflect other paramount social needs as well.

The informing purpose of the earlier types of education—Egypt, India, China, Israel—was the shaping of human pulp in a rigid, traditional mould. The means of reconciling order with progress were not then understood or discussed. The only fabric that men could conceive of was the existing one, and hence social stability seemed bound up

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with conservatism. Immovable these civilizations were certainly not, but their slow secular drift had little to do with conscious change. Education, therefore, consisted in so hypnotizing the young with the ancient lore that free exercise of the mind on religious, ethical, or political matters should be impossible. They were to be stung and paralyzed with tradition, thrown into a mental catalepsy by exclusive contact with sacred books and classics edited, interpreted, and, perhaps, even doctored by a priestly caste. To make men torpid and peaceable by making them resigned, to get them to accept the social system as they accept the order of nature, to clothe law and religion with such prestige that the individual, unable to see over them or around them, bows the head submissively — such were the aims of early education!

In Greece conflicting tendencies were at work. In Sparta the state was a great educational institution; and warrior-citizens were deliberately turned out according to pattern. "At seven years Spartan children," says Plutarch, "were enrolled in certain companies and classes, where they all lived under the same order and discipline, doing their exercises and taking their play together. Of these he who showed the most conduct and courage was made captain. They had their eyes always upon him, obeyed his orders, and underwent patiently whatever punishment he inflicted; so that the whole course of their education was one continued exercise of a ready and perfect obedience."¹

In Athens there was no state system, and the child was educated primarily for himself. The profound and just reflections of the philosophers on the rôle that early suggestion might play in

¹ "Lycurgus."

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the control-apparatus of society¹ never gave direction to Athenian education. But while social order had little help from the school, Athens gave birth to noble ideals of personal development, which have been the guiding stars of liberal minds ever since. Rome throughout her history showed a strange apathy in respect to education. The fact that the wholesome, character-forming home training of the child did not give way to schools until Roman power had become consolidated, suggests that Rome put her trust in physical force rather than in ideas.

The Christian church, rapt by mystical visions, gave, at first, little heed to anything but soul-saving. When, later, much the same blood coursed in the veins of the church and the world, she settled down into a useful, though somewhat unmanageable, social organ engaged in the establishing of order with tools of a peculiar edge and a strange temper. During the Middle Ages state and church roughly divided the work of control, the one monopolizing the direct, the other the indirect means. The contrast of coercion and influence was symbolized in the maxim that the state has to do with the body, the church with the soul.

Under this arrangement the education of the young fell to the church. The clergy were granted a legal monopoly, and no lay teaching was allowed. But this was, after all, only a slender strand in the work of the church. Armed with other-world terrors she grappled boldly with the adult mind, and chose to preach rather than to teach. It mattered little that, at best, the poor were instructed merely in the catechism and the rudiments of religion. If not by schools, then by her worship and ceremonial,

¹ Plato, "Laws," VI, 766; "Protagoras," 325, 326.

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the church managed to indoctrinate with her beliefs. The delicate art of creating in the child, by means of skilful suggestions, a lasting bias for the good, and a rooted prejudice in favor of righteousness, remained for later thinkers to discover.

The fate of higher education in the Middle Ages shows how loath is society to treat even the teaching of adults as a private affair. The early aggregations of masters and scholars at Paris and Oxford and Bologna came near to affording an open market for instruction. But the free dealing of the buyers and sellers of teaching was soon meddled with, and, by hook or crook, a regulative finger was laid on the windpipe of learning. By bulls, charters, or "licenses to teach," the old free university, which had originated independently alike of the civil and the papal authority, was brought under the central organs of control. Moreover, the university itself became a close corporation, fitted in due time by its timid sense of responsibility and its conservative temper to become a pillar of order.

With the Reformation the elementary schools received a prodigious impulse. From the advent of the reformers dates primary instruction in Scotland, Switzerland, Sweden, and Protestant Germany. The schools were necessary to Protestantism, for they stiffened private judgment against the authority of tradition. The appeal to the Bible as interpreted by the individual conscience was a barren mockery unless the people knew how to read.

The same century saw the rise of a secondary education, based on the Greek and Latin classics. Perfected by the Jesuits and imitated by the rest of the world, this classical training, which reigned until this century and has only slowly been dislodged from its seats, is a most interesting device

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of control over the middle and ruling classes. For a pyramidal society putting a severe strain on obedience, the safest and best education is one that wears away the energy of youth in mental gymnastics, directs the glance toward the past, cultivates the memory rather than the reason, gives polish rather than power, encourages acquiescence rather than inquiry, and teaches to versify rather than to think. It is natural that teachers in meeting such requirements should construct a system that favors the humanities rather than the sciences, literature and language rather than history, and the forms of literature rather than the substance.

The great democratic upheavals changed again the aim of education. The old preoccupation with the other life disappeared before the political purpose. Thinkers flaming with generous wrath at the parasitism of the upper orders demanded enlightenment as a means of arming the people against their despoilers. "No people in a state of civilization," said Jefferson, "can stay ignorant and free." Schools alone render the people "the safe, as they are the only legitimate, guardians of their liberty." This origin in revolt gave the public education of France and America that almost exclusively intellectual cast which it still retains. While latterly this political motive is dying away, the successful working of democratic government is making ever greater demands upon the intelligence of the common man, and the disposition to educate for citizenship at the public expense is ever more marked.¹

¹ "So long as the direction of man's institutional life was in the hands of one or the few, the need for a wide diffusion of political intelligence was not strongly felt. The divine right of kings found its correlative in the diabolical ignorance of the masses. There was no educational idea, resting upon a social and political neces-

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But the newer policy in this matter has not been shaped wholly by self-interest. Contending in the social mind with the motives of utility is the generous ideal of an education at the public expense aiming at a free and harmonious personal development for all. For this old Greek vision is, in a way, the only solution of the difficulty of our time. The old societies dreaded change. So they sought to run each generation into conventional moulds, and were worried if any traces of individuality still remained. Our Western societies, on the other hand, have embraced the idea of progress and made it a part of their tradition. In the faith that the present will be surpassed, they would prepare their youth to initiate, or at least to welcome, progress. Hence they are throwing away their rigid moulds. For them, as for the Athenians, there remains no satisfying ideal of education save the fullest development, in body and spirit, of every child within the state.

Nevertheless, we should go very far wrong to suppose that the systematic employment of instruction for the purposes of control has, in any wise, been neglected in modern educational policies. Under the stress of new aims—political, civic, ideal—the strictly practical object of promoting morality and order by means of teaching has not been thrust aside or forgotten. The avowal that

sity, that was broad enough to include the whole people. But the rapid widening of the basis of sovereignty has changed all that. No deeper conviction pervades the people of the United States and of France, who are the most aggressive exponents of democracy, than that the preservation of liberty under the law, and of the institutions that are our precious possession and proud heritage, depends upon the intelligence of the whole people. It is on this unshakable foundation that the argument for public education at public expense really rests.” — N. M. BUTLER, “The Meaning of Education,” pp. 108–109.

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free education is "an economical system of police" sounds rather brutal in this smooth-spoken age. It shocks the public and chills teachers. But now and then the cat is let out of the bag. Swift declared that "all nations have agreed in the necessity of a strict education which consisted in the observance of moral duties." Burke regarded a religious education as "the cheap defence of nations." Napoleon said frankly: "It is impossible, indeed, to remain long in the present state of things, since every one may now set up a shop for education, as he would a shop for broadcloth."¹ "I feel called upon to organize a system of education for the new generation, such that both political and moral opinions may be duly regulated thereby."² "It seems to me that the special and the private schools ought all to be united, and brought under the cognizance of the education corps, which body ought to be so constituted as to have under its eye every child from the age of nine years."³ And this "corps" was to be "an order, not of Jesuits whose head resides at Rome, but of Jesuits whose sole ambition shall be to make themselves useful, and who shall have no interest separated from that of the public."⁴ Webster, in his Plymouth oration, said: "By general instruction we seek as far as possible to purify the whole atmosphere, to keep good sentiments uppermost, and to turn the strong current of feeling and opinion, as well as the censures of the law and the denunciations of religion, against immorality and crime." Elsewhere he terms the public schools "a wise and liberal system of police, by which property and the peace of society are secured." In

¹ Pelet, "Napoleon in Council," p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

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of the regular curriculum; given during school hours, but by an outsider; given outside of school hours, but within the school building; given apart from the school, but paid for with school funds. In quantity, likewise, there is every gradation. We find religious instruction *ad libitum*; instruction in stated subjects, such as Bible, catechism, and sacred history; instruction solely in the Bible; no formal instruction, but simply religious exercises; no exercise save the reading of the Bible without comment. We find state-aided church schools, elementary public schools with compulsory religious instruction, religious instruction save at special request, religious instruction only at special request. What are these but so many stages in the emergence of the chick from the shell? They are stations on the road to emancipation, and the school, having reached one station, never goes back to an earlier one. Underneath the medley of systems we find *an almost world-wide drift from religion toward education* as the method of indirect social restraint.

This is not all. In most cases the teaching in the common school has been given an intellectual bias, not because anybody demanded it, but because the sects, in their mutual jealousy, had gradually cancelled out of public education nearly every atom of religious instruction. That this has come more by accident than by design does not help the fact that the school has thereby lost much of the character-forming power that originally gave it a claim on society. It has become less an instrument of social control than an aid to individual success. Not that intellectual education is without a moral value.

"By giving men a clearer view of their true interests it contributes largely to the proper regulation of life; by opening a wide range of new and healthy interests it diverts them from much vice;

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by increasing their capacity for fighting the battle of life it takes away many temptations, though it undoubtedly creates and strengthens some; and it seldom fails to implant in the character serious elements of discipline and self-control.”¹

But this is not enough. Something more massive is needed as a breakwater against vice and crime and that moral decay which is worse than either. In India, Japan, France, Italy, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Australia there are complaints that the school is not doing all it might do. In view of the decay of faith and the inexorable eviction of religious teaching from the school, the cry goes up for a secular civic and moral education that shall effectively minister to peace and order.

Just what shape this new education will take, no one can say. But it will not be merely one more branch of study, like ethics or civics. It will not be an intellectual system with bad metaphysics instead of theology as its corner-stone. It will not consist in the droning of moral abstractions. It will begin early. It will give great scope to the personal influence of the teacher. It will be realistic, and its starting-point will be the facts of personal and social life. It will form moral prepossessions rather than intellectual prejudices. It will strive “to store up moral power in good habits.” It will seek not so much to fix certain principles by authority, as to suggest directly actions and feelings and modes of viewing conduct.

In this attempt there will be, at first, much to call forth laughter—or tears. Only few teachers have the gift of personal influence; the rest must learn with awkwardness and stumbling. In time

¹ Lecky, “Democracy and Liberty,” Vol. II, p. 63.

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character-forming will be understood and taught to the teaching craft, although it will always be something of the fine art. For a while the results on the young will not compare favorably with those of the old religious education. But it took the Jesuits a long time to perfect an education in the interests of the church; so let us not begrudge the time necessary to perfect an education in the interests of society.

Let those who rebel at this prospect remember that the only alternative is to go back to state churches and church schools. A state educational machine with its semi-military organization of little children, its overriding of individual bent and preference, its appeals to head instead of heart, its rational morality, its colorless and jejune textbooks, its official cult of ethical and civic principles, its cold-blooded fostering of patriotism, is far from attractive. But its unloveliest features seem comely, compared with the harsh and forbidding traits of a state church.

The coalescence of physical and spiritual forces in the modern state may well inspire certain misgivings. When we note the enormous resources and high centralization of a first-class educational system; when we consider that it takes forcible possession of the child for half the time during its best years, and submits the little creature to a curriculum, devised more and more with reference to its own aims and less and less with reference to the wishes of the parent; when we consider that the democratic control of this formidable engine affords no guarantee that it will not be used for empire over minds,—we may well be apprehensive of future developments. The chief security for spiritual freedom in this educating modern state seems to lie in the vigor of other spiritual associa-

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tions lying over against the state to check it and redress the balance. The "free church in the free state," the press, the organization of science, the republic of letters, the voluntary cultural associations—these forbid the undue ascendancy of the control organization of society.

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL SUGGESTION CONCLUDED—CUSTOM

IT is perhaps safe to think of the lowest savage as a creature of appetite and propensity that is clever enough to reach its ends in roundabout ways. But if we take man farther up the path of evolution, we find his life cannot be platted on the lines of a few simple animal desires. He has become polygonal, and no simple formula will fit him. Ideas and idea-motor activities complicate his life. Native promptings are overruled or postponed in virtue of built-up habits and sentiments. His thoughts about things, his notions of himself and other selves, strangely perturb him. He is anything but rational, but he is very far from natural. Why is this?

The active life of the primitive man is *little organized*, that is to say, it is not formed about ruling ideas or habits. It is the sport of bodily conditions as the sand-dunes along the shore are the sport of the wind. The daily flow and ebb of energy, the unsteady pull of instinct, the rhythm of appetite, the irregular pulse of desire, the explosions of passion—it is chiefly the play of these that gives life its stamp. There is no building up of personal character, because there is no stuff for the framework. The shifting sands do not become soil till the roots of some plant bind them. The shifting moods do not become soul till the force of some idea seizes and holds them against the play of

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bodily suggestions. And an idea that is to have this force must be implanted in childhood.

The association of parents and children is of little moral consequence unless there are ideas to communicate. The rise of a race tradition that can be handed down marks, therefore, a great hour in human development. Nothing so pregnant in social possibilities has occurred since the invention of language. The child now does something more than ape the parents' ways. It receives at the golden moment those ideas, precepts, prejudices, and habits which are to become the foundation of its character. Thenceforth it is possible to *organize the individual life*, and to lay a solid basis for the social union, by *organizing the lives of many individuals about the same ideas and habits*.

It is certain that the exposure to family government and tradition lasts until the youth can assert his physical strength against that of the parent. The sure overlap of human generations reaches, therefore, to adolescence in both sexes, and from this period of kneading by authority and shaping by suggestion youth cannot escape. By so much as the first fifteen years dominate the rest of life can the traditions of the group dominate its members. Such is the contribution that the family makes to social order.

Now, do these years really dominate? Is social custom fixed in early habit powerful? Does the life that is once built up about tradition stay so built? Once the world's wisdom said "yes." If we hesitate to say it now, it is owing to the new phase we have entered. Nowadays, no sooner does youth come forth from home with his life organized about certain ideas than we hasten to disorganize it. After the young have got in the current of custom, they meet and are swung round

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by the rollers of fashion. Conventionality captivates them, and they cease imitating ancestors in order to imitate contemporaries. Moreover, culture and "the spirit of the age" bid them to drift no longer but seize the helm themselves. Yet, after all, these new forces that break us out of the socket of custom are social and trustworthy. Besides, they have been active only in the handful of progressive societies. Throughout the story of the race, it has been the normal thing for the social influence that bears on the adult to be one with the domestic influence that bears on the child.

The real question, then, is this: Can the clamping for fifteen years within the family and social order, and the early organization of life about the ideas presented by this order, afterwards avail against the wild and lawless impulses of the heart? Of the answer to this there is no doubt. There is a powerful feeling which keeps the later years welded to the earlier. A kind of dreadful homesickness punishes any wide departure from the old lines. The strange revulsions to the faith of childhood spring from the same longing that draws men back to the fatherland, the old homestead, the friends of boyhood. Evangelists know how potent is the memory of the old teaching at mother's knee, the old prayers from the trundle-bed. Sometimes, after periods of breathless innovation, whole peoples are seized with a yearning for the old-fashioned. After every radical movement historians have learned to look for a reaction. As a mouse that has ventured from its hole suddenly runs back, smitten with a causeless terror, so man is liable to bolt the moment he realizes he is far from home. It is reason and convenience that lure him from the time-hallowed; it is nostalgia that draws him back.

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A little novelty charms, but a general invasion of the new makes the world look bleak and dreary. Socialist utopias, no matter how thick the felicity is spread, strike us as chill and forbidding, because we miss familiar features and homely detail. The main prop of custom is not the fear of the ancestral gods, but the dread of self-mutilation. For to give up the customary is to alienate portions of one's self, to tear away the sheath that protects our substance. Well says the musing Wallenstein :—

“For of the wholly common is man made,
And custom is his nurse ! Woe then to them
Who lay irreverent hands upon his old
House furniture, the dear inheritance
From his forefathers. For time consecrates ;
And what is gray with age becomes religion.”¹

It is the prerogative of custom to organize personal life on many lines, to fix bodily habits, language, costume, sports, pleasures, aims, and expression, as well as the attitude toward others. But one thing never forgotten in its organization of life is *adaptation to requirements*. The mould in which the life of the child is to be cast is, for the most part, not of the parent's own making, but is borne to them on the stream of social tradition. Says Plato, speaking of primitive societies : The families “would have peculiar customs . . . which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them ; and these customs would incline them to order, when the parents had the element of order in their nature. . . . And they would naturally stamp upon their children and their children's children their own likings.”²

¹ “The Piccolomini,” scene iv (Coleridge's translation).

² “Laws,” III, 681.

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It is, then, likely that custom will, among other things, transmit and fix habits of submission to elders, chiefs, and magistrates, of obedience to precepts and laws, of subordinating personal aims to the demands of the social order.¹

But to make custom, as such, a cause of order is to lend it a new and striking rôle. Custom has, it is true, received of late much attention as the source of early law. In its spirit the sociologist has seen the first dim realization of the conditions of social well-being. In its unwritten commands the jurist has seen the germ of written laws enforced by threat of punishment. So much for the *content* of custom. But the point I am making now is that this content is in a measure *self-enforcing*. We have learned to see in custom a primitive code obeyed out of superstitious dread or fear of public opinion. I present it here as a *power*—and an ally and reënforcement of the other powers that bind the individual. The view needs but to be stated, for it has been foreshadowed by many thinkers. Such terms as “tyrant custom,”² “venerable tyrant,”³ “violent and treacherous school-mistress,”⁴ “principal magistrate of man’s life,”⁵ “greater power than nature,”⁶ “shifting away,”⁷ recognize a *power*, not merely an unwritten code.

The secret of this power must be sought, in the last analysis, in suggestion and habit. The child receives the ideas, precepts, and likings which are to become the organizing factors of its life, because it has no habits, because it is not yet obsessed by

¹ “The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom; every one having an inward veneration for the opinion and manners approved and received amongst his own people cannot without very great reluctance depart from them.”—MONTAIGNE, “On Custom.”

² Shakespeare.

³ Thomson.

⁴ Montaigne.

⁵ Bacon.

⁶ Locke.

⁷ Byron.

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other ideas and feelings, because it wants something that may help it to bring order out of the chaotic contents of its mind, and because the hunger of a growing creature makes it greedy for mental aliment. On the other hand, the adult who has passed the suggestible age and emerged from the family chrysalis, allows the early organization of his life to dominate him, because habit is strong and the wrench of mental readjustment is painful. *Chiefly upon these successive ascendancies—the ascendancy of the surroundings, and later the ascendancy of the past self over the present, rests the might of custom.*

But there is another factor not to be overlooked. To a certain extent suggestions are accepted according to the *prestige* of their source. Now, one effect of the overlapping of generations is to lend prestige to that which is old and in so far as it is old. Ancestor-worship, for instance, which is simply father-domination writ large, turns the face toward the past. The worshipper trusts the dead more than the living; all his light is from setting suns; the sky is dark save just behind him. To him a custom is the cherished habit of some spirit, and the older the custom the more spirits there are who will make his conformity to it a personal matter. On people of this mental habit the old is sure to impose, and the greater its antiquity the more it imposes. Have we not here the clew to that feeling which leads certain peoples to distrust positive laws and to throw everything into the form of immemorial custom?

Says Sir Henry Maine: "Each individual in India is a slave to the customs of the group to which he belongs."¹ "The council of village elders

¹ "Village Communities," p. 13.

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does not command anything ; it merely declares what has always been. Nor does it generally declare that which it believes some higher power to have commanded ; those most entitled to speak on the subject deny that the natives of India necessarily require divine or political authority as the basis of their usages ; their antiquity is by itself assumed to be a sufficient reason for obeying them.”¹ But “The body of persons to whose memory the customs are committed has always added to the stock of usage by tacitly inventing new rules to apply to cases which are really new.”²

Now, *apropos* “of the invention of customary rules to meet cases which are really new” by the council of elders of the Hindoo village, Maine says : “It is always the fact or the fiction that this council merely declares customary law.”³ For instance, the water supplied to village communities by government irrigation canals is distributed according to rules which “do not purport to emanate from the personal authority of their author or authors ; nor do they assume to be dictated by a sense of equity : there is always, I am assured, a sort of fiction, under which some customs as to the distribution of water are supposed to have existed from all antiquity, although in fact no artificial supply had been even so much as thought of.”⁴

The halo of prestige is not always the hoar of antiquity. Tarde⁵ shows how epochs of custom-imitation alternate with periods of mode-imitation. For a while the course of imitation is between past and present ; then the current changes, and the course of imitation lies between contemporaries.

¹ “Village Communities,” p. 68.

² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁵ “Les lois de l’imitation,” ch. vii.

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To down-transmission or *social heredity* succeeds cross-imitation or *conventionality*. In the latter period the old is distrusted and the new has the presumption in its favor. In the former period the recent is weak, the presumption is with the ancient, and the maxim of statesmanship is, *Let things alone*. It is in such an epoch that Wallenstein soliloquizes :—

“Power seated on a quiet throne thou’dst shake,
Power on an ancient consecrated throne,
Strong in possession, founded on old custom ;
Power by a thousand tough and stringy roots
Fixed to the people’s pious nursery faith.
This, this will be no strife of strength with strength.”¹

We are in an innovating age, and the prestige of antiquity seems a slight thing to hold upright a law. But now, when all this is at a discount, it is well to remember with Sir Henry Maine :—

“It is indisputable that much the greatest part of mankind has never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved, since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by embodiment in some permanent record.”²

“To the fact that the enthusiasm for change is comparatively rare must be added the fact that it is extremely modern. It is known but to a small part of mankind, and to that part but for a short period during a history of incalculable length. It is not older than the free employment of legislation by popular governments.”³

“Vast populations, some of them with a civilization considerable but peculiar, detest that which in the language of the West would be called reform.

¹ “The Piccolomini,” scene iv. ² “Ancient Law,” p. 21.

³ “Popular Government,” p. 134.

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The entire Mohammedan world detests it. The multitudes of colored men who swarm in the great continent of Africa detest it; and it is detested by that large part of mankind which we are accustomed to leave on one side as barbarous or savage. The millions upon millions of men who fill the Chinese Empire loathe it and (what is more) despise it. The enormous mass of the Indian population hates and dreads change.”¹

Now, this reverence for antiquity — which prevails so widely even to-day — was very pronounced in the historical civilizations. Tradition, we know, availed to keep the Jewish type fixed, despite the vicissitudes of Israel. Roman society, founded on ancestor-worship and *patria potestas*, was for many centuries intensely conservative. Greece we think of as a model of emancipation. Yet Plato, discussing the art of establishing a commonwealth, says: “No one can easily receive laws at their first imposition, but if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state; . . . then, I think, there would be very little danger at the end of the time of a state thus trained not being permanent.”²

So far two principles have been established. One is that the social order is greatly strengthened when the laws, precepts, wisdom, ideas, and feelings which make for adaptation have entered the very warp and woof of a civilization, so that they are passed on as a matter of course from sire to son. The other is that every visible prop of order becomes able to sustain more with the lapse of time.

Now, have these principles any bearing on social

¹ “Popular Government,” pp. 132–133.

² “Laws,” VII.

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control? Apparently not. Use and wont is certainly not one more regulative device. It is rather a gain got for nothing, like the toughness of old mortar, the strength of old ramparts, or the hardness of long-exposed stone. To impart venerableness to an institution is within the power of no man. Society cannot at will make the moss grow or the ivy run, although it can gladly avail itself of the charm they lend to the granite walls of authority. Is custom, therefore, something to be recognized and then passed by?

No, the binding power of custom is more fecund of consequence than that. It calls forth certain adjustments. Every regulative institution pays homage to the empire of use and wont; at many and various points society deflects its policy in order to get the utmost service that custom is able to render it.

The segments of social life in which custom-imitation prevails fall naturally into two groups. In the one group, which embraces language, costume, *cuisine*, games, sports, greetings, folk-lore, etc., we find an unconscious and passive persistence in old ways. An improvement has to contend less with the resistance than with the indifference or the inertia of people. Little controversy is waged between the old and the new. The many follow the well-worn path unthinkingly; a few deliberate and then adopt the better. With certain changes, such as the spread of reading, the rise of discussion, or the substitution of teacher for parent, the old is more rapidly displaced, and the new triumphs with hardly a protest.

But there is another group in which improvement arouses opposition. In politics, law, religious belief, ritual, ceremony, and moral codes, the time-hallowed finds stanch defenders, and the tension

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between the old and the new calls forth the hostile camps of conservatives and radicals. To the superior new the old shows itself pugnacious and uncompromising. The removal of the young from home to school changes, indeed, the theatre, but not the fierceness, of the strife.

Whence this pig-headed conservatism? Shall we say that the old becomes bound up with the interest of a class, and that it is this selfish interest that fights innovation? No, not this. In the case of change in the dogmas or rites of a church, or in the procedure of a court, there need be no private interest at stake. Moreover, there are private interests arrayed against a new machine, a change of fashion, or an improvement in medicine; and yet they soon succumb.

The real cause of the truculent and stubborn conservatism that crops up in questions of government, law, belief, ritual, ceremony, etc., is the superior value of the old *for purposes of control*. It is easy to see the connection. In language, sport, or costume, a change may do violence to one's habits, and wrench one's feelings, but the cost of it is borne by the one who enjoys the improvement. But in the field of control we find society engaged in a desperate struggle with the human will; and the replacement of the old constitution, law, dogma, or formality by something newer and fitter is at the cost of society. For, putting intrinsic merits aside, the old, *just because it has been sucked in with mother's milk*, is better than the new. Every change, then, is the surrender of an advantage in the struggle with the individual—a coming out from intrenchments to fight in the open. To innovate in law, religion, or state is to re-form an army in the presence of the enemy. *And society is always in the presence of the enemy.*

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The old political thinkers let these truths appear very plainly as the basis of their conservatism. Aristotle contrasts the art of control with such arts as medicine or gymnastic: "The law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time; so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law."¹

Says Bodin: "Newness in matter of laws is always contemptible, whereas, to the contrary, the reverence of antiquity is so great as that it giveth strength enough unto a law to cause it to be of itself obeyed without the authority of any magistrate at all joined unto it; whereas new edicts and laws, with all the threats and penalties annexed unto them, and all that the magistrates do, cannot but with great difficulty find entertainment; in such sort that as the fruit we are to receive of a new edict or law is not oftentimes so great as the harm which the contempt of the rest of the laws draweth after it for the novelty of some one."²

Montaigne takes the same view: "It is a very great doubt whether any so manifest benefit can accrue from the alteration of a law received, let it be what it will, as there is danger and inconvenience in altering it; forasmuch as government is a structure composed of divers parts and members, joined and united together with so strict connection that it is impossible to stir so much as one brick or stone but the whole body will be sensible of it."³

Says Hooker: "What have we to induce men unto the willing obedience and observation of laws but the weight of so many men's judgment as have with deliberate advice assented thereunto;

¹ "Politics," II, 8.

³ "On Custom."

² "Of a Commonwealth," Book IV, ch. iii.

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the weight of that long experience which the world hath had thereof with consent and good liking?"¹

Bacon declares that "it is good also not to try experiments in states," and recommends: "It were good, therefore, that men in their innovations would follow the example of time itself, which, indeed, innovateth greatly, but quietly and by degrees scarce to be perceived."²

After him comes Burke, whose watchword is "prescription," and who thinks "a sacred veil" should be drawn over the beginnings of all government.

We can now lay down the law that *all institutions having to do with control change reluctantly, change slowly, change tardily, and change within sooner than without.*

A second consequence of the spell of custom is that change in regulative institutions is masked when possible by *fictions*. In *government* we have the fiction of legitimation, by which usurpers are anointed from the holy ampulla; the fiction of constitutional monarchy, whereby the leaders of parliament figure as advisers chosen by the king; and the fiction of the protectorate, by which, as in Egypt or Tunis, the real ruler is disguised as the minister resident of the protecting state. In *law* we have the Roman fiction that the *prætors* and *jurisconsults* were only interpreting the ancient *Twelve Tables*, whereas they were really developing law, and the English fiction that the decision of a judge only declares the common law, whereas it often creates it. In *belief* we have only to recall biblical interpretation, by means of which the *Scriptures* are made to teach whatever the age thinks, and citation from the *Fathers*, by which

¹ "Ecclesiastical Polity," Book IV, § 14.

² "Of Innovations."

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the way may be paved for any new dogma the church wants to set up. In *ceremony* we have the convenient discovery of the "real significance" of an impressive rite when the old theory of it breaks down. How often, for instance, have such ancient rites as the mass, the eucharist, or the taking of the oath been given fresh vitality by re-interpretation! In *moral ideas* we have the constant teasing of a complete code for modern life out of the Decalogue, and the scourging of wholly new sins with the rods of the old prophets.

A third consequence of the superior restraining value of the old is that abundance of survivals which makes regulative institutions the great fossil-bearing strata of the sociologist.¹ In law we have the persistence of parchment, of Latin terms, of obsolete phrases, of seals, of criers, of wigs and gowns. In religion we may instance the Roman *pontifices*: "Just as they adhered to wood for bridge-building after masonry had been discovered, to wooden nails and spears after iron, to scourging to death after decapitation had come in, to the assembly of the people by word of mouth after the bugle had long been known, so they adhered also to oral proclamation of the calendar and oral communication of legal suits long after the secular power had substituted writing for them."²

Government is almost as archaic as this, and as to ceremonial it has been well termed "the museum of history."

Finally there is the consequence that those in charge of the instruments of control—senates, ephors, magistrates, officials, judges, lawyers, priests, clergymen, masters of ceremonies, rabbis,

¹ See Spencer, "The Study of Sociology," pp. 106-110; "Principles of Sociology," III, p. 102.

² Von Ihering, "The Evolution of the Aryan," p. 321.

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Brahmins, Brehons, ulemas—develop the conservative habit of mind. Wanting a social science which might account for it, they *feel* rather than *understand* the prudence of guarding unbroken the hallowing spell of time. Hence they make a principle of that which is wise policy only for institutions of control. They come to resist innovation in the arts or sciences as well as in law or religion. So that too often the black bat of obscurantism gets them at the last. Over against them, then, must stand the investigator, the artist, the reformer, the prophet, to level “the forts of folly,” to open new paths, and to keep mankind on the march.

It must be admitted that, in Christendom at least, custom now holds things together less than ever before. The family is no longer the secure seat of tradition it once was, and the spirit of the age has broken the sceptre of the Past. The hoop of precedent has become a streak of rust, and the ferment is spreading the staves of the social cask. Consider the meaning of the democratic reorganization of society in the nineteenth century. In the United States free land has supplied an economic lever for the levelling-up process. But in western Europe the democratic movement arose, beyond all doubt, out of the radical movement of thought in the eighteenth century, which discredited traditions by requiring them to submit their credentials at the bar of reason and justice. The shock broke the spell of use and wont, and weakened the bonds of society beyond their power to hold those under-classes which bore the most and got the least out of the social union—those who, from the nature of the case, required the most control to keep them quiet. The undermining of authority left only physical force confronting them, and against this the disadvantaged classes have gradu-

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ally fought their way to political recognition and a certain equality of opportunity. Whether, after this is fully attained, power can dispense with that custom which was once, in Pindar's phrase, "lord of all things"—whether, in other words, the centrifugal tendencies will continue until property goes the way of privilege—is a question to be seriously pondered.

In social arrangements the prime desiderata have always been order and progress. If one must come first, it is the former, for there can be no progress without order, although there can be order without progress. But their real rivalry lies in the fact that order can be somewhat impaired for the sake of quicker progress, or progress can be somewhat checked for the sake of better order. Which will be favored in such interference depends on how they are esteemed. For obvious reasons order was prized before progress was, and until modern times enjoyed far greater consideration. But the visible triumphs of physical science in these latter days have implanted the idea that progress is vastly beneficent and must be provided for.

This, however, by no means implies a general recognition of the principle of progress. How few there are who honestly believe that improvement is possible anywhere and everywhere! Who expects change in worship or funerals, as he expects it in surgery? Who admits that the marriage institution or the court of justice is improvable as well as the dynamo? Who concedes the relativity of woman's sphere or private property, as he concedes that of the piano or the skyscraper? No,—the sway of custom has been weakened; but who will say that too much room has been made for social progress?

CHAPTER XVI

SOCIAL RELIGION

OF the last six chapters, three have dealt with the efforts to control the human will by parading sanctions of a social, legal, or supernatural character. Here on the threshold of another kind of control is the place to point out a central weakness in the use of sanctions. Laws, human and divine, are addressed to a being who is able not only to calculate, but to anticipate penalties and overrule his impulses. But this reasonable person who can be deterred from anything by the threat of so many units of pain is still far from common. Every attempt to grasp all the striving of man under a single formula, such as "the quest of happiness" or "the pursuit of self-interest," shatters on the fact that man is constituted not for happiness, but for survival. The strength of impulses corresponds not to the pleasure the satisfaction of them will yield, but to their value in the struggle for existence. Hence primitive passions such as lust and jealousy, anger and revenge, are not only strong enough to upset and wreck our personal schemes of life, but are also strong enough to defy threats and promises. The anthropologists have identified the born law-breaker, and discovered the criminal of passion. We now see that laws can protect property better than persons, stop fraud quicker than fornication, draw business contracts tighter than the marriage bond, and procure almsgiving or penance sooner

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than the forgiveness of injuries. The experiences of court and confessional in dealing with assault, duelling, vengeance, or sensuality, show that there is an unreclaimed jungle in man from which wild impulses break forth and lay waste the tilled fields. Despite the well-trimmed prepossessing lawns in front, there are unpleasant slimy things lurking in the rear fens and undergrowth of the human soul. Consequently, we must fight the devil with fire, quell one emotion with another, and supplement control by sanctions with control through the feelings.

Among the means of *orienting* the feelings to the advantage of social order, we shall first of all consider *social religion*.

The main trunk of religion is undoubtedly an evolution of man's beliefs as to the Unseen. In continual interplay with these beliefs are feelings of fear, wonder, reverence, gratitude, or love, which give rise to institutions of prayer, worship, sacrifice, and so on. Now the feelings which inspire worship are not without an effect upon conduct; but this effect is, in most types of belief, neither very certain nor very considerable. The tap-root of religion seems to be that strange unveiling of the sub-conscious self, which is variously known as ecstasy, rhapsody, demoniac possession, divine afflatus, or *gnosis*.¹

Now in the ecstasy or *yoga*, the mystic who is persuaded that he becomes one with his god may be seized with a strange love for all creatures. He may experience a genial expansion of self which will cause all private aims to disappear in a practical devotion to those whom he regards as his

¹ D. G. Brinton, "The Religions of Primitive Peoples," pp. 51-59.

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brothers.¹ But, on the other hand, in a great regulating religion, it may be in the little knot of holy adepts at the very centre that the greatest laxity prevails. The Konshilaki Upanishad says that when the *Yogi* has once attained true apathy, "by no deed of his is his life harmed, not by the murder of his mother, nor by the murder of his father, nor by theft, nor by the killing of a Brahmin. If he is going to commit a sin, the bloom does not depart from his face."² Plotinus declares "we ought to aim, not at being without sin, but at being God."³

While such a cult is of little use to the social union, there are two mighty branches of belief issuing from the main stem of religion which are unmistakably ethical. One of these offshoots is *legal religion*, which has already been traced out in the chapter on "Belief." The other branch is *social religion*, which it is now our task to follow out. By this I am far, very far, from saying there are no other moral forces at work in a great historical system like Buddhism or Greek polytheism. In a full inventory of the moral stimuli of a religious system it is necessary to take account of the personal ideals presented in its gods, founders, or saints,

¹ "There was something taught at Eleusis which filled minds like Plato's and Pindar's with a happy religious awe. Now, similar 'softening of the heart' was the result of the teaching in the Australian *Bora*: the Yao mysteries inculcate the victory over self; and, till we are admitted to the secrets of all other savage mysteries throughout the world, we cannot tell whether, among mummeries, frivolities, and even license, high ethical doctrines are not presented under the sanction of religion." — A. LANG, "The Making of Religion," p. 213.

² "Sacred Books of the East," Vol. I, pp. 293-294.

³ "In all religions, in the essence of religion itself, lies concealed a certain contempt for the merely ethical, as compared with the mystical in life. That which is wholly religious in thought and emotion is conscious of another, and it claims a loftier origin than that which is moral only, based as the latter is, on solely social considerations." — BRINTON, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

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of the virtues glorified in its cult, of its teaching as to life and conduct, of the reverence accruing to the venerable, of the influence of the ceremonial, and of the charm of rare personality. But every one of these distinct agencies receives due attention elsewhere in this book.

In the type of society that proved to be the cradle of civilization, the unit was the patriarchal family. Now in an association of this sort two kinds of feeling spring up spontaneously. One is the feeling of *piety* for the head of the family, a sentiment of mingled awe, respect, and confidence, which is the root of obedience and duty. The other is the feeling of *sympathy* with other members of the family, which is the root of fellowship and brotherly love. Each of these relations and feelings becomes the starting-point of a transcendental kind of control. From the former there issues after a long course of development *legal religion*. From the latter springs *social religion*. This may be defined as the *conviction that there is a bond of ideal relationship between the members of a society and the feelings that arise in consequence of this conviction*.

The natural basis for the earliest fellow-feeling is long association during childhood. Even carnivores of the same litter are gentle to one another, and primitive human beings are not less mild. The playing together of little children permits an in-and-in weaving of fibres, an interlacing of tendrils from different selves, which is the most perfect form of social adaptation. From the companionship of house-mates spring toleration, sociable delight in one another, comprehension, and sympathy. But since it is usually only brothers and sisters who are so thrown together, kindness becomes identified in the thought of early man with blood kinship, and it is felt that, as a matter of course, the gentle

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feelings toward house-mates must reach out to and embrace all the kindred.

Among the Semites, and probably among the Greeks,¹ Romans, and Celts² as well, the blood tie becomes the bond of the earliest stable groups. But almost from the first they begin to conventionalize it. For one thing, the blood bond is a little too rigid, seeing that the kin group is frequently joined by rovers or runaways. So it is made more elastic by the blood-covenant and the fiction of adoption. "The commingling of blood by which two men became brothers, or two kins allies, and the fiction of adoption by which a tribesman was feigned to be the veritable son of a member of the tribe, are both evidences of the highest value that the Arabs were incapable of conceiving any absolute social obligation or social unity which was not based on kinship."³

Another weak point is that connection is a matter of degrees; but when kinship is the only bond between the men of the group, it will never do to admit gradations. Consequently "the original doctrine of kinship recognized no difference of degrees."⁴ In order to unite all the members of the social group in equal bonds, blood kinship is everywhere recognized as equally binding. It is something mysterious and absolute, like the drop of negro blood that shuts one out of white society in the South. It is only after social tissue comes to be formed in a different way that there is allowed to grow up a rational view of kinship, admitting degrees of nearness and therefore of obligation. "All people who think of counting degrees, instead

¹ H. E. Seebohm, "Greek Tribal Society."

² F. Seebohm, "The Tribal System in Wales."

³ W. Robertson Smith, "Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia,"

p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

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of considering the whole *hayy* as a single unity of blood, are the men who break up the old society and bring in that growing chaos which made the prophet's (Mahomet's) new law a welcome reformation.”¹

A third weak point is that being *akin* simply means *having an ancestor in common*. But this notion is too pale, cold, and abstract to bind self-willed nomads tightly together. So the acknowledgment of kinship comes to imply not the mere recognition of common descent, but a realizing sense of identity. “A kin was a group of persons whose lives were so bound up together, in what must be called a physical unity, that they could be treated as parts of one common life. The members of one kindred looked upon themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh, and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members suffering.”² Both fellow-feeling and morality are induced, so far as may be, to run along these half-artificial links that connect persons. “Under such a system there can be no inviolable fellowship except between men of the same blood.”³ . . . “No binding precepts of conduct except those that rest on the principle of kinship.”⁴ “No life and no obligation was sacred unless it was brought within the charmed circle of the kindred blood.”⁴

How closely the primitive conscience was involved with the conviction of identity of life is witnessed by the blood-covenant, in which persons make a life-and-death compact by tasting the blood either of each other or of some animal, by the tie

¹ W. Robertson Smith, “Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia,” p. 52.

² W. Robertson Smith, “The Religion of the Semites,” p. 255.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

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of milk which unites the foster child to the kin of the foster mother,¹ by the ceremony of adoption, by the significance attached to the taking of food together,² by the invention of an eponymous hero as a make-believe ancestor to cement the alliance of two groups, and by the prevalence of the sacrificial meal for the purpose of confirming fellowship between a god and his worshippers.³

In the wild hearts of the sons of the wilderness who cleave to such symbols and fictions in their desire for a firm basis of association, there is a strange interplay of belief and feeling. The love of comrades generates first the make-believe and finally the conviction that they are akin. On the other hand, the discovery of kinship generates, first a sense of obligation, and finally a genuine fellow-feeling and sympathy. As the social group grows farther and farther away from the natural society of tent-mates or house-mates, the need of belief as a stimulus to feeling becomes greater. It is necessary to enclose the members of the community in a network of half-metaphysical ties in order that feeling may play through it and unite them. Then the feeling itself ceases to be quite the same. The old free friendliness, natural to those who suckled at the same breast, becomes tinged with awe and fear. Where impulsive sympathy fails to answer the summons of a kinship theory, a special conscience must be formed. In other words, the feeling between man and man ceases to be wholly natural and begins to become *religious*.

Possibly because they were farmers, rather than nomads, the Aryans made the household rather than the kin the unit of social organization, and

¹ W. Robertson Smith, "The Religion of the Semites, p. 257.

² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

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substituted for the bond of a common blood the bond of a common worship. When the curtain of history rolls up, we find them bound together, not in natural kinship groups, but in semi-artificial groups like the household, the phratry, the city. The plane along which peace and friendship are invited to spread is not the physical relationship of kinsmen, but the mystical relationship of co-worshippers. "The tie of blood," we are assured, "did not of itself alone constitute the family; the tie of the common worship has to be added."¹ "The foundation of relationship was not birth; it was worship."²

Always the god formed the keystone of the social arch. Marriage was sacred because the wife had gone over from her own gods to the hearth spirits of her husband. The authority of the head of the house over the members of it was sacred because he alone could perform the rites of domestic worship. The rights of each member of the house were sacred in the eyes of the others because they had joined with him in the ceremonies and had eaten the sacred meal together. The larger political group had likewise its common worship. The authority of the magistrate reposed in the solemn shadow of the city's gods, and the only way of entering or leaving the civil community was by accepting or renouncing the divinities of the city. It was not strange that Plutarch should exclaim, "For it is this (religion) that contains and holds together all human society, and is its main prop and stay."

It is probable that the Greeks and Romans entered prematurely upon this stage of religious development. The discarding of the kinship bond

¹ De Coulanges, "The Ancient City," p. 64.

² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

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in favor of the artificial bond of community of worship, caused the deity to become all too early the pivot of association. One necessary result was a polytheism reflecting the hierarchy of groups in society. Another consequence was that the feeling between associates lost too soon its fraternal character and became an obligation supported by dread and awe, that is to say, by sanctions.

From an outward relation to ancestral deities religion is destined to return to the old basis of brotherhood. But now, so much has society enlarged, the assertion of physical kinship is impracticable. It is the mission of the religion of Jesus to proclaim the union of all men in the bonds of an ideal brotherhood.

The social contribution of Jesus is bound up with his doctrine of man. According to him, man is both body and soul — the former lying in the chain of heredity; the latter descending directly from God, the common source of all souls. The body is but dust and will perish, but the soul is immortal and destined to unite with its source. "Capacity to merge his life with that of similar beings, that is, social life, is a characteristic of man. He alone is sane, natural, and normal who is in union with his fellows." "In failing to follow the fundamental instincts and capacities of his nature, a man becomes at once selfish, unsocial, and sinful." "He loses those powers by which he might become a member of God's family, and of the brotherhood of man."¹ Only in social life does man realize his true and complete self. Hence, to seek the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, *i.e.* to realize perfect harmony with one's brethren, is the first concern of the disciple. The "tat-

¹ Shailer Mathews, "The Social Teaching of Jesus," p. 35.

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twam-asi" (this is thyself) of esoteric Brahminism — the affirmation of the One below the Many — becomes in the teaching of Jesus something yet to be realized. It is not so much a fact as an ideal, a goal of effort and therefore of vast regenerative power.

For the doctrine of man there is needed a doctrine of the divine that shall make reasonable the mystical relationship of human beings to one another. This is provided in the God who stands to the redeemed in the relation of father to children. Jesus "believed in the destination of all men to become actual children of God through trust in God and assimilation to Him."¹ God and His people form one perfect community typified by the vine and its branches. In this view conduct stands quite otherwise than in legal religion. Righteousness is not an outward conformity to command, but an inward disposition. Not obedience, but love — to God and to neighbor — is the fulfilling of the Divine Will. Wrong is a disowning of the brother relation. Sin is serious, not as entailing penalty, but as putting a barrier between man and God. But the conception of the Father required by social religion, and that of the unapproachable lawgiver, judge, and punisher required by legal religion, are in sharp opposition. The struggle between "justice" and "mercy," between hell-fire and love, marks the interference of these two great orders of socializing ideas.

If this interpretation be correct, human brotherhood and the divine fatherhood for the sake of and in order to comprehend this brotherhood, constitute the religion of Jesus. Among the primitive

¹ Otto Pfleiderer, "The Philosophy and Development of Religion," Vol. I, p. 251.

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Christians the sapless legalism of the scribes and Pharisees yielded to an enthusiasm which cried, "Love is the fulfilling of the law." The aspirations toward the "Kingdom of God" testified to the yearning to realize here on earth the perfect community life. But power brought decay. In a couple of centuries the Church caught from Rome the trick of ruling. With the union of Church and State, the corruption by heathenism, the decay of civil authority, and the ascent of the Church, after the barbarian invasions, to the position of leading civil institution in Western Europe, the ethical-religious spirit fell into the background, and supernaturalism coming to the front gained and kept control of Christianity for centuries. "It is certain," says Pfeiderer, "that the inwardness and freedom of evangelical morality entirely disappeared before an external legalism only distinguished from that of Judaism by not being limited to the theocracy of a single people, but claiming universal rule over the nations." While the sacred flame of love has ever been kept alive in the Church, the recovery of the primitive tradition and the extensive reorganization of doctrine in line with the social affirmation of Jesus did not fairly begin until the middle of the nineteenth century.

That the doctrine of brotherhood became from the very first a great socializing force there is no doubt. Says Lecky: "The first aspect in which Christianity presented itself to the world, was as a declaration of the fraternity of men in Christ. . . . From this notion grew up the eminently Christian idea of the sanctity of all human life."¹ "Besides quickening greatly our benevolent affections, it definitely and dogmatically asserted the sinfulness

¹"History of European Morals," Vol. II, pp. 17, 18.

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of all destruction of human life as a matter of amusement, or of simple convenience, and thereby formed a new standard higher than any which then existed in the world.”¹ “This minute and scrupulous care for human life and human virtue in the humblest forms, in the slave, the gladiator, the savage, or the infant, . . . is the distinguishing and transcendent characteristic of every society into which the spirit of Christianity has passed.”² “The high conception that has been formed of the sanctity of human life, the protection of infancy, the elevation and final emancipation of the slave classes, the suppression of barbarous games, the creation of a vast and multifarious organization of charity, and the education of the imagination by the Christian type, constitute together a movement of philanthropy which has never been paralleled or approached in the pagan world.”³

It would be a mistake to regard social religion as a mere cement manufactured by shrewd men. Legal religion may possibly be explained in the light of its usefulness. It would seem to be shaped by broad-browed rabbis, ecclesiastical statesmen, sages, and legists. But social religion has roots of its own. Even if it were no longer countenanced, furthered, and favored for its services to social peace, it would not utterly die out. It springs from ethical emotions, like sympathy, the sense of justice, and moral indignation. Coupled with a purely religious sense of nearness to or communion with a superior consciousness, these generate beliefs as to invisible bonds between self and others. While sympathy is the offspring of certain religious convictions, it is no less true that these convictions are

¹ “History of European Morals,” Vol. II, p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 34.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 100.

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the offspring of sympathy. Always the thrill of fellow-feeling suggests to the thoughtful mind some hidden bond between "me" and "thee." Energetic social sentiments cannot but seem to deny our visible separateness and to point to unseen relationships between us. A religious philosophy, therefore, comes from the hearts of poets, enthusiasts, moral prophets, and saints, and tends to spring up afresh wherever there is a flow of warm human sympathy.

The rise of such belief is, then, a matter of race psychology. No brutal people ever discovered that God is Love or that men are brothers; while in every higher race such ethical-religious convictions more or less sporadic are sure to arise. But nothing less than Genius is able to frame these convictions into a system that can lead men captive.

The conviction that men are spiritually related is unquestionably efficacious in modifying conduct. We must remember that in proportion as man satisfies and so quenches his imperious lower wants, his conduct comes to be shaped by ideas and beliefs. Moreover, in the course of social evolution, the selective process increasingly tends to eliminate the men of violent appetites and passions, and to favor the type of man who is able to appropriate and conform to the body of social ideas. Now upon those who are really amenable to ideas there can be no question as to the effect of religious belief. Under the instinct of self-preservation, every creature builds for itself an ego-centric world. "I am the centre, the pivot of things. Only what is good for me is good, only what is bad for me is bad. Things have worth only as they have worth to me. The universe exists for my purposes." Let such a one reflect upon his stirrings of sympathy or indignation and he will

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regard them as a weakness, a handicap. He will strive to tear up these outreaching filaments. But convince him that his ego-centric world rests on an illusion of sense, and that, in very truth, in the precious and everlasting part of him he is one with other human beings : instantly his reason reverses action, sympathy will no longer appear as a childish weakness, but as his soundest instinct. Greed and envy and hatred will seem a noxious growth, to be torn up and stamped out as soon as possible. To put others on an equal footing with self, to love them, to refrain from using them as instruments to his own schemes, to admit in them every claim he makes for himself, — all this is now the most reasonable thing in the world.

But, alas, there is only a fraction, perhaps a small fraction, of any population that can be reached and regenerated in this way! For the common run of persons only the nomistic side of belief is effective for control. Hence social religion, though it loathes legal religion, has never been able to shake itself free. The scheme of supernatural rewards and punishments is too useful to be dispensed with, and after every epoch of freshening and purifying of religious emotion, legal religion quietly slips back into her old place and takes up her old tasks.

In some instances a conviction unlocks great natural stores of ethical-religious energy. But in general, we can say that an improvement of character and conduct by beliefs running counter to natural inclination is *a doing of work*; and we can lay down the law that *the doing of work by religious beliefs tends to weaken or deform them*.

The majority of those whose lives are shaped by social religion must receive constant stimulation if they are not to lapse into lukewarmness and moral deadness. The life of every church shows

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a curious wavelike alternation of ardor with chill due to the abundance or lack of men gifted in a religious way. There is no religious society that would not lose half its vitality if deprived of the leading tenth of its membership. In the community it is easy to distinguish the active few and the passive many, those who emit belief and those who use it up. Doubt, too, is a widespread malady, and far from being of purely intellectual origin, is found to be troublesome in proportion as faith imposes constraint on the natural man.

For precisely the same reason, beliefs are liable to suffer changes of form which lessen their effective sovereignty over conduct. The most common path of degeneration is from the *ethical* to the *ceremonial*. The substitution of worship for right-doing, of outer purity for inner purity, of many scrupulous, god-pleasing observances for the far heavier burden of a brotherly behavior toward the fellow-man, is the inevitable fate of social religion. The adoption of the Levitical code by a people that had heard the grand words of Amos and Isaiah, the triumph of the mediæval church over the religious humanism of Jesus, the growth of creed-mongering and Sabbatarianism after the genial teaching of the Reformers, and the forms with which later Buddhism encrusted the doctrine of the master, exemplify this tendency. The task of putting life into an ossified orthodoxy has to be done again and again.

The fact that faith is all the time being used up in warming cold hearts and bending selfish wills, suggests to some that the stock of faith is steadily depleted, and must eventually disappear. But it often happens that a process of waste is perceived sooner than the companion process of repair. The melting of the glacier in the valley is easier to

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observe than its rebirth from the snow-fall on distant peaks. The washing down of the hills into the sea was noticed before the facts of land elevation had become known. The loss of the sun's heat by radiation was recognized by science before it was understood that heat is constantly generated by the contraction of the sun's mass. Early in this century the withering away of authority, political and ecclesiastical, became painfully evident to the leaders of society. There seemed to be no way of avoiding anarchy, save with Metternich to husband carefully the inherited stock of authority. It remained for recent decades to explain the genesis of ascendancy, and to show how fresh authority is continually supplied to take the place of that which is dying or dead.¹

Now similarly the gradual evaporation of religious belief was noticed ere the springs by which the reservoir is fed had been brought to light. The stock of faith in the Unseen seemed to be an inheritance which was being consumed, a capital which must sooner or later run low. Each generation seemed to live on what the fathers had accumulated. Even the devout caught the alarm, and acted as if the persistence of religion in the world depended on isolating and guarding from every form of loss the identical heritage of faith handed down from the past.

Now faith must be regarded as a social possession that is being used up at certain points and by certain people, and is being added to at other points and by other people. When certain kinds of faith are consumed faster than they are supplied while other kinds are supplied faster than they are con-

¹ Tarde, "Les transformations du pouvoir"; Le Bon, "The Crowd"; Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," Vol. II, Part III.

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sumed, religion undergoes a transformation. In our time, that faith in the Unseen which calls forth dread and propitiatory effort is not being renewed as fast as it perishes. But the faith that makes for ethical religion is welling up as fast, perhaps, as it is being consumed. Every saint, evangelist, or preacher with a "call," every one in whom the love impulse becomes overmastering and religious, is a creator of faith in the mystic brotherhood of men. Every one, in short, who creates more faith than he needs to use up in his daily life is a feeder of social religion.

A body of religious belief of the kind I have described is a storage battery of moral emotion. It is a means of storing up for society the surplus moral energy of the ethical élite, and enabling it to do work by producing sociable emotions and modifying conduct in desirable ways.

At a time when all the beliefs in Western civilization feel the powerful reshaping pressure of new knowledge, it is of interest to fix the limits within which religious belief may vary without losing its effectiveness. Nearly every one takes for granted that a deity and a future life are the essentials of such a faith. But the most striking manifestations of the pure ethical-religious sentiment do not seem to warrant this view. The horror at gladiatorial sports, the antipathy to warfare, the championship of the slave, the serf, and the woman, the levelness of speech from superior to inferior, the respect for human life, the reverential treatment accorded the dead,—these, if traced down to their tap root, will be found to spring not from belief in God or immortality, but from something deeper still, namely, the conviction of our fundamental identity in nature and destiny.

Legal religion cannot work without a proper

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unity lies behind them, not before them. They are monads with different essence and different destinies. The misery of one need not slacken the progress of another in joy and power. Fellows they may be, but only so far as fellowship is felt. Beyond this there is nothing. If one takes up the burden of another, let him look for result to his own feelings; for other fact there is none; and the time comes when all burden-bearing is as if it had not been. "Therefore," so might the inference run, "look to thyself and to those that hold thy heartstrings, but trouble not thyself about the rest."

From the religious point of view, conscience and the ethical feelings possess authority over every other inclination. But the naturalist says: "I see with Plato that the rational nature of man should prevail over the appetitive nature and tame the passions till they enter quietly into a rational life scheme. I see the value of self-control and the need of imposing the law of the nobler self upon impulse, if we are to rise above the brute. But why among our impulses should the sympathies have consideration over self-assertion, pride, or ambition? Why consecrate the late and weak-rooted social emotions, and brand as devil-made the will to power? Why hold up the serene, fraternal community as a worthier theatre of man's effort than a society wherein prevail personal competition and success?"

Between this individualistic interpretation of man and the social interpretation of him as we find it in the higher religions, the opposition is complete. The one rests on external fact, the other on faith. The one is positive, the other idealistic. The one fosters rivalry, the other sympathy. The one limits association, the other pro-

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motes it. The one cries, "Struggle!" — the other cries, "Bear ye one another's burdens." Here, then, is a conflict between "science" and "religion" which will last, we may be sure, a very long time.¹ The dawning truth that, whatever may be the ultimate ground of association, society at a given moment is held together by *beliefs*² rather than by *interests*, opposes the confident claims of the naturalists, and gives countenance to those who have insisted upon the vital importance of religion to society.

There are some who hold that social science can replace idealism in our system of motives. Now it is well that all codes of requirement — legal, moral, religious — should be frequently overhauled by sociologists so that we shall not encourage things hurtful to the common good, or discourage things agreeable to the common good. But in

¹ Of "Naturalism," which takes what is here called the *positive* view of man's nature, life, and destiny, Mr. Balfour says: "If it is to be in harmony with principles like these that the child is to be taught at the mother's knee and the young man is to build up the ideals of his life, then, unless I greatly mistake, it will be found that the inner discord which exists and which must gradually declare itself, between the emotions proper to naturalism and those which have actually grown up under the shadow of traditional convictions will, at no distant date, most unpleasantly translate itself into practice." — "The Foundations of Belief," p. 86.

This able book argues that "naturalism" is unfavorable to morality, therefore *untrue*. What it shows is that naturalism is unsuitable for purposes of social control, therefore at present *unsafe*.

² "General beliefs are the indispensable pillars of civilizations; they determine the trend of ideas, they alone are capable of inspiring faith and creating a sense of duty." — LE BON, "The Crowd," p. 150.

"Every civilization is, as it were, a dream of a thousand years, in which heaven and earth, nature and history, appear to men illumined by fantastic light, and representing a drama which is nothing but a projection of the soul itself, influenced by some intoxication — I was going to say hallucination — or other." — AMIEL, "Journal Intime," Dec. 8, 1869.

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getting people to observe these rectified rules of social morality, the truths of sociology are of little help. The *stimulus*, "ay, there's the rub." It is so easy to improve the *contents* of the moral code without improving its *grip*. The sociologist shows that we are bound up with one another in a kind of loose corporation, so that in many cases we have to stand or fall together. He shows how we are entangled in a web of interlacing interests, so that I cannot offend others without putting myself somewhat at their mercy, and often I can benefit myself only by consenting to coöperations that benefit others, too.

Very good. Open-eyed selfishness is better than blind selfishness. But this does nothing to redeem man from the ape and tiger in him. One might know all this, yet be as dangerous as Miocene man when he lived in a cave and went calling with a club instead of a card-case. Not long ago, the evangel ran, "Go ye into all the world and make men conscious of their material interests." And universal peace was preached from statistics of international trade and investments. But it is less likely that men are friendly because they have dealings than that they have dealings because they are friendly. Enlighten him as you will, a being who cares for nothing but its body and the young of its body will remain treacherous and untrustworthy. The palm, then, must always belong to that influence which goes to the root of man's badness, and by giving him more interests and sympathies converts a narrow self into a broad self.

And what of the future? In Western society, the beliefs that create legal religion are perishing before our eyes. They stand in flat contradiction to our knowledge, and as the state becomes more

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able to secure civil order, the social ego takes less pains to keep them alive for the sake of their usefulness. The idealism that creates social religion, however, is not suffering so much. These beliefs are more elastic, and they have never learned to lean so heavily on the supporting arm of society.

Social religion, then, has a long and possibly a great career awaiting it. As it disengages itself from that which is transient and perishable, as the dross is purged away from its beliefs and the element of social compulsion entirely disappears from it, social religion will become purer and nobler. No longer a paid ally of the policeman, no longer a pillar of social order, it will take its unquestioned place with art, and science, and wisdom, as one of the free manifestations of the higher human spirit.

CHAPTER XVII

PERSONAL IDEALS—THE TYPE

A DEVELOPED society presents itself as a system of unlike individuals strenuously pursuing their personal ends, but nevertheless so ordering their activities as to realize a certain equilibrium. Whatever his place in this system, a person must assume certain definite relations to other persons and to other parts of the system. The requirements attach to places rather than to persons, so that a man in passing from minority to citizenship, from bachelor to benedict, or from subordinate to chief, enters a new zone of requirement.¹ In some cases the requirements that attach to different positions are so unlike as to call up precisely opposite sentiments. Consider the emotional contrast between diplomat and man of science, soldier and nurse, section boss and kindergartner. The kindness society desires of the pastor is no twin to the lusty competition it expects of the business man. Running religion on business principles and running

¹ This view of social order is confirmed by Alexander. "This system of social relations . . . implies similarity and diversity of functions among its members. Many fight, and many work, and many govern; and there are some needs so general that morality makes similar requirements of all—temperance, and justice, and the like—but each has his own individual place, and holds it through preserving a right relation to those who are like and to those who are unlike himself. Morality makes the best of the endless repetition it finds in the natural beings called men, and marshals them to their place in a system of relations, the meaning of each of which is present to their consciousness."—"Moral Order and Progress," pp. 127-128.

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business on religious principles prove equally disastrous. Jailer's harshness, nurse's tenderness, each has its place.

It follows that altruism, ordinary short-sighted altruism, is quite incompetent to hold each unswervingly to the particular activities and forbearances belonging to his place in the social system. What prompts each to adjust himself to the demands the social order makes upon him, is not a vague altruism, but a particular way of regarding these demands. Soldier's work, chaplain's work — however contrasted the sentiments they call up, both can be looked upon and discharged as *duties*. The development of such feelings is effected chiefly by means of patterns or types which society induces its members to adopt as their guiding ideals. The secret of this kind of control is the fact that we love or hate, admire or despise, traits of character. Just as we have specific reactions for odors, colors, or scenes, we have specific reactions for personal qualities. Some of us love impetuosity; others admire cool deliberation. Some adore cleverness; others tenacity of purpose. The self-assertion that angers one, intimidates another, and charms a third.

Because we live closer to our own choices and efforts than to those of others,¹ we all have originally a high self-esteem. But with the growth of the reflective habit we become apt at critical self-appraisal. We become able, as it were, to stand off and look upon and pass judgment upon ourselves. Self-esteem now lifts its head only when we see in ourselves that which we deem estimable, droops when we can see in our qualities or achievements nothing we think fine. Shame supervenes.

¹ James, "Psychology," Vol. I, pp. 326-327.

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when we must confess to that in ourselves which we despise in another.¹

From the fact that self-esteem exhilarates and shame depresses, the normal person aspires to that which he deems precious and worthy. Be it trophy or title, grace or dexterity, wit or erudition, it remains true that what he admires he strives to acquire. Admiration has, therefore, a transforming power, because its object becomes the goal of endeavor. In the field of character the admired becomes a personal ideal toward which one strives. Hence, to control personal ideals is to control character.

To this end are elaborated various patterns of conduct and of character, which may be termed *social types*. These types may become in the course of time *personal ideals*, each for that category of persons for which it is intended. By keeping distinct these two stages in the process, it is easy for us to perceive that the presence of self-control, fidelity, or courage in the types held up for imitation in a community by no means proves that these are the leading qualities of its members. It is perfectly possible for the pattern evolved by a community of grasping men to embrace fair play and respect for ownership. It is just because the type held before the average man is *above* him, that it is able to lift him once he comes to love it and lay hold on it.

Some one will object at this point that such a differentiating of social type from private practice will do no good. The legerdemain is too transpar-

¹ "That we dislike in others things which we tolerate in ourselves is a law of our aesthetic nature about which there can be no doubt. But as soon as generalization and reflection step in, this judging of others leads to a new way of regarding ourselves." — JAMES, "Psychology," Vol. II, p. 435.

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ent. By no such device can the stream be made to rise higher than its source.

We escape this paradox only by recognizing certain great social facts, such as the division of labor, the contrast of leaders and led, and the sway of the past over the present. Consider, for example, how the soldier comes to regard as despicable that prudent concern for one's safety which is commended in other walks of life. There is first the fact that contempt of danger is absolutely necessary to the business of fighting. Those depending on the success of the fighting force, *i.e.* all the rest of society, will see to it that courage is emphasized in the soldier type. Secondly, the leaders of the soldiers, whether self-devoted or not, perceiving that professional success with all the glory and personal aggrandizement it brings depends on the inspiring of courage in their men, will zealously impress this quality. In the third place, courage bepraised and besung in one generation, will shine before the eyes of the next generation with a prestige it could never have acquired in a day.

The last fact should be dwelt on. For it is chiefly by being handed down embedded in transmitted culture—literature, art, religion, codes, moral disciplines—that social types of character come to be accepted as ideals, not merely by the led, but even by the leaders and guides of society. This lifting of social type higher than actual race character, far from being mere shallow artifice, is, in reality, the outcome of a long social growth. It is from the summit of twenty centuries of myth and legend, song and story, faith and aspiration, that certain types of to-day look down upon us. Social control is based not only on the ascendancy of the many over the one, of the wise over the simple, of the

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rulers over the ruled, but yet more on the domination of the living by the dead.

To a certain extent patterns will spring up of themselves if you give them a little time, for they are the natural products of long association. Society does not have to take thought for them any more than a man has to see to it that his gastric juice is properly secreted. It lies, as we shall show later, in the very nature of human intercourse that models of character and conduct should develop which are superior to the average person, and will draw him upward when he strives toward them.¹

Since Plato and the Greeks, no one has paid much attention to what we may term *the vegetative moral life* of society. Supernaturalism vitiated the intellectual atmosphere until social order came to be regarded as altogether a matter of hocus-pocus. Up to a century ago philosophers laid all virtue to visible institutions, and even now they love to send a shudder through us by hinting that every man's hand would be at his neighbor's windpipe were it not for the consciously provided machinery of policemen, preachers, Sunday schools, sacred books, pomps, ceremonies, and the rest. They would have us believe that but for the knitted brows of magistrates, theologians, and moralists this visible frame of order would fly into bits. But social order is not quite all carpenter's work. People show, sometimes, a surprising knack of getting along together. They secrete, as it were, a limpid cement of ideals, valuations, and mutual suggestions which binds them into a harmonious whole.

How now is the individual induced to admire and aspire to the social type? What is meant by "holding up" a pattern?

¹ See ch. xxv.

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Let us consider how the soldier model embodying such elements as courage, endurance, fidelity, self-sacrifice (none of them easy for human nature), is so impressed on great numbers of ordinary men as to become for them an imperious ideal. In any society that survives by the military qualities, we find that all manner of homage is paid to the soldier type. Literature glorifies it, eloquence crowns it, religion canonizes it, multitudes applaud and cheer it. Everywhere that type is honored, reverenced, sung, and praised. Healths and toasts are drunk to the soldier; women smile on him; men bow down to him. Art, literature, oratory, worship, monuments, statues,¹ festivals, commemorations, and observances unite in perpetually reminding men of soldier qualities, exploits, and prizes.

Besides these streams of suggestion, all playing on one point, admiration is further kindled by flashing before the dazzled eye those aspects of the soldier's life which are adventurous, dramatic, or picturesque, while carefully keeping in the background its cruelties, hardships, and agonies; by gracing it with attractive imagery; by expurgating history of the horrors of war, and literature of all disparagement of the soldier; by referring to soldier worth on the most momentous and solemn occasions; by bringing it forward when habitual self-interested prudence is thrown off its guard in a sudden rush of emotion; by getting it associated

¹ "Who is to have a Statue? means, Whom shall we consecrate and set apart as one of our sacred men? Sacred: that all men may see him, be reminded of him, and by new example added to the old perpetual precept, be taught what is real worth in man. Whom do you wish us to resemble? Him you set on a high column, that all men, looking on it, may be continually apprised of the duty you expect from them." — CARLYLE, Essays, "Hudson's Statue."

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with all that is beautiful or holy ; by identifying it with the defence of the roof-tree from the torch, of ancestral graves from the vandal, of women from the ravisher, and of children from the destroyer.¹

It goes without saying that the feelings of the young are more easily guided than those of the adult, and that the set they have once received they are more likely to keep. To warp the loves and scorns of youth is, therefore, the last word of the moral educator. Plato speaks of the "royal art" of control as "binding the soul with a divine cord," by which he means the inplanting of "opinion about the honorable and the just and good and their opposites."² But this must be attended to early. "The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which, when he grows up to manhood, he will have to be perfected."³

The diversity of conduct and character required

¹ The precise way in which the knightly pattern sank into the soul of Japan and became in modified form the personal ideal of all Japanese is well shown by Dr. Nitobe.

"The innumerable avenues of popular amusement and instruction—the theatres, the story-tellers' booths, the preacher's *dais*, the musical recitations, the novels,—have taken for their chief theme the stories of the Samuri. The peasants around the open fire in their huts never tire of repeating the noble exploits of Yoshitsune and his faithful retainer Benkei, or of the two brave Soga brothers; the dusky urchins listen with gaping mouths until the last stick burns out and the fire dies in its embers, still leaving their hearts aglow with the tale that is told. The clerks and the shop-boys, after their day's work is over and the *amado* (outside shutters) of the store are closed, gather together to relate the story of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi far into the night, until slumber overtakes their weary eyes and transports them from the drudgery of the counter to the exploits of the field. . . . Even girls are so imbued with the love of knightly deeds and virtues that, like Desdemona, they would seriously incline to devour with greedy ear the romance of the Samuri. Thus 'Samuri' grew to be the *beau ideal* of the whole race."—"Bushido," p. 106.

² "The Statesman," 309.

³ "The Laws," 643.

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in a highly differentiated society is so great that if it were sought to use one concrete type for all, this type would be so generalized as to be valueless. How few are the moral elements that the scout, the mother, the bank clerk, the boss, the nurse, and the stock jobber have in common! How unlike the qualities that will make each one *good* of his or her kind! To the actual variety of place and function must answer, therefore, a certain variety of type. Besides such patterns as the son, the lover, or the father maintained on behalf of the family, we find types of the friend, the neighbor, the partner, the business man, the teacher, the servant, the policeman, the citizen. However indistinct in the literature and debate of the day, where variants and novelties get most of the attention, these types will be found quite definite for each family or neighborhood. Vague though they may seem for the whole nation, they are precise enough for each little local group; and it is just in some such group that everybody is born and raised. These types, then, are very real things in the lives of people. A girl, for instance, is impressed at home with the daughter pattern, at school with the pupil pattern; with her teens she is confronted with the young lady type; and later she encounters the reigning standard of wife and mother.

If, however, she varies her life to the extent of becoming saleswoman, or accountant, finds she no specialized model held up to her. This brings us to the truth that the moulds provided by society are, after all, few, while nowadays the variety of situation and requirement is all but infinite. It would seem, then, that this species of control is incapable of detail regulation. But this difficulty has been triumphantly met. Types complete in every feature are provided only for the chief positions which

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one may occupy. For the rest, society by dissecting and comparing normal conduct for all sorts of exigencies brings to light certain resemblances. "Good" conduct under all sorts of conditions is found to repeat a few general qualities. "Good" character at a thousand points in the social system can be resolved into a few simple elements. Therefore, after the ground plan of society has been sketched out in a number of special types, it is possible to fall back on these few recurring qualities and elements. For each of these a type is framed and held up for the individual to admire and imitate. These abstract types are *the moral virtues*. By this analysis we get such generalized forms as honesty, justice, truthfulness, loyalty, courage, perseverance, temperance, etc. We no longer bid the taskmaster not to "strip the temples of their stores," "diminish the substance consecrated to the gods," "carry off the cakes and bandages of mummies," "over-value or diminish the supplies," or "cheat in the weights of the balance." We simply bid him "*Be honest.*" We no longer rehearse the forty-two sins recognized in the Egyptian Book of the Dead. We have worked out to abstractions. But the guidance of men by such abstractions presupposes in them the power to recognize the abstract in the concrete, and is, therefore, not without its drawbacks and dangers.

The analysis of fit character in all manner of positions so as to discover uniformities which are erected into virtues and made the reigning ideals for individual life is a real master stroke. Its economy is that of the alphabet. There, by analyzing spoken words into their simplest sound elements, we are enabled to reduce the number of written characters from thousands to a little over

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a score; these, in turn, must be variously combined in order to form the multitude of written words required. Here, by analyzing social characters into their ultimate elements, we can make a few virtues do the work of many concrete types; but these virtues must be combined in varying degrees and proportions, in order to give the variety of guidance needed in the social system. Vast, indeed, is the gain from this moral alphabet. In all early societies that reached a settled order, we find elaborate codes specifying what is standard conduct for all the chief places and functions. The bringing up of each person in the highly specific ethic of his particular status and calling tended to confirm caste, lessen mobility, and discourage variation. Such societies had to throttle progress, for with change in the number, strength, or relation of the orders of men in society, the elaborate patterns ceased to fit, and morality collapsed. It is the bringing people up to love and imitate *generalized* social qualities and *generalized* social character that, more than any other improvement in this department of social evolution, has given control the elasticity necessary to progress.

But there remain certain concrete types that affect us all. One of these is the elementary type of "man" or "woman" which is embraced as a personal ideal by the common workaday millions. Everybody knows that to "be a man" means not to whimper, to face danger that is unavoidable, to keep promises, to deal fairly, to support one's wife, and to be considerate of a woman. Everybody knows, too, that a woman cannot "be a woman" unless she is modest in demeanor, ministers to her children, and stands by her husband through thick and thin. So much are these the guiding ideals for the common folk of our race that there is not

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one male out of ten who will not redden or bridle if told that he is "no man at all" or "half a man"; while the female who is not distressed at the charge of being "unwomanly" is properly considered very far gone indeed.

Another concrete socializing type is that of the "gentleman" (or "lady"). This type, which grew up in a military-religious order constituting but a small fraction of the population, conquered first the upper class, and later the middle and lower classes. "In English literature," says Emerson, "half the drama and all the novels from Sir Philip Sidney to Sir Walter Scott paint this figure." With us the type has become so popular and supreme that one must descend quite low in the social scale to find common the man who does not wince at being told he is "no gentleman."

It might at first blush seem strange that the aspiring millions of our democracy should embrace an ideal worked out among professional fighters, and neglect ideals like that of the Quaker or the Puritan or the Moravian, which sprang up among men of peace, and are more suitable to a pacific industrial society. But it is to be remembered that people will adopt as ideal only that type which charms and fascinates them. Our experience, as well as that of Japan, shows that an upper-class ideal, with its halo of luxury, romance, and feats of arms, is more apt to take by storm the hearts of plain people than one that springs from the soul of the prophet or reformer.

There are two other types which, though they are not set before everybody, are noteworthy, on account of the social energy that has gone to perfect and glorify them. These are the *soldier* and the *priest*.

They have been the concern of society partly be-

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cause religious and military functions have seemed to be of highest moment to the common welfare, but still more because the demands of these professions go so much against the grain. To develop the courage, obedience, and fortitude of the warrior, or the self-denial, chastity, and piety of the priest, human nature has to be overlaid with an artificial nature. As the task is difficult, the means have to be powerful, and thus it is that these types have been worked out to a distinctness and backed up with an authority we find nowhere else. The most powerful known agencies — poetry, song, eloquence, applause — are summoned to uphold and commend them. So deeply and durably is the type stamped upon the individual, that he betrays in his thought and feeling a certain arrest of development. The thought of the soldier or the priest cannot wander much beyond the range marked out by his type. Either can do scientific detail work, but very rarely does either do first-class thinking on social, religious, or philosophical subjects — those, namely, about which he has been trained to think and feel in a particular way.

Each of the higher religions owes some of its efficacy to the types and models it is able to set before the faithful. Each contributes to the general stock of ideals in society, its pattern lives, characters, and virtues, so movingly set forth in narratives, examples, parables, legends, and myths as to win and hold the love of generations of men. Each finds means to make some quality or other supremely attractive, and hence supremely striven for. The Norse myths formed the proper mould for the spirit of the fighter. Mazdaism was but a pedestal to lift purity into the upper heavens. "The spirit of Shinto," says Mr. Hearn, "is the spirit of filial piety, the zest of duty, the readiness

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to surrender life for a principle without a thought of wherefore. It is the docility of the child; it is the sweetness of the Japanese woman.”¹ Lacking as it is both in supernaturalism and idealism, the teaching of Confucius could never touch the feelings and mould human lives were it not for the attractive power of its model characters and virtues. Stoicism, as a force in the world, was neither more nor less than a well-wrought-out type of manly character fortified by philosophical doctrines and made fascinating by the genius of Epictetus. Buddha gave an irresistible charm to unselfishness, self-control, and serenity. Jesus conferred upon meekness, love, and forgiveness a lustre that has led captive the hearts of millions.

If it is true that the character of the worshipper tends to become assimilated to the character of the being worshipped, then the social worth of a religion depends a good deal on the kinds of deity it sets up.² Useless or even positively degrading was the worship of Aztec, Phoenician, or Syrian gods. In classic Greece, the best men were painfully aware that the gods of their mythology were unfit to serve as personal ideals. It is the glory of Hebrew genius, on the other hand, to have set before the world the pure and holy Yahveh as an object of worship, and later to have added the worship of the risen Christ.³

¹ “Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan,” Vol. II, p. 388.

² See Wundt, “Ethics,” Vol. I, pp. 78-100, “The Gods as Moral Ideals.” Also, Pfeiderer, “Philosophy and Development of Religion,” Vol. I, pp. 40-41.

³ Paul’s doctrine of the vicarious atonement and salvation by faith was a wonderful device for lifting religion from the plane of mere legalism, on which the Scribes and Pharisees had placed it, to the plane of *control by personal ideals*. Says Professor Toy, “It was thus the power of an ideal to which Paul appealed. His experience and his reflection led him to see that the mightiest instru-

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As it is the concrete and living that draws the world, much of the power of a religion to provide personal ideals depends on the wealth of types incarnate in its founders, heroes, and saints. Islam despite its original simplicity contrived to get its *walis* or saints. Says Kuenen, "We can hardly exaggerate the place occupied by this adoration of the prophet and the saints in the life of the Moslem peoples."¹ Buddhism owes much to the majestic character of Gautama, while Christianity possesses a priceless moral treasure in the figure of the Founder as delineated in the Gospels. These fleckless, flawless, pattern-lives, human yet enveloped in the religious nimbus, are among the great ethical possessions of our race.

Besides these chief types carefully constructed and strongly fortified, we find many subordinate types serving to effect the minor adjustments of the individual to the group. The framing of these is the work not of society but of the minor group most immediately conversant with the function regulated — usually the trade or profession. The lawyers in their intercourse, their papers and discussions, their legal books and periodicals, their bar associations, and their law schools arrive at a professional ethics which sketches out the type that becomes the ideal of those lawyers imbued with the "professional" spirit. So teachers, clergymen, physicians, civil engineers, artists, or actors, by agreeing among themselves as to what is praiseworthy and what disreputable, control the feelings and consequently the endeavor of the individual.

ment for the transformation of character was the hearty devotion of the soul to a supreme model of truth and holiness; and so he trusts confidently to the power of faith to reorganize and perfect man's nature." — "Judaism and Christianity," p. 277.

¹ "National Religions and Universal Religions," p. 41.

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Likewise conductors, typesetters, glass-blowers, or pilots communicate to each other standards of excellence which become trade types. Every "service"—military, naval, hospital, revenue, police, life saving, detective, or missionary—acquires in time traditions, stories, anecdotes, precedents, maxims, and sayings which conspire to delineate and glorify its type. It is this power to subdue the initiate to its standards that marks the bureaucracy. When a service is originated, say the Franciscan Order or the Salvation Army, the inspiration of its members comes from the magnetic charm and the ascendant personality of its founder. But with age the vitality of the order comes to reside in its models or ideals which each member has accepted for himself and seeks to communicate to the novice.

Every party, labor union, guild, lodge, surveying corps, or athletic team will, in the course of time, develop for its special purposes appropriate types of character or observance, which exert on its members an invisible pressure subordinating them to the welfare or aims of the association. In other words, the minor groups of men resemble the great social group in needing to control their units and in the means they employ for this purpose. We have pointed out the need of a succession of generations for perfecting a social type and giving it prestige. So of minor groups it is only the stabler ones with a succession of memberships that are able to create a distinctive atmosphere.

The special ethical standards that associations, professions, and trades impart to their members may be said to constitute in a way social types and to belong among the agents of social control. They are usually worked out under the oversight and criticism of the public. If in any respect they are observed to run counter to the general social in-

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terest, a hue and cry arises. If the profession fails to amend, its type will be stripped of its prestige by being confronted with those general types that are backed up with the full authority of society past and present, *i.e.* the ruling moral standards. Just as the emitting of money by the inferior divisions of the state is a sign of political disintegration, so a sure sign of social disintegration is the emission, by sects, classes, or professions, of types and standards which are able to pass current and supersede the old moral mintage. Society is far gone when sect imperatives no longer need to be legitimated by the indorsement of general morality.

CHAPTER XVIII

PERSONAL IDEALS—THE IDEAL

So far we have studied the nature of the moral type or signet society presses upon its members. Turning now to the individual, let us study the type as personal ideal. The force that holds a man to his personal ideal is self-respect or sense of honor on the one hand, and shame on the other; these taken together constituting a veritable self-acting system of rewards and punishments. Compared with externally applied rewards and punishments they have the merit of dispensing with inquest and award by external authority, of being certain in operation, of regulating men when unobserved, of appraising motive as well as deed, and of shaping character as well as conduct.

The lofty independence of this righteousness, lifted as it is far above calculations of gain or loss, of praise or blame, has won the admiration of thinkers in all ages. It is the supreme aim of the Stoics. Says Marcus Aurelius: "When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?" It is the goal of the great modern teachers. "The hero fears not," says Emerson, "that if he withholds the avowal of a just and brave act it will go unwitnessed and unloved. One knows it—himself—and is pledged by it to sweetness of peace and to nobleness of aim." In high contrast to the lives

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regulated by the prospect of heaven and hell stand those lives governed by ideals. Dispensing with belief in a future state,¹ they demand simply belief in one's self.² Neither reposing on dogma nor responding to self-interest,³ they give a security for lasting goodness that seems absolute.

Steadfastly to live up to an exacting ideal presupposes a kind of character which, whether good or bad in its native impulses, is certainly strong. We do not look for it in genial, fibreless, good-natured people. We do not expect it of an indolent, un-strenuous race. On the other hand, provided it has will and self-control, a race that is harsh, greedy, and masterful in temper may develop into something noble, once its allegiance is fixed upon high personal ideals. Both the Romans and the English, in spite of their cold and unsociable disposition, have been able to produce for justice and administration men that cannot be surpassed in integrity.

Besides strength of will, the sway of the personal ideal presupposes a developed self-sense. I am to practise all the social virtues not in the least out of consideration for other people, but out of respect for myself. I am to abstain from lying, or taking a bribe, or betraying a trust, not at all because such things harm others, but because they do not comport with my personal dignity. Strangely enough, then, egoism is here the soil out of which the social virtues spring, the well from which they are watered. While supernaturalism makes for humility, the personal ideal constantly appeals to pride.

¹ "Man's ignorance as to what will become of him after he dies never disturbs a noble, a truly religious soul." — SALTER.

² "The fearful unbelief is unbelief in thyself." — CARLYLE.

³ "Can he really be honest, can he be called really virtuous, who would gladly give himself up to his favorite vices if he feared no future punishment?" — KANT.

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Unless modesty be incorporated into the ideal itself, the Stoic is likely to follow the injunction of Epictetus: "Do thou also then not be greatly proud of thy food and dress, or of any external things, but be proud of thine integrity and good deeds."

Because it cannot dispense with a vivid consciousness of personal worth, control through ideals flourishes in the higher classes while yet the inferior orders are under the curb of custom and authority. Always in aristocracies, nobilities, leisure classes, and military castes, the self-sense is so exaggerated that there is no good leverage for control unless self be used as a fulcrum. At a time when supernatural sanctions were woven through and through the European social fabric, chivalry took the brute pride of the barbarian upper classes and transformed it into a noble and jealous sense of honor, which was able to rout the monastic spirit from castle and court.

The morality that the propertied or exploiting classes develop among themselves has its mainspring in pride.¹ We see this in Greek ethics as expounded in the pages of Aristotle, in Roman Stoicism, in the "gentleman morality" of mediæval Europe, and in the *Samuri* ethics of feudal Japan. The humble, working, exploited people, on the other hand, have no such hypertrophied sense of personal worth as the upper class, and hence do not respond so readily to the appeal to pride. The morality they develop among themselves is, therefore, the

¹ "In an aristocratic society, the elevated class, though small in number, sets the fashion in opinion and feeling; even virtue will, in that state of society, seem to be most strongly recommended by arguments addressing themselves to pride; in a democracy, by those which address themselves to interest." — J. S. MILL, "Dissertations and Discussions," Vol. II, "Democracy in America."

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morality of consideration, or "neighbor morality." Kindness, helpfulness, and fair dealing, the great desiderata among the humble, are procured not by appealing to pride but by appealing to love. Of this character are the moral currents set in motion by the early Christians, the Franciscans, the Waldenses, the Anabaptists, the Quakers, and the Moravians. Sometimes "neighbor morality" makes its way upward, as it did in the Roman Empire when associated with Christian dogma. Sometimes "gentleman morality" makes its way downward, as it has in Europe and the United States since the great democratic upheaval. But in either case the morality that wanders beyond its natural habitat is sure to be modified and lose much of its original stamp.

Whether or not it is the more effective, the appeal to love instead of pride is certainly saner, inasmuch as social morality does, in fact, exist for the sake of "the neighbor." "Gentleman morality," on the other hand, referring what is to be done or avoided to the false standard of self, is liable to such morbid and fantastic developments as the lady-service of chivalry, the superfluous duelling of the seventeenth-century courts, or the *hari-kari* of Old Japan.

With the rise of cities and industry, the passage from a serf economy to a wage economy, and the widening of opportunity by the free land of the New World, the sense of worth lifted its head in the industrial orders of Europe, and pride in the sober garb of self-respect was given more and more the custody of virtue.¹ As the empire of super-

¹ "Pride, under such training (that of modern rationalistic philosophy), instead of running to waste, is turned to account. It gets a new name; it is called self-respect. . . . It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obedience,

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naturalism has declined personal ideals have silently extended their sway and averted the moral catastrophe which, though always predicted, has never occurred. "Our country offers to-day," says Pré-vost-Paradol, speaking of France in 1868, "the unique spectacle of a society in which honor has become the principal guarantee of good order and is made to accomplish most of those sacrifices which religion and conscience have lost the power of ordering." "Not respect for divine law . . . nor a philosophic devotion to a vague duty and still less to that abstract entity, the State, uprooted and discredited by so many revolutions, but the dread of having to redder publicly for a shameful action maintains among us an efficient desire of well-doing."¹

It is more than a coincidence that as the transformation of feudal into democratic society awakens a sense of dignity in the common man, there follows a rapid soaking of upper-class ideals—in modified form, of course—down through the strata of burgher society even to peasant and working-man. The persistence of a rich and ruling feudal aristocracy, on the other hand, depresses the self-sense in the masses and retards the percolation of the "gentleman" ideal with its sanction of honor. In the pagoda society the governing class, whatever its scepticism, bolsters up faith and supports

and becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honor in a day like our own. It becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of veracity, in high and low; it is the very household god of the Protestant, inspiring neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness, and generosity in the head of the family."—J. H. NEWMAN, quoted by Lecky in his "History of European Morals," Vol. II, p. 188.

¹ "La France Nouvelle," p. 358. See also TAINÉ, "French Revolution," Vol. II, Book VII, ch. 2, where he shows what are the historical roots of honor and self-respect in France.

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the church, not wholly from class interest, but from the soundest considerations of social morality. Only a democracy dares to be "modern" and "scientific" in its outlook on the world.

It is noteworthy that in societies like Italy, Russia,¹ and the Slavonic nations, where chivalry has never been strong, where the mediation of Protestant ideas is wanting, and where self-respect has not served her apprenticeship in the household of religion, the removal of the old supports to conduct appears to be a more serious matter. In India, too, where morality has for ages formed an irreducible amalgam with religion, the regulative ideals that dominate the West do not pervade the common consciousness. Educators have therefore found it well-nigh impossible to get the upper hand of egoism without calling in the aid of religious beliefs.

During this transformation the idea of honor has been somewhat modified. Honor was formerly a caste badge. It was that quality which guaranteed a man his caste and loss of which meant loss of caste. But with the wider sway of specific types honor has come to mean the cardinal virtue of each type, the one thing that *must not* be tampered with.

¹ Types that are to be high, clear-cut, and exacting have to be incubated for centuries. They cannot be hatched out in a day. The lack of such types reveals itself in the flabbiness and (to us) shamelessness of Russian character. Says Lanin: "The Russian is so hearty, so good-humored, so intensely human, that dishonesty seems in his hands only a distorted virtue. You catch him in the act, overhaul him; unabashed he confesses, sees nothing objectionable in the deed, and is ready to sacrifice all his gains to put you in good temper. This trait of mere criminal *bonhomie*, in all his dealings with the world, the flesh, and the devil, should never be overlooked in estimating a Russian's character. He is no distressing moralist clamoring for a stringency in public opinion which he will do his best to evade; he asks no greater laxity than he himself is prepared to allow; and playing the game of life with cards in his own sleeve would only laugh if he detected his neighbor indulging in a similar practice." — "Russian Characteristics," p. 205.

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Failure to realize this excellence is looked upon as equivalent to failure to realize the type. Thus for woman honor is identified with chastity, for the soldier it is courage, for the business man it is the meeting of pecuniary obligations. The officer who runs away, the judge who takes bribes, the engineer who passes work "not up to contract," the pugilist who "hits below the belt," the jockey who "pulls" his mount, the schoolboy who "peaches," forfeits his honor. He is taught to feel that he has gone wrong in the main thing, and that by his act he is declassed and degraded.

As the fulcrum for the elevation of character by means of the personal ideal is provided by the vivid sense of personal dignity and worth, this form of control is weakened by everything that enfeebles or blunts this sense. Physical intimacy, the lack of shame and privacy, easy ways, habits and conversation, the herd life of pullulating slums and tenements — all these work against the feeling of honor and self-respect. All through those northern lands where the influence of personal ideals upon the common people is most marked, it is felt that "cleanliness is next to godliness," and that privacy and decency are the first upward steps in the moral regeneration of the low or fallen. In dealing with the backward humanity of the summer lands, the missionaries of the religion of self-respect instinctively begin by building up those personal habits which are favorable to the self-sense. And the northern tourist, when he comes in contact with the impudent, cowardly, mendacious tribe that fills the lower quarters of Naples or Cairo, feels that nothing can be hoped from the Mediterranean folk until their indecent manners and ways of life are changed.

Apparently, human beings will stand only a

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certain measure of postponement to others, and if we take it out in one form we cannot do so in another. Martyrized in daily life by overmuch intrusion of other people, the person balks at that particular postponement we call morality. Protected on the other hand by a hedge of conventional decencies from this wearing irritation, he may be induced to spend himself freely in obedience to the moral law and devotion to the public cause. The touch-me-not attitude, therefore, need not imply anything anti-social. The decency and privacy that the Anglo-Saxon insists on may really be economical from the standpoint of the general welfare.

May we not find here a clew to the importance attaching, in the early priestly as well as in the later philosophical moralities, to the distinction of "pure" and "impure"? For these are not to be taken in a symbolic sense. "'Pure' man," remarks Nietzsche, "is, from the very beginning, merely one who washes himself; who abstains from certain aliments liable to beget skin diseases; who will not lie with the filthy women of the common people; who betrays a horror of blood;—he is no more, not much more."¹ It is possible that the moral worth imputed to this fastidiousness came from a dim recognition of its service in heightening the self-sense and thus paving the way for the reign of the personal ideal.

There are other social conditions that undermine the self-sense. In slaves, menial classes, subject peoples, and inferior races, self-respect is blighted by the ever present arrogance of the superior, and consequently they are always complained of as deficient in "honor," "principle," and "reliability." Their motives to good conduct

¹ "A Genealogy of Morals," First Essay, Sec. 6.

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reduce to a doglike simplicity, being fear or affection accordingly as they are treated with harshness or kindness. The rapid degeneration of native character after a brief contact with the ruling race is likewise attributable to the decay of the self-sense and of the motives that depend upon it. The proverbial viciousness of half-breeds and half-castes is probably due, in like manner, to an extreme depression of the sense of personal worth, brought about by their trying social position.

The inspiring of conduct by ideals implies a view of human nature diametrically opposed to that of supernaturalism. While there we have doctrines of the Fall, of sin, and of total depravity, here we have a buoyant confidence in the fundamental goodness of men. "Within," says Marcus Aurelius, "is a fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up if thou wilt ever dig." Regeneration is not by grace but by endeavor. "Wipe out thy vain fancies," he urges, "by often saying to thyself: 'Now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any perturbation at all.' Remember this power which thou hast from nature." People must be taught that the good or noble they admire, they can attain to. "Men talk of 'mere morality,'" says Emerson, "which is much as if one should say, 'Poor God, with nobody to help Him!'" Vistas of infinite possibility must be opened. Free will must be exalted and fate depreciated. Hope and aspiration must be offered the meanest man. The belittling and maligning of human nature must cease.¹ Man, it is insisted, is

¹"The dignity of human nature was a fundamental article in Channing's creed. In every human being there is the germ of an unbounded progress. An unspeakable value belongs to him. His nature is not to be villified." — FISHER, "History of Christian Doctrine," p. 428.

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"a moral being," and so but achieves his true self-hood by realizing his ideals. Such are the correlated teachings that underlie the method of "morality."

The greatest effect of an ideal is not attained when it is pitched very far above natural inclination. As is well pointed out by Professor Petrie, "in the case of a very high standard the danger is that it will attract such a slender portion of the whole area of variation that it will benefit very few people; and in short be hypocritically concurred in but practically disregarded. A standard nearer to the average will have a more generally useful effect; while one even lower may yet be more useful. But too low a standard may do no good by not being far enough above the average to raise it. Of course the stronger the standard or the greater influence there is of religion, shame, good feeling, or other motive for obeying it, the farther it may be placed from the average."¹ A practical illustration of the complete divorce of ideal from conduct is afforded by China. "That government exhibits the widest discrepancy of any known system between theory and practice, the purest ideal cloaking the grossest aims; . . . and the preternatural exaltation of the ideal places it so far beyond the reach of the highest attainment in real life, that the standard of public duty, lost in the clouds of inflated verbiage, is wholly disconnected from practical affairs." "Whereas in other countries there is still some relation between the profession and the procedure . . . this relation has practically disappeared in China and the substitution of the false for the true has become an organized system already consecrated by unwritten law."²

¹ "Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt," p. 107.

² Colquhoun, "China in Transformation," pp. 188-189.

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The guidance of men by ideals is just the reverse of guidance by authority. When we bind from without, free inquiry, criticism, and unhampered choice are discouraged. We undermine the self-confidence of the individual and surround the source of law with every prestige of antiquity and divinity. But when we bind from within, we must leave him the illusion of self-direction even at the very moment he martyrs himself for the ideal we have sedulously impressed upon him. This type of control, therefore, builds on granite men, and granite men are produced by it. It is small wonder that Cromwell wanted not "decayed serving men and tapsters" but "men of spirit" to pit against the Cavaliers. He who is master of the secret of imparting ideals can have the pick of the human race for his purposes. Says Jacob: "The circumstance that the conduct of the Bedouins is never directly determined by a fear of punishment tends to develop in them a moral strength which lends a peculiar charm to the personality of the old-time Bedouin. He has an ideal possession, his honor, which does not, as with us, mean the matter-of-course possession of the average man, but a treasure that he ceaselessly strives to increase, that without effort on his part soon decays. . . . This manly independence, on the other hand, lessened the need of religion; and it is no accident that it is just that Semitic people which has the concept "honor" in its language in which '*Volksreligion*' played a relatively insignificant rôle."¹

Just because it is one of the ascendant forces of our time many people cannot bring themselves to see that the guidance of persons by social types is

¹ Georg Jacob, "Das Leben der Vorislamischen Beduinen," pp. 165-166.

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a form of social control at all. Least of all can an "ethics," which addresses its precepts to the individual and undertakes to provide him with reasons for being good, bring itself to this admission. The moralists with their "self-realization," "beauty of virtue," "moral ideal," assure us they are not controlling the individual, they are simply *enlightening* him. They are not thinking of the social order, of community welfare, at all. They are merely trying to show the individual what is most worth striving for. That the *moral values* they commend to him tally so closely with *values for society* is a mere coincidence. That what is best for him to be agrees so beautifully with what his particular social group wants him to be is an accidental—or shall we say a Providential?—parallel.¹ That the values of the various elements of moral excellence undergo a mysterious revision every time there is a change in the situation and needs of society, makes no impression on them. On whatever crutches of law or hell-fire humanity has hobbled up to its present level, it has at last, they tell us, thrown away all such aid and now advances upon its own legs!

But the sociologist must regard the polarizing of the feelings in regard to carefully framed models of character as simply one of the means by which large bodies of people have been brought to live together harmoniously. It is simpler and more elastic than certain outworn means of control. It is peculiarly compatible with that higher evolution of personality for which society exists. At present it has more promise than any of its rivals. But it is not the final basis of goodness. It is not the ultimate form of sociality.

¹ Well brought out by Professor Thilly in an article, "The Moral Law," in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. X, p. 223.

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Self-regard, however transfigured into self-respect and sense of honor, has never been the mainstay of family altruism, nor did it underlie the social disposition in the early clans and tribes. Two developments have combined to make morality, rather than enlightened altruism, the chief support of our social order. The size of modern societies makes it easier to love a few abstract relations to our fellows than to love our fellows themselves. Again, the increasing division of labor, by removing the discharge of our special functions farther and farther from the visible welfare of particular persons, tends to depersonalize our services and so make them *duties* rather than *ministrations*. But the influence of these two circumstances should not blind us to the nature of that goodness which is above and on the other side of all social control. Social order will have to rest on artifice till there is joined to natural altruism, as we find it developing in the family, a clearness of vision that sees in the upright discharge of the requirements of every social office and station the highest ministry to the welfare of our fellows.

CHAPTER XIX

CEREMONY

AT the outset of his study on "Ceremonial Institutions" in the second volume of his "Principles of Sociology," Mr. Spencer declares that "the earliest kind of government, the most general kind of government, and the government which is ever spontaneously recommencing, is the government of ceremonial observance." And elsewhere he repeatedly speaks of ceremony as "restraint," "control," "regulation." On closer examination, however, it appears that his "ceremonial government" is not a *means* of government, but a *kind* of government. In his view obeisances and respects are the pale shadow of social, political, or religious subordination. They are not means of winning ascendancy, but the sign and symptom of ascendancy already won. He shows that the postures and actions that enter into the forms of intercourse are plainly derived from natural acts of propitiation employed by an inferior in his intercourse with a superior. Now, it is proper to supplement this study of forms by a study of motives and effects. Let us inquire if ceremony is not a social institution as well as a social practice. Let us see if it is not a means of impressing the feelings of individuals in ways advantageous to society.

Two views may be taken of the forms observed in intercourse. From one standpoint the essence

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of ceremony is *propitiation*. The force impelling people to these tiresome and precise actions is *fear*. The practice is adopted by the inferior either as the instinctive expression of submission, or as a means of pleasing and mollifying the superior. These formalities mark the militant state of society with its personal and class ascendancies. When the levelling influences of industrialism cause the government of one man by another to disappear, they become rarer. Ceremony, therefore, does not approach the dignity of a social institution playing some part in the life of society. It is a private procedure generalized by imitation but no more significant in the social economy than is *fashion*, which Mr. Spencer deems to be of a kind with ceremony.

Yet there are significant facts which suggest another point of view. Often formality does not proceed from the inferior, but from the would-be superior. Ceremoniousness is, we know, well suited to curb over-familiarity and keep others at a distance. There are forms characterized by obsequiousness, but other forms exist which are, so to speak, the weapons by which one man subdues another. "Amongst a man's peers," says Bacon, "a man shall be sure of familiarity; and therefore it is good a little to keep state."¹ "In early society," says Bagehot, "a dignified manner is of essential importance. . . ." "The habitual ascendancy of grave manner was a primary force in winning and calming mankind."² Everywhere we must distinguish from the ascendancy gained by force the ascendancy gained by demeanor. The stately bearing, no less than the strong arm, was a means of control in early society.

¹ "Of Ceremonies and Respects."

² "Physics and Politics," p. 151.

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But why should demeanor give a man the upper hand? It is likely that the soul of fine manners is to show forth confidence and a sense of power. This suggests a respect for one's own person, doings, or opinions which powerfully affects the minds of beholders; for there is no reason why this state of mind should not as readily pass from one to another by way of imitation as any other feeling or judgment. The man of impressive manner simply reiterates in gesture-language his sense of his own high worth, till others are irresistibly led to believe in it.

Formality in personal intercourse, then, can be traced to two roots—*servility* and *self-respect*. These feelings give rise to two contrasted efforts—the effort of the servile to control others by propitiating them, and the effort of the self-respecting to control others by impressing them. These, if successful, inspire graciousness in the one case and deference in the other.

Undoubtedly the forms that become stereotyped are those originally used to propitiate. But it would be rash to conclude from this that ceremony is an endeavor at mutual propitiation. Nothing is more certain than that manners, far from growing up spontaneously, early get the social sanction behind them, and are forced into vogue. Propriety gets codified as soon as morality. Society actively interferes in order to get certain forms observed by men in their intercourse. The school teaches them, art lauds them, religion indorses them, and in every way society betrays its solicitude about them.

Would it be safe to infer that society is concerned in propagating manners of mutual propitiation tending to develop graciousness? Manifestly not; for such a sentiment is of little use to it.

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On the other hand, nothing could more conduce to social order, with its equilibrium of interests and balance of egoisms, than a respect of each for others. So that forms of intercourse which impose a mutual restraint, and cause each to set a value upon the personality of another, will very likely win the support of society. Says an observer of Chinese manners: "The whole theory and practice of the use of honorific terms . . . is simply that these expressions help to keep in view those fixed relations of graduated superiority, which are regarded as essential to the conservation of society."¹ Of the stiff manners of the Colonials Dr. Eggleston says: "Perhaps it was the partial default of refined feeling that made stately and ceremonious manners seem so proper to the upper class of that day; such usages were a fence by which society protected itself against itself."² How well this tallies with the saying of Confucius: "The ceremonial usages serve as dykes to the people against bad excesses to which they are prone."

The society that has relied most on ceremony is China. Let us see what virtue is found in it by the sages who helped to frame that wonderful and enduring fabric. "They [ceremonies] are the bond that holds the multitude together; and if the bond be removed, those multitudes fall into confusion."³ "For securing the repose of superiors and the good order of the people, there is nothing better than the Rules of Propriety. The Rules of Propriety are simply the development of the principle of reverence."⁴ "The sages knew

¹ Smith, "Chinese Characteristics," p. 64.

² "Social Life in the Colonies," *Century*, Vol. XXX, p. 391.

³ "Sacred Books of the East," Li Ki, Book VIII, § i.

⁴ "Sacred Books of the East," Vol. III, Hsiao King, ch. xii.

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formality grows, till it reaches its climax in the intercourse of belligerents or the negotiations of ambassadors. It flourishes in militant societies, but not solely as suggested by the obsequiousness of inferiors. It is most observed by the members of a military class, and by those who command rather than by those who obey. In caste societies, while the lower orders may practise humble obeisances, it is in the highest caste that ceremony grows most rankly. The forms of politeness have passed from above downward, and not from below upward. The courtesy of chivalry was for warriors, not for burghers. It is noble or courtier, not peasant, that feels most the yoke of etiquette. In other words, wherever place or pursuit has fostered excessive self-assertion, there society imposes its rules of behavior designed to check arrogance and suggest the sacredness of another's personality.

Why, then, does society later allow this code to lapse? Is it, as Mr. Spencer asserts, due to the increase of sympathy and social feeling? Partly, but not wholly. While granting that industrialism develops a pacific temper that does not need a rigid ceremonial discipline, let us not overlook the finer type of control that has come in. What now curbs men in their intercourse is not gesture, but idea. Ideas of "human dignity," "equality before God," "divine sonship," "value of the undying soul," etc., which saturate the culture we are bathed in till every one is more or less affected by them, are the moderating influences of to-day. These notions, partly implicit in Christianity, partly drawn from Greek thought at the Renaissance, and partly struck out by the humanitarian idealism of the last two centuries, inspire in us that reverence for the personality of another which in Persia, Arabia, or China was bound up with ceremonial observance.

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As we pass from the ceremony of intercourse to the ceremony of occasions, new problems appear. It is a feature of early society that all important occasions in the life of the individual are solemnized by the public performance of rites. The great mass of these are probably intended to impress rather than to control. The formalities connected with the transfer of real estate, the contracting and paying of debts, the making of wills, marriage, adoption, disinheritance, succession, the emancipation of slaves, etc., suited as they are to make vivid and lasting impressions on the minds of witnesses, are necessary to authenticate transactions in days before document and record are possible. They call attention to the fact that something important is taking place, and by their mysterious and unusual character grave deeply on the memory of spectators that which now we trust to deed and note and register.¹

In many cases, however, the ceremony of occasion is something more than means of record. We find that the occasions most scrupulously accentuated by public formalities are just those which mark a change in the relations of the individual which involves the acceptance of new responsibilities. The recognition of a new-born child, the attainment of manhood or womanhood, the coming of

¹ Of the Sumatran *bimbangs*, or noisy public festivals, we read: "To give authority to their contracts and other deeds, whether of a public or a private nature, they always make one of these feasts. Writing, they say, may be altered or counterfeited, but the memory of what is transacted and concluded in the presence of a thousand witnesses must remain sacred."

To the same effect writes Hooker: "No nation under Heaven either doth or ever did suffer public actions which are of weight . . . to pass without some visible solemnity; the very strangeness whereof, and difference from that which is common, doth cause popular eyes to observe and to mark the same."—"Ecclesiastical Polity," Book IV, § 1.

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age, the inheritance of family property, the succession to the headship, marriage, adoption, initiation, confirmation, naturalization, the promise of allegiance, enlistment, installation in office, ordination, compact, and treaty — these, though they are events of very different importance, have this in common, that they bind somebody to do for others, for his family, or for the group at large, what hitherto has not been laid upon him. Sometimes, as in christening or enlistment, the obligation is one-sided; sometimes, as in marriage or adoption, it is mutual upon two parties; and again, as in baptism, ordination, or coronation, it embraces the beholding public.

On the other hand, when obligation narrows instead of widens, the event, though certainly as important, is not signalized by ceremony. Thus, divorce is less formal than marriage, withdrawal from association or church than initiation or confirmation, expatriation than naturalization, mustering out of service than enlistment, the adjournment of court than its opening. By the gateway of ceremony is the *entrance* to duties, not the *exit* from them. Is it not, therefore, clear that elaborate rite marks not all changes in status, but chiefly those which involve fresh obligations?

Why should this be unless ceremony promotes the performance of these obligations — is, in sooth, a means of control? Note that it is symbolic. The picturesque, dramatic, or sensational will serve to impress an event upon the memory; but the ceremony that modifies the feelings must be full of meaning. It dwells on that which would be overlooked, reminds of that which would be forgotten, and so reveals the full significance of what is being done. Thus in marriage the carrying away of the bride, the pretended payment for her, the “giving”

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her away, her whipping by the groom, etc., are ways of signifying that the girl's allegiance to her family has ceased. The *confarreatio*, the drinking together of *saké*, the joining of hands, the exchange of bracelets, the tying together of garments, symbolize the intimacy of the new relation. The service of ceremony, therefore, consists in so stimulating the imagination by appropriate gestures, actions, and words as to call up the conception of something vaster in power, life, or numbers than the here and now — God, society, the dead, or the unborn.

Again, ceremony is *solemn*; this, not in order to be remembered, but in order to leave a moral impress. A coronation or a knighting is a miniature drama intended to produce an effect upon the feelings of the principals or spectators. Anything in the way of abridgement or disturbance or interruption or caprice would break the spell and destroy the value of the whole. Hence, ceremonies must be guarded from distracting sights or sounds, the parts must be arranged beforehand, the details must be precise, and the minutiae must be so archaic as to be *tabu* to the attacks of a critical rationalism.

Just as proverbs lose their value because of the growing variety of judgment upon life, so ceremonies lose their impressiveness because of the growing diversity of taste. When there is no form or rite that affects all in the same way — when that which moves one is meaningless to another and ridiculous to a third — the age of symbol is over. The building up of a complex culture, with the resulting intellectual differentiation, ushers in the era of speech-making. As language presupposes no such agreement of taste and imagination as does the symbol, the occasion once signalized by ceremony is now marked by the oration.

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Still, the appeal that leans so much on reason cannot be sure of sweeping away reason in a tide of sentiment. We must recognize that the age of ceremony is nearly over, and we have nothing so effective to put in its place. It behooves society, therefore, to guard with care the little valuable ceremony yet remaining to it in church sacraments or public inaugurations. Ceremonies are not exposed so much to disintegration as beliefs, but still they suffer in a critical, rationalistic age like the present, that cannot divine their virtue. And what is lost is not replaced. It is as hard for a sophisticated age to make new ceremony as to make new myths or new epics. We Americans, with our detachment from the past, our reliance upon the rational, and our hypertrophied sense of the ridiculous, have little ceremony left; but that little we should keep, for it has been well winnowed by time.

CHAPTER XX

ART

ART is here taken in its broader sense as including poetry, rhetoric, eloquence, painting, and sculpture—all those means, in short, whereby an idea wins peculiar force through its *form of expression*.

How can art thus defined modify the feelings of men to the advantage of society?

Art arouses the passions. Early art is seen in the direct service of corporate excitement. It supplies aids and symbols by which at gatherings and assemblies the individual is spurred to a common emotion. All manner of festivals and feasts—warlike, religious, Bacchic, phallic—make use of the arts of representation. While there is a distinct value in anything which promotes a convergence of feeling upon a single object, art serves especially for arousing the passions of conflict. The warfare of the ages before military discipline was waged under great excitement. It was necessary to flood the self-preservative instincts with a tide of fury. Hence, the resort to drug and intoxicant, and hence, also, the choral song, the tribal chant, the wild dance, and the mimic warfare that precedes the rush upon the foe. Even when training comes to be relied on rather than spasmodic excitement, there are marching songs, war songs, watchwords, flags, battle-cries, inspiring bulletins,

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and eloquent words by chiefs which serve to direct the ideas and impulses of the soldier.¹

Art kindles sympathy. The specific emotion it aims to arouse is social. It gives that diffused pleasure which comes in moments of enlargement and solidarity. Art is "an *ensemble* of means of producing that general and harmonious stimulation of the conscious life which constitutes the sentiment of the beautiful."² In times of decadence it may become merely a means of producing agreeable sensations, but in its best estate it is interpretative and appeals to the emotions. "The true object of art is the expression of life." "It is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot."³

The taproot of selfishness is weakness of imagination. "We can sympathize only with what we can picture to ourselves; and the inability to feel for another simply means inability to grasp by means of the imagination the experiences through which that other is passing."⁴ So far as the artist by his warmth of imagination releases from the closed chamber of self he conciliates the individual with society. Oftener, however, his task is to give to sympathy range rather than force. Life rather than art is the first nurse of sympathy; yet most of us are narrow in sympathies because our life circle is narrow. Our contacts with others are

¹ "War-whooping brings us to war-dancing. From all accounts this appears to be a way in which savages work up their lower emotional nature, their 'passions,' and thus get up fighting steam. War-dancing is accompanied by a declamation consisting of exaggerated statements of the prowess of the tribe and of virulent abuse of its foes, accompanied usually by gestures of contempt for them." — MEADOWS, "The Chinese and their Rebellions."

² Guyau, "L'art au point de vue sociologique," p. 16.

³ George Eliot. ⁴ Hudson, "The Church and the Stage," p. 68.

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quite too few. We need to feel with those we shall never meet. We need a magic that shall lift into view what is below our horizon.

The artist, like Le Sage's Asmodeus, waves aside all roofs. He shows us in another sex, class, lot, group, race, or age the old passions, longings, hopes, fears, and sorrows we have so often supped and bedded with. So he calls forth fellow feeling and knits anew the ever-ravelling social web. Without his filaments to bind hearts together, it is doubtful if the vast free groups of to-day could last. Certainly a nation like ours could not endure without the mutual comprehension and sympathy established within the folk-mass by artists living and dead. It is they who have put breath into the common past and joined men in love of it. It is they who have discovered the common character and enamored the people of its type. And they are still at work cementing classes, conciliating local groups, keeping all parts of the nation *en rapport*. The yoke of enforced coöperation galls fellow citizens, and it needs art to allay the irritation. Not slavery alone, but the narrow sympathies of a provincial literature, caused the South to drift away. East and West become alienated through clash of interests, but the story writers and playwrights interpose and help the people of each section to understand the other.

This service of art is most signal in a vast democratic state embracing many kinds of life and many interests. Here, where only imperial ideas and grand policy can succeed, comes the sternest test of popular government, for the mass of men are necessarily of few contacts and narrow experience. Unless the flagging imagination of the common man be stimulated to divine the multifarious life of his country, his will be no fit hands to hold

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the reins. Greek and Italian and Swiss democracies were local, while empires have always been committed to leisured aristocracies or bred princes. An imperial democracy like ours is an experiment, and succeeds only because the press and the national literature inspire broad sympathies even in the plough-boy.

The man of genius, with his clairvoyant gift of seeing into all kinds of life and his power to make us feel that life as our very own, wins his most brilliant triumphs in modifying the relations of classes. The emancipation of negro slaves or Russian serfs is hastened because a Mrs. Stowe or a Turgenieff makes them *comprehended*. A Dickens or a Reade is formidable to social abuses because he has the power to make us yokefellows of their victims. A Tolstoi or a Millet, by making the peasant *understood*, gives him a new social weight. Slaves, serfs, convicts, exiles, outcasts, sufferers of every sort, gain strength the moment genius gives them a voice. Social struggles turn not wholly on the relative power of classes, but in a measure on the degree to which a suffering class can convince the rest of common clay. Social art with its "Put yourself in his place!" spares us many a mad revolt.

Not all art is sociable. Conventional art, ornamental art, art that interprets nature — these aim to please¹ rather than to elevate. But the kinds — like poetry, eloquence, novel, or drama — that deal with human life rather than lines or colors certainly socialize men. Although the interest and sympathy they awaken is not virtue, it is the seed-plot of the virtues and their natural climate. We think

¹ "Art emancipated and a law into itself . . . degenerates rapidly into an *ensemble* of devices for exciting sensuality." — F. BRUNETIERE, "L'art et la morale," p. 34.

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of culture as selfish, yet the iciest indifference of the man of culture is aglow compared with the absolute zero of heartlessness possible to the savage. There is little good art that has not in it something of the sociable, and he who has been long exposed to its humanizing influences cannot get away from the comprehension of his kind. His eyes have been opened, his imagination unsealed. Somewhere, somehow, his interest in his fellow-men will betray him into generosity, and demonstrate that art has made him a citizen of humanity.

Art exploits the æsthetic sense. It is in the power of the artist to foster goodness by making it beautiful, and to blight badness by making it ugly. There are, of course, elements of beauty in social conduct, and the artist is the one to reveal them. But the lukewarm support the æsthetic sense of itself lends to morality is by no means enough for society in its stern conflict with the rampant will. The æsthetic must be pressed into its service under leadership of the lords of the imagination. While some men naturally abominate selfishness, all men abominate filth; and by art it is possible so to link together the two that the loathing for defilement shall extend to bad conduct. Weak conscience can be reënforced by good taste, so that he who is not saved by his scruples may be saved even by his fastidiousness.

The artist weds the moral to the æsthetic by taking advantage of our feelings for person. The faces of saints are shown as clear and beautiful, while sinners are painted black and hideous. The poets and painters of a blond race will make evil men swarthy, while those of a dark race will make them red haired. In the epic and drama of our fair race the hero is a tall blonde, while the villain is small and dark. Physical deficiencies, such as the hunch-

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back or the club-foot, get so associated with bad character as to work great injustice to the malformed. Avarice besets young and old, fair and foul. Yet art has coupled it indissolubly in our minds with the filthy person, yellow skin, and long, bony, clutching fingers of an old man!

Besides putting a shadow into the face of the sinner and a halo about the head of the saint, art polarizes our feelings in regard to deeds and characters. In literature, unruly appetites are "leprosy"; sin is "defilement"; lust is "a cruel pestilence"; obedience to instincts is "the bondage of our corruption"; sinful passions are "scabs"; hypocrites are "whited sepulchres"; wealth seeking is "raking muck"; evil practices are "putrid sores"; crafty transactions are "malodorous"; absence of integrity is "rotteness." The wicked are "like the troubled sea when it cannot rest; whose waters cast up mire and dirt." The egoists are, after their kind, cormorants, vampires, leeches, vultures, vipers, toads, spiders, and vermin.

Dante, a moral æsthete, is able to give conduct the stamp he wishes by his choice of punishments in his *Malebolge*. Flatterers "snort with their muzzles," traitors "bark," fratricides butt together "like two he-goats," thieves become reptiles, falsifiers are covered with scabs, gluttons thrust forth their heads "as in a ditch the frogs stand only with their muzzles out." So Spenser in his "*Faërie Queene*" shows Envy of "leprous mouth," Lechery "rough and blacke and filthy," Gluttony on a swine, crane-necked and "spuing up his gorge." Tennyson and Browning, while less crude, are no less emphatic. Thus the wrong is yoked with the foul, and the excesses of animalism and egoism are associated with disgusting images.

In short, the two series of ideas and their correl-

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ative feelings are completely blended. Moral excellence is made akin to every other form of excellence. Conformity to the principles of associate life is purity, straightness, whiteness, sweetness, clearness, life, health; while nonconformity is filth, stain, blemish, deformity, disease, decay. By causing the unsocial to appear first as *sin*, or that which is offensive to God, and then as *defilement*, or that which is offensive to man, society appeals first to man's reverence and then to his fastidiousness.

Art exploits the sense of the sublime. In many the first straying from the ego is not toward fellowship but toward the vast. Not sympathy but thirst for largeness, carries them out of themselves. They sicken of self-seeking because individual aims seem petty, and so crave, like Faust, to lay hold on the permanent. Now, art turns this to social account. She weans away men still zestful for life by harping on its brevity, frailty, feebleness. By skilful selection and fitting imagery the artist is able to impress with the triviality of life and the insignificance of the individual lot. The consequent quest for a fit aim of endeavor is directed to social advantage by dwelling on the vastness, might, and permanence of society, the nation, or the race. Only the group is worth striving for; it alone can give eternity to one's name or work.

Occasionally one reminds us that society is nothing but people, and if the individual joy or pain be held trivial, corporate aims, too, must be held trivial. But such a voice is a jarring note in the chorus. Art shows us Society, and bids us be content. The collective life is magnified till it fascinates with its spaciousness, glorified till it dazzles with its splendor. Thus the stream of dependence and awe that naturally sets out toward the universe is skilfully turned aside and caused to make fruitful

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the social garden. In a century of *Götterdämmerung* like ours this apotheosis of society is especially marked.

Art perfects social symbols. The great permanent needs of man get provided for in the ordinary flow of social life. But in times of struggle a part of society must leave ease, embrace pain, defy their instincts, and act in many respects as irrational beings. Most of those thus devoted can form no mental picture of the good to accrue to others from these sacrifices. Hence, they must be charmed by unrealities and lured on by symbols. For Amiel is right when he says : "The art of moral government is to enter into the poesy of an age and guide it." War time, indeed, with its high-beating emotion and its dire need of idealism, is the golden hour for the lords of the imagination. The magicians then become the chief custodians of the group consciousness, the high incarnation of the social spirit. When the crisis is over, the tempered idealism of religion and morality resumes its sway, and Tyrtæus becomes a Pindar.

Art, with its strong human impulse, strives always to make pearls of man's drops of sweat. But softening inevitable ills, or persuading to present hardship for the sake of a future gain, is easy compared to the task of luring men to the supremest sacrifices for the sake, not of themselves or their near ones, but of society at large. In war stress the artist must be alchemist enough to turn lead into gold. Pain he must make sweet, disease comely, mutilations lovely, and death beautiful. It is his to convince men

"That length of days is knowing how to die;"¹
that

¹Lowell, "Ode read at Concord."

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“Death for noble ends makes dying sweet;”¹

“That death within the sulphurous hostile lines,
In the mere wreck of nobly pitched designs,
Plucks heart’s-ease and not rue.”¹

Ever a considered prudence strives to order the lives of men, but the artist must know how to make the current of emotion foam over restraining bank and dam.

This the artist does by appealing to the æsthetic sense. He sings the pomp and glory of war, its glitter and circumstance, not its hideousness. Thanks to the poets, painters, and orators, modern warfare is, despite the field correspondent, about as mythic to the popular mind as the struggles of the gods and the Titans. The artist, moreover, associates the martial and the æsthetic. He envelops the brave man in a cloud of glory, and substitutes a halo for a physiognomy. The fallen brave “sleep,” while cowards “rot.” Soldiers are “heroes,” while stay-at-homes are “children,” “women,” “sweet little men.”

But by far the mightiest service of the artist is the perfecting of the symbol. By his mythopoeic faculty he transmutes realities, and veils with some attractive image the grisly features of hardship, mutilation, and death. Duty is “God’s eldest daughter”; war becomes Mars, Bellona, “Thor’s Hammer”; death appears as the Valkyrie, Azrael, the Angel of the Darker Drink, the Valley of the Shadow, “Lethe’s sleepy stream”; the sword is “the Iron Bride”; the enemy are “hireling hosts” or “ruffian bands.”

Especially is it the duty of the artist

¹ Lowell, “Memoriæ Positum.”

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"To body forth that image of the brain
We call our Country, visionary shape,
Loved more than woman, fuller of fire than wine,
Whose charm can none define,
Nor any, though he flee it, can escape!"¹

Symbols for the group arise naturally in the impassioned folk-soul. But it needs rare imagination to give these vague shapes that outline and color and life and beauty which enable them to work upon citizens as the image of Helen worked upon the soul of Faust. Once the prince or king personified the unity of the group, and the artist served patriotism by glorifying the sovereign. With modern states comes a harder task of perfecting and animating a pure symbol — Columbia, La Belle France, or Britannia — that men shall fight for as loyally as for chief or liege. As it is *men* who rear and defend the state, this group symbol is always feminine, appealing as maid or mother to the strongest affections of man's heart. It is likewise their high symbolic value that explains why queens inspire the most ardent loyalty and make the best modern sovereigns. Could we conceive society in charge of women, we should no doubt get a change in national symbol as significant as the passage in the Catholic Church from the Madonna-cult to the Jesus-cult. Equally meaning is the fabrication of the symbol for the larger, not the minor, group. It is when the imagination fails to grasp the vast collective life that the symbol is invoked. A Tyrtæus merely reminds of home and altar. A Lowell appeals for his country —

"Smoothing thy gold of war-dishevelled hair
On such sweet brows as never other were;"

or dreams of Truth

¹ Lowell, "Ode read at Concord."

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“plumed and mailed
With sweet, stern face unveiled
And all-repaying eyes. . . .”

In such way, then,—breathing life and charm into symbols that enter among the guiding stars of the individual soul—does the artist make himself ally and friend of the purposes of society.

Art fascinates with new types. What the artist holds up to nature is not always a mirror; sometimes it is a model. For he may not content himself with putting us in touch with our kind; he may choose to put us under the spell of exceptional or imaginary people, for whom he would excite admiration rather than fellow-feeling. All of us long to stamp our lives with distinction, but few there are who can conceive how to do it. To us pent in the commonplace comes the genius with this radiant image or that fascinating figure. He flashes before our eyes a Werther or a Hernani, a King Arthur or a Prince Hal, a Gretchen or a Julie, and we troop after him as children after the Piper of Hamelin. In this way a Calderon, a Rousseau, or a Bunyan leaves his stamp on national character. The welding power of a national literature is partly its power to assimilate a people by moulding them over a number of specific types.

The ideal creations, then, of poet or novelist or playwright become *mother types* and bring forth men and women in their image each after its kind. “Whole generations of German girls and women,” says Nordau, “have formed themselves upon the model of Claurens’ female figures, as now upon the Gold Elsies and Geierwallys of recent fiction.” The well-dowered darling of the creative artist moving gloriously through an ideal world is as irresistible as was Amadis of Gaul to Don Quixote. Its

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public yield to the charm as helplessly as iron filings to the magnet or the waters to the moon's attraction. It is a new force abroad in society.¹

Of course the fancy-begotten type may not touch the moral at all. It may be only an arc or crescent of life. The painter may charm us with a mere pose, an expression, or a way of wearing the hair. An actress may create a model as to voice, gait, or manners. Even the rounded types brain-born of genius are not, like "social types," wholly subdued to social ends. They are patterns, not only for our conduct, but for all choices whatsoever. They are addressed to the individual and embody the genius' conception of how he may live out his life. Yet it is certain that a type like St. Preux, or John Halifax, or Colonel Newcome, or Jean Valjean, will draw its imitators upward and so help a little in the problem of moralization. The artist's ideal, therefore, may become an ally of social control.

Such aid the artist can give if he will. But will he? Consider first the influences that predispose him to side with society.

The group by its might and permanence has a peculiar power to stir the imagination and awaken fervor. The nation itself, with its colossal life-drama, is a hero no less splendid than an Achilles or a Beowulf. Who, whether friend of England or foe, is not stirred by Matthew Arnold's majestic image of the "weary Titan" "staggering under the too vast orb of her fate"? In the gropings of

¹ "Thus the poets and novelists stand like the Jacob of the Bible before the watering-trough and set their 'rods of green poplar, and of the hazel and chestnut-tree' in which they have 'pilled white strakes' in the gutters and cause 'ring-straked, speckled, and spotted' generations to be brought forth as they may choose."—NORDAU, "Paradoxes," "The Import of Fiction."

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a vast collective life toward self-consciousness, swift-divining genius finds just that hint which incites it to imagine and to glorify a gigantic group personality.

If he but keep the epic attitude, the artist will be apt to cast his influence on the side of order. For though he spurn codes and creeds he cannot disavow that morality which lies at the base of all association. Indifferent though he be to all men, he will feel the reasonableness and rightness of those sentiments which will not let one live as if there were no one else in the world. In trying to hold the beam level between clashing individuals he will insensibly be led to consecrate the dictates of an elementary justice. But when he becomes subjective he loses this impartial view. The thoroughly modern and decadent aim of the artist to *express himself*, rather than to give what he sees or imagines, helps to explain the more frequent outcropping in literature of a profoundly anti-social individualism.

Again, sociability runs hand in hand with the very technique of the artist. The delight he aims to confer flows from the felt harmony of self with other beings. Despise the multitude as he may, the artist is still alive to the charm of some people, and so, after all, levels his appeal at our sympathies. Take from his palette love, affinity, and loyalty, and there would be little left save the elementary beauty of form and color and motion. Everywhere in works of art, therefore, we find some clear note of sociability.

The individual artist is often the flower of an entire civilization. He sends his root fibres far and wide into the culture of his time, which culture is already social. Moreover, in whatever medium he works he comes in contact with tradi-

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tions, canons, models, and ideals¹ which have been elaborated for that particular art and which exert a shaping pressure on each craftsman. These will tend to limit the caprice and irresponsibility of the individual artist, because the standards of every fine art come in time to a sort of *modus vivendi* with the reigning moral and religious standards.

As his preaching goes farther than his practice, the artist may help in the moral uplifting of people without living up to his ideals. Singing the praises of friendship, constancy, poverty, toil, simplicity, or patriotism, however much it may move others, happily does not commit the singer to any rash courses. His life is private, his work is public, and while the latter inspires and exalts, he may live his life much as other people. The orator or the poet may nerve others to do and die without imitating a Fichte or a Körner. Devotees who take art as from higher beings stand aghast at the gap between the artist's utterance and his life. But the judicious will see in this dualism one means whereby art has become an ally of society and a beacon light for moral progress. Only on such terms, perhaps, could the world have the inspiration of a Petrarch, a Rousseau, a Shelley, or a Coleridge. Let us not quarrel with an arrangement that enables each to assist in setting high his neighbor's ideal!

Nevertheless, the rarest worth will always be that of the great sincere artists who speak from their heart of hearts, and whose work is moral because their natures are profoundly social. Where, as with Æschylus, Dante, Milton, Lessing, Lam-

¹ "Signs of communal literary culture are to be found in any literature with which the author of the present work is at all acquainted." — POSNETT, "Comparative Literature," p. 129.

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menais, or Tolstoi, the art rings with the personality, its mastery will be greatest.

Such are the guarantees that works of art generally will stand above the average man and so draw him *upward*.¹ But we must not expect of them any such unflinching support of the social order as is given by religious beliefs or by moral ideals. Law, belief, religion, ceremony, become *institutions*. This implies two things: that they repose on a consensus and will not obey the will of one man; that they get organized and so act in a measure independently of the wills at any moment in charge of them. A system of belief, for instance, goes on with its tremendous momentum dealing out bane and blessing on behalf of the central requirements of society in an almost automatic way. Art, on the other hand, is not an institution and will not bless that which it can see no good in. Born of the zeal and sympathy of individuals, it holds no brief for the established order. It will exalt self-sacrifice for persons. But the impersonal requirements, the exactions that protect not people but institutions, the inobvious necessities of restraint occasioned by the social division of labor — these too often the artist misunderstands and rages blindly against. Wilful, moody, and erratic, this member of the *genus irritabile vatum* is ever shaking off the dust of his shoes against the *de facto* order, flouting authority, and stirring people up against restraints.² The

¹ Of the four novels — “The Count of Monte Cristo,” “Les Misérables,” “Vanity Fair,” and “Ben Hur” — which during a recent twenty-three months were drawn more than a thousand times each from the St. Louis Public Library, only one is ethically neutral. Two if not three are profoundly social.

² “I abominate everything that is compulsory, every law, all government, all rule. Pray who are you, O Society, to force me to do anything? What God made you my master? Observe that you

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more downright forms of control he detests, while he exalts spontaneity and has great faith in the appeal to sympathy. Both art and religion emanate from the creative power of the genius or the élite. But religion finally comes to rest on a broad basis of national custom and belief, while art remains personal in character. Hence, there is such a thing as art reformatory, art revolutionary, art harbinger of a new time and angel of progress, more eager to disrupt than to create. And so it comes to pass that art, while fighting in the main on the side of society, has not the steady stroke of church or state.

Other guarantees for the sociality of art are found in the control society exercises over it.

This control is by *hindrance* and by *furtherance*.

We see *hindrance* in official censors, in the licensing of playhouses, in the suppression of plays, in the exclusion of certain books from the mails, in the shutting out of peace books from garrison libraries. Besides the authorities we have librarians, hanging committees, art juries, monument boards, reputable publishers, and responsible periodicals conspiring to check the raid of the immoral artists upon the public. Behind these hovers a cloud of critics, and every work of art must run the gauntlet of them ere it can gain easy access to the multitude. Flanking these are the Church

fall back into the old injustices of the past. The individual will no longer be oppressed by a despot, but by the crowd, the public benefit, the eternal 'reasons of state,' that phrase of all peoples, the maxim of Robespierre. I prefer the desert. I return to the Bedouins, who are free." — FLAUBERT, "Correspondance," Vol. III, p. 88.

Here the artist sets up principles which would bring back the world to the condition of his Frankish ancestors when they crossed the Rhine sixteen hundred years before.

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with its Index, the pulpit with its thunders against the stage, W. C. T. U.'s, Y. M. C. A.'s, mothers' associations and reading clubs down to the local oracle and the village Dogberry. What with censor, police, critic, priest, schoolmaster, and matron, the hindrances society can oppose to a demoralizing work of art are very considerable.

Still more effective is the *furtherance* given to that which is deemed most salutary and wholesome. A great quantity of art-work is selected and paid for by society. The literature conned in the schools, the libraries of barracks and ships, the eloquence of senates, the oratory and poetry of public occasions, the frescoes of public buildings, the collections in public galleries and museums, the repertory of subsidized theatres, the art in churches and cathedrals — on these the social purgation shows as plainly as the patronage of the Bourbons shows on the battle pieces at Versailles. Add now to this the effect of general praise and commendation, the favor shown one class of literature by the church, the fillip given another by the "family" magazine, and it will be evident that the policy of society toward art is anything but *laissez faire*.

Even if we abandon all official censorship, so long as society spontaneously ranges itself into leaders and led, into makers and takers of opinion, it will be possible greatly to let or hinder the access of the artist to the public. Let those of influence but appreciate the moral bearing of art, and the impulse of every one to look out for his neighbor's morals will do the rest.

Artists, resenting the yoke of morality, have coined the absurd phrase "art for art's sake," and with it have bewildered not a few. To meet this cry with empty assertions of the "moral purpose of art," the "moral obligations laid upon the

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artist," is only to heap up chaff. But put "social" for "moral," and the situation becomes clear.

The "realists," "naturalists," and "veritists" assert that art is an individual affair, that a man has the right to speak, print, or publish anything he pleases or that he can get another to like. Art as Master of Revels and Dispenser of Delights cannot, they say, attain its utmost if it be fettered by conventionalities. To naysay the free access of artist to patron is to kill inspiration and cut off humanity from choice springs of enjoyment.

For society to concede any such claim would be sheer folly. What madness, when we are all the time besetting the individual with our theologies and religions and ideals, and can scarcely keep him in order at that, to let the irresponsible artist get at him and undo our work! Why give art *carte blanche* when there is abroad scarcely a speculation regarding the other world which has not been shaped by considerations of this world's discipline? Until sober Reason has won *Lehrfreiheit*, it is overearly to emancipate the Artistic Imagination.

By whom art shall be supervised is quite another question. All attempts to lodge the supervision of it in any man or board have done more harm than good. By brutal suppression they consecrate the established order and turn artists into sycophants or revolutionists. Art should be the handmaiden, but it should never be made the mere bond-slave and scullion of current morality.

It may be that the fate of the artist's work should be decided by the ten thousand influential, subject to an appeal to the million uninfluential; the latter to ban without ruth or scruple whatever gives moral offence. In this way it may be possible to make art amenable to society without making it amenable to law.

CHAPTER XXI

PERSONALITY

THE natural inequality of men, which explains so much to the sociologist, is nowhere more strikingly manifested than in the ascendancy which certain persons are able to gain over their fellows without reliance on the ordinary means of procuring obedience. The assumption that everybody naturally acts egotistically is undermined, not only by the existence of spontaneous sympathy, but also by the fact of voluntary subordination. Sympathy with fellows and deference to the born leader are the two primitive social facts which precede and antedate all the species of control I have been describing.

That at the appearance of certain exceptional men the impulse to obey is as natural and overpowering as that of the spaniel to nose the heels of a master, can be easily established.

Garibaldi "inspired among men of the most various temperaments love that nothing could shake, and devotion that fell little short of idolatry." "He enjoyed the worship and cast the spell of a legendary hero."

Cortez had "wonderful power over the discordant masses gathered under his banner."

Of Sam Houston it is said: "If he had been bound naked upon the back of a wild horse, like Mazeppa, the first tribe he came to would have chosen him prince."

Mirabeau "carries all before him," has "a terri-

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ble gift of familiarity," "turns people round his thumb," "is possessed of a secret charm that . . . opens him the hearts of almost all people."

Said Vandamme of Napoleon : "That devil of a man exercises on me a fascination that I cannot explain to myself, and in such a degree that, though I fear neither God nor devil, when I am in his presence I am ready to tremble like a child, and he could make me go through the eye of a needle to throw myself into the fire." Augereau is stupefied at their first meeting, and confesses afterward that this "little devil of a general" has inspired him with awe.

What are the conditions and causes of this personal ascendancy ?

Undoubtedly a condition of excitement favors it. The battle-field has always been the scene of the most splendid triumphs of personal influence. Hence great captains — Hannibal, Cæsar, Khaled, Clive, Bonaparte, Ney, Stonewall Jackson, Lee, Skobeloff — have shown a rare capacity to win their men's devotion. Cavalry battle, especially, with its intoxication of rapid movement and thrill of personal encounter, gives to leaders like Prince Rupert, Murat, Schill, Sheridan, or Phil Kearney an almost superhuman value. Men in masses — armies, mobs, audiences — succumb more readily than as individuals because of the herd thrill. Hence, perhaps, the otherwise strange connection between personal ascendancy and public speaking. Quite apart from the persuasiveness of his utterances, the orator enjoys two favorable conditions of personal fascination — a crowd and continuous attention. Times of alarm and stress give golden opportunities to the born leader. We have but to recall Peter the Hermit, Joan of Arc, Danton, Lamartine, Garibaldi, and Lincoln.

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The causes of hero-worship are chiefly in the hero. The serene brow of Saky Muni, the "burning, black eyes" of Mahomet, the stature of Charlemagne or Peter the Great, the purity that shone upon the face of the Maid, the "terrific ugliness" of Mirabeau, the piercing eye of Napoleon, the leonine face of Webster, the glance "like the glint from broken steel" of Walker the Filibuster, the romantic aspect of Garibaldi, the yellow curls of Custer—these witness to the value of physical traits. Perfection of physique certainly subdues. The old Teutons loved to recognize in their leader the supreme manly beauty of the true god-descended Amal or Balth. Manner, as already shown *apropos* of ceremony, is perhaps the key to pure personal fascination, because it proclaims and suggests belief in one's self. Primitive chieftains, a sachem like Logan, a sheik like Abd-el-Kader, are renowned for their superb dignity. For winning rather than merely impressing, the peculiar cordiality of a "magnetic" Clay or Blaine is potent. Even tricks have their effect, and we must not ignore the histrionism of Houston, Jackson, or Napoleon.

Of mental qualities strength of will is, of course, requisite; but faith in one's self and imagination are the real architects of vast personal authority.¹ Those who win multitudes for some great enterprise—a crusade, a conquest, or a canal—are invariably great promisers. A royal imagination, coupled perhaps with the ecstatic temperament and equipped with eloquence, enables them to bedazzle their followers with prospects, and a tremorless faith in themselves and their cause inspires confidence of success. Such men were Mahomet, Cortez, Pon-

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tiac, De Lesseps, El Mahdi. Courage and persistence avail. The man who bears up when others despair, is cool when they are excited — a Luther or a Brigham Young — acquires in time large influence. The most stupendous enterprise of all time is the campaign against the unsocial self, and in this the master qualities of a leader are generosity and love. Disinterested paladins of justice like Epaminondas, Kossuth, or Chinese Gordon, great lovers like St. Francis or Livingstone, surpass in the power to call forth supreme personal devotion.

Such are the elements of natural prestige. But a man overtops others, not only by his stature, but as well by what he stands on. The hero may be lifted up by his skill at arms, his sagacity, his hoard of experience, his talents, gifts, accomplishments. Outside the heroes of religion, the pure charm of personality is rarely seen in history, so much is it blended with the boundless admiration extorted by distinction and achievement. Who can separate Ulysses from his craft, Richard from his exploits, Saladin from his skill, Johnson from his intellect, Bismarck from his success, and say how much is due to the personality itself?

Moreover, when we pass from the heroes to the numerous captains and governors of men, we must take account of still other factors. Society is ever arranging itself in ranks with reference to race, caste, family, wealth, condition, and so forth. To the Hindoo the European, to the Sūdra the Brahmin, to the plebeian the patrician, to the tenant the lord, to the soldier the officer, is invested with elements of prestige that have awe-inspiring, obedience-compelling power.

Let us observe the rôle of personality in the history of control.

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We find that in primitive societies headship, ere it becomes the sacred right of a royal family, is held, as a matter of course, by the exceptional man. Among the Khonds "the spirit of attachment to persons rather than to institutions is very powerfully developed." "The patriarch depends for obedience to his decisions entirely upon his personal influence." The homage of the Ostiaks to their chief "is voluntary and founded on personal respect." The Damaras "court slavery" and "follow their master as spaniels would." "Their hero-worship is directed to people who have wit and strength enough to ill-use them." Among the Fiote of the Lower Congo "reliance upon the capable man is a very prominent trait in their character, as with females and the lower orders at home; a master of slaves or the father of a family may be very exacting toward his dependents, yet they will support him devotedly if he can only protect them from outside annoyance." Among the Bedouins the sheik must "maintain his influence by the means which wealth, talents, courage, and noble birth afford." "The tribes never obey their sheiks unless for personal considerations." "The functions of judge and lawgiver are not separated, and reverence for law has its basis in personal respect for the judge."¹ Among the Franks, "the personal element is, speaking generally, the predominant element in all the relations . . . of public life." The Germans "looked upon descent from great fathers or ancestors as a valuable personal advantage. Whoever could claim it might, even in early youth, count on the consideration of his fellows. True, he usually held it not beneath his dignity to win his spurs in the service of a seasoned

¹ W. Robertson Smith, "The Prophets of Israel," p. 72.

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warrior; yet if he broke off the relation in riper years the reverence for his ancestors helped him at once to a formidable following.”¹

From a study of Asiatic and African races one truth stands out clear. *In natural societies personal control is all the positive control there is.* But the true nature of this voluntary subordination must be noted. The sentiments that underlie early allegiance are not love and devotion, but fear, trust, and admiration. Vague fear that comes to be inspired by an Attila, a Tecumtha, or a Chaka; trust, inspired as in the case of Hastings, by his “constant successes and the manner in which he extricated himself from every difficulty;” admiration for preëminence in those qualities that insure success in an enterprise, such as superior cunning, sagacity, knowledge, athletic skill, strength, courage, or resource. But all this amounts merely to recognition of the able-man. Early man is too egoistic and practical to be swept from his moorings by any sentiment of personal devotion. There is no hint of idolatry for one of his kind.

Nothing can carry men beyond this hard-headed cult of efficiency but a dash of idealism. With noble, idealizing races, like the Arabs or the Germans, we see almost from the first something chivalric in the relations of follower to leader. The chieftain of Tacitus’s Germans was the able-man to those who chose him in assembly, but to the band of comrades — the *comitatus* — that voluntarily clave to him he was the object of all love and fidelity.² We get something better than a myrmidon

¹ Seeck, “Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt,” p. 216.

² “When we compare the polity of Rome or Constantinople, where a century was a long time for the duration of a dynasty, with the far simpler polities of the Teutonic tribes which invaded the Empire,

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allegiance contingent on success as soon as we get *disinterested admiration*, *i.e.* admiration for qualities that are not serviceable to the follower. When men begin to admire and obey him who is most conspicuous for eloquence, or truth-speaking, or justice, or magnanimity, we get a loyalty that does not turn on the prospect of success. Such an attitude implies that in the course of social life certain values have come to prevail, certain ideals have infected the mass — in other words, moral civilization has begun.

This disinterested appreciation of personality is but a phase of a larger movement. As the social environment becomes rich and varied we can distinguish a development of man's feelings, judgments, and choices, which may be termed *the evolution of personality*. The law of it is that *men come to feel toward more things and to feel toward them more strongly*. The world's gray is broken up into lights and shadows. For instance, during a definite period we can see the Greek race pass from indifference to the strongest feelings of admiration or dislike for a work of art. During the Middle Ages we can observe the dawn of that sense of the charm of woman that was to give birth to romantic love. With the Renaissance the feeling for natural beauty develops prodigiously, while in about a century and a half we have seen the rise of a passion for absolute self-direction. Now, in the midst of these developments we can discover *a growing sense of the charm of persons*.

almost all of whom had their royal houses, reaching back into and even beyond the dawn of national history, supposed to be sprung from the loins of gods and rendered illustrious by countless deeds of valor recorded in song or saga, we see at once that in these ruder states we are in the presence of a principle which the Empire knew not, but which mediæval Europe knew and glorified, the principle of *Loyalty*." — HODGKIN, "Theodoric," p. 70.

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So far as this means keener feelings about personal beauty or ugliness it is a chapter in the development of taste. But there is something more than æsthetic in the growing emphasis of attitude toward traits of character. In the fourth century before Christ men are enamored of courage, justice, magnanimity. In the fourth century after, it is mercy, meekness, unselfishness, that are prized. With the rise of chivalry, courage, courtesy, and purity become supreme values. In fact, whenever a people is formed, certain character values are sure to be throned among the gods and become the goal of individual endeavor. The possessor of these is not followed simply as a promiser of success ; he is adored as a hero. In India "the fact that men of special sanctity are still raised to the rank of Avatars, not only by ignorant and prejudiced masses, but also by men who have received the light of Western education shews the influence which religion still exercises over the Hindoo."¹ He "scarcely recognizes any heroes but those of religion ; and amongst them he dispenses with caste qualifications."

Besides this development of personality, there is a certain development of society that favors hero-worship. The military organization of an invading host, coupled with the stratification of races through conquest, ranges men, as it were, on terraces. Those kingly men who stand high up on the social pyramid are invested with an additional prestige by their exceptional birth, wealth, education, or privilege. The hearty recognition of their superiority by common men smooths the way to a costless ascendancy of the born leaders from the

¹ Bose, "Hindoo Civilization during British Rule," Vol. I, pp. xiv, xv.

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higher class, and thus vastly simplifies the problem of government. But this is on condition that the masses consent to be measured by the scale of the masters. Where, as with the captive Jews, or the Christian races of the Turkish Empire, the governed feels itself a subject population, and spurning the master values that brand it with inferiority clings to its own table of excellences, the ruling class will not be able to ease itself in the saddle. But if the subjugated accept the scale of values of their rulers, and so *feel* their own inferiority, the hard relation of *coercion and submission* passes over into the *domination and fealty* of Feudal Society. Here, where fidelity is the universal countersign with which men meet the challenge of conscience, personal control bulks for more than it ever has before or since.

A later evolution of personality shatters the foundations of this control. Certain theological ideas accepted by the Occident taught each man even the undermost, to feel himself an immortal soul of a worth quite independent of his political or social weight. In the eye of Deity men stood not on rising terraces, but on a common footing. Acquired prestige, therefore, shrank, and personality lost the brilliant chromosphere lent it by social distinction. Printing, gunpowder, trade, and new land conspiring to improve the social situation of the lower classes, these theological ideas, revamped by metaphysics, were used as a lever to lift the lowly to a realizing sense of the possibilities before them. The common man was declared first custodian of an inviolable conscience, and later proprietor of a bundle of "rights." Equality was proclaimed a fact, liberty a birth-right, and fraternity an ideal. Thus Protestantism, Puritanism, and democracy have worked

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together to deepen the individual's sense of his own worth, and to indispose him to unconditional subordination to another.

Impressed by the collapse of social order in revolutionary France, and the signs that Western societies were sliding toward the abyss of anarchy, Carlyle, with his gospel of hero-worship, sought to revive the sway of personality by inspiring anew reverence and admiration for the exceptional man. For the decay of control by constituted organs he saw no remedy save in the return to personal ascendancies and personal fealty.¹ Salvation lay in brushing aside dogmas of "equality" and "rights," and fostering that humble frame of mind that bows gladly to the natural superior. To this end Carlyle made of history a drama,² exalted the rôle of great men,³ belittled that of the people, over-emphasized loyalty as a principle of order,⁴ and sought to trace back all existing ranks, dignities, and titles to primitive personal ascendencies.⁵ In the flinging off of authority led by Luther and ending with Rousseau, Carlyle saw but the casting aside of "shams," "false heroes," and "make-believe authorities," "the painful but indispensable first preparative for true sovereignty getting place among us."

¹ Hero-worship is "a fact inexpressibly precious; the most solacing fact one sees in the world at present. There is an everlasting hope in it for the management of the world."

² "The history of the world is the biography of great men."

³ "They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the模ellers, patterns, and, in a sense, creators of whatsoever the mass of men contrived to do or attain."

⁴ "Society is founded on hero-worship." "Hero-worship never dies nor can die." "Loyalty, the life breath of all society." "Admiration for one higher than himself is to this hour and at all hours the vivifying influence in man's life."

⁵ "All dignities of rank on which human association rests are what we may call a *hierarchy*." "Society everywhere is some representation . . . of a graduated worship of heroes."

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It is now clear to us that Carlyle missed the drift of the age. His gospel was post-dated. He did not see that a new type of control was made possible by the cult of the individual. When he wrote, the moral method of democracy, namely, the guidance of men by ideals to which they are held by pride and self-respect, had not yet shown its efficacy. Not on the Continent, but in America, where it is a lineal descendant of Puritanism, do we see democracy providing its own antidote. Here the steadiness of a social control through self-masterhood lessens both the mood and the need of hero-worship. Rare spirits, no doubt, will never be wholly defrauded of their birthright over the souls of lesser men. In emergencies, in troublous times, in new countries and on frontiers, in the contact of higher races with lower, the Strong Man still comes to his own. Moreover, if this experiment of exaggerating the common man's sense of his own worth ends, not in a proud loyalty to ideals of duty, but in an overweening conceit, unleashing a baleful egoism, the parent of misrule and lawlessness, we shall, no doubt, get the Man-on-Horseback. But not until society finds its impersonal instruments — its laws, faiths, disciplines, ideals, dogmas, and values — no longer adequate, will it consent to fall back upon precarious personal ascendancies, and patch together a social order out of the order every strong personality creates about him.¹

¹ "The members of a stable and legitimate association are more cultivated, above all, more calm, more settled, more reflective than the members of a sect or a crowd. The personal fascination has less hold upon them; with them the centres of inhibition are more active; reason guides and curbs sentiment, and instant and complete adhesion to one man is rare and difficult." — SIGHELE, "La psychologie des sectes," p. 79.

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How, now, is society able to avail itself of the control enjoyed by persons?

It is, of course, possible that such a control may in no wise comport with the ends or welfare of society. The Samson may elect to pull down instead of build up the Temple of Order. There is nothing to hinder an Alcibiades, a Napoleon, or a Burr from exploiting his fascination wholly for his private benefit, and not at all on behalf of his followers or of the group. In fact, to say nothing of the historical instances of hecatombs of victims, self-immolated to the greed or ambition of one man, we have but to look about us to see men — worldly clerics, bosses, demagogues, and adventurers — assisting themselves to the top by their magnetic power, coolly using their charm to disarm rivals or win allies as their interest may require. It is only because society soon intervenes to snuff out such dangerous egoists that the leaders who are permitted to attain historical dimensions usually possess some social aim and significance.

There is, nevertheless, a guarantee furnished by the very nature of the born captain. The qualities — will, imagination, courage, preëminence — which give him lasting ascendancy imply largeness of caliber. They go with wide horizons, far-ranging vision, soaring ambition, and a passion for large objects, great causes, and enterprises of pith and moment. What Orpheus among men would not turn builder if the walls of some Thebes were willing to rise at the sound of his enchanting note! Quite apart from any love of others or devotion to the group, a great man is liable to a noble enthusiasm for labors which do not terminate upon himself. Alongside of that little boat which he steers so carefully, are millions of others of similar build and dimensions; none of them is worth much,

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and his own is not worth more. In vain will he provision it, decorate it, and shove ahead to get the first place; in vain will he repair it and handle it carefully; in a few years it leaks; sooner or later it sinks, and with it goes all the labor it has cost him.

He with eye to see the shortness of his course and the nearness of his fate will feel the pettiness of individual aims, and will be drawn toward those substantial and enduring communal objects, those corporate concerns and undertakings, which affect vast numbers of men and have an imposing secular history. Among the innumerable boats, so soon to sink, so easy to replace, there are great three-deckers, freighted with vast interests, and destined to remain afloat long after he and his boat have disappeared. Is it strange, then, that the exceptional man frequently devotes himself more willingly to steering, manœuvring, and advancing one of these ships than to managing his own frail bark?¹

But if the strong man still cleaves to a purely personal ambition, and if, moreover, society cannot overcome him with any of its long-range weapons of control — its faiths or its ideals — there are still other means of bringing him into line. Society is always contending with the brittleness of its regulative instruments. The helmsmen of the state, the archons of religion, the shapers of moral disciplines, the framers of ideals, are painfully conscious of a certain impotence. Like the churchmen of the Dark Ages they find they cannot extend the truce of God over the whole of the week but must, for want of sufficient power, vacate a certain time to the devil of disorder. Hence, society, through its guides,

¹This illustration is adapted from Taine, "Modern Régime," Vol. I, Book IV, ch. i.

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courts the aid of dominating persons, hoping to use their influence to strengthen its own. This it does by making it to the interest of the man of light and leading to pull with it rather than against it, to dispose of his control to the wardens of the social order rather than to invest it on his own account.

The military service exemplifies this policy. Here we have a great body of fighters led by a small body of officers, organized hierarchically and graded in respect to responsibilities, emoluments, and honors. All along this staircase, excepting perhaps a few steps at the very top reserved for the Grants and Von Moltkes, promotion is very closely bound up with successful leadership. The officer who can animate his men to the greatest efforts, win them for the boldest enterprises, nerve them for the heaviest shocks, is deemed of highest value and is advanced toward ever higher prizes. Such a service, therefore, establishes a perpetual market where personal ascendancy can be disposed of to the best advantage.

The State has always been another field for the profitable employment of natural mastership. The steady authority political organs can count on now is a rather recent thing. The time was when the success of government was very much bound up with the personal authority of those who officered the state. Not great administrators like Stephan or Cromer, nor yet great statesmen like Pitt or Cavour, welded the modern state out of the fragments of power provided by feudalism. This was in part the work of heroes, of kings and the ministers of kings, who eked out the scanty royal authority with their personal dominion. Through most of its history the state has been a hierarchy of places and prizes open to those most able to make their wills prevail over those of other men.

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to dominate " enlists in the ecclesiastical corps for the "heaven's incense," the "Greek busts, Venetian paintings, Roman walls, and English books" of a Bishop Blougram. The democratic tendency to do away with steep gradations in the prizes of State and Church is a sign that society, having installed new machinery of control, needs no longer bid so high for personal influence.

On the whole it appears that personal ascendancy will play no such rôle in the future as it has in the past. It is precarious being bound up with fragile lives. It is hard to manage and very liable to abuse. It is apt to bring in its train caste, gross inequality, social chasms, Divine Right, the hereditary principle, and other things we cannot afford to harbor. Unless humanity surrenders the idealistic basis upon which, more and more, the control of its members rests, personality will remain as now a valuable auxiliary to political and moral authority, but not the corner-stone of social order.

CHAPTER XXII

ENLIGHTENMENT

IN the preceding six chapters we have considered the means that are employed to influence the *feelings* of individuals in ways that shall conduce to harmony, obedience, and respect for the rights of others. There remains still another department of the mind through which the individual may be reached. The *judgment* may be moulded as well as the will and the feelings. An examination of the means of modifying conduct through the judgment calls for the consideration of Enlightenment, Illusion, and Social Valuation as instruments of social control.

Undoubtedly the asses' bridge in the science of order is the recognition of the conflict between society's purposes for the individual and the individual's purposes for himself. Yet the deadlock is not quite complete. Often a man misbehaves from mere shortsightedness, and if we can get the myope to consider his welfare *in the long run*, he will become a well-conducted member of the community. It is true that corporate and private interests are not always parallel, as the tribe of moralists would have us believe; but neither are they quite so divergent as the unreflective man is apt to imagine. Other virtues as well as honesty, if pursued in due moderation, are matters of good policy in settled societies, and it is not at all futile to point this out to the would-be transgressor. In

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other words, *the enlightenment of a person as to the prudent ordering of his life for his own ends is a means of moralization.*

The only light to be shed on conduct is light as to its *consequences*. It has been widely held that light can be thrown on the *nature* of actions, and much time has been wasted in investigating the rightness or wrongness of acts. But this is futile. *The only classification of human conduct society cares for is one which discriminates according to results.* And it is just here that men stumble. For the consequences of a deed are numerous, various, lying in many directions, and entangled often with the consequences of other acts. In this maze the uninstructed eye catches chiefly what will happen *to me, here, and now.* When the links in the chain of connection are many, a consequence is overlooked; when its form is indeterminate, it appears doubtful; when it is remote, it is discounted; when it strikes another person, it is neglected. Thus partial views prevail, pennyweights are balanced against each other instead of pounds, and the choices of life prove to be unreasonable and disastrous.

This state of confusion is harmful to all. On the whole it is more to the interest of society to turn up the lights than to turn them down. A facility in reckoning consequences makes more virtue than it mars. Of course good impulses may be overruled as well as bad ones, but the balance of advantage lies with prudence. Impulse reigns in Uganda, enlightened selfishness in China. Neither is a paragon of social architecture, but there is no question as to which presents the better equilibrium. We find, therefore, that no one is allowed to go through life without receiving a vast amount of gratuitous instruction, admoni-

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tion, and advice, from sources official, semi-official, or merely countenanced, as to the consequences of acts in the debatable portion of the field of conduct.

A man is enlightened as to the results of his acts *to himself*.

Here we have a setting forth of:—

a. Physiological consequences. — “Society” is, of course, a kind of fiction. There is nothing to it, after all, but people affecting one other in various ways. The thesis of this book is that from the interactions of individuals and generations there emerges a kind of collective mind evincing itself in living ideals, conventions, dogmas, institutions, and religious sentiments which are more or less happily adapted to the task of safeguarding the collective welfare from the ravages of egoism. Whatever it may have been in caste communities or sacred aristocracies or priestly oligarchies, the “society” that “controls” is to-day too closely identified with the mass to feel any great aloofness from the individuals it deals with. Originating in the community of many consciousnesses, it does not place itself over against the individual in order to bully, browbeat, and exploit him if it can. This public composed of living and dead is, if you will, a despot, but still a paternal, benevolent despot. Hence, it is concerned not only with what harms the community, but with what harms the man himself. Society does not repress vice as vigorously as it represses crime, but it earnestly warns its members against it.

Our schools do not fail to enlighten as to the care of health, assigning personal welfare as a motive where a Brahmin, a Magian, or a Levite gave the will of the gods. Hygienic rite and sanitary observance, that once people were awed

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into or trained into, we now support by appeals to prudence. Intemperance we discourage by showing its effect on the body, dissipation by forecasting nervous exhaustion. We combat sexual excess by exhibiting the medical sanctions of purity. In this rationalistic age we connect the use of opium or cigarettes not with curses of the Mount Ebal kind, but with nerve fatigue and brain blight. Thus by showing indulgence as sacrificing the future to the present, or bartering health for momentary gratification, we seek to offset the attractiveness of vice, especially the anti-social sort.

b. Psychological consequences. — The likening of the first bad action to the first patch of leprosy is not mere tumid rhetoric. Reflective man tends so strongly to integrate his choices into large wholes that he cannot easily pass over a lapse. Principles, standards, ideals, be they generous or mean, assert their unifying force in character. Occasional recreancy under special temptation is usually the crack in the levee that ends in ruin. The favorite moral delusion is to trust that a darling sin, pet vice, or occasional yielding can be kept isolated and harmless in some corner of the soul. But "man is not built in water-tight compartments." It is in order, therefore, to show the unripe that one kind of meanness, dishonesty, fraud, lie, unfairness, sensuality, or selfishness, if granted lodgement, infects the rest of character till there is a total degeneration. Again, many a one will recoil from a pet vice if confronted with the natural outcome. To show the coquette, the libertine, the gourmand, the cynic, the miser, the domestic tyrant, the sycophant, or the fakir as the psychological consummation of vanity, lubricity, gluttony, contempt of others, greed, self-will, flat-

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terry, or mendacity, is a well-tried and long-approved method of control.

c. Social consequences. — Experience teaches the above truths, but society cannot let its members register in so dear a school. For its own sake it cannot afford to wait till undermined health or corroded character shall drive home the lesson of consequences. In the social field, however, consequence treads so close on the heels of transgression that forewarning is scarcely necessary. Neighbors, if abused, react more promptly than do nerves or moral sentiments. The boy on the playground can find out in much less time than his teacher can tell him how others will react when he strikes, mocks, or robs them. Hence, the importance of association during childhood in order to acquaint with the reactions that follow overmuch self-assertion. The home often fails to provide them, but the playground never. The continuous tapping of companions on the plastic will spares it later many a heart-breaking blow on the anvil of practical life. This is why no system of national education has failed to provide association during youth with comrades or elders.

But in adult society the novice, not finding at once the reactions he met with in his circle of companions, thinks himself able to dodge the unpleasant consequences of egoism. Hence, it is well to declare those tardier but no less sure reactions that make honesty the best policy and shame the portion of the wicked. That "the gods have long memories," and that their mills, though slow, "grind exceeding fine," are wholesome truths to instil. It is well to remind that "God pays, but He does not pay every Saturday," that "the benefit we receive must be rendered again, line for line, deed for deed, cent for cent, to somebody." Trans-

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gressors should be warned against the impolicy that overlooks the eventual forfeiture of such assets as reputation, credit, honor, public esteem, and love. We can safely join Josh Billings in assuring the would-be rascal that he has "the qualifications for a phool."

One is enlightened as to the consequences of his acts *to others*.

Even the well-disposed need light, for society's ultimate concern is not right motives but right actions. It must, therefore, illuminate the foolish as well as the perverse. As social relations become manifold and the chain of cause and effect longer, it is possible for the innocent or the thoughtless to do more harm by their blunders than the wicked by their crimes. "God be merciful to me, a fool!" is the cry of the modern man placed in a too complex world. It is, then, wise policy to make audible the social reverberation of deeds, and to show people the distant, bitter fruit of innocent actions. The preacher who helps us realize what evil crop is sown when one marries a degenerate, indulges children, sells liquor, or feeds "the devil's poor," is doing yeoman's service.

So far as a man has a corporate sense, it is enough to deter him to show that a proposed course of conduct, if generally followed, will hurt or ruin the community. In respect to those who are ready to obey Kant's injunction to "do only that which everybody might safely be allowed to do," the battle is as good as won. All that is needed is to set before them the basic laws of social life. It is easy to demonstrate that fraud breeds fraud and violence breeds violence. Nor is it hard to prove that fairness begets fairness, and that generosity is infectious. The supreme triumph of enlightenment awaits the social philosopher who can con-

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vince men that a régime of self-aggrandizement leads to enmity, strife, wounds, and disappointment, while the fruits of mutualism are peace, health, and life.

Less than other types of control does enlightenment leave historic traces. Early literature, ministering to leisured upper classes, chose to embalm the prideful morality of masters rather than the prudential morality of peasants. History records the reflections of the élite upon the conduct of life, but neglects the forces that held in their humble social orbits the yeoman and the artisan. Yet it is safe to surmise that in all free communities there was an exudation of proverb and aphorism, gnome and parable, legend and moral tale, tending to bring about a canny adjustment of men to the requirements of life in common. That underground growth we call folklore was full of salty maxims and pithy counsels which gave shape to multitudes of obscure, unhorizoned lives. Here and there this hidden trunk sent up a shoot in Hesiod or Solomon, Jesus the son of Sirach, or Poor Richard.

The prudential era of morality begins when law and custom relax. Invested at first with a sanctity that wins them unquestioning obedience, these lose in prestige whenever, as in old Greece, the contacts of embryo cultures give rise to discussion and to the spirit of inquiry. When sacred law is thus arrested at an early stage, saws and maxims grow up, and the sagacity of the living replaces the authority of the dead. In the old Greek world Hesiod stands for prudential morality, and recommends justice no less than thrift as a means to prosperity. We may be sure that his pungent precepts became classic because he was a builder of order as well as a wholesome adviser of farmers. After him the "Wise Men" filled Greece with the

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fame of certain pregnant moral observations, and in the sixth century before Christ, the poets, Theognis and Simonides, won great authority by reflections on life which throw many a light on the natural sanctions of conduct.

The reflective stage is now reached, and the moral development of Greece becomes dramatic. The ancient sanctions are crumbling. The Sophists appear and the old reasons for righteousness are thrown into the melting-pot. Hippias declares the laws of the State to be mere arbitrary enactments. Protagoras makes the individual man "the measure of all things," exalts inclination, and extols prudence. Socrates, himself a Sophist, puts his trust in individualism, declares virtue a science that can be taught, and believes that all the wicked man needs is more light. The swift collapse of the higher enginery of social control can be traced in the Tragic Poets. In Æschylus morality is backed by the will of the gods; in Sophocles it is supported by a noble intuitive sense of right and wrong; in Euripides it is the conclusion dictated by a sophistical reasoning upon moral questions.

From Aristophanes we learn that in Athens this disintegrating subjectivism led to a serious moral crisis. Philosophy now hurriedly left the problems of the Cosmos to attend to those of conduct. Plato with his subordination of desires to the divine faculty of Reason and Aristotle with his sublimated gentleman-morality labored earnestly to get a solid foundation for social order. As the problem continued to press, the sunlight vanished and the fog closed in. Speculation became handmaid to ethics, and a Stoicism of Semitic origin contended with Epicurus for the souls of the higher classes. But in respect to the common people chilled by philosophic ethics and dead to the high-pitched Stoic

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appeal, the problem of control stayed unsolved until the importation of Oriental mysteries and religions permitted the recovery of living gods.

Although showing at times a truly childlike faith in the efficacy of instruction and the supremacy of reason over appetite,¹ the thinkers of the Middle Ages were too well armed with supernatural arguments to care much about the purely natural sanctions of conduct. So rational thought on life and conduct stayed in eclipse till after the Renaissance. Then criticism of objective authority set in, and by the middle of the eighteenth century an individualism had been worked out, not unlike that of Athens at the end of the fifth century before Christ. The foundations of the higher forms of social control were broken up. Morality became conscious and sophisticated. Man became once more "the measure of all things," and in the crucible of Helvetius's analysis he saw disappear the last idealistic restraints on his will. It was in line with this dissolution of control that "enlightenment" became the watchword of all moral agencies. Religion ceasing to bear on the feel-

¹ The Fables of Bidpai spread through mediæval Europe "not for the story interest of them, but on account of their moral interest, their 'moral philosophy' as the title of the Italian and English version testifies. They were regarded as homilies, and the tales were only tolerated as so much jam to give a relish to the morality. It was, therefore, appropriate that these Asiatic tales with their Buddhistic tendencies should be introduced just at the period when Europe was Asiaticizing. For if we may generalize about such big things as continents, may we not say the ideal of Asia has been *to be*, that of Europe *to do?* And was it not the striving of mediæval Europe *to be*, and not primarily *to do*, that makes it seem so alien to us moderns, who have recovered the old European tradition of Greeks and Romans and Teutons? With touching simplicity, the mediævals, like the Asiatics, thought it only necessary to know, in order to do the right, and hence their appeal to Oriental wisdom: alas, we moderns know better!" — JOSEPH JACOBS, "The Fables of Bidpai," Introduction, p. xxxviii.

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ings, reduced to a scheme of morality, enforced by supernatural rewards and punishments, and enabling a man "to make the most of both worlds."¹ Ethics became utilitarian, and staked everything on enlightened self-interest. The ideal man was he who regulated his life according to the dictates of reason. Not selfishness but stupidity was declared to be the common enemy, and virtue was identified with common sense.

Rationalism failed for several reasons. It clipped the wings of imagination; it cramped the emotions; it misinterpreted the social impulses; it robbed religion of all wonder; it neglected the ebullient side of human nature. But its cardinal sin was failure to furnish a good cohesive principle for society. Its cement would not hold, and the bankruptcy of its moral method soon became apparent. Romanticism, revivalism, sentimentalism, idealism, and the new Stoicism fell upon it and overwhelmed it with jeer and contumely. Thus the world's second ray of sunlight was withdrawn, and the flying mists were permitted to make the nineteenth century an age of half-lights.

One unavoidable drawback of enlightenment is that after we have paraded all the sanctions, there

¹ Says Professor W. H. Hudson, of the English clergyman of the Hanoverian reigns: "We have the moderate and sober divine, reading from his carefully written manuscript a homily full of good sense and fair judgment, unsentimental, precise, and lucid, the aim of which is to establish by solid argument the essential reasonableness of Christianity, or to enforce the prudence of right living and the principles of enlightened self-interest. He studiously avoids all extravagance of thought and phrase; dwells rather upon the nobility than upon the debasement of human nature; touches lightly, if at all, upon the questions of the sacrificial death, salvation through faith and eternal damnation; and labors to impress upon his hearers the important fact that the founders of his religion were not enthusiastic dreamers, or mystics, but emphatically men of sense and gentlemen."

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are still many cases in which the virtue or duty that society demands of the individual is hopelessly at variance with his personal welfare. Another drawback is that enlightened self-interest requires too precise a discernment of the conditions of social life ever to become a mainstay. Moreover, it would seem that enlightenment, failing to reach the deep springs of human conduct, results frequently in a stereotyped and hollow morality. The emotionalists will always be able to address to the prudential moralists the reproach of Lao Tsze to Confucius: "It was when God had been set aside that virtue and benevolence, wisdom and prudence, were made to take His place. As a consequence there arose a widespread spirit of deception, so that at a time when there was no harmony in the social relations, filial piety and fraternal affection appeared to flourish, and ministers claimed to be upright when the whole fabric of the State was thoroughly depraved and corrupt."¹

There is no doubt, however, that the more intelligent the common people, the safer it is to drop all those distinctions between actions which are founded on religion, convention, or authority, and to influence men in respect to conduct by a frank *exposé* of its consequences, personal and social. We Americans, for example, have never admitted European romanticism into our theology, ethics, political philosophy, or literature. We have steadily sought the light of fact and reason, and shunned the fog. The secret of this, no doubt, lies, not in the nature of the American mind, but in those favorable conditions here which have made the policy of enlightenment effective in influencing men.

In the controlling of groups, classes, or parties,

¹ Alexander, "Lao Tsze the Great Thinker," p. 67.

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the method of enlightenment is more effective than in modifying the conduct of individuals. The matters in which a body of people can go wrong are, in general, less under the sway of passion than those matters in which the individual can go wrong. Save in the case of the mob, the rule holds that the larger the body of persons who act together, the more their action is guided by interest and the less it is directed by sentiment. Consequently, when society seeks to control the conduct of one of its sections or classes, or when one group, sect, or community seeks to modify the action of another group, sect, or community, it is the language of interest that is used. The larger the group to be controlled, the more needful it is to address the reason and to level the appeal at selfish interest. In the nature of the case, then, the psychic battles that are waged in society, the struggles internecine and international, parliamentary and diplomatic, assume this form.

The method of enlightenment has distinct correlations. An age that deems man, at bottom, a reasonable creature, thinks much of *education* as a cure for human depravity. Times of great educational enthusiasm are, therefore, times of faith in enlightenment, and *vice versa*. The magnificent educational zeal of the nineteenth century was inspired by the theories of the eighteenth.

The attempt to manage men by enlightenment hurries society toward consciousness of itself. For with the endeavor to awaken a sense of responsibility by dwelling on the social consequences of conduct, there grows up a rational theory of social relations which every "good citizen" is expected to believe in. Thus the group becomes aware of the processes on which its life depends, and utilitarianism prepares the way for social science.

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The prudential method flourishes in periods when tradition breaks down, and it is no longer heresy to confess that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends upon the character of its consequences. It prospers in a scientific age when physiology, psychology, and sociology bring to light unexpected sanctions for old rules of conduct. It thrives in an industrial epoch when the discipline of regular work has developed in the common man the habit of self-control and reflection, without which enlightenment would be of no effect. It grows apace in democratic times, when laws are seen to be matters of enactment, when a laicized religion ceases to give minute guidance in life, and when the moral authority of the exceptional man touches its nadir.

But whether the appeal to self-interest, silently insinuating itself into religion, philosophy, ethics, and literature, rides splendidly at the swaying summit of society's system of control, surrounded by the Muses and the Graces, or whether, thrust out of the high places by dogmas and dreams, it works quietly and unobserved in a humbler sphere, shaping the character of youth through homely proverbs and copy-book maxims and moral tales and Sunday-school books—in any case we cannot do without it. It never gets in the way of science. It relieves the strain on other parts of the system. It is the best custodian of whole fields of conduct. It alone can reach certain natures. It enlists parents and friends, all those solicitous about the individual, in the task of controlling him. And so, while it may not be the battlement, it will always remain the foundation of a system of social control.

CHAPTER XXIII

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IN the taming of men there must be provided coil after coil to entangle the unruly one. Manquellers must use snares as well as leading strings, will-o'-the-wisps as well as lanterns. The truth by all means if it will promote obedience, but in any case, obedience! Hence, coupled with the social endeavor to clarify the individual's judgment on certain points, we detect an unmistakable effort to confuse, befuddle, and mislead it on other points. Taking a leaf from the policy of nature, society learns the trick of deception. Of outright invention, of pious fraud, there is of course no question. But we *do* find that certain appearances which mask the face of reality have been seized upon, turned, and manipulated for the management of men.

I showed in an earlier chapter how, upon a platform of belief in the supernatural, various orders of extra-mundane sanctions come to be planted for the upholding of the commandments. In this chapter I shall show society again making use of conviction, but in a different way. We shall examine, not creeds, but the films, veils, hidden mirrors, and half-lights by which men are duped as to that which lies nearest them — their own experience. This time we shall see men led captive, not by dogmas concerning a world beyond experience, but by artfully fostered misconceptions of the pains, satisfac-

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tions, and values lying under their very noses. For this the fitting term is not *control by belief*, but *control by illusion*. Of such illusions we can describe only a few leading types.

Pseudo-consequence. — This grows out of the method of Enlightenment itself. The guardians of society, when the genuine sanctions fall short, often draw upon their imagination. It is so easy to exaggerate effects, to ignore exceptions, to overlook qualifying circumstances, to marshal fanciful consequences. Most moral instruction reeks with a goody-goody disingenuousness which everybody excuses because it is salutary. A fine disregard for the real aftermath of heroic deeds and a shameless use of bugaboos to scare people away from the forbidden are everywhere the mark of the didactic. Sunday-school literature, for instance, plays fast and loose with the facts of life in its efforts to connect church-going with commercial prosperity, the memorizing of texts with worldly preferment, Sabbath-breaking with the gallows. It finds a mysterious causal relation between the robbing of orchards and the breaking of boughs, the Sunday sail and the capsizing boat. Such humbug finally provokes the humorist to intervene with his "Story of an Ill-natured Boy," and his aphorism, "Be good and you will be lonesome."

Nor does the adult escape. It took Artemus Ward, with his "Moral Show," to satirize the American rage for edification. The social encouragement to pious fraud is seen in the strained exegesis of the Biblical allusions to wine, that has become popular with us since the temperance movement. Much of the teaching as to the physiological effects of alcohol and narcotics is known to be merest rubbish. In literature romanticism, whatever troubles it heaps on the innocent, knows how

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to extricate them at the end and reward their virtue. Realism labors to banish cheap optimism, and to be at least as candid as the author of Job; but realism makes little headway. Fairy tale and saga boldly suited the lot of man to his desert, and the fiction and drama of to-day do not hesitate to do the same. What better witness to the divorce of literature from life than the fact that the case of a righteous man suffering misfortune, is still held to present "a problem"? Biography is usually the masterpiece of the imagination, poetry and fiction being the work of its 'prentice hand. As for the history of itself a nation teaches its young, it is a fig leaf.

Solidarity.—Many thinkers have flattered themselves that the phenomena of interdependence present solid ground for the appeal on behalf of a social line of conduct. Max Nordau, after shattering the traditional bases of obedience, brings forward social solidarity as the corner-stone of the morality of the future. To the question, "What reward, what punishment, will follow my actions?" this moralist of solidarity replies: "As you are a part of humanity, its prosperity is your prosperity, and its sufferings your sufferings. If you do that which is good for humanity, you do good to yourself; but if you do that which is injurious to it, you inflict an injury upon yourself. A flourishing humanity is your paradise, a decaying humanity your hell."

But the facts of solidarity have long been urged. St. Paul, in the twelfth chapter of First Corinthians, conceives society as an organism:—

"For the body is not one member, but many.

"If the foot shall say, 'Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body,' is it, therefore, not of the body?

"And the eye cannot say unto the hand, 'I have

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no need of thee ;' nor again the head to the feet,
'I have no need of you.'

" And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it."

Says Marcus Aurelius : " For we are made for coöperation like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and the lower teeth." " If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself . . . who separates himself from others or does anything unsocial." " Whatever act of thine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and is of the nature of a mutiny."

And Whitman says :—

" Whoever degrades another degrades me;
And whatever is done or said returns at last to me."

This ground of appeal is at once very old and very new. We find it with those ancient thinkers who first commented on the social division of labor. We find it with the latest students of society, such as Comte, Carlyle, and Emerson. Moralists have written their best pages in tracing the train of reactions by which evil-doing recoils upon the head of the evil-doer, or the "bread cast upon the waters" returns. Fables and parables delight in devising neat circuits by which one comes to reap that which he has sown. Sermons without number press home their exhortations with the facts of solidarity. Everywhere we spur the citizen to patriotic or civic endeavor by showing him he cannot escape the common lot. And as the supernatural recompense grows doubtful, the more eagerly we look for such natural recompense. In-

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deed, many cherish the hope that, as the old supports decay, a scientific analysis of society, with its demonstration of interaction and solidarity, may serve to uphold the moral life.

It is vain to suppose that solidarity can furnish us a sufficient reason for "fulfilling the law." It is demonstrably untrue that we thrive only when our group thrives; that so entangled are we in a network of relations, we cannot fare well when the social body fares ill; that labor for the corporate welfare pays the best dividend to self. Of course, when a tribe is so hard-pressed that each of its fighters is of pivotal importance, and when the issue is either a common safety or a common ruin, even the selfish man will do just what his group would have him do. But in peace time people are not so closely matted together but that some may rise at the expense of the rest. The lot of the individual is sufficiently apart from the fortune of the group for him to snatch an ill-gotten gain for himself, just as a man may profitably cheat his government, even though he raises his taxes thereby.

True, the longer time we allow, the oftener may we see the transgressor sicken with the very virus he has introduced into the veins of society. So they who take the sword come to perish by the sword. But it often takes long to complete the circuit; and human life is not for the long run. A nation lives long enough to complete the circuit, and many an edifying lesson may be drawn from history; but the life of the individual is brief, and more than one generation of human midges can live out their lives in the sunny half of a bad transaction. The world's "judgment days" are not a success in respect to settling with the right persons. It is the *children* whose "teeth are set on

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edge." The "deluge" is *after us*. The bad man profits, enjoys, and flits ere the social Nemesis arrives.

Surprising as are the interactions that enchant the social philosopher, they cannot work miracles. Curses do not always recoil on the head of the curser. Only to an Emerson does the thief "steal from himself," the swindler "swindle himself." Of tares men reap tares, but not every one who sows tares reaps them himself. If Providence does not bring back the "bread cast upon the waters," one may well hesitate to cast it forth; for we have no guarantee that social reactions will do it. There is considerable proof, indeed, that a man will *feel* the social lot, but there is no demonstrating that he will *share* it.

Then there is the fallacy bred in the bone of jurists, legal writers, political philosophers, and moral empiricists generally, that the social nécessity from which requirements flow is a sufficing ground of obedience. Nearly all who have approached the moral problem from the side of social science — and they are many in these days — regard the common blessings of order as at once standard and sanction of social behests, and look upon those who disobey in the face of such demonstration as a handful of passion-led men who will not hearken to reason.

It is true that I desire my group strong and flourishing. It is true that the codes define the conditions of this well-being, and hence I wish them to be generally obeyed. "All of us," says Plato, with quiet irony, "have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws." Yet — and now comes the thin ice — in any particular instance the question

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is not, "What if this rule be abrogated?" but, "What if I break it while others continue to obey it?" To have my way may mean much to me, may mean little hurt to society. Therefore I will transgress, hoping, however, for my own sake that the rest will not do the same.

Recently an assemblyman, who had induced his legislature to enact a law forbidding the dynamiting of streams, was found swooning by a mountain creek, one arm torn off by the premature explosion of a dynamite cartridge. This violation of his own law throws into bold relief the contradiction between the man in his corporate capacity, judging and controlling the acts of individuals, and the same man in his private capacity, scheming to evade this control. The moralists pronounce this legislator illogical, inconsistent, self-contradictory. He was none of these; he was simply a hypocrite.

The solidarity plea is valid for the social man, but not for the individualist to whom it is addressed. And if it influences him—as undoubtedly it does—it succeeds only because it leads him to confuse his status as member of the controlling group with his status as controlled individual. It is, therefore, safe to urge against Nordau and the optimists generally, that the solidarity of society, while yielding a scientific criterion of right and wrong, gives no irrefragable reason to him who is not disposed to do the right. Their "firm foundation" for the good conduct of the future is a quaking bog of fallacy and illusion.

Asceticism.—Asceticism is a stream fed by several springs. It is a symptom of bad race temperament, depressing climate, or low physical tone. It is the resource of a rising contemplative class in getting the upper hand of rude, violent men. It is the creed of the poor, who, having no

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other gift to lay on the altar, bring their virginity or their natural affections as an acceptable sacrifice. It is a corollary of triumphant supernaturalism, the aspect of man's life when regarded from the far end of the theological telescope. It is the regimen of thinkers who recognize in it "an *optimum* of the conditions of highest and keenest spirituality."¹ It is the cult of pain that springs up spontaneously among serfs, peasants, sailors, or miners, as befitting the hardships they must face. But these do not suffice to account for a phenomenon that we have learned to expect whenever a race or class touches a certain level of culture. The volume and persistence of the world's asceticism cannot be understood until we take note of it as instrument of social control.

Character implies a habit of inhibiting the promptings of appetite and passion in favor of a steady pursuit of rational aims. Something of contempt for gratification, therefore, has always entered into the rearing of stark men, be they Spartans, Romans, Puritans, or Boers. But the severity that toughens the fibre of the will in the interest of personal efficiency gives us no real clew to the meaning of that life-hating doctrine that seeks to maim rather than to build up the individual. And with good reason. For the secret of asceticism is this: *It is the régime that tames men for social life.*

Through the ascetic priest society seeks to hamstring the primitive impulses of lust, greed, and pride, the chief mischief-makers among associated men. Nor is this all. In the development of the individual we find, beyond the period of the fierce pursuit of objects of desire, a reflective

¹ Nietzsche, "A Genealogy of Morals," p. 145.

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period in which, generalizing from his experience, he concludes that pleasure is the sole object of rational endeavor. Now, this hedonic creed of life, despite a certain Epicurean mildness, makes on the whole for self, rather than for others, and is in this way a disintegrating force. Those sages who have thought to socialize men by marshalling purely hedonic considerations have always failed. Naked, unshamed hedonism is anti-social. The true social policy is to discredit the calculus of feelings, so that men may again pass under the dominion of the object.¹ For only on this condition can society reinstate its ideals and values as goals of endeavor.

To this end the ascetic teacher snubs the healthy instincts, abases the "body," rejects the common-sense sanctions of pleasure and pain, flouts the "carnal" reason, disparages the "natural" man, and in every way seeks to break down the hedonist appraisal of life. It is true this leaves little to strive for. It abolishes at a stroke four-fifths of willing. But the void thus created may in itself be prized as "Nirvana"; or it may be filled by exalting public activities; or certain "inward" goods—"salvation," "peace," "love of God," "union with God," "the Beatific Vision"—may become goals of endeavor. Along this line, then, the ascetic, be he Buddhist, Stoic, Christian, or Sufi, tames lustful, grasping, vying men and transforms them into quiet, untroublesome members of society.

But he may not stop here. The tamed energy of the anchorite wasting itself in fast and penance and self-torture is socially useless. The unlimited saint would wreck society as quickly as the

¹See Martineau, "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II, pp. 321-332.

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unlimited sinner. Urging, therefore, "weakness of the flesh" or "hardness of heart," the ascetic teacher usually manages to stop short of an extreme pessimism that would plunge the race into quietism or suicide. The simple life in fraternal communities¹ is approved, and the teacher addresses himself to cutting away as proud-flesh all riches, luxury, or ambition. He joins the ethic of compassion to the gospel of renunciation, so that the strong, after consenting to forego the quest of pleasure, are induced to shoulder the burdens of the weak. Thus diluted and doctored, ascetic ideas promote social harmony by fostering the spirit of brotherhood and smoothing away the harsher inequalities.

The extravagance and vehemence needed to impress the many may mislead the few. Narcotics are dangerous, and you cannot drug an entire people without an occasional overdose. Crazed by these daring paradoxes, many a one betakes himself to pillar or cave, and so ceases to benefit his fellow-men. Moreover, the ascetic priest is no infallible physician, nor is his eye single to the regulation of men in the interest of a healthy, harmonious social life. Whole communities, as in the fourth century, steeped in the morbid teachings of fanatics, have sunk into a miserable paralysis. Well does Lecky say: "A hideous, sordid, and emaciated maniac, without knowledge, without patriotism, without natural affection, passing his life in a long routine of useless and atrocious self-torture,

¹ In fact, there seems to be an evolution from solitary to communal asceticism, indicating the increasing mastery of ethical motives and the gradual interpenetration of the social principle with the religious principle. It is as if a practice, at first individualistic, were seized and used for a social purpose. See Zoekler, "Askeze und Mönchthum."

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and quailing before the ghastly phantoms of his delirious brain, had become the ideal of the nations, which had known the writings of Plato and Cicero and the lives of Socrates and Cato.”¹

Once its terrible toxic power is realized, asceticism administered in more cautious doses is capable of beneficent effects. Besides acting as a tonic to the will and an antiseptic against a corrupting sensuality, it is a sedative moderating the spirit of fierce strife and worldly ambition. The teaching of Gautama, who, after practising the utmost austerties of his time, gave them up and preached “the Middle Way,” has made Asia mild. Likewise the doctrines of Jesus, since the excesses of monasticism passed away, have fostered a readiness to self-sacrifice which has been of vast ethical benefit to European civilization.

That the ascetic view of “the world” is an illusion it is scarcely necessary to show. The ecstasies, visions, insights, and Nirvanas for the sake of which the natural man is to be crucified are hallucinations. To pursue them as supreme blessings is to relinquish realities for mocking phantasms, to exchange solid earth for mirage. The worship of pain has never contributed an element of solid worth to human life which might not have been added through the gradual enlightenment of the judgment and the elevation of taste. Despite its pretensions, it has neither enriched man’s experience nor unsealed new springs of joy.

Nor is this illusion so necessary as once it was. The world is passing from a “pain economy”—to use Professor Patten’s phrase²—to a “pleasure economy,” and can, therefore, lay anew the moral

¹ “History of European Morals,” Vol. II, p. 107.

² See Patten, “Theory of the Social Forces.”

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accent. The cult of pain that once served to keep men from clutching at one another's means of enjoyment is less needed, now that these means have become abundant and diffused. And—what is still more important—our satisfactions themselves are in course of refinement. Men are turning from material and exclusive pleasures, not startled by the wild paradoxes of the ascetic priest, but drawn by the charm of new kinds of enjoyment. The art and culture of the Greeks, restored to us by the Revival of Learning, have done more to deliver from the old ravening lust and greed than did ever Diogenes or St. Jerome. Not monkish vigils, but the pursuit of culture, blanches the face and refines the features of the modern man. With the diffusion of higher tastes, society may safely soften its official rancor against life, and serenely look forward to the time when ascetic ideas may be dismissed with thanks for their services.

Moral philosophy.—During the last three centuries there has been gradually disengaged from supernaturalism a system of ethical ideas which, under the name of "moral philosophy," has won with West European peoples a considerable authority of its own. Making its way step by step, as rationalism has beaten back theological ideas, this system has always professed to declare the true criteria and sanctions of conduct in lieu of those which are supernatural and false. As a matter of fact, this moral philosophy, or "moral science" as in this scientific age it is pleased to call itself, is the successor to which theology handed her sceptre as she lost her empire over souls.

A leading idea of this system is that actions, even when objectively considered, have a moral

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quality irrespective of their consequences. In religious systems the standard of conduct is the revealed or implanted will of God. Ethics, on discarding this idea, might have announced the only sure and scientific criterion by which actions may be divided into good and bad, *viz.* Results. But such frankness would have been fatal. If society bade us look to the consequences of an act to the general well-being, it would thereby place its welfare in the foolish hands of rash, short-sighted, and inexperienced people. How few are competent to do their own social philosophizing! In a maze of effects, how is the ordinary man with his little arc of experience to judge the real trend of actions? Like a wise parent who realizes that some of his commands must rest on his sheer dictum, society refuses to let its members into its central secrets. Special systems of requirement — military, clerical, or industrial discipline — are avowed to rest on utility; but for its central requirements a surer criterion is claimed. They are not *social*; they are *moral*.¹ Not their consequences, but their *essential nature*, marks this class of actions as good, that class as bad. By thus registering its age-clarified, time-winnowed judgments as to what is good for it or bad for it in a Moral Code, society delivers its well-being from the hasty, biased judgments of the purblind many.

Another idea is that human nature is constituted and intended for goodness; that uprightness, self-sacrifice, and forgiveness are *natural* to us in a way that indirection, selfishness, and resentment

¹ The beholder does, of course, have feelings about an action that are determined by the character of the *motive* he detects beneath the action; and in the contrast of such feelings we have a basis for classifying actions. But the classification consecrated by the moral philosophers juts far over this original basis.

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are not. On this point religion held otherwise. The idea of original sin thrown out by the Yahvehistic author of Genesis about 850 B.C. was neglected till St. Paul made it the corner-stone of his theology. Afterwards adopted by St. Augustine and Calvin, it became part of the official psychology of Christendom. Despite its connection with a fabled "Fall," this notion of human nature persisted because it squared with the facts. The "law in our members warring against the law in our minds and bringing us into captivity to sin," we now know to be the "ape and tiger" living over into us their distant relatives. But until Darwin there was no scientific explanation of the facts which the doctrine of inborn depravity sought to interpret.

Moral philosophers, on the other hand, from Mencius to Shaftesbury, from Zeno to Bishop Butler, and from Marcus Aurelius to Kant, shut their eyes to such facts. They hide with roses the abyss between the natural man and the moral man. They overlook the strain our social order puts on the natural instincts. They ignore the historical recency of many social requirements. Deriving the rule of right from the constitution of the mind, they find virtue conformable to our nature, and are able to convict "the average, sensual man" of being unnatural and foolish as well as wicked. In the early impulsive ages such ideas could have little influence on conduct; but since the rhythms of settled life, the regularity of social pursuits, and the iron routine of labor have made self control common, these considerations which enlist the reflective self on the side of obedience acquire a high value for regulation.

A third idea is that actions fall naturally into two groups. In the first group, which comprises

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most human activities, the ground of choice is found in the nature of the consequences; in the second group, called "conduct," the ground of choice is to be sought in the *conscience* or *moral reason*. As a matter of fact, the consequences of any act, as they are the natural criterion for judging it, constitute the natural sanction for doing or shunning it. This holds true even in that borderland where the paths of individuals intersect and their purposes are liable to clash. Here we have the complication that the doer of an act may reap the pleasant consequences of it, while others reap its unpleasant consequences. If the doer is unsocial, his "good" will be society's "bad," and there will be nothing for it but to convert him or control him. But, if he is truly fit for fellowship, he will appraise consequences to others at par, and so the sanction of consequence will lead him to follow a social line of conduct. The mother in doing for her children, the clansman in standing by his fellow, the Samaritan in helping his neighbor, the patriot in serving his country, is guided by *results*. In fact, whoever heartily shares a common life will act with the joint welfare in view. In such cases we recognize the change of venue to conscience as a lapse and a sign of decay.

Far from being a badge of perfection, the looking within for sanctions is a mark of defect. When we push beyond the confines of our corporate sense, we get deadness to consequences and the leaden sense of obligation. The resort to inner justification, therefore, reveals the boundaries of one's *socius*. It belongs to frontier conduct. It prevails in the debatable ground between whole-souled concern and whole-souled indifference. Here springs that cold, effortful, inward-looking righteousness that rigorists term "virtuous action," and adopt as

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the model and type of all goodness whatsoever.¹ Teutonic peoples, strong in character but weak in imagination, tend, it is true, to inward reference; but Latin peoples with a livelier social sense push along the social car without so much reflection. In times of change or peril the clumsy system of inner reference yields to warm-hearted disinterested action springing from such emotions as *esprit du corps*, fellow-feeling, and loyalty; but for the fixed relations and stereotyped offices of a settled social life, there is nothing better than the habit of reference to a well-primed conscience. *It is one way of getting right action in default of social feeling.*

Let us now probe the reigning moral psychology. This century has been marked by the eager exploration of human nature in quest of supports for the social. Religious thinkers have emphasized the sentiments of mystery, dependence, and reverence, the sense of sin, the emotions of conversion and regeneration, because these phenomena, when the last drop of implication is wrung from them, seem to suggest the chief concepts of religion. As the objective supports—sacred books, tradition, the evidences—rot away, subjective supports are sought and theology, ceasing to account for the Cosmos, becomes a way of interpreting certain facts of familiar, human experience.

With this shifting of base religion gains in value, because the social element no longer needs to be *smuggled* into it, as it has to be into systems of objective belief. It was a sheer *tour de force* to assert that not “firstlings,” but the doing of justice, is the acceptable sacrifice; when, however, religion

¹ Kant insisted a good action must proceed “from respect for the law.” Hence Schiller: —

“Willingly serve I my friends, but I do it, alas, with affection,
Hence I am plagued with doubt; virtue I have not attained.”

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gets a subjective basis it has full warrant to be social. These emotions bursting up right through the floor of the scheming, aggressive self have a social origin and a social purport. Consequently, the constructions made from these materials will be splendidly suited to social control. The "true" and "higher" self aimed at will be the reverent, obedient self, and the "Higher-than-we," the "Stream-of-Tendency-not-ourselves," will be a law-giving, right-loving, group-protecting God.

Now, similar tactics are followed by the moral philosopher. After the partial failure of the eighteenth-century appeal to reason, the moralist, turning his back on the baldly rational as well as on the frankly supernatural, explores anew the personal life. Selecting such experiences as sense of oughtness, feeling of responsibility, bad conscience, repentance, and the like, he isolates, studies, magnifies, generalizes, and interprets them into an authoritative philosophy of life. As the phenomena he selects are allied to those dwelt upon by the religious thinker, his results are not wholly dissimilar. His ethical philosophy proves to be religious philosophy truncated. Secular and scientific as he flatters himself to be, his constructions — Duty, Conscience, Categorical Imperative, Moral Law — are but torsos of deity, ghosts of the Presence that gave the Law from Sinai.

The beginning of moral philosophy is the honest interpretation of genuine experience. Over and over again, choice spirits have given us the record of their inward struggles and their ethical salvation. In the Psalms and the Prophets, in the neo-Platonists and the Stoics, and all down through the Christian centuries, we detect the note of moral crisis and triumph. But these stood as sequestered fountains of inspiration to which the few repaired.

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They were undisturbed until the breakdown of other engines of regulation caused society to cast about for some fresh stimulus. Then the phenomena of the ethical consciousness were anxiously explored, analyzed, and interpreted by many thinkers; and these interpretations came to be organized into an imposing moral philosophy, which, to paraphrase a famous saying about the Papacy, might be termed "the ghost of theology sitting crowned upon the grave thereof."

As the English theology of the early eighteenth century was simply the reflection of British constitutionalism, so this moral philosophy is the reflection of modern legalism. The feeling we have that the deliverances of the reflecting self are more weighty and binding than those of the eager, passionate self is perverted by the moral philosopher into the dogma that the "ought," the scruple, the sense of duty, has, in the nature of things, a right to triumph over our other instincts and desires. The "moral law" is the inner counterpart of that "law" which at the close of the later Middle Ages began to draw to itself the authority of the absolute monarch, and finally became supreme. That this abstraction is a figment there is scarcely need to show. Psychology has turned its object-glass on the phenomena of "oughtness" and "moral responsibility," and bids fair to furnish ere long a genetic account of them.¹ A sacred or ethical psychology will prove no more immune than a sacred cosmology from the biting acid of scientific criticism.

When caught up by a society looking for a new discipline, the system just described becomes a full-blown creed and confession of faith. The pulpit is propped with it. Political thinkers anchor

¹ See Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development," for a brilliant example.

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to it. Statesmen ground their appeals on it. The law absorbs it, and lawyers and judges speak the language of it. Patriotic and civic feeling is challenged in its name. The poet hurriedly masks its stern outlines with myths, fancies, and allusions. The artist finds radiant and beautiful symbols for it. The tendency writer feeds upon it. In every college "moral philosophy" is taught; it underlies the most solemn appeals to rising manhood. Simplified, popularized, and stereotyped, it settles ever deeper into our education and prepossesses even the tenderest ages. Thus become conventional, official, and orthodox, moral philosophy has come to be in this century one of the two great secular instruments of control. The charm of a type, the authority of the inner law — everywhere these seem to be the master forces in the upper levels. "Rise to this ideal" and "Respect the dictates of conscience" — these injunctions disguised in a hundred ways are the pith of those appeals that smack most of the modern and democratic.

Obvious enough are the advantages of a system of ideas that with lofty gesture refers the individual to the voice of his inmost self, after having carefully primed the monitor in advance. Let us dwell rather on the unsuspected weaknesses that forbid us to look upon it as a stand-by and a sheet-anchor of social order.

The ludicrous contrast between the ponderous court-of-law procedure of the moral philosopher and the simple directness of good people in the workaday world is significant. It means that *he has made the form of choice at the margin of sociality the type of all moral choosing*. This has given opportunity for many a novel, play, and satire to drive home the contrast between conscientiousness and whole-souled goodness.

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In the absence of an external code the staking of everything on conscience is liable to end in a badness the more complete because wearing that badge of goodness, "inward self-approval." The inward tables of the law are not easy to write from the outside. Morality, therefore, is liable to degenerate into mere self-approbation of the hollow conscience, to which acts are good simply because they are one's own, to become "an empty self-will and self-assurance, which, swollen with private sentiment or chance desire, wears a mask of goodness."¹ This is why England, "the chosen land of moral philosophy, has the reputation abroad of being the chief home of hypocrisy and cant."¹

The policy of meeting the rationalism that threatens to dissolve one by one all faiths, obligations, and ideals by fairly outbidding it with the Moral Reason is well-nigh done for. As the rational moralist delves deeper and deeper into the inner life to find a firm foundation for his summons to obedience, the sceptic follows and undermines him. The task of confounding the unjust man with reasons drawn from his own nature is futile. And even were it not, reasonableness is, after all, a tepid thing compared to patriotism or loyalty or love of a cause. The world hears the empty clatter about "realization of the rational self," and passes by on the other side.

If we read aright the recent decades, the inner voice has lost in clearness and authority. Right is no longer looked upon as graven law. National groups now claim what was meant for mankind. The ethics of the German is less universal since he has a country to love. In France the sentiment of patriotism proves far easier to foster than

¹ Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," p. 436.

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an exacting conscience. In England the "Non-conformist Conscience" is in abeyance. For all the nations imperialism holds the baton. Under the tutelage of Darwinism the world returns again to the idea that *might* as evidence of fitness has something to do with *right*. Yet with it all dwell vastly richer human sympathies and a far more haunting consciousness of the corporate self. An observer of seven centuries ago, tracing the evolution of the warrior up to the mail-clad knight with half a hundred-weight of metal on his body, would have felt justified in deeming armor a permanent factor in warfare. So the man of today, on reviewing the history of the ideas that have finally enthroned sociality in the soul's inner citadel, feels sure that in the growing authority of the "moral law" lies the hope of society. But the one may prove as mistaken as the other. There are tokens that the moral man is not the final type. The man with "outlook" may supplant him. The morbid inwardness of the conscientious person may pass away as sympathy ranges farther and group aims become clearer. The dreary stretches of duty may be covered by the rising tide of a common life.

CHAPTER XXIV

SOCIAL VALUATIONS

It is possible to distinguish impulsive desires from those which follow upon a judgment of approval. In the appetites for food, sex, and sleep, and the passions of love, jealousy, and revenge, the impulse precedes any imputation of worth.

Such desires arise as spontaneously as the sap mounts or the tree puts forth buds. But there are less imperious desires that wait upon judgments of approval. When not under the spur of the appetites and passions, man shows himself a reasonable being by directing his endeavors toward "goods," *i.e.* objects which his judgment tells him are the causes of pleasure. When his vision is undimmed by the mounting of hot desire, he selects *values* as the goal of his endeavor. In his reflective moments he reviews the possible experiences that beckon to him and passes upon them various judgments of approval or disapproval, attaches to them different degrees of esteem. As are these valuations, so will be his choices and his conduct.¹ Now, this habit of letting "I would" wait upon "I approve" gives society a new opening in its struggle with the anti-social man. Can it not persuade him to adopt its valuation of the goods of life?

Civilization is not simply the progress of the arts,

¹ Most illuminating on this point is Professor Giddings ("Principles of Sociology," Bk. IV, ch. iii), to whose exposition I am much indebted.

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it is also the growth of wants in number and variety and the shifting of the accent from type to type. Food, drink, shelter, sex make up the animal group of wants. To this are added in the higher mammals curiosity and the desire for play and for companionship. Early man begins to be urged on by love of colors, of ornament, of noise, of rhythmic action in unison (dancing), by desires for festivity, converse, collective excitement, and social esteem. In the historic period the scale of wants is gradually extended by the spread of new habits of pleasure—friendship and the higher forms of love, sympathetic pleasures, music, the delight of power, the charm of the beautiful, poetic and religious feeling, intellectual activity, the quest for truth, the thrill of the on-looker, cosmic emotion, and a multitude of others hard to name or classify. Now this development of wants has been hastened by a development of social values. The ascent of the individual, in its later stages especially, has been assisted and presided over by society.

Whence comes that mounting of desire which gives us moral civilization? How is it that men come to spend themselves for excellence or knowledge instead of for booty or women? Shall we credit the ascent of Pisgah to the seers and poets, who, like Merlin, have caught the splendor of a new gleam and beckoned the multitude to follow it? Was it Isaiah who enamoured humanity of justice, Æschylus who charmed it with heroic duty, Dante who made purity precious, Petrarch who taught men how to love, Thomas a Kempis who made the spiritual life inviting, Goethe who gave self-culture supreme value? Certainly they reached a helping hand to the mounting human spirit. These men of insight and imagination have done their part in pioneering our race up from the bog of animal satis-

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So long as the "old Adam" rekindles in his descendants selfish or base desires, it is impossible for social valuations to rise clear of private judgments. But in any case their plane is higher, and so far as they influence man at all, they will draw him upward and fit him for society.

To this "spontaneous generation" of social values we must add the zeal of an élite to spread its desires, tastes, and moral opinions. This is a factor by no means to be despised. Some view the progress of society as the trailing of an ill-organized procession along the street — quickstep at the front, but the rear straggling out indefinitely. That is to say, advance takes place by the superior practice, belief, or want overcoming the inferior, and so passing from man to man, from class to class, from people to people. It is thus, for example, that the use of soap or underwear or forks or wedding journeys becomes common.

The fact is, however, the van of this procession is not content to be followed by who will and at such interval as pleases him, but actively urges and forces the stragglers to close up ranks. In other words, we progress not merely by imitation of example, but partly by response to insistent suggestion. In the classic world, it is true, the élite was fain to draw apart for the pursuit of its refined enjoyments and leave the rude multitude to its gross pleasures and brutal amusements. But such cleavage betrayed old race lines. The Prophets, the élite of Israel, never stood so aloof; and Christianity was born with the imperishable instinct to impregnate the meanest man with its soul. At one time even the Church seemed about to fall under the sway of an intellectual syndicate that echoed the sneer of Basilides, "I speak for one in a thousand, the rest are dogs and swine." But

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the democratic instincts of the Church threw off the yoke of the Gnostics, and the élite went on with the great missionary task of spreading their desires and valuations throughout society. For a thousand years sacred culture sought to leave upon every man, even the nethermost slave and serf, its impress. Then secular culture became missionary and proselyting, and for three centuries we have seen it striving by means of education to imbue every human being with those tastes and views we term "civilized," or at least to equip him with a knowledge of letters that shall put him *en rapport* with the élite of the race.

Let me be understood. It is not society that kindles strange longings or invents new pleasures, but superior individuals. Society can only await these Prometheans and spread broadcast the fire they have stolen from the gods. If a people can provide no élite to discover the ideal goods, the higher tastes do not develop. Where, as with Carthaginians or Turks, the initiatives are lacking in those aspirations, interests, and pursuits which constitute *civilization in the person*, the power of the society to influence the valuations of its members can avail but little.

To the influence of the *conventional* and the influence of the *élite* must be added the force of *tradition*. Whatever once dominates society acquires in time authority and prestige by reason of the overlapping and dovetailing of generations. The impersonal products of the past — institutions, beliefs, valuations — become semi-independent factors, working along with living men and women in shaping the life of the present. Becoming fixed in literary and artistic traditions, religious systems, moral theories, and worldly wisdom, the social valuations are skilfully brought to bear on

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the minds of the young in home and church and school and social life, till they become a stanch but unseen prop of the social order.

Just how will social valuations be employed?

In the first place, those qualities by which a people overcomes its enemies and maintains an orderly common life—courage, justice, honesty, fidelity—become “virtues,” and are conceived as ends in themselves. In all early wisdom they are natively compared to gems, jewels, fine gold, king’s treasures, or beautiful damsels. Later on they are lifted quite away from ordinary goods and become incomparable “moral values.” It is then that qualities become “good” and “evil” instead of merely “good” and “bad.” By so much as our striving away from “evil” exceeds in energy our striving away from the “bad,” by so much is a control of values to be esteemed above a control of moral notions. For the power of praise or dispraise is the power to create good and evil, and the power to create good and evil is the power to guide the choices of men.

In the second place, those pleasures which are exclusive, collision-provoking, or liable to excess are steadily depreciated. Wise would be the leader who should get his pack to bay the moon instead of fighting over a bone; for there are not enough bones, but there is enough moon. Wise, too, is the sage who diverts men from the dangerous pleasures of sex and property. The love of money and money’s worth threatens order at many points. It saps every ideal and standard that society sets up. It undermines the loyalty of the soldier, the impartiality of the judge, the honesty of the official, the self-devotion of the pastor, the disinterestedness of the artist, the probity of the business man, the fidelity of the servant, the chastity of

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the woman. It is, then, not to be wondered at that society wars against mammonism and extols self-improvement and self-realization.

Again, the sexual instinct being socially disruptive is habitually dismissed with slanting allusion and contempt. In all schedules of social forces the great motor, concupiscence, cuts, indeed, a sorry figure. Then feasting and drinking, orgy and fighting, so rarely esteemed by natural men, come to be frowned upon. First deemed to be sinful, then abominable, they are finally declared to be evils and not goods. Thus the gorging, mating, and fighting animal gets metamorphosed into a creature of fine tastes and noble aims. And yet these crude pleasures bulk so largely with actual men that we cannot regard the low appraisal everywhere openly put upon them as a true consensus of opinion. It is a conventional valuation resembling the sacro-sanct distinction between "clean" and "unclean" in the flesh of animals.

In the third place, society "appreciates" the safe pleasures—those, like companionship, converse, or sport, which are *coöperative*; those, like the enjoyment of nature or music or works of art, which are *inexclusive*; those, like health or beauty or humor or knowledge or personal excellence, which flow from what we *are* instead of from what we *possess* and hence *can be expanded without limit and without clash* with others; those which, being *ideal*, do not wastefully consume strength and life. The appetites and passions would tear society to pieces. But the pursuit of these pleasures confirms and perfects men in their association. A luring in this direction by high appraisals is, therefore, as valid a control as the thunders of a Sinai.

It is chiefly in the attitude of men toward non-physical goods that such influences are decisive.

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The more life escapes from the creature-needs, the more it obeys the movements of the social baton. Control by valuations is, therefore, a late development, being most marked in the era of a diffused economic surplus, leisure, and a high standard of living. Then only will the finger-post pointing to home, social pleasure, knowledge, and contemplation be heeded.

The conspiracy of Occidental philosophy, ethics, and literature to deprecate ambition and striving is a striking example of social valuation. It is certainly not an individual valuation. That dry rot which sets a race against strong emotions and strenuous effort is not yet our fate. There are, of course, over-spanned wills that turn gladly to quiet, meditation, and faint emotions. But the quietism that sounds like a minor chord through the art and faith of the most striving, pushing, overcoming people of history, the English race, is not the mere expression of individual feeling. The accent is put on "tranquillity," "serenity," "quiet and freedom of spirit," "inward calm," "still and quiet conscience," because the group instinctively seeks to blunt the greed, ambition, and enterprise of its members. Hence, the quietism running through our religion testifies, not to the weakness of our desires, but to their excessive and dangerous strength. What irony in the spectacle of men banding themselves into churches to uphold the worth of detachment and spiritual serenity, while each is driven by some passion, low or high — greed, love, ambition, rivalry, the spirit of enterprise, or the zeal for activity !

That the valuations we are bred to are not native to us is shown by the way they are affected by experience. The oft-deplored falling away from the noble idealism of youth and the growth of sordidness as the years bring wisdom, betray the

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fact that we are trained to high-pitched social appraisals of things. This lament is heard only in higher societies, where the youth is carefully inoculated with a set of notions and enthusiasms intended to civilize and socialize him. With a people like the Uzbegs or Afghans, that have developed no such subtle and pervasive means of control, it is the young men with their passions and wilfulness that endanger the social order, and it is the old men who safeguard it.

It is shown also by the damage wrought by an alien culture. A people that has come to be steadied and guided by one of these artificial schedules of values is in a position of unstable equilibrium, and it needs only the example of strange delectations or contact with unfamiliar luxuries to arouse their lulled cupidity and inflame them with the lust of wealth. This is why early sociologists, like Lycurgus and Cato, have always dreaded and opposed the introduction of new, disquieting luxuries and more costly ways of living.

In this century we have listened to thinkers who deny that society needs to concern itself greatly with control. Dispensing with the sanctions of religion, the authority of moral ideas, and the compulsion of law, they point to democratic progress as the natural cure for moral ills. "Give free course," they say, "to the diffusion of light and the spread of new tastes. In the evolution of desires among an intelligent and prospering people, lies a better guarantee for order than jails and churches, Scriptures and Sunday Schools." Led by these ideas a considerable party makes "Enlightenment," "Progress," "Liberal Thought" the watchwords, not only for the increase of happiness, but, as well, for moral advance.

These ideas have a seeming justification in the

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undoubted fact that the great democratic diffusions of prosperity have been attended by an upward development of wants. But this is not due to the mysterious law that "the satisfaction of any want gives rise to a new want of higher order than the want whose place it takes,"¹ but to the fact that a conservative power in society presides over valuations, and consequently gives direction to the growth of desires. In mere multiplication of wants there is no guarantee of moral progress. A burst of prosperity is a spur in the flanks of egoism and not a curb. Too often there has been an evolution of wants that the social spirit was unable to control. Undoubtedly, with the growing passion for the sweets of philosophy, poetry, games, and drama, there went on, for a while, an ennobling and refining of Greek character. Nevertheless, in 60 A.D. the hope of the classic world lay not in the new desires that, fostered by the world's riches flung into the lap of Rome, were rapidly undermining the old simplicity, but in certain little, ascetic communities in the back streets of Ephesus and Philippi!

The unsuspected influence of conventional values is shown by the fate of the Humanists. The Humanist enjoyed release from authority, as does the man of to-day. But amid the great disruption of ideas at his time he was steadied by no such long-elaborated system of values as shapes the choices of the modern man. Consequently his attitude toward life was inadmissible, and he fell into ill-odor and contempt. What with his craving for praise, appreciation of the sensuous, contempt of a quiet life, scorn of domesticity, neglect of character, enthusiasm for ancient learning, worship

¹ Blair, "Human Progress," p. 168.

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of success, and apotheosis of genius, he made sad shipwreck. Such men could not be tolerated, and the Humanist's free and unconventional valuation of life came justly to be regarded as a dangerous distemper.

The new methods in mission work testify to the influence of valuations. To the old-time missionary, seeking to save souls by changing the heathen's religious beliefs and worship, succeeds a teacher and civilizer, striving to develop in his flock an appreciation of clothing, cleanliness, privacy, order, property, and home, the elementary goods of the white man. It is just this patient guidance of backward peoples along the path by which the civilized races have reached their present elevation that alone can save them. The lightning process of converting, baptizing, and veneering with a thin layer of morality makes the docile neophyte whose character collapses the moment the supporting hand is withdrawn. Such was the work of the Jesuits in California and Paraguay, in China and Japan, and such has been too much of the mission work of this century. The patient fostering of new wants and imparting of new standards of appreciation produce results less brilliant, but far more enduring.¹ A like change of method is taking place in the inner missions and social settlements dealing with the "cellars" and "swamps" of modern society. This change is,

¹ "These facts are better recognized by the missionaries to-day than they were sixty years ago, and they have in consequence made some changes in their methods. They are no longer so anxious to baptize, or so apt to reckon success by the number of their converts. . . . Perceiving that other influences ought to go hand in hand with religion in helping the natives forward, the missionaries now devote themselves more than formerly to secular instruction, and endeavor to train the people to habits of industry." — BRYCE, "Impressions of South Africa," p. 469.

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in fact, a return to the method by which the first missionaries civilized the barbarians. If we study the Rule of St. Benedict or the discipline enforced by St. Cuthbert or St. Dunstan, we perceive that the founders of monasticism aimed to alter the fundamental *values* of the novice. To wage war on gluttony, drunkenness, and fighting, the darling vices of Jute or Angle, by building up in the monks withdrawn into the sheltering cloister an appreciation of worship, learning, art, and labor — this was their secret. Without the monastic orders to introduce in a mild form the ascetic values that had grown up about the Mediterranean, the voracity, bibulousness, and sensuality of the Germanic tribes would have ruined them as soon as they had an economic surplus to dispose over.

The uplifting of the American negro is another field for the method of control by social valuations. It is now recognized that not churches alone will lift the black race; not schools; not contact with the whites; not even industry. But all of these coöperating can do it. The growth of new and higher wants, coupled with the training to new skill, is the best lever for raising the idle, quarrelling, sensual Afro-American. Certainly the infecting of the backward portion of the race with a high estimate of cleanliness, neatness, family privacy, domestic comfort, and literacy is quite as truly a moralizing agency as dread of future punishments or love for an ethical God.

The songs, ballads, proverbs, and tales that well up from the heart of the folk are instinct with a frank delight in meat and drink, in hues and sounds, in revel and song, in love and war, in freedom and danger. The native literature of Arab or Cossack or Magyar pictures his reigning pleas-

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ures in a way that startles while it charms the modern man. But when culture ceases to be local and of the folk, and becomes national and central, this fidelity to life is lost. Singer or sage may not thrive, save as he kotows to the notions that assist in moral government. In the country and the backwoods, in isolated rural communities and mountain settlements, the reigning estimates are shrewd and practical and racy of the soil. Here the values taught to children spring most directly from the lives and experiences of the people, and, while lacking in the high-pitched idealism we find in the tideways of culture, do really rule the choices of those who profess them. But when this indigenous culture dies out, and each community becomes dependent on a national literature, art, philosophy, or religion, the valuations it receives and supports drift ever farther from reality. The opening of a rift between what we command to our neighbors and what we adopt for ourselves cannot be avoided. It is the penalty for using gentle, inobvious forms of control. We cannot manage men by social suggestions, ideals, or valuations, unless these are *above* them. For sincerity and frankness let one betake himself to Kabyles or Bedouins. Genuineness is not for a society that prefers to maintain its social order by sweet seduction rather than by rude force.

CHAPTER XXV

THE GENESIS OF ETHICAL ELEMENTS—SELECTION AND SURVIVAL

IF we would understand how a race becomes acclimated in a new region,—the French in Algiers or the Dutch at the Cape,—we must make large use of the principle of selection and survival. The immigrants always vary considerably among themselves in power of resistance to the climate, and if we divide them into two equal groups, of those who are little suited to it, and those who are more suited to it, we shall find the death-rate much higher in the former group. This enables the offspring of the latter group to gain on the others, till in a few generations the immigrating race has, as it were, been made over and adapted to the new climate. This principle of unequal death-rates (or birth-rates) is the key, not only to acclimation, but to all manner of fitnesses in nature.

Now, something very like it is at work in society. There were many styles of gold-washing on the Sacramento in 1849; but one style was gradually found to be more convenient than the others, and became after a while the standard way of washing out gold, which newcomers adopted as a matter of course. A like weeding out of inferior individual practices brings to light a standard form of pot or tool or weapon, a standard mode of tilling or breeding, a standard sex relation or education of the young, which is uniform for all,

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possesses authority, and may be termed *a culture element*. Besides this evolution of customs and forms of life guided by the principles of convenience, there is an evolution of beliefs guided by the principle of verity. When many sayings concerning anything are afloat, opinions about dreams or sickness or darkness or weather or good luck, the high death-rate among them insures the triumph of those views which for the time and place seem to be the *truest*. In this way arise general beliefs; and in time such beliefs get a good deal of social force behind them.

Once an element has emerged triumphant from this rivalry, it becomes fixed in custom and remains thus shielded from competition, until, perhaps, it is confronted with a different practice or belief that has won the favor of some other group. Then deadly comparisons are made, and weeding out begins again. One of the great agencies in human progress, then, has been the extension of intercourse between peoples which have been working independently at civilization, for this brings in once more the healthy process of selection and survival, and permits an all-round advance in the culture elements. Here, for one thing, is the secret of the great historic cross-fertilizations of culture—Phœnicia with Egypt, Greece with the Orient, Israel with Hellenism, Christendom with the Moors, the Occident with India.

This struggle of rival elements of culture is by no means the same thing as the struggle between persons. When one race has overrun and trampled down another, it is always interesting to see if the spiritual contest of the two civilizations has the same issue as the physical contest of the two races. Will the upper civilization smother the lower, as in the case of the Spaniards and the

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Aztecs, the Germans and the Wends, the Romans and the Etruscans, the Saracens and the Roman Africans ; or will the one beneath grow up through and subdue the one above, as the Romans were captivated by Greek culture, the barbarians by Roman civilization, or the Mongols by Islam ?

The reader will hardly have failed to notice that in such forms of control as *public opinion, law, suggestion, personality*, there is a pretty direct and immediate management of one person by others. But in other kinds of control something comes between controller and controlled — some ideal, religious belief, symbol, or standard that is a necessary means in the business, and that is not originated for the particular occasion. The idea as to what is "nice" or "not nice" for a woman to do, the low appraisal put on "the flesh," the labels "right" and "wrong" pasted on to every species of action, the belief that "God sees," the doctrine that men are "brothers," the ideal known as "the good citizen," the symbol "Columbia"—these are examples of what we may call *ethical elements*, to distinguish them from other classes of culture elements. Now, some of these are very old. They are detached from persons and float free in the descending stream of culture. They are ownerless, unless we can regard them as the possession of society. In some cases we cannot trace them back to wise or good individuals. They seem rather to be the results of social reflection, products of what we might term the social mind.

In that case, how is their genesis to be understood?

It may be suggested that an ethical element, such as a social ideal or valuation, results from the compounding of many private admirations and estimates. Tom, Dick, and Harry, it may be said,

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cast their ideas on a subject into the common stock of ideas on that subject circulating about in the channels of social intercourse; and from this mingling there is precipitated after a time a typical or average opinion. Each ethical element, then, would be the expression of a consensus, the result of a vast social symposium. In the social mind would be formed a composite photograph of what Tom, Dick, and Harry have contributed to the common stock; and in this image would rise a social standard or estimate which could be used in the fashioning of individual character.

The weak point in such a theory of genesis is that it gives no room for moral progress. In conduct man has been lifted higher; and this not so much by an improvement of his nature as by the influence of ethical factors external to him. But if he has been pulled upward by certain elements, these must have been *ahead of* and *above* him, not simply on his level. If the ideal of "man," "gentleman," or "citizen" is simply an ungolden mean between the aspirations of the topmost and those of the bottommost people, then when it becomes a ruling force in the lives of individuals it is just as certain to drag some downward as to draw others upward. The ethical elements we have made so much of would then be as impotent to lift the average man as those heathen Canaanite deities of whom we read: "The attributes ascribed to them were a mere reflex of the attributes of their worshippers, and what character they had was nothing else than a personification of the character of the nation that acknowledged their lordship."¹

The fact is, the genesis of ethical elements, as well as the genesis of customs and beliefs, is a

¹ W. Robertson Smith, "The Prophets of Israel," p. 66.

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process of selection and survival. Just as the development of Zuñi or Lydian pottery is due to a competition which makes the handiest and handsomest form of pot the prevailing type, and to the renewal of this healthy competition whenever an inventive potter or a foreign art supplies a new pattern, so the improvement in the ethical standard of a civilization is due to the survival and ascendancy of those elements which are best adapted to an orderly social life.

Let us now follow closely the selections and rejections whereby the ideal or judgment of conduct that emerges and reigns in a body of associates comes to be so different from the actual ideals or judgments of the persons themselves. In the first place, it must be recognized that human intercourse is far from being a complete mutual uncovering, inasmuch as converse is a social act implying a willingness to tolerate and a wish to please. Without assuming that "language is given us to conceal thought," we can yet safely say that only a part of the contents of one's mind is communicated to others. How much is withheld for fear of disagreeable consequences! How much is kept back lest it stir up trouble and widen the space between people! How often an exploring party has kept on longer than any one wished because each dreaded to speak out! How often a body of reluctant men have carried through a mad enterprise because each feared his protest would meet with jeers! In their baptism of fire, recruits conceal a "blue funk" under an assumed nonchalance; and this serves as a reassuring badge of the courage that the company as a whole exhibits and finally inspires in its members. The suddenness of recoil one sometimes witnesses in the retreat of a garrison, the abandonment of a strike, or the collapse of a boom is due

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to the fact that in a body of men the inner tension may become very great before some one speaks the word every one is thinking, and so breaks the spell. Locked in a kind of charm we run farther and farther out on the dizzy trestle of make-believe, till, as in Hans Christian Andersen's Tale of the Invisible Clothes, the truth is blurted out and we drop to the solid ground of fact.

These striking cases of reserve illustrate the truth that all speech has reference to the hearer. The communication by which associates come to have ideas and ideals in common is carried on in a propitiatory spirit, and is more or less seasoned to the taste of the listener. If it be otherwise, if intercourse becomes an avowal of hostile intentions or a mutual hurling of defiance, all friendly talk is soon broken off, and association ends in flight or avoidance. This being granted, it is easy to see that a man will prudently lock within his own breast those notions and projects which are so egoistic and aggressive that nobody else can share them. He will cast into the stock of ideas circulating through the capillaries of intercourse only those which are not hateful or shocking to his hearer.¹ What the Thug proposes to his fellow-Thug is to butcher some third person. What the Bedouin imparts to Bedouins is not his admiration of stealing, but his admiration of stealing *from outsiders*. The Dyaks, talking of scalps about a camp-fire, may praise the taking of heads, but not

¹ "Though it may be true . . . that every individual in his own breast naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can never go along with him, and that, however natural soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to them." — ADAM SMITH, "Theory of the Moral Sentiments," Vol. I, Part II, § ii, ch. ii, p. 168.

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the taking of heads from each other. Yet, if they tell us true, just that project may lurk in the recesses of each Dyak's mind. Blackfeet do rob each other; but the only predatory project that can be openly talked of, justified, and glorified in the council lodge is the robbery of aliens like Crows or settlers. The talk of a band of Mohocks about a tavern table will dilate, not on the fun of maltreating one of their own number, but on the fun of sallying out and baiting the belated burgher.

So at the very outset the contents of the social mind are morally superior to the contents of the ordinary individual mind. The stream is purer than the springs that feed it, because so much badness is stopped at the source. Now let us see, furthermore, what happens to the matter actually thrown into the channels of intercourse. Just what is the nature of the selection and survival that takes place there?

The clumsier ways of making pots or carts perish by refusal to imitate, the sillier beliefs about sickness or spirits by refusal to adopt. But the more sinister ideals and appraisals are eliminated chiefly by refusal to communicate. A man may take up with an anti-social idea, but he hesitates to pass it on. Occasionally a thief declares the propriety of "saving one's own bacon," but the sentiment that circulates most easily in thief-dom is the vileness of "splitting on one's pals." Whispers slip furtively from mouth to ear about "discretion" being "the better part of valor," but what the stay-at-homes shout to the warrior is, "Bring back your shield, or be brought back on it." Take Latins in small batches under tongue-loosening conditions, and you get chuckling confidences about feats of gallantry. Take the same men in larger groups, and the ideas and ideals of conjugal fidelity enjoy as much currency as they would among

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Anglo-Saxons. We must not forget that a man recommends to others, not what he likes, but what he likes others to like. The opinion of buccaneers is strangely disdainful of wassail and women till snug harbor is reached. The libertine is careful not to spread an appetite that might ravage his own family. It is the ex-predatory who have the most to say for the sacredness of the rights of property. Men, for the most part, take superior moral standards as they take coins, not for personal use, but to pass them on to the next man.

We see, then, that some of the ideas that are set afloat circulate readily, while others meet with difficulties in passing from man to man, and, like bad pennies, are always being rejected. In other words, there are moral ideas of short circuit and moral ideas of long circuit. The wicked ideas are not put into circulation so often as the good ones, and they drop out sooner. The ideas which propitiate, inspire confidence, and draw men closer pass up and down conversational channels till, like worn coins, the image and superscription of the utterer are effaced, and they are imputed to the public,—or to human nature,—passing current in its name and authority.

It is just this selection which explains the snug fit of early ethical elements to the needs of the group that develops them. Many of our modern moral notions have been generalized till they are out of relation to the welfare of any particular group. They prescribe a certain conduct toward *all men*. Primitive ethics, however, exhibits a strange double standard. Thus and thus must you treat your clansman, but on the stranger you may wreak your will. Now, if the judgments of rude men about conduct spring from faintly stirring instincts of right, from a dim sense of the good, why is

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there an abrupt change at the frontier of the group? If in these standards of dealing with clansmen we have the gropings of a half-awake conscience, what becomes of this conscience when the stranger appears?

But if they develop very naturally by a process of unconscious adaptation out of the mental contacts and long intercourse of associates, it is the most natural thing in the world that these ethical elements should have a short radius of operation. The Tscherkesses of the Caucasus have developed an ideal that includes prowess in cow-lifting and is a great formative influence in the lives of the young Tscherkesses. Yet the cows it is so fine and noble to lift are never Tscherkess cows, but always the cows of the plainsmen. Whence this limitation? Clearly it is not the voice of the natural conscience. It is rather the outcome of unconscious adaptation. However the clansmen feel about *meum* and *tuum*, they cannot make a cult and a glory of lifting one another's cows. The only ideal that could possibly take root and grow up was the stealing of strange cows. The radius of the moral *tabu* is in very truth a function of association. If any section of the clan moves away, they can no longer keep the *tabu* wide enough to protect their cattle. If newcomers associate freely with the clansmen, they can probably widen the *tabu* till it covers their herds. *For each element in a body of associates is able to influence the trend of the selections in the group-mind, and thereby to modify to its own advantage the ethical equipment of the group.*

If we understand by *ethos* a body of related standards, ideals, and valuations, then we can say that a *social ethos* distinct from the private *ethos* is formed under the following conditions: First,

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the intercourse by which superior ethical elements are selected and gain currency must be long and intimate. Second, the individuals must not be very unlike or prepossessed by clashing traditions. Third, the group must not receive many strangers or have close contact with alien groups. Fourth, there must be a matrix of folk-lore, religion, literature, or art, in which the ethical gains may be embedded and held fast. Fifth, the new ethical varieties are not safe from swamping until they have entered into tradition and the young have been reared under them.

Hitherto, when the genesis of ethical civilization has been considered, the sociologist has stood aside and let the psychologist step to the desk. But if the fitness of the ideals and standards that become paramount in the group is due to a blind selection for which nobody deserves any credit, then we no longer need trace the ethical strand in a civilization to the individual conscience. We do not need to start from a native sense of right and wrong. Men do not need to be sheep in order to develop the ethos of the herbivore. Even in a band of brigands or buccaneers there spring up after a while certain conventions that are moral. The conscience of the social group, as soon as it appears, is several points better than the private conscience, *just because* it is social. A wholly wicked idea, in being imparted to another, becomes a little less wicked, because now it excludes the thought of evil toward him. And a wickedness that can be communicated to and adopted by all persons in the group can be directed only against outsiders. There is honor among thieves because they mingle, and so arrive at a professional ethics. Pirates develop among themselves a *tabu* on pirate property because they live together. Accomplices develop

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a double standard of right, and the morality of primitive groups everywhere is nothing else at bottom than the morality of accomplices. The old notion that only men with good innate ideas can initiate a moral civilization is too much like the saying, "Who drives fat oxen must himself be fat."

In insisting that ethical elements may and do grow up in a natural way out of peaceable intercourse, we do not mean to say that by this means men can get very far or rise very high. No advanced race has come by its moral heritage in just this way. Such noble ethical achievements as the character of Jehovah, the Persian dualism, the Stoic ideal, or the Beatitudes cannot be ascribed to slow evolution. They are as much the creation of genius as are the higher gains in the arts and sciences. The reason why standards cannot become very exacting or ideals very high by way of selection and survival is that they can never rise quite clear of the vulgar, private fact. The conventional valuations of things cannot shake themselves quite loose from the sensual views of the individual. The ideal that triumphs in the social mind is anchored close to earth by the base admirations of the common mortal. The notions of right that become sole legal tender in the community are tainted by the sweat and grime of the private hands they must pass through. Not entirely can the ideal disengage itself from human clay.

The "volunteer crop" of morality that springs up quickly and passes into the tradition of tribes of Arabs or Samoyeds or redskins or negroes, is marked by a regard for the obvious and near-lying conditions of individual welfare. It is sure to exalt personal prowess and martial courage, and

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to frown upon murder, wanton aggression, theft, arson, malicious injury to property, adultery, false witness, the settlement of disputes by violence, or the use of unfair weapons such as poison. But when the harm of a line of conduct is not so clear and plain, it is ignored until the far-sighted few set up stricter standards. The development of the clan ethos in disapproval of lying, slander, vengeance, gambling, drunkenness, unchastity, feud, exposure of infants, or the sacrifice of widows, as well as the discovery of new forms of old vices and new corollaries of old virtues, is usually traceable to superior persons who see farther than the rest into the consequences of conduct and the laws of well-being.¹

¹ The account of the prophets of the American Indians found in the Fourteenth Annual Report of the U.S. Bureau of Ethnology shows distinctly how much the ethos of the tribes owes to the reflections of commanding individuals. See especially pp. 777-783 for the moral teachings spread by Wovoka the Messiah.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE GENESIS OF ETHICAL ELEMENTS CONTINUED—THE ELITE

THE distinct and separate ethical threads that are woven into a civilization are rarely of anonymous origin. They can usually be traced back to men of unusual insight into the requisites of good personal and social life. The humble beginnings of a social ethos can be conceived as the outcome of a folk-evolution. But its later and higher stages require the inventive genius. As the origin of a form of pot or hoe is likely to be more anonymous than that of the printing press or the sewing machine, so the origin of a *tabu* on clan property is likely to be more anonymous than that of the Golden Rule. We can account for the clan ethos by selection, but we need invention to explain the rise of a national or a race ethos. If this is so, we ought to be able to trace back the leading ethical possessions of the higher races to the influence of the few or the one.¹ Let us see if this can be done.

¹ "No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted or instructed One or Few. The initiative of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals, generally at first from some one individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative." — J. S. MILL, "On Liberty," p. 119.

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It is usual to explain the ethical monotheism of Israel by a Semitic genius for religion. But, as a matter of fact, the religions of other Semitic stocks, such as Phœnicia, Moab, or Edom, never came to anything. They were not even as respectable as the religion of the primitive Celts or Germans. What gave the faith of Israel its wonderful career was its conception of an ethical God. At first the national god of Israel was not distinct from the gods of the neighboring nations. He had made Israel his chosen people because Israel covenanted to give him worship. He was interested, not in the morals of his people, but in their loyalty to him. When evils and disasters suggested that Jehovah was estranged, his people thought to win him back by greater zeal in acts of external worship.

Later, however, we find Jehovah comes to be unlike Moloch, Melkarth, or Chemosh, the deities of the other Semitic peoples. It was discovered that he loved mercy and not sacrifice, obedience and not the fat of lambs. In him was no variableness. His will was steadily directed toward a moral aim and could not be turned aside by flattery or offerings. His dealings with his people aimed to lead them on "to higher things than their natural character inclined toward. To know Jehovah and to serve him aright involved a moral effort—a frequent sacrifice of natural inclination."¹

Now this holy and righteous God, who championed absolute justice without weakness and without caprice, was the discovery of a handful of men, namely the Reforming Prophets. Amos, whose Jehovah is an upright judge unbribable by firstlings or praise; Hosea, whose Master hates injustice and falsehood and requires, above all, righteous conduct;

¹ W. Robertson Smith, "The Prophets of Israel," p. 67.

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Isaiah, whose Lord will have mercy only on those who relieve the widow and the fatherless — these were the spokesmen of a minority that finally destroyed the national character of the old religion and founded ethical monotheism. The folk were not in sympathy with the leaders who sought to impose this higher deity, and only amid continual struggles with the recalcitrant, backsliding Hebrews was the moral reform carried through.

It is again to an élite that we can trace the ethical tendencies in the old Greek religion. The gods of the Greeks were mere nature gods, and had at first little interest in the conduct of their worshippers. Like all superior human beings, they demanded cleanliness and comeliness in those who would approach them acceptably. Defilement, at first physical in character, debarred from intercourse with the god until certain purificatory rites had been performed. But after a time the idea grows up that not liturgical impurity alone, but moral guilt as well, debars from public worship. Wrong-doing is conceived as leaving a smirch or stench most abominable to the senses of the gods. This offensiveness can be removed, if at all, only by moral means, that is, by expiation, atonement, or reparation. Through such regulation of the terms of admission to public worship the gods were utilized to promote peace and obedience. Later, indeed, some of this ground was lost, and the philosophers, like Xenophanes and Heraclitus, found public worship in Greece useless and superstitious.

Now, the belief that the guilt of a worshipper gives offence to the god, and that only in innocence can men approach the altar, was not due to the slow, spontaneous clarifying of the popular consciousness or to selection and survival among the various notions men formed of the godhead. It was the discovery

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of an élite. . The doctrine seems to have radiated from the masters of the Apollo cult at Delphi, and to have been diffused by pious singers and by poets like Pindar. Says Pfleiderer: "The rules to be observed in conducting the purificatory rites were fixed by the priesthood of Delphi, and by tradition and public law received public sanction over the whole of Greece."¹

A system of law that functions without the civil arm is an ethical element in a civilization; and such a system is always the creation of the intelligent few. The law of Manu was not a code actually administered, but a *résumé* of what a small enlightened caste thought the law ought to be. The Law of Israel was worked out and interpreted by doctors and scribes who discussed its provisions freely among themselves, but presented an unbroken front to the outside world. The long apprenticeship required for admission to the learned caste, and the contrast between the freedom of thought within the four walls of the school of the law and the reticence observed outside the school, show that the Thorah was the instrument of the Pharisees and not the custom of the people.²

For more than four centuries one of the great possessions of the classic world was the ideal of a life lived by a plan, a life superior to the play of the emotions, framed in accordance with reason, and having the beauty of unity, simplicity, and symmetry. Such an ideal becomes the parent of the political and civic virtues as soon as human law and justice are regarded as the dictate, in the field of social relations, of that Reason which rules the universe, and which it is a man's duty to put

¹ "The Philosophy of Religion," Vol. IV, p. 243.

² Bragin, "Die frei-religiösen Strömungen im alten Judenthume," pp. 78-79.

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himself in line with. Now, this ideal of life was created and perfected by a handful of men, the Stoic philosophers, who succeeded in combining the Hebrew earnestness about right and justice with the Hellenic ideals of beauty and wisdom.

The romantic ideal of love we owe to an artistic élite, the Troubadours. Arising from the sentiments felt by wandering lyrists for great ladies far above them in social position, this ideal was spread by their songs through the castles and courts of mediæval Europe. There it blended with the ideals of chivalry, and thence it has passed downward through the people until it bids fair to govern the sentiments between young men and women in western societies.

The knightly ideal exalting valor, loyalty, courtesy, and generosity was perfected within a religious-military caste. Since the days of the crusades nothing has been done to make that ideal more lofty or more attractive. But at first its virtues were of the few and for the few. Since then we have universalized them, making them binding in the treatment of all ranks; and by modifying the pattern of the knight into that of the gentleman, the chivalrous ideal has been fitted to become a reigning personal ideal in an industrial society.

In like manner Bushido, the knightly ideal that has been, and still is, the mould of Japanese character, was perfected within the fighting caste of *Samuri*. Says Dr. Nitobe: "As the sun in its rising first tips the highest peaks with russet hue, and then gradually casts its rays on the valley below, so the ethical system which first enlightened the military order drew in course of time followers from amongst the masses." "In manifold ways has Bushido filtered down from the social class where it originated, and acted as leaven among the

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masses, furnishing a moral standard for the whole people. The precepts of knighthood, begun at first as the glory of the élite, became in time an aspiration and inspiration to the nation at large; and though the populace could not attain the moral height of those loftier souls, yet *Yamato Damashii* (the soul of Japan) ultimately came to express the *Volksgenit* of the Island Realm.¹

It is perhaps in respect to men's valuations rather than their ideals that the influence of an élite is most marked. The prophet is the master of enthusiasms and detestations; but to the superior class it is given to modify the estimates of men. One line of improvement has consisted in drawing people away from turbulent pursuits liable to bring them into collision. Our ancestors, the primitive Germans, passed their time in drinking, gaming, and brawling, leaving industry to women and thralls. Their conversion to regular toil was not owing to contact with Rome. In the classic world slavery had put a stigma on all manual labor. The great work-tradition of the Germanic race is traceable to the Benedictine monks, who in the Dark Ages taught from a thousand monasteries the lesson that labor is worthy and pious.² Again, it was the Puritan minority that championed the quiet, home pleasures and induced the English to give up the old, orgiastic, communal pleasures so prolific of harm. In India the taste for learning and the contemplative pleasures has spread from one small section of the Brahmin caste.

The spread of the superior ideal or valuation developed in the bosom of an élite is not wholly by

¹ "Bushido," pp. 105, 108.

² See Montalembert, "The Monks of the West."

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the contagion of example. The van of the social procession urges and stimulates the rear to a double-quick. The few press their desires, tastes, and opinions upon the many. Prospero busies himself with the teaching of Caliban. This may be because it is to the interest of the few to get their ethical contribution generally accepted. Or, the Hebrew or Puritan notion of joint, national responsibility may spur the élite to an active campaign against ways of living or acting that might draw down on the nation the divine wrath. Again, when the general social consciousness is intense as compared with the class-, caste-, or sect-consciousness, we find in the possessors of the superior ethical view a disinterested eagerness to press it on the rest. The proselyting, missionary spirit is awakened and inspires the minority to leaven the entire lump with their new ideal.

The ethical capital of a race is increased, not only by the contributions of minorities, but by those of individuals as well. The first elements of a social ethos may be spontaneously generated within a body of associates. The development of an ethical content in old local cults may be due to the influence of a priesthood. New value-scales that favor social tranquillity may be worked out in a class of men with superior economic vision or in a better economic situation than the rest. But such sublime paradoxes as that enemies are to be loved, that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and that it is better to suffer than to do injustice, are the discoveries of genius. So at the beginning of many an ethical element stands the figure of the Great Man.

Pythagoras contends with the evils of a soft and luxurious society by reviving the Dorian ideal of **abstinence** and hardihood. Confucius contributes

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to Chinese civilization the Silver Rule and the majestic outlines of the "superior man." Zoroaster assists the transition from nomadism to tillage with new moral standards, fortified by a book of account and a last judgment. In his injunctions looking to the welfare of agriculture, the extermination of noxious animals, and the care of useful ones, we recognize the sage pioneer of progress. Mahomet, with his discovery of the just and compassionate Allah, creates among heathen nomads an ethical monotheism that becomes the cornerstone of a great civilization. Buddha puts new meanings into good and evil, and re-values the objects of human endeavor. St. Francis charms his age with his glowing ideal of a life of pure love freed from the servitude to material things. George Fox makes an appeal to the inmost self that evokes the Quaker conscience.

Whence comes the great man's ethical contribution? Shall we credit it all to his conscience or to his religious inspiration? No, we ought rather to lay it to his superior social insight. Usually the ethical grandee appears, as did Confucius or Amos or St. Francis, at a time of disorder, anarchy, and misery. He gazes upon society as the compassionate man looks upon a fever patient. Calmly he makes his diagnosis, thoughtfully he ponders the relation of symptom to deep-seated cause. "Here thou ailest," he says, "and here." Then confidently he proclaims his remedy. The prophet is therefore more than "one who pities men." He is a sociological genius. He divines the secret of peaceful union. He knows the terms on which men can dwell happily together. He utters the formula for coöperation. Confucius, with his doctrine of the five relations; Zoroaster, with his principle of purity in thought, word, and

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deed; Pythagoras, with his ascetic ideal; Jesus, with his maxim of returning good for evil—each brings his prescription. Each comes forward as a social physician.

There are prophets, however, who envisage a personal as well as a social problem. They offer *redemption*, pointing out the way of salvation, not for men alone, but even for man. Buddha believing that man is the dupe of his will to live provides escape along the eight-fold path. Zeno sees that man is the sport of inherited appetites and affections, and can be saved only by that spark of the Universal Reason which has been implanted in his breast. Epicurus finding man in bondage to custom, or superstitious fears, or speculative abstractions, invites him to break away and enter on the quest of happiness. St. Paul beholds the unhappy struggle of the spiritual man with the natural man, and offers salvation by grace.

The genius who is to impress the mind of coming generations as the hand impresses the waxen tablet, does not commend his ideal on the ground that it is good for society. He does not advertise it as a means of securing order. He knows that men will not do as they would be done by, or forgive injuries, or subject their impulses to reason, for mere utility's sake. The genius that succeeds takes high ground from the first. His way is not merely a better way of getting along together. He declares it the one possible path of life. It is the God-ordained type of living. It is prescribed by man's nature. It is the goal of history. It is the destiny of the race. So it comes to pass that the inventors of right and wrong, the authors of ideals, not only disguise their sociology **as ethics**, but often go farther and disguise their

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ethics as religion. The magistral tone of the heaven-sent prophet drives home the message of a Zoroaster, an Isaiah, or a Mahomet. It is possible, indeed, for a secular thinker like Confucius to succeed. But, for the most part, men of the religious temperament are the ones who impress their ideals. No doubt there have lived hundreds of geniuses with sufficient insight into life and society to improve on the ideals of their time. But they have failed to score. Their message has not been listened to. The world has hearkened only to the seer of visions and dreamer of dreams.

There is another condition of prophetism that favors the religious enthusiast. Emphasis and the lofty tone can easily be counterfeited by the pretender. How, then, mark the true prophet from the false? How tell the disinterested sage from the ambitious impostor? The masses have met this difficulty by applying the rude but effective test of *renunciation*. They will not receive a sterner ideal unless the author renounces all that common men strive for. The false prophet makes his success the stepping-stone to power and ease; while the true prophet puts the world beneath his feet. Hence, the locusts and wild honey, the staff and the sheepskin, have always been the sure credentials of the moral reformer. Even to-day, in most countries, it is the *yogi*, the fakir, or the saint, who wins authority over the popular mind in matters of conduct.¹

¹ "We were surprised to find last year that the Gonds of an extensive tract in the Rewah state had given up drinking; and on inquiry we found out the reason to be the *fiat* of a yogi who had visited the state the year before. His order had gone forth from village to village, and the Gonds without question had become total abstainers." — BOSE, "Hindoo Civilization during British Rule," Vol. I, p. xi.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE MAINTENANCE OF ETHICAL ELEMENTS

THE moment a hill is lifted above the plain the agents of erosion begin to wear it down. The moment a finer type of animal is bred it is liable to be swamped by crossing with scrubs. So the moment there is reared above the common feelings about conduct — the folk ethos — a set of ideals and standards good for the group — the social ethos — this superior set is subject to strains tending to lower it. It would be natural to expect folk ethos and social ethos to modify each other until they are assimilated ; and in this case, of course, the folk ethos would yield the less because it is rooted in the instincts of the race. Now, as a matter of fact, the social ethos worked out by superior men or classes does not always sag and decline. For centuries it may keep its high plane, drawing the people up to it rather than sinking down towards them. Here, then, is a problem. If the social ethos steadily exalts righteousness while the individual values power, if it continues peace-loving while the heart of the folk is warlike, if it stays austere while the common man is sensual, there must be forces that hold up the higher elements stiffly against the influence of natural gravity. What are these conserving forces ? In other words, how are ethical elements maintained in their pristine strength and purity ?

For one thing, ethical gains are safe once they

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have been fixed in the heart of folk tradition. A Sacred Book, for instance, is a wonderful vehicle for transmitting without loss perishable spiritual products. While Mahomet was yet alive an important city like Taif could offer to become Moslem if he would modify his commands against usury, adultery, and wine. But at his death the canon of the Koran was closed. All this gristle became bone, and there was no longer any danger of lowering the standards of Islam. The Bible is another conserver. However the ideals of the Prophets and of Jesus may be alloyed with baser metal, the pure gold can always be recovered in the Scriptures. It is, then, by embedding them in recorded art, literature, or religion, that ethical gains may be held and moral progress insured. Without fixation in a book or caste the teachings of the moral prophet are soon debased and lost; but a gain fixed in the transmitted culture may enter after a time into the folk ethos and thus form the platform for a new lift.

The *dead*, then, armed with the lever of tradition, are the first contingent to support the ethical elements. The second contingent is composed of *parents*. By the overlap of their lives the parent has great power in forming the character of the child. If, now, the parent passes on just his private ethos, that is, the views and feelings that really govern his actions, there is no gain from this ascendancy. But if he instils the superior social standards and ideals he becomes thereby their prop and bulwark. Now, what is the actual policy of parents? Observation will show, I think, that the influence of the parent is, on the whole, uplifting. When a higher ethics is abroad, the father frequently favors it more in shaping his son's character than in shaping his own. He

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wants the boy to be a little more sober, chaste, honest, and truthful than himself. Often the sum of his exhortation is, "Do as I say and not as I do." It would be too cynical to say that the sire knowingly lays upon his sons a burden he will not himself take up. But it is certain that he forgets to allow in them for that passion and self-will which is the secret and excuse of his own shortcomings. At the *début* of each of the historical peoples the fathers are content, just as they are among nature folk, to be faithfully copied by their sons. But later, when a social ethos stretches above them from horizon to horizon, an inner conflict breeds discontent; and this discontent is more potent in modelling the character of their children than in remodelling their own character. The influence of parents, then, is one of the forces that prevent social ideals and standards from sagging to the vulgar level.

The third and by far the most interesting contingent is what we may call *the party of order*. The solid nucleus of this contingent consists of those professionally interested in the work of control. In an army it is the duty of the officers to key up discipline. On a ship it is the task of the captain and his mates to provide the needed bossing. In a factory it is the business of the foremen to hold up the level of organization among the hands. In a dependency good order is the professional concern of the pro-consul and his staff. So there exist in society *professionals* whose first business it is to keep up the tension. Rulers, priests, schoolmasters, magistrates, and others told off to wield the instruments of control are expected to keep them bright and clean. By their training and affiliations they are cut off from those on whom they bind the yoke. They no more care to

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make it easy for men than the "broncho buster" cares to make it easy for the broncho. Their attitude toward us weak mortals is that of Frederick the Great toward his fleeing soldiers: "You hounds! Do you want to live forever?" Specialized for control, though to a less degree, are lawmakers, publicists, editors, educators, "social leaders," and "pillars of society"—those, in short, who cannot well "succeed in life" unless they lend an unflagging support to the standards and ideals of the group.

After the professionals come the *stabilists*, or those who stake most on good order and cannot fish save in still waters. Such are officials, property owners, traders, masters of industry, business men and those affiliated with them. Order is a benefit to nearly everybody in society; but these classes, by reason of their situation, realize it with peculiar keenness. Their interest calls for a closely articulated system of rights and duties, well lived up to. Too much a play to individual will or caprice deranges their calculations and upsets their projects. They are the firm upholders of such standards as affect property and contract, and such ideals as inspire business honor and probity.

Finally we have the *ethical élite*, embracing those who have at heart the general welfare and know what kinds of conduct will promote this welfare. They must be wise enough to perceive the social value of sobriety, monogamy, or veracity, and disinterested enough to champion the standards that make for these practices. By reason of their ethical feeling they are superior to the other groups in the party of order. The others want *order*, any kind of order, while the élite stand for an order that is *right*, one that squares with their instincts of sympathy and fair play.

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But we must not suppose that this élite includes only the handful of saints. It is possible to uphold good rules without obeying them ; to love and sincerely champion an ideal without being able to live up to it. The cause of order may count among its friends all those who, looking abroad upon the social ant-heap, incline toward stringency. That they succeed in practising as moral agents what they support as on-lookers is not absolutely necessary. Whatever be their secret behavior under temptation, the conservatism of Pharisees, or Brahmins, or elders of the synagogue, or deacons of the kirk is still a measurable social force.

"You have cast a wide net," some one will say at this point. "If so many categories of men are among the upholders of the social ethos, would it not be safe to say that *society* maintains the superior ethical elements?"

It is a political commonplace that only an enlightened people can govern themselves ; but it is equally true that only an intelligent people can themselves maintain the ethical elements that lie at the base of the social order. Every detail of military discipline exists for the well-being or success of the fighting body. Troops clever enough to perceive this soon develop among themselves the standards and ideals that accord with this discipline, and thus lessen the strain on their leaders ; but ignorant troops do not. Hence the initiative of Sudanese soldiers and the officers of American volunteers is much to the profit of the latter. Now, what holds of army discipline is true of the greater social discipline. The shares of the many and the few in upholding standards is not the same in Madagascar as in Europe, not the same in Mexico as in Minnesota. Wherever people come to understand just what morality is for, their ethical emaci-

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minority that bound the Law upon the Semites of Palestine, a minority that put down the drinking of wine in Eastern countries, a minority that upheld Christian strictness against Saxon licentiousness, a minority that declared the Truce of God, and why it is a minority that in Burmah to-day upholds the fantastically humane ethics of Buddhism.¹ Our hundred years of community-making on the Western frontier is eloquent as to the part played by the active few in maintaining the ideals and standards elaborated in older communities. In the days before the railroad, the conquest of the American wilderness forced upon the pioneers an isolation which favored a return to the primitive practices of struggle, revenge, and feud. The actual development of law and amity within these communities was mainly the work of the circuit riders of bench, bar, and pulpit, whose special training fitted them to assert the superior canons of a highly cultivated society. "The Winning of the West" was in fact one vast, now almost forgotten, missionary enterprise, in which men standing firmly on the great traditions of law and religion contended with crime and sin. Moral laxity as well as political insubordination has characterized the bulk of our frontiersmen, and the warfare against gambling, horse-racing, fighting, and loose sex relations has usually been waged by the few. The great stiffening in the standards of morality and decency in Kentucky, at the beginning of this century, was due to the Methodist and Baptist preachers.² The temperance and anti-

¹ See Fielding, "The Soul of a People," chapters on "War" and "Monkhood."

² See Roosevelt, "The Winning of the West," Vol. IV, p. 249; and McMaster, "History of the People of the United States," Vol. II, p. 577 *et seq.*

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liquor movements likewise have originated in the apostolic zeal of clergymen and missionaries.¹

As a dam is strongest when it is built on the V plan, so the champions of a superior ethos offer the greatest resistance to folk inclinations when they are organized into a hierarchy. When they are few in number their only hope lies in forming themselves into a solid corps, cherishing distinctive ideals and standards and closed against the crude influences coming from the mass they work upon. The Jewish scribes were able to uphold their noble Deuteronomic Code in the face of popular "hardness of heart" because they drew apart from the rabble and learned to lean upon one another. The priests during the Dark Ages were able to assert their ideals of monogamy and sobriety against the rude barbarians in virtue of their freedom from lay dictation. The great work of Hildebrand that lifted the prostrate Church to her feet was nothing else than the perfecting of the hierarchy. Free and spontaneous as was Buddhism in the land of its birth, it took on the form of a hierarchical church when it came to civilize Thibet. One consideration that centralized public instruction in France was that in backward regions like Auvergne or Corsica the teaching of the schoolmaster ought to be independent of and superior to benighted local sentiment. In early San Francisco and Melbourne the power of refined people to uphold "good form" was vastly augmented the moment they found one another out and

¹ In the Kentucky mountains prohibitory laws "grew out of a popular reaction against the uncertain, lawless, terrifying régime of whiskey and bloodshed. The conviction gradually gained ground that liquor was the source of the evil. In creating this feeling missionaries and temperance workers took an important part"—GEORGE VINCENT, "A Retarded Frontier," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IV. p. 19.

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arranged themselves in that hierarchy known as "good society." The same contrast of higher and lower is seen in our Indian policy, although in this case the higher did not prevail. "A very curious feature of our dealings with the Indians," says Col. Roosevelt, ". . . has been the combination of extreme and indeed foolish benevolence of purpose on the part of the government, with, on the part of the settlers, a brutality of action which this benevolent purpose could in no wise check or restrain."¹

In a homogeneous people dwelling on a lofty and solid platform of moral tradition, it is practicable to let the agents of control—teachers, clergy, judges, sheriffs, and public prosecutors—reflect the wishes and sentiments of the community they work in, *i.e.* to let place and leading go according to the will of the people. But all great civilizing or levelling-up tasks must be committed to picked men organized apart and receiving their stimuli from a central independent source. Missionary boards find it wise in foreign work to make the native workers responsible to the missionaries, and not to their native flocks. In other words, churches that are democratic at home feel obliged to introduce something like episcopacy in the foreign field. The few thousand Englishmen among the millions of Hindoos can maintain European standards of law and justice chiefly because they are formed into the solid wedge of an administrative hierarchy. Japan could never have been reformed so rapidly on Western lines but for the leverage the reformers enjoyed in the Japanese civil and educational hierarchy. In the Mohammedan world aloofness is requisite to all leadership. Of the judges in a

¹ "The Winning of the West," Vol. IV, p. 316.

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Tunisian divan a traveller says: "To my eye accustomed to the swarthy Bedawys with heads and legs turned copper color by the bronzing sun of Africa, the delicate skins, fair as a child's, of these men presented a most suggestive contrast, denoting as it does the studious seclusion of their lives, the days and nights spent in pondering over the Koran and its code, a seclusion from which they never emerge, save to deal justice to the people out of the stored wisdom of their illuminated minds."¹

The apexed hierarchy that, like a triangular bracket supporting a mantel, holds up the moral platform upon which a people lives is usually in the closest contact with a tradition embodying the ethical elements that have been contributed by the prophets and élite of the past. Now and then history shows us a society where the sacred book is in the hands of the common man; but, for the most part, the stream of inspired or revealed wisdom does not run by the beaten highways so that all may repair to it. The literature that preserves and transmits the superior ideals and standards constitutes a special learning beyond the common ken. This literature the hierarchy guards with care, and studies with zeal. Protracted contact with it is the *sine qua non* on which new blood is admitted to the hierarchy. While its young recruits in the Rabbinical schools or the priestly seminaries or the church colleges or the law classes are acquiring the requisite learning, they are at the same time being formed in such a fashion that when *they* become leaders, there will be no sagging or gravitating toward the inferior folk ethos.

¹ Mrs. Greville-Nugent, "A Land of Mosques and Marabouts," p. 179.

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The specialized minority, then, that constantly radiates ethical stimuli into the uninstructed mass may group itself in two ways. It may be made up of the accredited possessors of traditional learning distinguished by common estimation into greater or lesser according to degree of proficiency. As examples of this loose organization we may instance the Scribes and Pharisees among the Jews, the clergy of the Reformed churches, the doctors and teachers of Roman law in the Middle Ages, and the learned clan that exercises authority in law, morals, and theology among the Mohammedans. Or, passing over to a more rigid organization, the minority may be made up of carefully graded holders of lucrative or honorific places, bound together as superior and inferior by relations of authority and obedience, and deriving the principle of appointment and promotion wholly from within. Something of this kind we find in the Roman Catholic hierarchy, in Russian Orthodoxy and Russian bureaucracy, and in the educational hierarchies that (I fear we must confess it) are growing up in certain of our modern states.

What the official hierarchy *can* do is to pitch high the standards of order, decency, and justice, and to hold them stubbornly against all debasing influences. What it frequently *does* do is to reshape them in its own interest until the means of social control degenerate into instruments of class control. The ecclesiastical hierarchy, for instance, becomes a means of getting money out of the people like the Papacy of the later Middle Ages, or the tool of a foreign domination like the Spanish church in old Mexico, or the prop of petty despots like the Lutheran churches of sixteenth-century Germany, or the instrument of absolutism like the Orthodox church in Russia, or the supple

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ally of a governing aristocracy like the Church of England during the eighteenth century.

What must be done in such cases is to break up the rigid organization, and put things into the hands of the genuine élite recruited freely from the people and unspoiled by class spirit. The ethical elements will then be brought into line with healthy ethical sentiment and with the common welfare. In the department of religious control, for instance, the most perfect identity of God's requirements with conscience and reason is found in those democratic sects where the yoke borne by the faithful is mainly of their own making. In the Reformed churches there has been an unmistakable tendency to drop requirements that have no human or social meaning; while in the Latin and Greek churches the volume of purely religious obligation has remained larger. The Lutheran churches, although they broke away from Rome, played no such glorious part in the struggle for human freedom as the Reformed churches, because they fell under hierarchies of their own with some German princelet at the apex instead of the Pope. This meeting of the civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies in the same person delayed the advent of liberty in Germany.

It is in relation to just this point that the question of church government assumes importance. In this age of many freedoms we have so far overlooked this point that the bitter struggles over church government in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries mean scarcely more to us than the wars of the Kites and the Cranes. The fact that the old fight of Presbytery against Episcopacy and of Congregationalism against both is strange and unmeaning to us now, bespeaks our ignorance of sociological principles.

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We may look upon hierarchy, then, as the formation an élite will adopt in order to uphold and assert a superior social ethos against a low folk ethos. But that very selection and isolation by which it guards itself against debasement is liable to conduct it to ruin; for these foster a class spirit which leads the hierarchy to use its ascendancy in its own interest, or to sell it to those who will give the most for it. The overthrow of a hierarchy may likewise have either of two results. It may mean the triumph of low and vulgar ideals, or it may mean that a self-seeking minority is thrust aside and the genuine élite come forward to maintain superior standards and ideals of conduct.

The maintenance of a social ethos higher than the folk ethos has certain very interesting side consequences. Among people still close to nature one is struck by the candor and realism of their songs and tales. All their output is naïve and smells of the soil. If it is sword play, horse racing, drinking, and dancing that they love, it is these they will sing of quite unabashed. If it is the hard hitter they admire, he is the one they will put in their Walhalla or Happy Hunting Ground. If it is the schemer or the gallant that is their darling, he will be the hero of their epics. If they prize ease or risk or sensual gratification, they will never sing the praises of meditation and prayer.

How changed this same people in the later stages of its social development! Gone is the genuineness and raciness of song and tale. From being sporadic the culture has become uniform; from being local it has become national; from being popular it has become social. Proverb and folklore, with their frank note of cunning and self-seeking, are more and more thrust out of sight. The

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literature and religion bear the stamp of a superior class engaged in maintaining a higher ethics than the folk cares for. The culture ceases to fit, for they have made it celebrate new pleasures and set up new goals. Popular forms of expression die out, while the literary guilds and the learned clans fail to utter what is the heart of the people. A rift has opened; to *idealize* is no longer the same as to *idolize*. The type most praised or sung is an acquired taste. Literature honors the just man, but the multitude lauds the successful man. The saint gets the shrines, but the gladiator or the bull-fighter gets the crowds. The hero of duty has the monuments and biographies, but the boss or money-maker is the one the people want to resemble. A people that longs to be like Solomon has Isaiah's "Servant of Jehovah" held up to it as its model. The Arabs at one time have Antar as their pattern, but in a few generations it is the "servant of Allah" they are called upon to imitate. The Hindoos, still Vedic in temper, have set before them the ideals of the Upanishads. Under the pressure of Christian missionaries the Germans suffer their old folk ethos to be partly displaced by Semitic-Latin ideals developed under alien conditions. In such cases the ideals crowned are like constitutional monarchs; *they reign but they do not govern.*

Now the age of hypocrisy begins, with the hardening of ideals that run counter to the common inclination. Then opens a gap between social ethos and folk ethos, and, though the latter gradually rises, the gap is never quite closed. In Israel the mainstay of the Law was the Pharisees. Yet a contemporary says: "Do not ye after their works; for they say and do not. For they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and

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lay them on men's shoulders ; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers.”¹ In China we have a learned official class upholding the ethics of Confucius, yet engaged in universal make-believe and “saving of face.” So long as he propagated his native virtues of courage, temperance, and magnanimity, the Greek was fairly sincere ; but later in Byzantium the hierarchy that supported the more exacting Christian ideals became rotten with treachery and hypocrisy. The Barbarians though brutal had a bent toward honesty and truthfulness. Yet the priestly hierarchy that upheld the high Southern ethics became honeycombed at last with corruption and falsehood ; while the nobles coupled sensuality and violence with outward conformity to the law of the Church. Among the English clergy under the Commonwealth, the canker of hypocrisy ate deeper as Puritan strictness approached its triumph. In the England of to-day, the obligation upon the members of the leisure class to pose as models to the other classes has compelled each to cover himself with a garment of “respectability.”

Hypocrisy is, in fact, the thing we must expect whenever men are ranked and organized for moral guidance and get honor or pay out of it. The only cure lies in what may be called “prophetism.” The temptation to hypocrisy is least where there is perfect liberty of preaching or exhorting, where each utters whatever he feels “called” to utter, where there is little inducement to uphold what one does not believe in, where all opinions may be voiced, and where higher and lower ideals wrestle on equal terms. Something like this policy has prevailed in our American communi-

¹ Matthew xxiii: 3, 4.

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ties, and our reward for subjecting no determinate body of men to the strain of moral leadership is that we have no class deeply tainted with hypocrisy.

It might be supposed that we Americans should have to atone for this lack of close union in our guiding minority by a certain slowness of ethical advance, a certain persistence of vulgar and barbarous standards; while one has but to look about him to perceive that the standards and ideals of conduct are keyed about as high here as anywhere. This paradox is explained, in part, at least, by the system of schooling and enlightenment which, by qualifying a great number to put themselves in immediate contact with the higher traditions and knowledge, has narrowed the gap between folk ethos and social ethos, and has democratized moral direction as well as political power.

PART III

THE SYSTEM OF CONTROL



CHAPTER XXVIII

CLASS CONTROL

IT was shown, in an earlier chapter, that inhibiting impulses radiate not only from the social mass but also from certain centres of extraordinary prestige and influence. Control of this kind is still social; but when the chief centre of such inhibition is a class living at the expense of the rest of the community, we no longer have social control in the true sense, but *class control*. This may be defined as *the exercise of power by a parasitic class in its own interest*.

There are various devices by means of which a body of persons may sink their fangs into their fellows and subsist upon them. Slavery, that is, the immediate and absolute disposal of the labor force of another, is the primary form of the parasitic relation. By modifying this into serfdom the parasitic class, without in the least abating its power of securing nourishment from others, places itself in a position more convenient to it and less irritating to the exploited. When the absolute state

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comes into being, that direct absorption of nutrient by the parasite from the host which characterizes feudalism goes out of vogue. The French state, for example, as it existed under the old régime, was a vast coercing apparatus that collected goods from the producers by means of taxation, and redistributed them among the favored parasites by means of royal patronage. Finally, the institution of property is so shaped as to permit a slanting exploitation under which a class is able to live in idleness by monopolizing land or other indispensable natural means of production.

These successive modulations of parasitism obey the principle of economy. To economize coercion, to economize supervision, to economize direction,—these are the motives which lead masters to substitute for the coarse and direct kinds of exploitation refined and slanting kinds of exploitation. During this transition a great many personal rights come to be recognized by the exploiters. The slave has no rights at all as against his master. The serf directs his own labor and sees to his own keep, but he is bound to the glebe. The subject of the absolute state is free to labor and to move about, to own and to sell as he pleases, but he has no voice in the spending of the taxes he must pay. In the legal state the exploited is conceded as many personal freedoms as the exploiter, but he must scrupulously respect the rights conferred by ownership. In this expansion of rights there is a gradual escape of the person from the grasp of the parasite. More and more he becomes master of himself and of the fruits of his toil after he has rendered certain fixed dues to the parasite. The tremendous stimulus that such enfranchisement gives to the energy and capacity of the producers invariably causes a considerable accumulation of wealth in the hands of the non-

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parasites which veils the parasitic relation from incurious eyes.

Besides these changes in form which make it less harsh and palpable, social parasitism is further softened and attenuated by changes in the *personnel* of the exploiting and the exploited classes. The wall between these classes is least passable when it runs along the abyss that divides race from race, or people from people. The parasitic relation, pure and simple, is founded on unlikeness and transmitted by heredity. The noble have a perpetual claim to gratuitous support. The base-born are under a perpetual obligation to render dues. Now, the grimness of this situation is relieved as soon as members of the superior class are liable to forfeit their places on the dais, while certain of the inferior may for signal merit be promoted to seats among the privileged.

The heaving and straining of the wretches pent up in the hold of a slaver is less, if now and then a few of the most redoubtable are let up on deck. Likewise the admitting of a few brave, talented, or successful commoners into the charmed circle above has a wonderful effect in calming the rage and envy of the exploited, and thereby protracting the life of the parasitic system. In the absolute monarchy the yielding to capable commoners of a fair proportion of the rich posts and sinecures in State, Army, and Church is recognized as an excellent means of prolonging the hold of the nobles upon the remainder. The short-sightedness of the French parasite orders on this point was one cause of their premature downfall; while, by timely and ample concessions to the new industrial élite, their brethren in England have, so far, saved their estates and their monopoly of the best offices.

The ennobling of new fortunes, the opening of

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careers to talent, the equalizing of opportunities, the dissolving of the hereditary classes through one another, and the increase of the social capillarity that facilitates the ascent and descent of men in the social scale according to their personal fitness are the successive steps by which a society of parasites and hosts passes over into a hierarchy of graded and competitive classes.

No people will toil and sweat to keep a class in idleness and luxury unless cajoled or compelled to do so. The parasitic class, therefore, is always a ruling class, and utilizes as many as it can of the means of control. But it is not by the means used that we can best distinguish this class control from social control. If we would know the real tenor of a control, we should scrutinize the laws, obligations, and exactions which it upholds. In other words, it is by studying the *constitution* of a society that we learn if there is a parasitic relation, and discover who are the parasites and who are the hosts. It is *what* men obey, rather than *why* they obey, that betrays the presence of class exploitation.

Still, there is no doubt that in the gamut of motives to obedience the ruling class does not strike quite the same chords as the social group. When the exploited are not a cowering, spaniel race, but are the virtual equals of their masters, they will not respond to all the instruments of control that society is able to use upon its wayward members. Some of these instruments cannot be used at all, and others that can be used are so modified as to be scarcely recognizable. For instance, those pressures which reach the individual through the suggestion and opinion of his neighbors cannot well be turned to account by the parasitic class. The immediate influences to which the slave, serf, or peasant is exposed come from

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his afflicted fellows, from those who share his lowly station and who like himself are under the harrow. Their encouragement, indeed, will often fortify him in defiance and resistance to his spoilers. Of the slaves in old Rome we read :—

“They shrink from no blows; they brave the most horrid punishments because they are proud to have deserved them. Among them, as happens sometimes among bands of criminals, there is formed a public opinion favoring everything that the public opinion of the masters condemns.”

“With them the point of honor is reversed. They pride themselves on lying, theft, deceit, just as their masters pride themselves on the opposite. One has but to mark the compliments they pay one another. The worst of them all, the one who has incurred the heaviest penalties, is the one who is most admired.”¹

Likewise it is impracticable for the ruling class to manage their subjects by skilfully moulding the personal ideals and valuations that reign in the social deeps. These are likely to shape themselves among the oppressed people quite independently of the will of the master. Indeed, he may count himself lucky if they do not antagonize his purposes in every way.

As unlikeness of interests, education, and mode of life forbids exploiters and exploited to share intimately a common life, there is between them little of the give-and-take that readily establishes itself among true associates. The leeches, as a class, cannot apply to the bled, as a class, any of those delicate pressures on the spirit, those volatile, suasive forms of psychic coercion, which bear upon

¹ Lacombe, “La famille dans la société romaine,” p. 316. Quoted by Vaccaro, “Les bases sociologiques du droit et de l’état,” p. 271.

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the individual so long as he is among comrades and equals. It is safe, then, to lay it down as a rule that *only those inhibitive impulses which flow from a central, determinate source can be controlled by a predaceous class.*

Thus, *suggestion* and *public opinion* are hardly come-at-able by an organization of *seigneurs*, because they do not flow out from a central source. They distil upon one from all sides. It is easy to poison a well; but to poison the dew — that is quite another thing!

While the checks and stimuli connected with *religion, art, personality, and personal ideals* do flow out from central sources, they cannot be reached for another reason. Because they emanate from the Great Man, the Prophet, or the spiritual Elite, their source is not determinate. They spring up, now here, now there. It is now this little knot of enthusiasts and now that, which radiates these impulses. Vainly does the crafty, ruling class seek to control them and get them to do its work. It gains possession of the spring, but the spring forthwith dries up or turns bitter. It suborns the prophet, and his inspiration leaves him. It seduces the hero, and his followers miss the old charm in him and fall away. It wins over the singer, and lo! his voice rings cracked and false. It takes the ministers of religion into its pay, and behold! the people leave the appointed sanctuaries and hang on the burning words of some wild-eyed fanatic from the hills — a Shepherd of Tekoa, for instance, or a Piers Plowman. It is chiefly, then, upon such engines of control as the supple hand can easily reach and manipulate that a ruling class must rely. Its best tools will be *law, belief in the supernatural, custom, ceremony, and illusion.*

These are the agents that, from the nature of

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the case, we should expect the ruling class to employ. But what are the facts? The props of parasitic rule, as history has revealed them over and over again, are *force*, *superstition*, *fraud*, *pomp*, and *prescription*. At first glance there appears to be a discrepancy here, but in a moment it is clear that these are simply degenerate forms of certain familiar supports of social order. What is *force* but the coarse, physical compulsion of *law*, without law's guarantees for the moderate and scrupulous exercise of this compulsion? What is *superstition* but a kind of *belief in supernatural sanctions*, which in no wise springs up from a natural longing to see the iniquities of this world righted by the just decrees of the next? *Fraud* is one form of *illusion*. *Pomp* is *ceremony*, intended to impress, not the individual entering upon new responsibilities, but the envious, presuming populace. *Prescription* is that sanctity of *custom* which attaches to the social edifice within which we have been reared.

These favorite instruments of the parasitic orders resemble the corresponding instruments in the service of society, and yet they have a ring and a temper of their own. Both use force; but the force that society applies is felt by all concerned to be less arbitrary, less "brute," than the force a class uses against its victims. Both use hell; but hell, as it shapes itself in the social imagination, is the place of just expiation, while the hell devised by priestcraft is the torture-chamber of an angry tyrant. Both use heaven; but the heaven conceived by the élite is the place where the just shall "see God," while the heaven that the hirelings of parasites hold out to the poor is a place where they shall be recompensed for patient submission to their hard lot here. Both teach religion; but genuine social religion is the cult of

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fellowship, while the religion an upper class provides for a lower is the cult of obedience.

The contrast of religion in the service of the social idea and religion in the service of a ruling class comes out well when we compare Ezekiel's just man with that of English bishopdom. Ezekiel's ideal man has not "defiled his neighbor's wife, neither hath he come near a menstruous woman. And hath not oppressed any, but hath restored to the debtor his pledge, hath spoiled none by violence, hath given his bread to the hungry, and hath covered the naked with a garment ; hath not given forth upon usury, neither hath taken any increase, hath withdrawn his hand from iniquity, hath executed true judgment between man and man."¹ On the other hand, the Book of Common Prayer² defines "duty towards my neighbor" as including "To honor and obey the King and all that are put in authority under him. To submit myself to all my governors, teachers, spiritual pastours and masters. To order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters."

In a word, the true socializing agencies have sprung partly from disinterested ethical sentiment, and partly from shrewd social policy ; while the enslaving agencies spring entirely from selfish policy. Through the measures that society uses even with the rowdy or the hoodlum there flames and pulses some honest feeling ; but the measures that a class employs upon its subjects are cold with egoism. The great constraining, as well as the great persuasive influences are still alive with the love, pity, reverence, or wrath out of which they grew ; while the means utilized by an exploiting class are the lifeless tools of cold-blooded policy, shaped by cunning and achieving a control that is crude and repulsive.

¹ Ezekiel xviii: 6-8.

² Of 1662.

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Each of the well-marked classes that incline to parasitism has its favorite means of control. Soldiers rely on physical force, and hence the rule of the military caste is characterized by *brutality*. Priests naturally avail themselves of superstition and fraud, and so their domination is marked by *hypocrisy* and *craft*. Nobles, after they have lost their military virtues and become chiefly ornamental, impress with pomp and show, and hence their rule is marked by *pride*, and — since only riches can keep up external splendor — by *rapacity*. All control is consecrated by age and becomes prescriptive. Hence every ruling class becomes in time exceedingly *conservative*.

But no single class is long allowed to sit alone in the seats of the mighty. Unless it shares with other power-holders in society its privileges and advantages, these will combine for its overthrow. So there is a natural tendency for all power-holders to get together, sink their differences, and organize one great exploiting trust. As Europe emerged from the Dark Ages, various parasites appeared one after the other — the lords of the soil, the princes, the Papacy, the financiers. By playing off one parasitic interest against another, the free townsmen and the peasants shook off, for a time, their tormentors; but the princes and the rich townsmen, joining forces, ruined the lesser nobles and reduced the rest to loyal courtiers. By nationalizing the church, or by seizing ecclesiastical property and patronage, the princes then deprived the Papacy of much of its power of preying upon the rest of society, and compelled that close alliance of throne and altar which was so helpful to the growth of monarchy. In France, before the Revolution, all the chief means of spoliation, the ownership of the soil, taxation, spiritual prerogatives,

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and finance, contributed to feed a monstrous wen which was fastened by all the ligaments that can attach a parasitic growth, and which drew to itself much of the sustenance in the social body.

A predatory minority, then, presents itself at first as a governing class, that by its toils, cares, and risks contrives to attract to itself the surplus goods of the governed. But, at a later stage of development, enjoyment and control are no longer vested in the same persons. The anatomy of a parasitic organization now shows certain idle enjoyers at the centre, surrounded by a great number of unproductive laborers who share in their spoil, and who in return busy themselves as retainers, mercenaries, police, priests, teachers, or publicists in intimidating, cajoling, or beguiling the exploited majority. It is at this stage of parasitism that the contrivances for holding down the exploited are the most varied and interesting.

The art of employing the organized collective might in the keeping of order appears to have been developed by a ruling class rather than by the undifferentiated social whole. Common observation shows us that, from the nature of the case, a union that has for its purpose the mutual defence of the claims of each member against outsiders, is easier to form and maintain than a union for the mutual guarantee of the claims of each member against the aggressions of his fellow-members. Owing to the clash of interests in the bosom of each of its adherents, the instituting of the latter union is by far the more difficult feat of joinery.

Now, in a society composed of spoilers and spoiled, the coercive power develops readily out of a kind of mutual defence (and offence!) association among the spoilers. In a simple society, on the other hand, the coercive power presupposes

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something like a mutual guarantee association, and is, therefore, not likely to arise at so early a point in social development. This conjecture is confirmed by the growing mass of evidence which goes to show that the historical state has, in almost every instance, taken its origin in the violent superposition of one people upon another.¹ Born in aggression and perfected in exploitation, the State, even now, when it is more and more directed by the common will, is not easy to keep from slipping back into the rut it wore for itself during the centuries it was the engine of a parasitic class.

The means whereby the minority can physically overpower the majority are many and well understood. They arm, train, and organize themselves as did the Spartans. Like the Normans, they build themselves strongholds and castles. They girdle themselves with mercenaries as the princes of the old régime surrounded themselves with Swiss. They sow the seeds of enmity among their victims after the manner of the Hapsburgs in dealing with their subject peoples. They deprive them of weapons as the Spartans did the Helots. Like the West India planters, they prevent them from meeting, seeing, or communicating with one another. They keep them ignorant, following the policy of the Southern slave-owners. They cut off their natural leaders as did the Roman masters. They break their spirit with overwork. They terrorize them with cruelties. They keep them under constant surveillance, as in classic times the slaves on Sicilian estates were chained by day and penned underground by night. By such policies it has

¹ Spencer, "Political Institutions" and "Principles of Sociology," Vol. II; Gumplowicz, "Der Rassenkampf"; Ratzenhofer, "Die Sociologische Erkenntniss."

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been found practicable for a parasitic band to hold down many times their number.

But this *technique of coercion* calls into being a counter *technique of freedom*. In England, for instance, where the intruding Normans had brought the instruments of rule to a rare perfection, the industrial classes, long before they were able to master and use government for their own ends, had learned to safeguard themselves by hedging it with certain checks. With their Acquired Rights they built a rampart against the formidable engine in the hands of their spoilers. The right to bind law upon the sovereign, the right to forbid a standing army in time of peace, the right of citizens to assemble, to petition, to keep and bear arms, to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, to suffer only on trial and conviction, to be tried by their peers, and to be exempt from cruel or unusual punishments availed to strip the class state of its most dreaded powers, and have justly come to be looked upon as the attributes of a free people. In this way *force* has become *law*, and *might* has been transmuted into *right*.

The virtue of *superstition* as manipulated by a parasitic class is that it causes the masses to look upon the priest as their only protector against the Unseen. The power thus accruing to the sacerdotal order may avail to support direct clerical exploitation through gifts and payments for priestly services, or, in return for places and privileges, immunities and exemptions, it may be placed at the disposal of other parasitic classes.

Even in old Rome the augurs learned to play cleverly upon the superstitious fancies of the populace. For example, "It was directly enacted by the Ælian and Fufian Law that every popular assembly should be compelled to disperse if it should

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occur to any of the higher magistrates to look for the signs of a thunder storm in the sky; and the Roman oligarchy was proud of the cunning device which enabled them, thenceforth, by a single pious fraud to impress the stamp of invalidity on any decree of the people."¹

But it is to the mediæval Papacy that we must look for the classic example of an exploitation fortified by superstitious beliefs. In the course of the four centuries after Hildebrand, the Western Church took on a parasitic character and perfected a great array of devices and weapons for mastering the minds of men in the sacerdotal interest. To this end, lay participation in ecclesiastical affairs was gradually lessened until "Church" came to be synonymous with "Hierarchy." The Church being from time immemorial the final seat of authority in matters of faith, the Papal machine was thus enabled to brand as heresy every proposition that assailed the superstitions supporting it. The tendency of all these superstitions was to make the priest independent of and necessary to the laity. The core of worship was the mass, and this was conducted in a dead language known only by the priest. To the priest alone belonged the right to administer such indispensable sacraments as baptism, marriage, or the Eucharist. From the priest alone could be procured prayers which benefit the souls of the dead. He only could forgive sins, and to him in the confessor's box was it given to peer into the bosom of his fellow-mortal and to insinuate a designing hand among his heart-strings.

From the tithes incumbent on the faithful and from the sale of masses, absolutions, and other religious services, the priests were able to derive a vast

¹ Mommsen, "History of Rome," Vol. III, p. 521.

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revenue. Of this, a large part was diverted from the support of the local working clergy, and drawn toward certain centres to be enjoyed by those at or near the apex of the hierarchy.¹

When the peoples of northern Europe began hacking at the tentacles by which the Latin Church held them fast, it was precisely these superstitions that suffered. The laity, headed by Luther, declared that the priest is not distinguished from the layman save that he exercises at the bidding of the Church a ministerial office; and that the Church is not the hierarchy but the communion of the saints. Calvin insisted that confession should be made, not to the priest, but to the congregation, and that sins are forgiven, not by priestly intercession, but as a matter of free grace. The terrible power to grant or to withhold the sacraments was assailed when the Hussites made the lay chalice their symbol. The Reformers recognized not the Church but the Scriptures, privately interpreted, as the final seat of authority in matters of belief. Worship was conducted in the vernacular. The mass was abolished, lay participation in worship was enlarged, and the public sermon before hearers armed with the Bible gave the laymen an important check on the clergy.

Taken all in all, the Protestant Reformation

¹ "The Holy See, in the fourteenth century, grasped almost the whole disposable patronage of the Church throughout Europe, and openly offered it for sale. In this market for spiritualities it is significant to observe that benefices with cure of souls were held at a higher price than those without cure, as though there was a speculative value in the altar and the confessional. . . . In addition to this source of demoralization, there was the shameless issue of dispensations to hold pluralities which had long been the cause of untold injury to the Church and which ever grew more reckless, and there was, moreover, the showering of numberless benefices on the creatures of the curia, the cardinals and their dependents, with dispensations for non-residence." — LEA, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 246.

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was economic rather than intellectual in origin.¹ It was a lay revolt, not the revolt of human reason; and the immediate result was a decay, not of belief in the supernatural, but of those particular beliefs which supported sacerdotalism. From the sixteenth century on, the direct exploitation of the devout by the clergy greatly declined. The Church, so far as it was still animated by greed, allied itself with the rising State, and looked to the monarchy for revenue as a reward for throwing its influence in support of "the powers that be."

It is scarcely necessary to point out that *fraud*, although used freely by every exploiting class, is a favorite instrument of the class that aspires to the mastery of the mind. In connection with the church parasitic we have but to recall the false Decretals, the pseudo-miracles, the legends accumulating about saints and shrines, the *Index librorum prohibitorum*, the consecration of "safe" science, the falsification of history, and the clerical control of the Universities. It is noteworthy that, on the other hand, nearly every movement against parasitism has endeavored to dispel the ignorance of the masses by some form of free popular instruction. Waldenses, Taborites, Bohemian Brethren, Reformers, New England Puritans, French Revolutionists, and European Liberals—all have given enlightenment a leading place in their programme of emancipation.

Over against fraud and superstition has been elaborated a *technique of enlightenment*. Freedom of meeting, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the inviolability of the mails, the autonomy of institutions of learning, the liberty of investiga-

¹ See Brooks Adams, "The Law of Civilization and Decay," chs. vii and viii.

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tion, the freedom of teaching, the free public university, the free open library,—not without good cause have these come to be prized by democratic peoples.

Once the material foundation of its rule has crumbled, an aristocratic class inevitably comes to attach great importance to *pomp and circumstance*. Pageantry, which is originally the swollen crimson crest of lordly pride, becomes an obligation and a solemnity when the nobility is no longer a match for the commonalty in physical contest. As the lords lose their power over the bodies of their subjects, it is the more necessary to consider the impression on their minds. Accordingly, the exterior of upper-class life comes in time to be regulated with an eye to the effect on the lower orders. Outwardly the mode of life of the rulers must be as far as possible differentiated from that of the ruled, in order that the former may be looked upon as beings apart. But the splendor with which nobles surround their actions, both public and private, is costly, and hence leads to that insatiable rapacity which characterizes overripe aristocracies, and which so often leads them to ruin.

Simplicity, on the other hand, comes in as class rule disappears. In the democratic era the need of solemn ostentation passes away, and the wealthy employ their riches in keeping up a manner of life very different from that of the great in the aristocratic era. Moreover, government is conducted with less of state, and the ceremony that is still retained for public occasions is religious and ethical in character rather than spectacular.

Finally, a ruling class profits by *prescription*. For the secret of the stability of an oppressive social system is not always in the weapons, or even in the prestige, of the class that sits aloft. What-

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ever be the relations it fixes between master and slave, lord and serf, priest and flock, prince and subject, the system by its very existence utters an imperious suggestion which few can resist. The young, drawing from their native feelings their ideas of what is fit and right, may criticise the established order; but a longer steeping in the silent, overmastering presence of institutions adapts their notions of what is fit and right to the relations that are, and fosters a spirit of acquiescence.¹ Nothing but this triumph of suggestion over logic can explain in history those epochs of paradox when the same men are at once mystics and heresy-hunters, philanthropists and slave-holders, Christians and assertors of feudal privilege.

Those who have the sunny rooms in the social edifice have, therefore, a powerful ally in the suggestion of Things-as-they-are. With the aid of a little narcotizing teaching and preaching, the denizens of the cellar may be brought to find their lot proper and right, to look upon escape as an outrage upon the rights of other classes, and to spurn with moral indignation the agitator who would stir them to protest. Great is the magic of precedent, and, like the rebellious Helots, who cowered at the sight of their masters' whips, those who are used to dragging the social chariot will meekly open their calloused mouths whenever the bit is offered them. This is why the social arrangements of new countries become the revolutionary models for old societies. The colonist, no longer in the over-

¹ "Wherever there is an ascendent class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests and its class feelings of superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and *routiers*, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings." — J. S. MILL, "On Liberty," p. 15.

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ing presence of an Ancient System, reverts to principles. Squaring his institutions with his true sense of justice and fitness, he frames a new system that becomes a wonder and a terror to the usurping classes among older peoples; while, on the other hand, the Hindoo cultivator, the Russian moujik, the Galician peasant, or the English laborer, hypnotized by the Actual, consents to the institutions about him.

This moral ankylosis that afflicts those who grow up within a bad social system, explains why the economist Roscher places among the conditions that favor communistic agitations, "*a violent shaking or perplexing of public opinion in its relation to the feeling of Right by revolutions*, especially when they follow rapidly one on the heels of another, and take opposite directions."¹ For a series of sudden changes breaks that spell of custom which is so conducive to the peace of the parasitic class. When their minds have thus been depolarized, the tides of the exploited people fly up like a released geyser, and the social classes jar angrily together. A social system is seen in its nakedness, and unless enough physical force is found to uphold it, it is sure to be modified.

In order not to mistake social control for class control, it is necessary to distinguish between a parasitic society and a society that is truly competitive. In respect to economic friction and the contrasts of worldly condition, a competitive society may present much the same aspect as a society composed of exploiters and exploited. But there is between them one great difference, a difference which has everything to do with the nature and kind of control that will be needed to preserve social order.

¹ "Political Economy," Vol. I, Sec. 78.

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In a really competitive society the hopelessly poor and wretched are, to a large extent, the weak and incompetent who have accumulated at the lower end of the social scale, because they or their parents have failed to meet the tests of the competitive system. In a society cleft by parasitism, on the other hand, the poor are poor because they are held under the harrow, and not because they are less capable and energetic than the classes that prey upon them.

Now a class of beaten people, a proletariat from which the industrially fittest have escaped or are escaping, has neither the will nor the strength to strain against the social system with the vigor of a resentful proletariat held down and exploited by means of artificial social arrangements. However sharply it may differentiate, however rude the clash of conflicting interests, a competitive society will still require no such elaborate apparatus of control as a parasitic society, with perhaps no greater contrasts of economic condition, will find it necessary to maintain. Moreover, its control will not exhibit the traits of class control, but will show the sincerity, spontaneity, and elasticity that mark the control that is truly social.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE VICISSITUDES OF SOCIAL CONTROL

NEVER do we find the social pressure uniform through a long period. There are times when society holds the individual as in a vise, and times when he wriggles almost from under the social knee. There are epochs when the corporate will is ascendant, and epochs when the individual is more and more. In other words, social control fluctuates between strong and weak, between more and less. To describe and account for these vicissitudes is the purpose of this chapter.

The most likely and obvious cause of such vicissitudes is *change in social need*. The function of control is to preserve that indispensable condition of common life, social order. When this order becomes harder to maintain, there is a demand for more and better control. When this order becomes easier to maintain, the ever present demand for individual freedom and for toleration makes itself felt. The supply of social control is evoked, as it were, by the demand for it, and is adjusted to that demand.

The changes that rack the social frame and so lead to a tightening of all the nuts and rivets in it are nearly all connected with economic conditions. The multiplication of numbers or the decline of prosperity may make the struggle for existence more wolfish and harder to keep within bounds. New methods of production which sharpen eco-

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nomic contrasts may relax the natural bonds among men and so throw more strain on the artificial bonds. A static condition of industry may allow differences in wealth to be aggravated by accumulation through a number of generations. A bad institution,—a defective system of land tenure or inheritance or taxation,—working worse and worse as time goes on, may require stronger props to support it. Alien ethnic elements introduced among a people, one in blood and culture and hence fitted to get along smoothly, may lead to race or class tension. Social mis-selections which hinder the survival of the best breeds of men may in the course of centuries weaken character and necessitate the application of a moral truss. The common perils of war or mass migration may call for stricter corporate discipline. An influential class, finding an inviting point of attachment, may fasten itself upon the rest and turn parasitic. It must then guard and perpetuate this parasitic relation by a more stringent discipline. Whatever the provoking cause, the increase of control is attended by a long cortège of social phenomena. It is impossible to restrict the movements of the social molecule without effecting a number of parallel changes. The operation of putting starch into Church and State is at once delicate and interesting.

It might be supposed that the best way to gauge a change in the volume of control is to watch the ordinary man and see what happens to him. Is he freer or less free? Does his personal interest, bent, whim, taste, or idiosyncrasy prevail more than it did, or less? But there is a better way than this.

The lessening of freedom that invariably follows an increase in control is felt not so much by plain, inconspicuous Doe or Roe, as by the man who

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stands nearest to and has the most to do with those activities which are in the nature of control. In order to double the pressure on the average person it may be necessary to decuple the pressure upon those who as artists, speakers, preachers, teachers, peace officers, and officials are in stations of authority or influence. They receive and transmit the impulses emanating from the elders, the notables, the mandarins, and other opinion-forming sections of society. They constitute the dial plate upon which we may read a magnified record of what the humbler folk are experiencing in the way of restraint or liberty. We have but to watch them to measure the fluctuations of social discipline.

In the religious field access of control chokes up the fountains of inspiration. The prophet is frowned upon, and the enthusiast discouraged. Dogma and ritual grow rank. The legal side of religion comes forward, while the mystic, inspirational side falls into the background. The clerical profession is less open to the man with a "call" or a "vision." From the whole mass of beliefs there splits off a body of accredited beliefs which comes to constitute orthodoxy. Heresy is dreaded and banned. Conformity becomes a more radiant virtue, dissent a blacker sin. Hierarchy rears its crest, and the layman loses his immediate touch with the Unseen. The offices of the clergy are magnified, and the laity as a whole retreats before the growing insistence on the spiritual eminence of the priests. The prophet yields to the scribe, the curé to the prelate, the local cleric to the central. The pastor becomes less dependent on his flock and more dependent on the higher powers. His opinions are more looked after, and the unsound are ruthlessly routed from all posts of influence.

Art is affected in the same way as religion. In

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times of little control the artist works as the plough-boy whistles — from sheer pleasure in free self-expression. But in times of tightening control the artist is impressed with his "responsibility." The irregular is deprecated and pursued. Canons and conventionalities multiply which he cannot evade. In increasing degree the art that is allowed to succeed is churchly or courtly or official or under patronage. The censor reappears, the press is licensed, and the drama becomes a state function.

In the sphere of opinion, the confidence that truth in open combat can always vanquish error declines. It is deemed needful to give a fillip to correct opinions and a handicap to erroneous ones. The maxim that every sober adult is responsible for his acts is abandoned in order that the agitator may be held responsible for his diatribes and incitements. Moreover, tendencies are everywhere sharply looked after. Certain branches of learning are "safe," while others are "unsettling." The curriculum of studies becomes less elastic. Classicism lords it in the schools. Experiments are frowned on, and a pedagogical orthodoxy arises. The direct relation of teacher to pupil and parent decays, and central authorities appear for the supervising and unifying and regulating of education. Even in the higher schools the teacher learns to value the favor of the appointing powers more than that of the men he teaches. The freedom of teaching is restricted, and more concern is shown for the soundness of professors than for their ability.

In the field of physical coercion there is an increase in the number of lictors, bailiffs, police, and soldiers told off to catch, prod, beat, and hold fast recalcitrants, and they are brought under a stricter discipline. They are more specialized for their

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work, and an *esprit du corps* is carefully cultivated among them. Executive and judicial officers are appointed rather than elected, and so made answerable to their superiors rather than to the people they work among. Locally chosen persons are displaced by the nominees of a central government. For the immediate control of the local community over the officials in its midst is substituted a general and remote control of the entire people over the whole governmental machine. The military becomes more independent of the civil power, the executive more independent of the legislature, the cabinet more independent of the party that supports it, the party organization more independent of the voter. The suffrage is restricted, or else its results are repeatedly decanted and filtered by means of degrees of election.

All this does not happen by simple fiat of the social will. Certain groups of persons — executive, cabinet, the central government, the party machine, the higher clergy, the educational hierarchy, "authorities" of every kind in short — are always striving for more power. When the need of a more stringent control makes itself felt, they find the barriers to their self-aggrandizement unexpectedly giving way before them. Formerly they were held in check, while now they find encroachment strangely easy.

On the other hand, there are certain deep-seated social changes which lessen the tension between man and man, and make for a milder discipline. Time assimilates juxtaposed races to one another, and fits them to think and feel alike. Inventions make industry dynamic, and the calcareous parts of the social organization are silently dissolved away. Changes in production or trade, lifting the base or depressing the apex of a conical society,

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purge out of control the element of class rule. Prosperity outrunning the growth of wants softens the economic struggle. Long peace melting down the tough masses cast in the iron mould of war gives men the freedom of molecules in a liquid.

What happens in such cases is just the opposite of that described above. Trammels of every kind — moral, legal, religious — relax, the greatest relief in this respect being enjoyed by those who handle the instruments of control. Moreover, in this movement as in the other, the changes are not anonymous. They are brought about not directly by the social mind, but chiefly by those groups which are most cramped and which are pressing hardest against the yoke. They are the work of artists, laymen, the lower clergy, the teaching rank and file, the intellectuals, the civilians, the commoners. These find the very stars in their courses fighting with them in their struggle for relief.

Next to *change in social need*, the vicissitudes of control are connected with *partial dissociation due to the rise and strife of classes*. Normally "society" presents itself as an interlinking of narrower and wider circles, each playing its part in the task of control, each spinning some of the ties that bind persons into social tissue. The outcome of these joint operations is social order. But there are times of ill health, when these natural associations cease to lend each other confirmation and support. In the bosom of society there appear tangent groups, each having its distinctive public opinion, creed, personal ideals, moral standards, mass suggestions, and fascinating personalities — in short, a more or less complete apparatus of control of its own. Groups of this sort are *sects*. When such sects are at variance with one another, the more absolute the control they exercise over

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their adherents, the greater the strain on the social fabric.

The growth of fresh social tissue is in itself good. Like the budding of unicellular organisms, it is a sign of health, and when fission takes place it amounts to a kind of social reproduction. In the course of this century, hundreds of such embryo societies have formed on European soil, detached themselves, migrated to roomy America, and burst into vigorous life.

When, however, the substance of these tangent associations so interpenetrates that they cannot secede and lead a separate existence,—that is to say, when they are interdependent *social classes*, with conflicting economic interests, nursing each its antagonism to the other,—the danger is very great. The sect ethos saps the life of the social ethos. Society loses in contractile power, and in many directions control is paralyzed. There remains sometimes no bond but the hard outer shell of military force, which may or may not be strong enough to hold together in peace the hostile classes that have formed within it.

Now, under what conditions does society split up into jarring groups? The first condition, of course, is *sharp conflict of interest*. But this alone is not enough; there is conflict of interest between merchants and farmers, between taxpayers and tax-eaters, yet these do not form true sects. The second condition is *great contrast of means*, resulting in extremes of misery and luxury. Especially important is this when the misery or uncertainty from which a class suffers appears to rise out of the social organization, rather than to flow from Nature. Still this is not enough. Such contrast does not always beget class consciousness and solidarity. The third and decisive condition is *a great inequality*

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of opportunity coinciding with a great inequality of possessions.

For the poor do not generate a militant ethos of their own if their élite are able to escape upward. In the zone of new lands that belts Western civilization the doors of opportunity stand open, and the spectacle of mountainous wealth does not, of necessity, breed envy and wrath. The capable poor, the natural founders of a sect within the proletarian class, acquiesce in the *status quo*, because they hope to be possessors themselves some day. On the white man's frontier, — the Far West, Alaska, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Siberia, — property is easy to defend and order easy to maintain, because in spite of economic contrasts opportunities abound. The social substance running smooth and unbroken from top to bottom, social control may be moral and mild. In older countries, however, the good places are occupied, escape from one's lot is more hopeless, and social order implies a formidable enginery. Here the institutions of control bear the stamp of harshness, illiberalism, and oligarchy.

Yet even here there is a see-saw between static and dynamic epochs. In the latter, inventions subvert old fortunes and create new wealth, enterprise thrives, and the high capillarity of the social strata permits the ascent of the ablest. In the static epoch, on the other hand, the social tension is not relieved, because opportunity is chiefly for those who hold the strategic points and own the instruments of production.

It is in obedience to this fundamental law that the decline of public spirit, the decay of social solidarity, and the rise of the class as a moral authority are, as has often been remarked, the peculiar malady of an old society. For the society that is old is likely to be economically developed. This implies

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French Revolution made Napoleon acceptable. The disorders after the close of the American Revolution provoked the establishment of the Federal Government. But this revived control is likely to be less suasive than the old, trusting more to the sword and less to ideas and ideals. At times, indeed, institutions will be bathed and the recesses of the nation flooded with the sense of a common life; there will come gusts of national feeling when souls are as straws in the wind. Nevertheless, if conditions continue static, we shall get, in the end, a society like that of the later Roman Empire, split into classes and devoid of public spirit and patriotism, yet enduring because held in the massive framework of a centralized state.

Another cause of vicissitude in social control is *change in the culture and habits of a people*. The beliefs in the Unseen, religious convictions, personal ideals, canons, maxims, ceremonies, moral philosophies, and social valuations which serve for control are a secular growth, and as such are *adapted* to collective needs. Let these be greatly deranged by fresh knowledge, new ideas, foreign influences, or novel experiences, and there will ensue during the time of convalescence an outburst of individualism. There will be a temporary emancipation from restraints, and a reversion toward primitive modes of behavior. In such cases we have what might be called *molecular dissociation*, that is, an increase of evil, crime, and strife without any cleavage of the social mass.

With the partial paralysis of social control, whether from the fading of ideals, the decay of religion, or the degeneration of the State, there is found normally a greater energy of individual reaction against wrong. The unbinding of the ego makes for the aggression of man on man, and

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hence invariably revives primitive practices of personal vengeance. Along with the individualism of the Italian Renaissance, for instance, went a demoniac energy of self-help.

Another symptom of triumphant egoism is the decline of patriotism and public spirit. In degenerate Italy, in dying Greece, in decrepit Egypt, the State, unable to rouse her citizens, fights her battles with *condottieri*. The cosmopolitan spirit prevails over the national spirit, and men expatriate themselves cheerfully for the sake of comfort or security. Foreign domination is endured, or even welcomed. The claims of the community rank below the claims of caste. Money-getting is more attractive than public life. Politics is followed as a lucrative trade. Justice and administration become hopelessly rotten, because enough good men cannot be found. The phrases and trappings of public spirit, being retained after the sentiment has fled, hypocrisy infects all civic life.

Again, the family bonds are less rigid. The young are earlier freed from paternal authority. Women are emancipated without being uplifted, and men selfishly shrink from marital obligations. Increasing divorce shows that the family is looked on as a means of pleasure, rather than a social organ. But while functional associations such as family, local community, city, and fatherland lose their hold on the individual, there is an efflorescence of the religious sect, the fraternal order, the guild, the club, the social circle — all those unions, in fact, which spring from free inclination and gratify social cravings. Men unite, if at all, on a purely human basis, so that the sweetest flowers of friendship blossom in epochs of individualism. Such times sound the heights and depths of human nature.

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When the ego has been unleashed by the decay of old regulative beliefs and the ruin of old ideals, recourse is had, whenever possible, to that amalgam of conscience and egoism, the sense of honor. In an era of individualism, whether in the Rome of the Stoics, the Italy of the Renaissance, the England of the Restoration, the France of this century, or the Japan of to-day, the conserving forces of society conspire to whet this sentiment to the utmost keenness.

In explaining why the moral solidarity of a society is now and then broken by a brief orgie of the natural man, it is necessary to observe that there is no fixed cycle of changes through which a system of social control normally passes. A phase of control is determined, not by the previous phase, but by social facts of a more primary order. Law and morality have no career of their own, but yield at every moment to the shaping pressure of other forces in social life.

If undisturbed, a people builds the knowledges, ideas, and experiences in its possession into a "world view" which agrees with and supports its social control. They are brought into harmony with those ideas about the other world, about the ends of life, about the worth of things, and about the honorableness and dishonorableness of actions, which society drills into its members. In other words, the form of culture, which is a trifling affair, is subdued to the purposes of regulation, which is a very important affair. Now, anything that shatters this rigid, confining crust which forms upon a society weakens control, and ushers in an era of individualism.

The *accumulation of new knowledge* does this. In Greece at her prime, the rapid gains in a scientific apprehension of things undermined the old

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religious and moral views, and brought on a moral crisis. Similarly modern science has destroyed the theological systems which subordinated knowledge to regulative ideas, and has fostered among the enlightened classes of to-day an extraordinary freedom of spirit. This, be it remarked, is an emancipation of wholly different origin from that which has resulted from the economic conditions of the New World. Let one but compare the individualism which the free exercise of the reason has generated in the cultivated part of European society with that which has always characterized the Americans of our frontier.

The borrowing of new knowledge has the same effect as the rapid accumulation of it. That direct taking over of the unmoralized knowledge and ideas of classical antiquity, which we call the Italian Renaissance, produced a brief but astounding burst of neo-pagan individualism which in its intellectual and artistic manifestations has charmed the world, but which in its moral results has excited only its horror. As the New Learning filtered from Italy into northern lands, it was partially mastered by conservative forces, and became an intellectual ferment rather than a moral solvent. A similar effect has been wrought within the educated class in India by too immediate a taking over Western science and culture. If in Japan morals have suffered less from the same process, it is, perhaps, because, for the support of character, Japan relies on *ideals* rather than *ideas*.

The wholesale acquisition of exotic wants likewise disrupts the system of social control. Inter-course with abroad acquaints a people with foreign luxuries and implants new cravings. The sudden growth of the standard of consumption beyond the means of satisfying it sharpens the struggle for

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wealth, undermines old personal ideals, and subverts the social valuations of things. As tastes and appetites are more catching than the moralities that hold them in check, heavy borrowings from a foreign culture are apt to demoralize, for a time, the upper classes of the people. The Greek moralists deplored the rage for Asiatic luxuries, which whetted the greed for gold and led Greeks to take the pay of the Persian king. Cato bewailed the sapping of Roman simplicity and virtue by insidious Greek fashions and Oriental pleasures. In the sixteenth century the Italians, in the seventeenth century the Spaniards, in the eighteenth century the French, and in the nineteenth century the English, have been reproached as the corrupters of peoples. Fruitful as is the intercourse of nations, necessary as it is for the rise of universal religions and universal moral systems, it is undeniable that wholesale importations from abroad let loose the world and the flesh, and make for social decomposition. Laxity reigns until the group soul has mastered the materials thrust upon it, and out of them has built a new fabric of regulative ideas.

New experiences may likewise unbridle the ego. In yeasty times, when men break away from home and family, village and custom, in order to swarm into El Dorados, into rising marts, or into factory towns, there is a kind of moral interregnum. They have passed from the spell of the old, and the new grouping has not yet woven its spell. The city is sometimes an amorphous, uncohering horde of this kind, and so arises the legend that life in the city can only demoralize and egoize men. But the fact is that every association is able, in time, to loyalize and subdue its members to corporate ends. When men come into newly formed social classes, there is likewise a demoralization until traditions

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are formed. Old landed gentries, for example, love to contrast their fine sense of responsibility with the raw egoism of codfish aristocracies, bonanza kings, "swagger" sets, and other *parvenu* societies.

Chronic internecine strife rends the social web in which men have been enmeshed. "War," says Thucydides, "which takes away the comfortable provision of daily life, is a hard master and tends to assimilate men's characters to their conditions." Of the bloody civil wars in Greece, he goes on to say: "Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness in Hellas. The simplicity which is so large an element in a noble nature, was laughed to scorn and disappeared. An attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere prevailed; for there was no word binding enough, nor oath terrible enough, to reconcile enemies. Each man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was secure; he must look to his own safety and could not afford to trust others."¹

The Thirty Years' War and the civil commotions in southern Europe early in this century merit a similar indictment. War, when it is the shock of great groups, inspires the individual with corporate aims; but when it enters all the intimate minor groupings of men, when it tears apart and dissolves the family, the neighborhood, the church, and the social circle, then it converts the social man into the lone wolf.

The physiologist in explaining the coördinating work of the human cerebellum does not presume to account for those convulsive muscular contractions that follow a bayonet thrust or a lightning stroke. Confining himself to states of health or

¹Thucydides, Jowett's Translation, Bk. III, chs. lxxxii, lxxxiii.

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of definite disease, he declines to frame a theory for such catastrophes. Likewise, the sociologist who explains the growth and principal variations of the social equilibrating-apparatus, does not undertake to account for all the moral phenomena in history. Actual societies, and with them their systems of control, have been so shattered, mutilated, and deformed by war, famine, depopulation, immigration, race degeneration, and class conflict, that no laws can be framed for them that shall hold true of all cases and situations.

CHAPTER XXX

THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL

IN respect to their fundamental character, it is possible to divide most of the supports of order into two groups. Such instruments of control as public opinion, suggestion, personal ideal, social religion, art, and social valuation draw much of their strength from the primal moral feelings. They take their shape from sentiment rather than utility. They control men in many things which have little to do with the welfare of society regarded as a corporation. They are aimed to realize not merely a social order but what one might term a *moral order*. These we may call *ethical*.

On the other hand, law, belief, ceremony, education, and illusion need not spring from ethical feelings at all. They are frequently the means deliberately chosen in order to reach certain ends. They are likely to come under the control of the organized few, and be used, whether for the corporate benefit or for class benefit, as the tools of policy. They may be termed *political*, using the word "political" in its original sense of "pertaining to policy."

Now, the prominence of the one group or the other in the regulative scheme depends upon the constitution of the society. The *political* instruments operating through prejudice or fear will be preferred :—

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1. In proportion as the population elements to be held together are antipathetic and jarring.
2. In proportion to the subordination of the individual will and welfare by the scheme of control.
3. In proportion as the social constitution stereotypes differences of status.
4. In proportion as the differences in economic condition and opportunity it consecrates are great and cumulative.
5. In proportion as the parasitic relation is maintained between races, classes, or sexes.

In confirmation of these statements, we have but to recall that the chief influences which history recognizes as stiffening State, Church, Hierarchy, Tradition, are conquest, caste, slavery, serfdom, gross inequalities of wealth, military discipline, paternal regimentation, and race antipathies within the bosom of the group. The disappearance of any one of these conditions permits a mellowing and liberalizing of social control.

On the other hand the *ethical* instruments, being more mild, enlightening, and suasive, will be preferred :—

1. In proportion as the population is homogeneous in race.
2. In proportion as its culture is uniform and diffused.
3. In proportion as the social contacts between the elements in the population are many and amicable.
4. In proportion as the total burden of requirement laid upon the individual is light.
5. In proportion as the social constitution does not consecrate distinctions of status or the parasitic relation, but conforms to common elementary notions of justice.

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In confirmation of these propositions, we have but to remember that the mild, democratic régime is now recognized as presupposing a homogeneous and enlightened population, free social intercourse, minimum interference with the individual, sanctity of the person, and equality before the law. When any of these conditions fail, the democratic forms soon become farcical.

Again, the instruments of control may be distinguished in respect to the functions that devolve upon them. There is a tendency to assign to each form of control that work for which it is best fitted. Law represses that undesirable conduct which is at once important and capable of clear definition. Central positive qualities — courage or veracity in man, chastity in woman — are taken in charge by the sense of honor or self-respect. The supernatural sanction is ordinarily reserved for those acts and abstinences requiring the utmost backing. Religion mounts guard over the ancient, unvarying fundamentals of group life, but takes little note of the temporary adjustments required from time to time. The taking of life or property, adultery, un-filial conduct, and false swearing encounter its full force; but not adulteration, stock gambling, or corporation frauds. In its code, as well as in its ritual and creed, religion betrays its archaic character.

In morals as well as in microscopes there is provided a major and a minor adjusting apparatus. In adaptability public opinion stands at one end of a series of which religion constitutes the other extreme. Connected with this there is a gradation in the nature of the sanction. Public opinion bans many things not unlawful, law may require much more than self-respect, and self-respect may be wounded by that which is not regarded as sinful.

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But the universality of the sanction widens as the scope of prohibition narrows. In the first case the offender encounters the public here and now, in the second the crystallized disapproval of society, in the third the opinion of generations of men who have conspired to frame a standard or ideal, and in the last case the frown of the Ruler of the Universe.

The champions of each detail of regulation strive, therefore, to get all these successive sanctions behind their pet commandments. The opponents of drinking, dancing, divorce, usury, horse racing, duelling, speculation, or prize-fighting strive to make these practices first blameworthy, then unlawful, then shameful, and finally sinful. But this massing of sanctions very naturally stirs up resistance. The attempt to get God against a new vice, such as liquor selling, always encounters fierce opposition from those who find themselves suddenly deprived of the odor of sanctity. New moral tests, like new party tests or new denominational tests, endanger ground already won, and so imperil the sanctions for the cardinal virtues. It is not well, therefore, to associate loss of honor with white lies or the Divine Displeasure with card playing. Sympathy, religious sentiment, self-respect, sense of duty, fear, regard for public opinion, enlightened self-interest,—each of these motives has its due place and task and no one motive should be overworked.

Again, the agencies in the system of control differ in their vitality. All are not equally available throughout the life of a society.

Changes in knowledge, in the level of civilization, and in the nature of social requirements cause a method of control to wax or wane from age to age. We might compare the social order to a viaduct

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across some wooded ravine, which rests partly on timbers that slowly rot away, and partly on living, growing tree-trunks. Or, we might liken it to a bridge resting on piers, built some of stone which crumbles in time, and some of stone which hardens with exposure to the air. No doubt etiquette and ceremony have done their best work. The seer of visions and dreamer of dreams has had his day. The hero will never again be the pivot of order. The reign of custom with its vague terrors is about over. The assizes of Osiris, Rhadamanthus, Jehovah, or Allah, with their books of record, inquisitions, and judgments, will hardly lord it over the imagination in the days to come. The reputed dispensations of Providence will less and less affect conduct. A feigned blood kinship is of no avail for binding men into the national groups of to-day. So public action in the form of mob, ban, or boycott is justly regarded as a relic of barbarism.

But there are other instruments that are coming into wider usefulness. Instruction as to the consequences of actions, with a view to enlisting an enlightened self-interest in support of all the conduct it is competent to sanction will meet with universal approval in an age of public education; and the passiveness of the average mind will make it safe to weave into such moral instruction certain convenient illusions and fallacies which it is nobody's interest to denounce. Suggestion, that little-understood instrument, will, no doubt, be found increasingly helpful in establishing moral imperatives in the young. But it will render its greatest service in aiding us to shape in the youth those feelings of admiration or loathing that determine the ruling ideals of character, and in influencing those imputations of worth which enable society

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to impose upon the individual its own valuations of life's activities and experiences. This work society will facilitate by cutting with cameo-like clearness the types of character it chooses to commend, and by settling ever more firmly in tradition and convention the values it seeks to impose. It is social art, however, which promises the most. I would place it next to religion in power to transform the brute into the angel. Art is one of the few moral instruments which, instead of being blunted by the vast changes in opinion, have gained edge and sweep by these very changes. So far as the eye can pierce the future, there is nothing to break it or dull it. The sympathies it fosters do not, it is true, establish norms and duties; but they lift that plane of general sentiment out of which imperatives and obligations arise. If there is any one in this age who does the work of the Amoses and Isaiahs of old, it is an Ibsen, a Tolstoi, or a Victor Hugo.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

A CRITIQUE of social discipline must answer two great questions: *What* should society impose? *How* should it impose? We shall undertake, therefore, to characterize in this chapter the *aims*, and in the next chapter the *methods*, of social control.

The present generation has heard much discussion of state interference, and has accepted certain canons as necessary to be observed in this interference. But no one realizes the vast control that is outside of and beyond the state, and so no one ever thinks of discussing in a scientific temper the proper limits of society's interference with the individual. Albeit everybody admits that at some point you must cease to coerce by fines and jails, there are few who confess there are limits to be respected in controlling people by means of public opinion, beliefs, suggestion, education, and the like. Most of those who touch this question are absolutists, champions of the Divine Right of the many, who want society to use all the power it has. They are Machiavellians who would have their master stick at nothing. In their view the individual has no right to be or to do otherwise than society wishes. Opposing them are a few moral individualists who rebel against society as the anarchists rebel against the state, and vehemently denounce "herdsmen," "eunuch virtues," "mental

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gelding," "moral soporifics," "slave shibboleths," and "sickroom air."

Between persons so contrasted in temperament and bias the dispute has been little else than a futile exchange of hot invective. It remains to be seen if there is not ground common to both partisans from which guiding principles may be reached.

It is agreed on every hand that all social control should conduce to human welfare. But this term is often translated "social welfare," and the inference is drawn that society may properly pile on requirements so long as thereby its order and security are in any way improved. This procedure, however, leaves the controlled individuals quite out of the reckoning. They, too, have a welfare, and this welfare is diminished when they are hampered on all sides to suit the collective convenience. For instance, we might guard better the marriage institution if the ideals of propriety stamped upon the brain-pulp of young girls were of that severe convent type that prevails in countries where male jealousy is on the alert against male lust. But at what terrible cost of girlish happiness! Again, the breeding function of the family would be better discharged if public opinion and religion conspired, as they have until recently, to crush the aspirations of woman for a life of her own. But the gain would not be worth the price.

The fact is "society" is not a being, but just people in their collective capacity. The only welfare there is is the welfare of persons present or to come. A person secures his welfare partly by coöperation with his fellows, partly by free individual action. "Social welfare" is merely a synonym for the gain that comes through joint action. Social control is one means of promoting this welfare; but it is peculiar in that it does so, for the

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most part, at the expense of that other welfare which is obtained through individual action. If for the sake of minute increments of such welfare people allow their individual actions to be greatly narrowed in range, they make a bad bargain. So far, then, as welfares can be considered comparable quantities, we should observe the canon :—

Each increment of social interference should bring more benefit to persons as members of society than it entails inconvenience to persons as individuals.

So runs the utilitarian formula—a formula which, crude and arithmetical as it sounds, should never be left quite out of sight. But people are not calculating machines. The behavior of human beings cannot be interpreted as referring only to real welfare, or even to supposed welfare. They are swayed by impulses and emotions unaffected by calculation, by passions which drive them to disregard their welfare in this world and in the next. As already shown, one of these is hero-worship, which makes a man love to forsake his own way and walk in the footsteps of his hero. A passion like this facilitates social control. But on the other side there is a passion for liberty. In some persons, in some races, there is an unruly spirit, strangely jealous of control, meeting pressure with an opposition out of all proportion to the price of obedience. People resist with frantic energy a slight inconvenience like vaccination. Blasphemy thrives on the efforts to suppress it. Sacrilege is a nuisance until it is left alone. Sumptuary laws are proverbially hard to enforce. A tyrannical exaction is less withstood than a petty meddling with personal habits. The despot falls the moment he invades the privacy of his subjects. This extravagant love of doing as one pleases makes it imprudent for society always to

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go as far as the utilitarian formula would warrant. Hence the second canon :—

Social interference should not lightly excite against itself the passion for liberty.

What lifts the bristles in man is, however, external pressure. He kicks against the pricks. Whipping makes him balk. Threat suggests resistance. Ostracism, prison, hell, provoke in certain natures defiance of God and man. If, now, society will lure him instead of drive him, he will cause no trouble. The moulding of his will by social suggestion, the shaping of his ideas by education, the enlightenment of his judgment, the setting up of shining goals and black scarecrows in the field of life to influence his choices — these, if skilfully done, do not arouse the insurgent spirit. The passion for liberty, then, limits particularly that social interference *which calls for pressure*. It hampers the State more than the Church, the Church more than the school, and the school more than it does the prophet or artist.

There are other passions society must take account of. Sympathy, the feeling for justice, and the feeling against injustice are, as I have shown, the emotions that support a natural order among men. Now, in the endeavor to perfect this order by art, it will never do to weaken its foundations. It is not enough that codes, ideals, and values conduce directly to the common welfare ; they must respect these great primal instincts — prejudices if you will — lest society should antagonize its natural allies. Religion at one time teaches that if the fathers eat sour grapes, the children's teeth will be set on edge ; but later the rising sense of justice silences such teaching. Society prudently abandons the thumb-screw and the lake of fire and brimstone as humane feeling asserts itself. Legists

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and penologists dare not place punishment on a frankly utilitarian basis lest they shock deep, popular feelings about requital. In deference to public sentiment, the state has to forbear to regulate prostitutes and liquor sellers. The old idea of wifely fidelity is assailed by the spirit of fair play demanding one standard of chastity for man and woman alike. The anonymous rules of conduct that disengage themselves from the intercourse of men, agree, of course, with common moral feelings. They are, in fact, more likely to be *moral* than to be *social*. But even the cold-blooded graybeards, who sit at the centre of the psychic organization of society and control the forces that control, dare not defy these feelings. Although they constitute the brain of the Social Person and can mould opinion, religion, and education, they obey the canon:—

Social interference should respect the sentiments that are the support of natural order.

In recognizing that social interference for promoting the common weal must not shock the feelings for humanity and justice, we reach the kernel of truth in the discredited "Law of Nature," which was once set up as a guide for the law-maker. Wrongly based and badly stated, this hypothesis has, among political thinkers, fallen into grave disrepute. Still, there is a sense in which it is true. There are, of course, no abstract, indefeasible *rights* belonging to man as man; yet it is sometimes well to act as if there were. There are no "immutable laws" or "eternal principles" limiting the interferences of the state or the social ego; yet there are instincts in human nature which it is prudent to respect. The rapt idealist who exalts into the empyrean such abstractions as Liberty, Justice, and Humanity, and the cool scientist who perceives

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certain primal moral sentiments which may not be ignored, are not so far apart after all.

So far as it is rational, society can have no other aim than the perfecting of its order and the hastening of its progress. Nevertheless actual control exceeds this. The unthinking, sentimental multitude lashes out at the unnatural rather than the pernicious, while the religious redeemers of the race are as anxious to restrain the man who harms himself by his actions, as the man who harms others. Now, the paternal policy that snatches the vicious from their vices and divides fools from their folly abridges the operations of Nature's remedy. If social pressure inhibits drinking, those born with the liquor appetite live out their days and plague our descendants with their ill-constituted offspring. If ablution—or other hygienic rite—is made a sacred duty, the naturally filthy and careless are relieved of their constitutional handicap, and helped to run the race of life on equal terms with those who wash to keep clean or to keep well. To send the suicide's soul to hell, and his body to the cross-roads with a stake through it, may lessen self-murder, but it is no way to strengthen the healthy instinct to live.

Nowhere does crude feeling blunder worse than in regulating sexual desire. If society attacks prostitution by repressive methods that do not go to the core of the individual conscience, it simply interrupts the self-elimination of the lecherous, and poisons the family,—that organ which above all others must be kept healthy. If society stamps out monstrous lusts, it forces the abnormal into the matrimonial groove and they rear children in their own image.¹ In this case, we see that crude

¹ See A. Moll, "Die Libido sexualis"; R. von Krafft-Ebing, "Der Conträrsexuale vor dem Strafrichter."

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social pressure perpetuates the very evil it seeks to cure.

It is a commonplace that advancing medicine more and more keeps alive the physically unfit and enables them to propagate their unfitness. Now, it is likewise true that the knowledge of suggestion, education, etc., puts within our reach a greater number of moral splints, braces, and trusses which enable those with unsound instincts and propensities to live and to pass on these traits to their children. It is not surprising that the friends and relatives of the mal-endowed should avail themselves of these means; but that is no reason why society should convert itself into a moral sanatorium and free dispensary, administering precepts to moral paupers, and poisoning the hale with hospital air in order to preserve the sick. The shortest way to make this world a heaven is to let those so inclined hurry hell-ward at their own pace. Hence the fourth canon :—

Social interference should not be so paternal as to check the self-extinction of the morally ill-constituted.

Although rivalry is necessary to the survival of the fittest, it is possible for society to abridge very considerably the natural struggle among human beings without thereby checking the beneficent process of selection. The protecting of women from the superior strength of men does not impair the selective process; for the fittest women are physically weaker than the inferior man and therefore in danger from him. Commendable also is the shielding of children from adult cruelty or violence; for the fittest children are weaker than the unfittest adults. Likewise the protection of the aged from the vigorous is unobjectionable; for the aged are past reproducing.

Even between persons in the same category, the

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rivalry has to be carefully regulated if the really best are to survive. The fleetest horse is most likely to win the race when the laws of the turf are observed. In athletic contests the palm is not infallibly borne off by the strong or the swift unless many stringent rules are enforced. On the other hand, the more that struggle reverts to the primitive mêlée, the more it results in mis-selection and needless pain.

Beyond a certain point, however, the effect of limiting that struggle which is a requisite of efficiency and progress is to promote race degeneration. The Christian cult of charity as a means of grace has formed a shelter under which idiots and *cretins* have crept and bred. The state gathers the deaf mutes into its sheltering arm, and a race of deaf mutes is in process of formation.

Since we have become aware of the selective processes working upon men and discerned the laws of race improvement, we see social control in a new light. That society should become a family and its members "brethren" is no longer a counsel of perfection. Absolute peace and unity ceases to be a satisfying goal. If all test and competition were eliminated, if all those prizes were abolished which stimulate strenuous individual exertion, if people had everything in common, and the strong instead of outstripping the weak bore them on their shoulders, the race would retrograde. No ideal community from the Messianic "Kingdom" to the latest socialistic Utopia is a safe goal. We want no *purée* of human beings. Justice, and sympathy enough to procure justice, should be the ideal of religion and ethics as well as of the law. A religion that should consecrate the woman's tenderness for weak things rather than the man's love of fair play would, if lived up to, act as a nar-

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cotic, lessening the pain of the race at the expense of its vigor. Justice, the *sinc qua non* of order, should be apotheosized. To this ideal, pity, being less necessary, should be subordinated. Not quite without reason are those who prefer the passion for right of the Prophets to the tenderness of the Gospels, who urge us to sacrifice ourselves for the *man that may be* rather than for the *neighbor*, and who exhort us to love the *children's land* rather than the *fatherland*.¹ Our fifth canon, therefore, runs:—

Social interference should not so limit the struggle for existence as to nullify the selective process.

As a matter of fact, however, there is little evidence that the reigning Christian morality at present hinders in any serious degree the beneficent working of natural selection. And there is much to suggest that the most flagrant interferences with the survival of the fittest are to be laid at the door of individualistic institutions such as property and inheritance.

No observer can have failed to note that social interference is now being reshaped in obedience to two distinct impulses, the one toward moral individualism, the other toward moral socialism. The former, dating from the eighteenth century, springs from that rational, critical spirit which perceives that many customs and conventions are of no use whatever to the community. Female subjection is traced not to social necessities but to property in women. The harsh, patriarchal régime of the

¹ Wholly false, however, is Nietzsche's view that Christianity set "slave morality" above the "master morality" of the Greeks and the Romans. The Hebrew Prophets, who founded the Christian ethics at a time when the Hebrews were neither masters nor slaves, promulgated a democratic *neighbor morality*. To its universal human character the Christian ethics owes its wonderful vitality.

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family is found to be actuated by paternal selfishness rather than by paternal benevolence. The discipline of army or navy or government or "society" is seen to owe much of its oppressiveness to class ascendancies. The enforcement of orthodox professions, church-going, Sunday observance, the mealy mouth, and the sanctimonious air, is justly ascribed to religious prejudices rather than to social needs. Likewise most of the interferences with one's dress, manners, and amusements are seen to be impertinent intrusions into private matters.

On the other hand is a socializing movement, beginning in the nineteenth century, and taking its rise from a knowledge of society rather than from natural science. This movement is by no means aimed at defending the labels "bad" and "blame-worthy" in cases where the individualizing movement seeks to obliterate them. In fact, it recognizes that these needless interferences are antisocial. It sees that the ass will bear only so much load, and if we stuff the panniers with rubbish we must perforce leave behind necessary luggage; the two movements are, therefore, not at all in conflict.

The habit of looking upon society as an organism, and of tracing the social consequences of private actions, impresses thinkers with the enormity and turpitude of certain actions that excite, as yet, little blame. Hence, the prophet of the new social ethics strives to direct against adulteration, or jerry-building, or bank-wrecking, or combination in restraint of trade, or newspaper sensationalism, or the corrupt use of money in elections, or the marriage of consumptives, the robust feeling that now dashes itself superfluously against wife-beating or body-snatching. Diligent and expert as he is in showing the unsuspected ways in which

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the social welfare suffers, the sociologist cannot but become sponsor for a multitude of new commandments and new duties.

The joint achievement of these two types of thought is the running of a scientific frontier between the individual and society. They subject our systems of restraint to a thorough overhauling and testing which will result, let us hope, in giving us the most welfare for the least abridgment of liberty.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE CRITERIA OF SOCIAL CONTROL

THE question "*How* should society impose its will?" is equivalent to "How can society tell the good weapons in its armory from those that are worn out or obsolete or unserviceable?"

This summons us to lay down criteria for judging an instrument of control as good or bad.

One mark of a good disciplinary agent is *economy*. On this principle a method that, once and for all, moulds character is superior to one that deals merely with conduct, which is but the index of character. A roundabout course of procedure, such as the instilling of social valuations, is more politic than a direct assault upon the individual will with threats and promises. A far-sighted policy, such as the training of the young, is preferable to the summary regulation of the adult.¹ In the concrete these maxims mean that the priest is cheaper often than the detective, that the free library costs less than the jail, and that what is spent on the Sunday School is saved at Botany Bay. It is, then, strictly scientific to emphasize the ceremonial salutation of the flag in army or navy in order to economize in court martial, to prefer a little reform

¹ Hence thinkers strain every nerve to enlist the family in moral education, to bind upon it a duty that is only too rarely taken up. In "La criminalité de la jeunesse," Henri Joly enunciates the law that juvenile criminality is in proportion to the abandonment of the family.

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school for the boy to much prison for the man, and to reform the law breaker rather than to catch and convict him after a fresh offence.

Again, the superior methods of control are *inward*. An external means, such as punishment, operates only so long as it is inevitable. Let witnesses be wanting or judges weak, and ill-will is sure to pass into evil deeds. The control of the person's will by precept or example is, therefore, preferable to the control of it by the employment of sanctions. Still better tactics than an attack upon the will is a flank movement aimed at the feelings or the judgment.¹ The lodgement in the soul's inner citadel of an uplifting aspiration gives society a steadier ascendancy than does the moving effect of public assemblage or sacred festival or solemn ceremony. An impression on the judgment is worth more than the transient ebullition of social sentiment evoked by music. Nevertheless, moral precepts that masquerade as worldly wisdom are not always to be relied on. They bind the man so far as he is governed by rational considerations; but real life never tires of showing us how the pet maxims of prudent conduct are swept away by imperious instincts and passions.

The best guarantee of a stable control from within is something that reaches at once feeling, reason, and will. To be widely effective for righteousness a religion should strike the chord of feeling, but not so exclusively as Quakerism, or Shinto, or Neo-Catholicism, or the Religion of Humanity, or the Salvationists. It should provide a day of

¹ De Coubertin, in the *Century* for November, 1896, points out how much more potent were the Olympic Games of 1896 in developing among modern Greek youth a passion for athletic sports, than any amount of demonstration that physical training is a benefit or a duty.

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reckoning, but not dwell on it so much as Islam or primitive Methodism. It should address the judgment, but should not become so baldly rational as the Stoicism of the Greek philosophers or as the English Church during most of the eighteenth century. A social religion succeeds best when it strikes all these chords, and the limited habitat of certain sects is undoubtedly due to a narrowness of appeal that restricts them to certain temperaments of certain social layers.

Simplicity is another mark of the great agent of discipline. Albeit beliefs are associated with many of the means of control, a type of restraint when it gets inextricably entangled with a particular cosmology or theology, when it rests squarely upon some dogma such as the Last Judgment or the Divine Fatherhood or the Unseen Friend, must be regarded askance, however transcendent its services. Either the dogma collapses, and with it the restraint built upon it, leaving the last state of a man worse than the first; or else the dogma, obstinately protected, becomes a stumbling-block to enlightenment, a barrier to progress, a shelter to superstition, and an offence to that intellectual honesty and sincerity which is one of the most precious impulses of man. Moral incentives should be anchored to lasting granite, such as human nature or the immutable conditions of association, not to masses of dogma which the first thaw-wind of doubt will melt.

Still another test of good control is *spontaneity*. The best control is that which rises afresh whenever a handful of persons associate, which, therefore, cannot be cornered and monopolized by a scheming class or profession. *Public opinion, suggestion, social religion, and art* are naturally diffuse. *Personal ideals, social valuations, and illusions* are less

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so. *Physical force, belief in the supernatural, and ceremony* are easily centralized and managed by the few. Now, it is not good that the enginery of discipline should be in the hands of a small part of society. It may in some cases enable the few to curb and civilize the backward many. But we have only to recall the despotism of Druids, Brahmins, Magi, Spanish priests, Scotch ministers, and New England parsons to see that the few are likely to push their interferences to an extreme.

The *diffusion* of control is, in fact, the chief security against its excess. In a tribe of Kaffirs, or Bedouins, if the rule of chief or medicine man or tribal opinion becomes too oppressive, the insubordinate decamp, and join some other tribe or form a band of their own. This simple remedy against over-pressure vanishes with the aggregation of men into larger and larger bodies. With far-flung dominion, universal religions, organized priesthoods, and centralized school systems, the individual is liable to be held too firmly in the network. The ascendancy of society becomes easy and therefore dangerous. There is an over-production of obedience. Lawmaker, official, priest, parson, schoolmaster, or moral philosopher exact more than they really need to ask for. Those who finger the machinery of Church or State or school come to entertain large designs of shaping persons as bricks are shaped in a mould. On behalf of God or prince, neighbor or group, one is called upon to give up too much that makes life worth living.

Accordingly freedom becomes a passion, *laissez faire* a dogma, skepticism a creed, egoism a religion, and all the rills of opposition run together into a great current of individualism which accompanies the development of control as a check and a reminder.

CHAPTER XXXIII

CONCLUSION

THE long course we have followed brings us, at last, to a point where we can trace the profile of the future. Here certain questions press upon us. Is there any prospect that humanity, having sown its wild oats, will now settle down and be good? Is there any reason to believe that in the years to come social control will be less necessary than now?

Probably not. On the contrary it is likely that certain of the more searching and pervasive means of control will grow in favor. Suggestion, education, and publicity, the choice instruments of the new *folk-craft* that is taking the place of the old state-craft, will be used, perhaps, even more freely and consciously than they now are. The ground for this surmise is the fact that powerful forces are more and more transforming *community* into *society*,¹ that is, replacing living tissue with structures held together by rivets and screws. In the *community* the secret of order is not so much *control* as *concord*. So far as community extends people keep themselves in order, and there is no need to put them under the yoke of an elaborate discipline. The lively sense of a common life enables mates, kinsfolk, neighbors, and comrades to

¹ The contrast drawn here is similar to that made by Tönnies in his "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft"; but it was worked out long before I became acquainted with Tönnies's book.

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love and understand one another, to yield to one another, and to observe those forbearances and good offices that make associate life a success. In such a case the group does not make the ties ; the ties make the group. To people living in such relations the apparatus of control seems a nuisance and an impertinence. Reciprocal constraint, indeed, shows itself even among kinsmen and neighbors ; but of control, definite and organized, there is little trace.

Now these natural bonds, that were many and firm when the rural neighborhood or the village community was the type of aggregation, no longer bind men as they must be bound in the huge and complex aggregates of to-day. Kinship has lost its old sacred significance. Social erosion has worn down the family until now it consists of only parents and young. From being a sacrament marriage has become a contract terminable almost at pleasure. Nearness of dwelling means less in the country and nothing in the town. For the intimacy of the countryside the city offers only a "multitudinous desolation." Frequent change of domicile hinders the growth of strong local feelings. The householder has become a tenant, the working-man a bird of passage. Loose touch-and-go acquaintanceships take the place of those close and lasting attachments that form between neighbors that have long lived, labored, and pleasured together. The power of money rends the community into classes incapable of feeling keenly with one another. Even while we are welding it, the social mass laminates. Everywhere we see the march of differentiation. Everywhere we see the local group — the parish, commune, neighborhood, or village — decaying, or else developing beyond the point of real community.

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Of course this is not all the story. If the molecules of the local group are jarred asunder, it is partly because they fall under influences which make them vibrate in vaster unisons. Local solidarity perishes because bonds of fellowship are woven which unite a man to distant co-religionists, or fellow-partisans, or fellow-craftsmen, or members of the same social class. In this way fresh social tissue forms and replaces, perhaps, the tissue that dies.

But these communions do not fit people to deal kindly and honestly by one another because, instead of resting on neighborhood or economic intimacy, they rest on preference. Like friendship they are founded on affinity and selective choice. Implying a preference for some persons over other persons, they cannot embrace all those who meet, or deal, or work with one another, and therefore ought to feel bound to one another. The clan feeling that unites Baptists or Odd Fellows or Railway Mail Clerks or members of the "smart set," is no adequate support for the sense of responsibility and duty that ensures social order. We dare not establish the obligations of the man and the citizen upon a communion of this kind; for the circle of obligation must be as wide as is the circle of relations. The individual must feel bound to do right, not only by his fellow-churchmen or his brothers in the lodge, but by every one with whom he has dealings. Otherwise order is not realized, and society perishes of partisanship or class antagonism or religious hatred.

I freely confess that not all the new communities are of this narrow gauge. Certain broad-gauge, inclusive communities are growing up. The famous old groups—the Semitic "tribe," the Greek "city," the Teutonic "kindred," the medi-

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æval "town," the New England "settlement"—were small; but now we see growing up a civic, metropolitan, national, or even racial communion binding men into mammoth aggregates. As the means of communication improve, as the school and the press grow mighty, and as man dares to look up a little from his engrossing daily task, the ease of comprehending distant persons and situations enables fellowship to overleap the limits of personal contact. The man of the street understands the far men of the field or the mine or the sea. Sentiment, ignoring latitude and longitude, welds men into vast bodies and facilitates the growth of orderly relations.

One of the most notable results is the rise of the *nation*. In such outbursts of national feeling as that of France in 1793, of Germany in 1813, of the North in 1861, and of Japan in 1894, we confront a new political fact. Since the Napoleonic era those liberal men who hate coercion have found no surer means of purging brute force out of government than to revise frontiers and make the boundaries of the *state* coincide with those of the *nation*.

After all is said, however, it is doubtful if *community* has grown as fast as *society*. War-time spurts of national sentiment do not long banish the spirit of selfishness, "the canker of a long peace." Civic pride and public spirit are often hot-house plants. Patriotism is openly fostered by art, ceremony, ideal, and symbol. The neighborhood or village communities that have been eaten away by the currents of change, were probably more serviceable to social order than are the great civic or national communities that take their place. It is perhaps safe to say that we are relying on artificial rather than natural supports to bear the increasing weight of our social order, and that a

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return to the natural basis of social partnership is about as likely as a return to raw food or skin garments.

The reader may shudder at the thought of modern society precariously rearing its huge bulk above the devouring waves of selfishness like a Venice built on piles. But it is perhaps no worse than man's depending upon cultivated instead of wild fruits, or removing the seats of his civilization to climates where only houses and stoves can keep him alive through the winter. So long as there is bread and wool and coal enough, what matters it that we depend on art instead of nature! And so long as society can stamp its standards and values upon its members, what matters our dependence on forms of control!¹

Not that the future is secure. The grand crash may yet come through the strife of classes, each unable to master the others by means of those influences that enable society to subdue the individual. But if it comes, it will be due to the thrust of new, blind, economic forces we have not learned to regulate, and will no more discredit the policy of social control than the failure of the water in the mountain reservoir discredits the policy of irrigation.

The better adaptation of animals to one another appears to be brought about by accumulated changes in body and brain. The better adaptation

¹ It is investigation of the kind I have attempted in this book that will enable society to go about the business of control in a scientific way. As far back as 1883 von Ihering wrote: "As investigation of the conditions of life of animals and plants enables science by artificially reproducing these conditions to mature and to propagate in the conservatories of the north the palms of the tropics, and in the inland aquariums the life of the sea, so in like wise the establishment of the processes that shape the moral will gives ethics the clew to moral education."—"Der Zweck im Recht," Vol. II, p. 130.

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of men to one another is brought about, not only in this way, but also by the improvement of the instruments that constitute the *apparatus of social control*. In the same way that the improvement of optical instruments checks the evolution of the eye, and the improvement of tools checks the evolution of the hand, the improvement of instruments of control checks the evolution of the social instincts. The goal of social development is not, as some imagine, a Perfect Love,¹ or a Perfect Conscience,² but *better adaptation*; and the more this adaptation is artificial, the less need it be natural.

Indeed, the art of domesticating human beings may succeed only too well. Something of the mournfulness and even disgust with which we look upon the shrivelling of the female breast with the advent of the patent baby-food, the decay of the teeth with the perfecting of dentistry, the degeneration of the eye with the improvement of spectacles, and the dermal decadence that follows in the train of scientific clothing,—something of this seizes us when we contemplate the great agencies of Law, Public Opinion, Education, Religion, and Literature speeded to their utmost in order to fit ignoble and paltry natures to bear the moral strains of our civilization, and perhaps by the very success of their work cancelling the natural advantage of the noble over the base, and thereby slowing up the development of the most splendid qualities of human nature.

No doubt the elimination of the savage still goes on among us, and the humane type of person will more and more predominate. But is it not possible that, as society ever more skilfully and

¹ Drummond, "The Ascent of Man," ch. x.

² Spencer, "Principles of Sociology," Vol. III, Conclusion.

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lavishly provides braces for the weak spine, the fibre of character will soften, and the power to follow the good when one knows it, will decline? On the battle-field of Omdurman, the English surgeons marvelled to see in the wounded dervishes a power to recuperate which the Europeans have insensibly lost. May there not likewise be unsuspected losses in energy of will and resistance to temptation under our great regulative agencies?¹ Take, for instance, American character. Its native strength is very likely due to the pitiless sifting to which Americans have been subject during three centuries of invading wildernesses and subduing new lands. As with the filling up of our vacant spaces and the growth of cities the selections become less unerring and salutary, will not a certain decay of character go on beneath our elaborate moral-educational régime — a decay which, in turn, may eventually revive in some form that ecclesiastical-governmental régime which we are supposed to have outgrown?

A more cheerful consideration is that improvement in the means of social control has facilitated the formation of large, orderly societies among races more energetic, self-assertive, and individualistic than those that initiated civilization in the river valleys of the South. It is likely that the old founder races — Egyptians, Babylonians, Etruscans, Pelasgians, Dravidians — were more communal and tractable in disposition than are the Occidental peoples of to-day. Certainly the researches of the ethnologists suggest that the innumerable little societies of Africa, or India, or Malaysia, or the islands of the sea, are, on the whole, composed of more sociable men and sup-

¹ See the great chapter "The Decay of Character" in Mr. Pearson's "National Life and Character."

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ported by a simpler discipline than ours are.¹ They need law less than we do, and are not so disordered if law relaxes. It would seem as if the way was opened for a stronger civilization than the world had yet known, when the moderating and restraining agencies developed about the Mediterranean—Greek culture, Roman law, and the Christian religion—were employed in furthering social order among the vigorous, individualistic breeds, such as Franks, Saxons, Danes, and Northmen. Shall we not reckon this among the causes which have carried the axis of civilization from the latitude of the Nile and the Tiber to that of the Seine and the Hudson?

There is reason to believe that even to-day difference in race psychology leads peoples of the same development to adopt different measures of control. The anthropologists now put Europeans into two great races—the tall, long-skulled blonds and the shorter, broad-skulled brunets. This distinction corresponds roughly to the old divisions of Aryan and Celto-Slav, or Germanic and Latin peoples. It is agreed that the former are more enterprising and variative than the latter. They conquer, and constitute the upper caste in most countries. They swarm to the cities. They migrate to new lands. They are colonists, roammers, and pathfinders. Careless of the old roof-tree, they carry “home” with them wherever they go. They prize their personal liberty, and will not stand policing and surveillance.

Now, men of such a temperament are best con-

¹ Kropotkin, “Mutual Aid among Savages” and “Mutual Aid among Barbarians,” *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. XXIX; A. R. Wallace, “The Malay Archipelago”; Spencer, “Principles of Sociology,” Vol. I, ch. vi; A. Sutherland, “The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct,” Vol. I, ch. xiii.

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trolled through their self-assertion and pride. They are guided by love of fame, by personal ideals and collective valuations. With them honor and self-respect are the mainsprings of right action. Of an inward-looking, self-analyzing bent, in contrast to the more outward-looking, sensuous peoples of the South, they can be reached by such illusions as "moral law," "conscience," and "duty," which install the reflecting self in the judgment seat of the soul. With them Protestantism and moral philosophy have real power because they corroborate certain inner experiences.

On the other hand, the broad-skulled brunets of southern Europe are less individualistic, and more gregarious and dependent. They prefer the farm village to the isolated homestead. They are more amenable to early impressions. They are patient and tenacious. They bow to authorities and feel the prestige of the past. Emotional and artistic in temperament, they are readily impressed by ceremony. Hence, these people are reached through their sensibilities. Catholicism, venerable and gorgeous, attracts them more than Protestantism with its "private conscience." Habit-loving, they are easily controlled in their ideas of right by means of early religious education. Their bias for authority betrays them to State or Church or some other corporation that hoodwinks and bleeds them; so they develop anarchism, a phenomenon almost unknown in northern countries.¹

The reader may have wondered sometimes if it is not rash to lift the veil from those sacred re-

¹ G. Ferrero, "L' Europa Giovane," pp. 212-216 and *Conclusione*; G. De Lapouge, "Les selections sociales"; and "The Fundamental Laws of Anthropo-Sociology," *Journal of Political Economy*, December, 1897; C. Closson, "The Hierarchy of European Races," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1897.

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whom the results of our dissection cannot be hidden. It is this that troubles those of little faith. I hear them say:—

“But the Strong Man at whose expense you widen your realm of order and justice! How if this man—thanks to your revelations—breaks the net in which society would enclose him and stands forth free! What then?”

To this I would reply:—

The end is not yet. The last word is not said. The Strong Man who has come to regard social control as the scheme of the many weak to bind down the few strong may be brought to see it in its true light as the safe-guarding of a venerable corporation, protector not alone of the labors of living men for themselves but also of the labors of bygone men for coming generations, guardian not merely of the dearest possessions of innumerable persons, but likewise of the spiritual property of the human race—of the inventions and discoveries, the arts and the sciences, the secrets of healing, and the works of delight, which he himself is free to enter into and enjoy.

When thus to the issue between him and the living men who ask him to concede to them no more than they concede to him, there is joined the issue between him and the dead men who have endowed him with the fruits of their toil on the sole condition of passing them on intact to posterity, the ancient spirit of fair play—the *I am* that was before all codes and controls and will be when they are gone—will make itself heard in the heart of the Strong Man.

And its verdict will not be adverse to the claims of society.

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